WATKINS (GARY) VS. COMP L3 COMMUNICATIONS, ET AL.
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RENDERED: JULY 23, 2010; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2010-CA-000383-WC
GARY WATKINS
v.
APPELLANT
PETITION FOR REVIEW OF A DECISION
OF THE WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BOARD
ACTION NO. WC-07-01285
L3 COMMUNICATIONS;
HON. IRENE STEEN, ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW JUDGE; AND WORKERS'
COMPENSATION BOARD
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: MOORE AND WINE, JUDGES; HARRIS,1 SENIOR JUDGE.
1
Senior Judge William R. Harris sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and Kentucky Revised Statutes
(KRS) 21.580.
HARRIS, SENIOR JUDGE: Gary Watkins has petitioned for review of an opinion
of the Workers’ Compensation Board (the “Board”) entered on January 29, 2010,
which affirmed the Administrative Law Judge’s (“ALJ”) June 23, 2009, order
dismissing his claim. We affirm.
Watkins worked as an aircraft mechanic in the engine rotor shop for
L3 Communications from 2003 to 2007, and in various other departments for L3
from 2001 to 2003. His primary tasks as an aircraft mechanic were disassembling,
cleaning, and modifying helicopter rotor heads, tail rotor assemblies, main rotor
assemblies, and transmissions. This work involved the use of solvents to clean the
various parts.
Watkins filed a workers’ compensation claim for occupational
disability benefits, claiming that his contact with the solvents produced cognitive
problems, peripheral neuropathies, respiratory problems, anxiety, and depression.
The claim was dismissed by the ALJ, along with Watkins’ subsequent petition for
reconsideration. The Board affirmed the ALJ’s decision, and this appeal followed.
Appellant first argues that the ALJ’s determination that Watkins failed
to carry his burden of proving a causal relationship between his use of solvents and
his cognitive difficulties was erroneous. Rather, Watkins asserts that the university
evaluator’s opinion established a causal link between Watkins’ cognitive
impairments and his occupation.
In a workers’ compensation case, “the claimant bears the burden of
proof and the risk of nonpersuasion before the fact-finder with regard to every
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element of a workers’ compensation claim.” Magic Coal Co. v. Fox, 19 S.W.3d
88, 96 (Ky. 2000). In order for Watkins to meet his burden of causation, he was
required to prove that the solvent exposure was the cause of his cognitive
impairment within a reasonable medical probability. Brown-Forman Corp. v.
Upchurch, 127 S.W.3d 615, 621 (Ky. 2004). The speculation or mere possibility
that the solvent exposure caused the disability is insufficient to impose liability.
Young v. L.A. Davidson, Inc., 463 S.W.2d 924, 926 (Ky. 1971).
Because Watkins was unsuccessful before the Board, the question
before this Court is whether the evidence was so overwhelming, upon
consideration of the entire record, as to have compelled a finding in his favor.
Wolf Creek Collieries v. Crum, 673 S.W.2d 735, 736 (Ky. App. 1984).
Compelling evidence is defined as evidence that is “so overwhelming that no
reasonable person could reach the [same] conclusion” as the ALJ. Greene v.
Paschall Truck Lines, 239 S.W.3d 94, 108 (Ky. App. 2007) (quoting REO
Mechanical v. Barnes, 691 S.W.2d 224, 226 (Ky. App. 1985)). As long as any
evidence of substance supports the ALJ’s opinion, it cannot be said that the
evidence compels a different result. Special Fund v. Francis, 708 S.W.2d 641, 644
(Ky. 1986).
The university evaluator, Dr. Brown, specifically stated in his medical
report that the cause of Watkins’ cognitive issues was unknown. He also testified
that there was no way within a reasonable medical probability to determine what
was causing Watkins’ cognitive complaints. He acknowledged “[w]e don’t know
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what’s causing his symptoms. I don’t know what’s causing his symptoms.”
Further, he stated that “[t]here is no way to prove a causal relationship in this case
. . . [b]etween his – there’s no way to prove that his work exposure caused his mild
cognitive impairment . . . [.]” Therefore, Dr. Brown’s medical report and
testimony did not compel a different result from that arrived at by the ALJ and the
Board.
Watkins next argues that KRS 342.315 required the ALJ to give
presumptive weight to the findings and opinions of the university evaluator. KRS
342.315(2) states that:
[T]he clinical findings and opinions of the designated
evaluator shall be afforded presumptive weight by
administrative law judges and the burden to overcome
such findings and opinions shall fall on the opponent of
that evidence. When administrative law judges reject the
clinical findings and opinions of the designated
evaluator, they shall specifically state in the order the
reasons for rejecting that evidence.
In Magic Coal Co. v. Fox, 19 S.W.3d 88, 94-95 (Ky. 2000), the Court stated that
“KRS 342.125(2) does not prohibit the fact-finder from rejecting a finding or
opinion of a university evaluator but requires only that the reasons for doing so
must be specifically stated.” The ALJ needs only to articulate a “reasonable basis”
for rejection of the university evaluator’s opinion. Bright v. American Greetings
Corp., 62 S.W.3d 381, 383 (Ky. 2001).
Even if the university evaluator’s testimony could be interpreted in
such a way as to establish causation, the ALJ stated her grounds for rejecting the
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evaluator’s opinion. Specifically, the ALJ relied on evidence from the results of
scientific tests conducted on the solvents which found acceptable levels of
chemicals and metals in the solvents. These results were reviewed by a University
of Louisville toxicologist, who found that Watkins’ described symptoms were too
broad to attribute them to chemical exposure after having seen the results of the
test.
Dr. Brown did not see the results of these tests before preparing an
opinion on causation. Tellingly, Dr. Brown testified that the results of these tests
would be important in determining the origin of Watkins’ symptoms. Therefore,
even if Dr. Brown’s medical report and testimony supported Watkins’ position on
causation, the test results established a reasonable basis for the ALJ to disregard
Dr. Brown’s opinion on causation. We find no error.
Finally, as to Watkins’ claim that the ALJ erred in considering nonmedial evidence in rejecting Dr. Brown’s opinion on causation, there is no
statutory or case law authority that precludes the ALJ from considering nonmedical evidence in rejecting a university evaluator’s opinion. As stated in Fox,
“[a]though KRS 342.315(2) indicates that the ‘burden to overcome’ a university
evaluator’s testimony falls on the opponent of the evidence, it does not provide a
standard for determining the type of evidence which is necessary in order to do
so[.]” Fox, 19 S.W.3d at 95. Here, the test samples were sent to an independent
laboratory for analysis, and the test results were then analyzed by a toxicologist.
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Furthermore, the results were entered into evidence without objection from
Watkins. Again, we find no error.
Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the Board.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
Charles W. Gorham
Lexington, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE, L3
COMMUNICATIONS:
Rodney J. Mayer
Louisville, Kentucky
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