HEARLD (STEVEN LYNN) VS. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: OCTOBER 29, 2010; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2010-CA-000139-MR
STEVEN LYNN HEARLD
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM OHIO CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE RONNIE C. DORTCH, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 04-CR-00146
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: CLAYTON AND COMBS, JUDGES; LAMBERT,1 SENIOR JUDGE.
CLAYTON, JUDGE: Steven Lynn Hearld appeals from an order of the Ohio
Circuit Court denying his Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure (RCr) 11.42
motion for post-conviction relief. We affirm.
Our Court had, on another appeal of this case, previously set forth the
facts as follows:
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Senior Judge E. Joseph Lambert sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and Kentucky Revised Statutes
(KRS) 21.580.
On January 6, 2004, Appellant and his girlfriend,
Rebecca Stevens, spent the day at the Budget Inn in
Beaver Dam, Kentucky. With them was the couple's 22month-old daughter, A.H. Evidence at trial established
that Appellant was in and out of the motel throughout the
day visiting with friends. That evening, however, the
couple had an argument and Stevens thereafter left the
motel to retrieve her vehicle, leaving A.H. in Appellant's
care for approximately twenty to thirty minutes. When
Stevens returned, Appellant advised her that he thought
someone had “messed with” A.H. Upon examining
A.H., Stevens discovered that there was blood in her
diaper. Appellant objected to taking A.H. to the local
hospital, instead suggesting that they take her to
Evansville the next day. Nevertheless, Stevens
immediately took A.H. to a hospital in Ohio County that
evening.
An investigation revealed that A.H. had suffered
perirectal bruising and tears measuring from one-half to
one centimeter in length at the twelve o'clock and six
o'clock positions. Also, during a search of the motel
room, police seized a towel, which was tested and found
to have Appellant's sperm on it.
On July 26, 2004, Appellant was arrested on
charges of first-degree sodomy, second-degree assault,
and first-degree sexual abuse. Following a trial in June
2005, a jury found Appellant guilty of first-degree sexual
abuse. However, at the conclusion of the
sentencing/persistent felony offender phase of the trial,
the jury informed the court that it could not reach a
decision on a sentencing recommendation. The trial
court thereafter sentenced Appellant to five years (with
three years of conditional discharge) on the sexual abuse
charge, enhanced to sixteen years by virtue of the PFO
conviction.
Hearld v. Com., 2006 WL 2924066 (Ky. App. 2006)(2005-CA-002112-MR).
This previous appeal was a direct appeal of the trial with nine reasons
proffered that the trial court denied Hearld of due process and a fair trial. Hearld
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was represented on appeal by the same attorney that represented him at trial, the
same attorney that he is now alleging provided ineffective assistance of counsel.
Our Court found no reversible error and affirmed the lower court. Subsequently,
Hearld’s motion for discretionary review of the Court of Appeals’ decision was
denied.
Next, in April 2007, Hearld filed a motion to vacate pursuant to
Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (CR) 60.02, alleging that he had been
improperly sentenced and that counsel was ineffective because counsel did not
ensure that his sentence met the requisites of the statutes. This motion was denied
by the trial court on May 31, 2007. Hearld filed a notice of appeal but when his
motion to proceed in forma pauperis was denied, he took no further action.
The current action commenced with several motions by Hearld in
October 2009, including a motion to proceed in forma pauperis, a motion for an
evidentiary hearing and the appointment of counsel, and a motion to vacate under
RCr 11.42. In his RCr 11.42 motion, Hearld primarily alleged that his counsel was
ineffective for two reasons. First, his attorney made no effort to remove a juror,
whom Hearld, prior to the trial, had had an altercation. Second, Hearld claimed
that his attorney was ineffective for failing to allow him to testify in his own
defense at trial. On December 11, 2009, the trial court denied the motion, and
thereafter, this appeal was filed.
Hearld argues, citing Fraser v. Com., 59 S.W.3d 448 (Ky. 2001), that
the circuit court erred by summarily denying his motion to vacate his judgment
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because of ineffective assistance of counsel. He maintains that material issues of
fact exist that cannot be resolved by the record and mandate an evidentiary hearing
and appointment of counsel for him based on his indigency. Further, Hearld
maintains that ineffective assistance of counsel co-opted his constitutional rights to
an effective attorney and an impartial jury.
The Commonwealth responds, however, that the circuit court did not
err in summarily denying Hearld’s motion because a reversal is not warranted
based on the limited record, which was designated by Hearld. Hearld did not
designate any trial records or videotape. The record designated consists of two
volumes of paper record without any trial proceedings or jury lists. Moreover, it
also asserts that because he previously filed a motion to vacate alleging ineffective
assistance of counsel, he cannot again argue the same issue.
In an RCr 11.42 proceeding, the movant has the burden “to establish
convincingly that he was deprived of some substantial right which would justify
the extraordinary relief afforded by the post-conviction proceedings[.]” Dorton v.
Com., 433 S.W.2d 117, 118 (Ky. 1968). “The motion . . . shall state specifically
the grounds on which the sentence is being challenged and the facts on which the
movant relies in support of such grounds.” RCr 11.42(2). A hearing is only
required if the motion raises an issue that cannot be determined on the face of the
record. RCr 11.42(5); Stanford v. Com., 854 S.W.2d 742, 743-44 (Ky. 1993), cert.
denied, 510 U.S. 1049, 114 S.Ct. 703, 126 L.Ed.2d 669 (1994).
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On an appeal from an order overruling an RCr 11.42 motion wherein
an evidentiary hearing was not held, “[o]ur review is confined to whether the
motion on its face states grounds that are not conclusively refuted by the record
and which, if true, would invalidate the conviction.” Lewis v. Com., 411 S.W.2d
321, 322 (Ky. 1967). A trial court's findings will not be disturbed absent a finding
of clear error. Com. v. Payton, 945 S.W.2d 424, 425 (Ky. 1997).
Both of Hearld’s arguments regarding ineffective assistance of
counsel are based on circumstances that occurred during the actual trial. Although
Hearld asserts that the trial record would not have been helpful because the
occurrences happened off the record, his designation of the record was so limited
that the record neither supports nor denies these assertions. Here, the absence of
available information, which could have been provided, is fatal to Hearld’s motion
to vacate his conviction. Since Hearld did not request any information about jurors
or the trial record, nothing supports his contentions regarding the ineffective
assistance of his attorney.
Even more damaging to Hearld’s claims is that a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel may only be raised once. “Where the collateral ineffective
assistance of counsel claim is presented in the course of the direct appeal, . . . [the]
issue cannot be re-litigated in a collateral attack.” Leonard v. Com., 279 S.W.3d
151, 159 n.3 (Ky. 2009). The rationale behind this factor is that collateral issue of
ineffectiveness itself had already been raised and rejected. Id. Hearld’s 2007
motion, albeit filed under CR 60.02, still incorporated an ineffective assistance of
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counsel claim. The reasons behind the present ineffective assistance of counsel
claim are not new and could have been enunciated in his 2007 motion. The rule
itself provides:
The motion shall state all grounds for holding the
sentence invalid of which the movant has knowledge.
Final disposition of the motion shall conclude all issues
that could reasonably have been presented in the same
proceeding.
RCr 11.42(3). Therefore, we are of the opinion that the trial court’s summary
denial of these issues was proper. Accordingly, the order of the Ohio Circuit Court
denying Hearld’s RCr 11.42 motion is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Steven Lynn Hearld, pro se
Central City, Kentucky
Jack Conway
Attorney General of Kentucky
Frankfort, Kentucky
Gregory C. Fuchs
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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