C. (C. F.) VS. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: OCTOBER 15, 2010; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2010-CA-000573-ME
C.F.C., A CHILD UNDER EIGHTEEN
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM ALLEN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE G. SIDNOR BRODERSON, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 07-J-00146
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
VACATING AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: CLAYTON, DIXON, AND WINE, JUDGES.
WINE, JUDGE: C.F.C., a minor, appeals from an order of the Allen Family Court
finding her to be a juvenile status offender and a habitual truant. On appeal, C.F.C.
maintains that the Director of Pupil Personnel in Allen County failed to comply
with the requirements of Kentucky Revised Statute(s) (“KRS”) 159.140, and thus,
that the order adjudicating her as a juvenile status offender must be vacated. For
the reasons stated herein, we agree.
Official notice was reportedly sent to C.F.C’s parent or guardian on
November 17, 2009, notifying same of C.F.C.’s unexcused absences in violation of
KRS 159.150.
On December 2, 2009, the Allen County Director of Pupil Personnel
swore out a complaint against fourteen-year-old C.F.C. alleging habitual truancy.
The complaint and notice were accompanied by a “student profile attendance
report,” a grade report, and a “pre-complaint--truancy diversion program” form
(which was essentially blank except for the signature lines). The court designated
worker’s preliminary inquiry/informal processing form stated that C.F.C “failed to
appear” for an inquiry on January 5, 2010, and that diversion was unsuccessful.
The complaint was filed in the Allen Family Court on March 2, 2010.
Summonses to the child’s mother, father, and guardian were issued; however, the
summonses to her parents were returned to the court unserved. The proof of
service on each stated, “Unable to locate.” The guardian was served and appeared
in court on March 3, 2010, for C.F.C.’s arraignment. The Department of Public
Advocacy (“DPA”) was appointed as counsel for C.F.C. and requested an
adjudication hearing.
At the adjudication hearing, on March 9, 2010, Jim Young (“Young”),
the Allen County Director of Pupil Personnel, was called by the Commonwealth to
testify. He testified that C.F.C. had seven unexcused absences and one unexcused
tardy at the time he swore out the truancy complaint on December 2, 2009. When
asked by the court whether he had taken any actions before filing the complaint,
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Young stated that he had sent a “final notice” to the parent or guardian on
November 17, 2009. On cross-examination, when asked what had been done to
acquaint the school with C.F.C.’s home conditions, Young stated only that he had
sent a letter to the parents inviting participation in the “Truancy Diversion
Program” and that he had mailed a final notice on November 17, 2009. However,
Young admitted that he did not know whether C.F.C. had participated in the
truancy diversion program prior to December 2, 2009. Young testified that he had
no documentation concerning whether he spoke with CFC’s parent(s) or guardian
or attempted to learn the causes of C.F.C’s irregular attendance. The
Commonwealth then closed its case.
Although the Commonwealth did not request a continuance by
motion, the court, sua sponte, after inquiring of Young whether he had any
documentation available in his office, continued the hearing until the next week.
On March 16, 2010, a different prosecutor for the Commonwealth
appeared and inquired of the court why the case had been continued. Upon the
Commonwealth’s being informed that the case had been continued after the court
inquired about documentation, Young was again called to testify.
Young testified that C.F.C. had seven unexcused absences and one
unexcused tardy at the time the complaint was filed on December 2, 2009. Young
further testified that a “pre-complaint” form, which he stated was issued on
September 18, 2009, would have informed C.F.C.’s parents that a meeting was to
be held concerning participation in the “Truancy Diversion Program” on
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September 29, 2009. Young had no documentation that the letter was actually
mailed out, other than a list kept in his office concerning to which students the
letter was to be sent. Young testified that he had no documentation of whether
C.F.C. attended the September 29, 2009, meeting.
Further, although Young testified that C.F.C. did eventually
participate in the Truancy Diversion Program, he had no documentation
concerning whether C.F.C. participated in the program before the complaint was
sworn on December 2, 2009. Rather, he “felt like” C.F.C. attended before that
time. Nonetheless, Young admitted that he didn’t know for certain. Young also
acknowledged that he was aware C.F.C’s parents had stated that the child had
medical issues and was seeing a doctor for stress-related problems.
On cross-examination, Young acknowledged that he had no
documentation concerning any attempts to become acquainted with the C.F.C.’s
home conditions, the causes of her irregular attendance, or any intervention
strategies that were implemented to deal with her attendance issues. In fact, Young
stated that he “didn’t think it was his responsibility” to acquaint the school with the
causes of C.F.C.’s irregular attendance and that the school could “draw their own
conclusions.”
On re-direct, the Commonwealth introduced several documents
through Mr. Young as “Exhibit 1.” Such documents included: (1) the “precomplaint form”; (2) the “September 18 letter”; (3) an email concerning C.F.C.’s
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contact with a counseling agency, “Lifeskills”; and (4) a list of students with
unexcused absences in the school district (which included C.F.C.’s name).
On re-cross, defense counsel elicited from Young that “Exhibit 1”
reveals that C.F.C. did not return to Lifeskills to reopen her case until after
December 2, 2009 (after the complaint was sworn).1 Defense counsel moved to
dismiss the complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Defense counsel
further argued that there was a complete absence of documentation to show that the
mandates of KRS 159.140 were followed. Counsel also pointed out that, even
though there was testimony that C.F.C. eventually participated in the Truancy
Diversion Program, there was no evidence that she participated in the program
before the complaint was sworn on December 2, 2009.
Relying on Young’s testimony and the documents entered in
Commonwealth’s “Exhibit 1,” the trial court found that the Allen County School
District met all of its obligations under KRS 159.140. The court then entered a
juvenile status offender order adjudicating C.F.C. to be a juvenile status offender
and a habitual truant. C.F.C. now appeals.
On appeal, C.F.C. avers that the Allen County School System failed to
comply with the mandates of KRS 159.140. Specifically, she alleges that the
Director of Pupil Personnel did not even attempt to visit her home prior to filing
the complaint and that he failed to produce any evidence documenting such
1
The e-mail refers to “reopening” her case, which was originally opened in June of 2009. The
record is not clear on this matter, but it appears that C.F.C. must have had some previous
involvement with Lifeskills. Nonetheless, this is not pertinent herein as the complaint only
covers the period from August 2009 to December 2009.
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compliance. She further alleges that the Director did not attempt to ascertain the
reasons for her truancy and did not seek elimination of those causes before filing
the instant action. C.F.C. further avers that Allen County and the Director of Pupil
Personnel have a practice of disregarding the mandates of KRS 159.140 when
filing complaints for habitual truancy.
KRS 159.140 states, in pertinent part, that
(1) The director of pupil personnel, or an assistant
appointed under KRS 159.080, shall:
....
(c) Acquaint the school with the home conditions
of a habitual truant as described in KRS
159.150(3), and the home with the work and
advantages of the school;
(d) Ascertain the causes of irregular attendance
and truancy, through documented contact with
the custodian of the student, and seek elimination
of these causes;
....
(f) Attempt to visit the homes of students who are
reported to be in need of books, clothing, or
parental care;
....
(3) In any action brought to enforce compulsory
attendance laws, the director of pupil personnel or an
assistant shall document the home conditions of the
student and the intervention strategies attempted.
(Emphasis added.) This Court has previously interpreted this statute, in
conjunction with KRS 630.060(2), to require compliance with its mandates before
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a complaint may be received by the courts. T.D. v. Commonwealth, 165 S.W.3d
480 (Ky. App. 2005). KRS 630.060(2) states that:
No complaint shall be received by the court designated
worker alleging habitual truancy unless an adequate
assessment of the child has been performed pursuant to
KRS 159.140(1)(c), (d), and (f), unless it can be shown
that the assessment could not be performed due to the
child’s failure to participate.
Upon a reading of both KRS 630.060(2) and KRS 159.140, this Court previously
held that the legislature intended to make the requirements of KRS 159.140 “a
matter of subject matter jurisdiction.” T.D. v. Commonwealth, at 482. Indeed, we
noted that although the director of pupil personnel’s duties as expressed in KRS
159.140 “are stated in broad language, the legislature’s later enactment of KRS
630.060 shows its intent to require the Director to perform those goals in a
particular case before bringing a child before the court as a habitual truant.” Id.
In T.D. v. Commonwealth, we found that although the Director
of Pupil Personnel’s duties may be burdensome under such an interpretation, it was
the intention of the legislature to establish rigorous prerequisites before a Director
may resort to the court for intervention into a juvenile truancy matter. Id. We
acknowledged the reality, however, that there would inevitably be instances where
home visits are impossible and where it may be impossible to ascertain the causes
of the truancy if such efforts are frustrated by a lack of cooperation by the student
and parent(s) or guardian(s). Id. We determined that, in those situations, the duty
would fall upon the court designated worker to determine whether an “adequate
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assessment” had been performed under the language of the statute. Id.
Additionally, we found that the legislature has provided that where the difficulty in
complying with the statute is due to a child’s failure to participate, the assessment
may be abandoned upon such a showing. Id. at 482-483.
In the present case, we conclude from the evidence that the
requirements of KRS 630.060(2) were not met prior to submission of the complaint
to the court designated worker. The Commonwealth has even conceded in this
case that the documentation of the Director of Pupil Personnel’s actions to satisfy
the statutes’ mandates was “woefully insufficient.” However, the Commonwealth
argues that the Truancy Diversion Program was implemented to satisfy the
requirements of KRS 159.140. We disagree. Rather, the existence of the program
cannot act as a substitute for the statutorily mandated documentation of compliance
with KRS 159.140 and KRS 630.060. As we previously held in T.D. v.
Commonwealth, lack of documentation of compliance with these statutes deprives
the court of subject-matter jurisdiction. The legislature has made quite clear that
the Director of Pupil Personnel’s efforts to ascertain the causes of truancy and visit
the home of the child must be supported by documentation. Accordingly, we find
that the complaint should have been dismissed by the Allen Family Court for lack
of jurisdiction. T.D. v. Commonwealth, supra.
Moreover, there appears to be an ancillary issue broached (although
not raised by the parties) in this case through the Commonwealth’s argument that
the Truancy Diversion Program may take the place of the Director of Pupil
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Personnel’s responsibilities under KRS 159.140 and KRS 630.060(2). Namely,
separation of powers problems may arise with any attempts to delegate the
Director of Pupil Personnel’s duties to the Truancy Diversion Program, which is a
program run by the Judicial Branch.2 Kentucky Constitution § 27 (Ky. Const.);
Ky. Const. § 28; Ky. Const. § 69. As we stated in T.D. v. Commonwealth, the
legislature intended that certain requirements must be met before the Director of
Pupil Personnel may involve the courts in juvenile matters involving truancy. Id.
at 482. KRS 159.140 and KRS 630.060(2) make quite clear that the duties
imposed therein fall upon the director himself (or his assistant). Any attempt to
shift these duties away from the director to a judicial agency may well violate the
separation of powers clauses of our Constitution.
For the foregoing reasons, the order of the Allen Family Court finding
C.F.C. to be a juvenile status offender and a habitual truant is hereby vacated. This
matter is remanded to the Allen Family Court for the purpose of entering an Order
dismissing the complaint alleging habitual truancy.
ALL CONCUR.
2
The Truancy Diversion Program is facilitated by the Court Designated Worker Program, which
was created by the General Assembly in 1986 and is under the direction of the Department of
Juvenile Services of the Administrative Office of the Courts. The Administrative Office of the
Courts is an operational arm of the Kentucky Court of Justice.
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BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Gail Robinson
Assistant Public Advocate
Frankfort, Kentucky
Jack Conway
Attorney General of Kentucky
Joshua D. Farley
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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