ESTATE OF ERICA BROWN, ET AL. VS. PRESTON (JAMES D.), ET AL.
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RENDERED: DECEMBER 10, 2010; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2009-CA-002362-MR
ESTATE OF ERICA BROWN, BY
AND THROUGH BRIAN BROWN,
ADMINISTRATOR OF HER ESTATE;
MELINDA LEMASTER, PERSONAL
REPRESENTATIVE OF CHRISTA
DAWN BURCHETT, DECEASED; AND
OLIVIA DAWN BURCHETT, A MINOR,
BY AND THROUGH HER LAWFUL
CO-GUARDIANS, MELINDA LEMASTER
AND CLIFFORD BURCHETT
v.
APPELLANTS
APPEAL FROM JOHNSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JOHN DAVID PRESTON, JUDGE
ACTION NOS. 08-CI-00050 AND
08-CI-00176
JAMES D. PRESTON;
WILLIAM D. WITTEN, JOHNSON
COUNTY SHERIFF; AND JOHNSON
COUNTY SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE SHERIFF
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
APPELLEE
BEFORE: LAMBERT, MOORE, AND NICKELL, JUDGES.
MOORE, JUDGE: The Estate of Erica Brown, by and through Brian Brown, the
Administrator of her estate; Melinda Lemaster, personal representative of Christa
Dawn Burchett, deceased; and Olivia Dawn Burchett, a minor, by and through her
lawful co-guardians, Melinda Lemaster and Clifford Burchett (collectively,
“Appellants”), appeal the Johnson Circuit Court’s order granting the motion for
summary judgment filed by James D. Preston; William D. Witten, Johnson County
Sheriff; and the Johnson County Sheriff’s Department, Office of the Sheriff
(collectively, “Appellees”). After a careful review of the record, we affirm
because the Appellees are immune from liability in this case.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On the day in question, Erica Brown was involved in a single car traffic
accident. James D. Preston, a Johnson County Deputy Sheriff, received a radio
dispatch concerning the accident. After responding to the dispatch, he activated
his emergency equipment and followed an ambulance to the scene of the accident.
Preston testified that the road was slippery because there had been snow and sleet
earlier that morning.
After arriving at the accident scene, the ambulance and Preston drove past
the scene, turned around, and the ambulance parked behind Brown’s car, which
was on the shoulder of the road, while Preston parked behind the ambulance.
Preston testified that he looked in his rearview mirror to see “what [his] view
would have been or what oncoming traffic’s view would have been,” and all he
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saw was the road. He did not see any traffic coming toward him. Both Preston’s
emergency lights and the ambulance’s emergency lights were on, and while the
two EMS personnel, Christa Burchett and Brian Moore, were getting Brown out of
her car, Preston began “running” Brown’s license plate. Preston got out of his
cruiser and began walking toward Brown, Burchett and Moore, who were walking
in his direction, toward the ambulance. Preston heard what he believed was a
“jake brake” from a coal truck. He then saw a coal truck “coming right at [them],”
so he yelled for everybody to run. The coal truck slid onto the shoulder of the road
and tragically killed Brown and Burchett. The circuit court noted, and the
Appellants do not dispute, that Preston was on the scene of Brown’s initial
accident only approximately three minutes before the subsequent accident
involving the coal truck occurred.
Appellants filed their complaint against Appellees and other parties who are
not parties to this appeal. Appellants alleged that Preston was negligent in failing
to direct and control traffic around the scene of the initial Brown accident, thereby
allowing traffic “with limited visibility and adverse road conditions” near the
Brown accident scene, and as a result of Preston’s alleged negligence, the coal
truck struck and killed Brown and Burchett. Appellants also filed their complaint
against William D. Witten, who was the Johnson County Sheriff, and the Johnson
County Sheriff’s Department, Office of the Sheriff. Appellants contended that the
Johnson County Sheriff was vicariously liable for the alleged negligence of Preston
because Preston was a “deputy, employee, agent, servant and/or representative” of
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the Office of the Johnson County Sheriff, and Preston “was acting within the
course and scope of his duty, employment, agency and/or representative capacity
of the Sheriff’s Office” at the time the coal truck hit Brown and Burchett.
Appellees moved for summary judgment, contending that they were immune
from liability. The circuit court granted their motion for summary judgment.
Appellants now appeal, alleging as follows: (a) the circuit court erred in
concluding that Deputy Preston’s actions were discretionary and, consequently,
that he was entitled to qualified official immunity; (b) Deputy Preston’s duty at the
scene was absolute, certain and imperative, therefore negating any cloak of
immunity; and (c) the circuit court erred in extending the immunity granted to
Deputy Preston to his employer, the Office of the Sheriff.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
“The standard of review on appeal of a summary judgment is whether the
trial court correctly found that there were no genuine issues as to any material fact
and that the moving party was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Scifres v.
Kraft, 916 S.W.2d 779, 781 (Ky. App. 1996).
III. ANALYSIS
A. CLAIM REGARDING CIRCUIT COURT’S DETERMINATION THAT
DEPUTY PRESTON WAS ENTITLED TO QUALIFIED OFFICIAL
IMMUNITY
Appellants first contend that the circuit court erred in concluding that
Deputy Preston’s actions were discretionary and, consequently, that he was entitled
to qualified official immunity. “Qualified official immunity applies to the
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negligent performance by a public officer or employee of (1) discretionary acts or
functions, i.e., those involving the exercise of discretion and judgment, or personal
deliberation, decision, and judgment . . . ; (2) in good faith; and (3) within the
scope of the employee’s authority.” Yanero v. Davis, 65 S.W.3d 510, 522 (Ky.
2001).
[W]hen an officer or employee of the state or county (or
one of its agencies) is sued in his or her individual
capacity, that officer or employee enjoys qualified
official immunity, which affords protection from
damages liability for good faith judgment calls made in a
legally uncertain environment. Application of the
defense, therefore, rests not on the status or title of the
officer or employee, but on the [act or] function
performed.
Indeed, the analysis depends upon classifying the
particular acts or functions in question in one of two
ways: discretionary or ministerial. Qualified official
immunity applies only where the act performed by the
official or employee is one that is discretionary in nature.
Discretionary acts are, generally speaking, those
involving the exercise of discretion and judgment, or
personal deliberation, decision, and judgment. It may
also be added that discretionary acts or functions are
those that necessarily require the exercise of reason in the
adaptation of means to an end, and discretion in
determining how or whether the act shall be done or the
course pursued. Discretion in the manner of the
performance of an act arises when the act may be
performed in one or two or more ways, either of which
would be lawful, and where it is left to the will or
judgment of the performer to determine in which way it
shall be performed. On the other hand, ministerial acts or
functions – for which there are no immunity – are those
that require only obedience to the orders of others, or
when the officer’s duty is absolute, certain, and
imperative, involving merely execution of a specific act
arising from fixed and designated facts.
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In spite of these often quoted guidelines, determining the
nature of a particular act or function demands a more
probing analysis than may be apparent at first glance. In
reality, few acts are ever purely discretionary or purely
ministerial. Realizing this, our analysis looks for the
dominant nature of the act. For this reason, [the
Kentucky Supreme Court] has observed that an act is not
necessarily taken out of the class styled “ministerial”
because the officer performing it is vested with a
discretion respecting the means or method to be
employed. Similarly, that a necessity may exist for the
ascertainment of those [fixed and designated] facts does
not operate to convert the [ministerial] act into one
discretionary in its nature. Moreover, a proper analysis
must always be carefully discerning, so as to not equate
the act at issue with that of a closely related but differing
act.
Haney v. Monsky, 311 S.W.3d 235, 240-41 (Ky. 2010) (internal quotation marks
and citations omitted; emphasis removed).
Appellants claim that Preston’s actions were ministerial, rather than
discretionary, because KRS1 70.150 “requires deputies to direct, regulate and
control traffic to maintain a maximum degree of safety.” (Internal quotation marks
omitted). Specifically, KRS 70.150(1) provides: “The sheriff of each county and
his deputies shall patrol all public roads in his county, and direct, regulate and
control the traffic on such roads so as to maintain a maximum degree of safety.”
In the present case, Preston attested that he parked his vehicle behind the
ambulance, which was behind Brown’s car. Both the ambulance and the police
cruiser’s emergency lights were activated. Preston testified that he could see the
road behind him by looking in his rearview mirror. The circuit court noted that
1
Kentucky Revised Statute.
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approximately three minutes passed from the time that Preston parked his car at the
accident scene to the time that the coal truck killed Brown and Burchett. Preston
testified that after he parked his car, he began “running” Brown’s license plate for
purposes of the accident report. This is in accord with KRS 70.150(2), which
provides that the sheriff’s office is required, as soon as possible after an accident
has occurred, to “ascertain, if possible, the license number of each of the vehicles
connected therewith, . . . the name and address of the owner or operator of the
vehicle, the name and address of each occupant of the vehicles,” and other
information concerning the accident, as well as the vehicles and persons involved
in the accident.
Appellants do not cite to any standard operating procedure concerning
securing the scene of an accident to show that a deputy’s actions in securing an
accident scene are ministerial. Rather, they cite to opinions by a police practices
expert and an accident reconstructionist regarding actions Preston allegedly could
have done to prevent the coal truck accident, and they cite to KRS 70.150(1),
requiring deputies to “direct, regulate and control the traffic on [county] roads so
as to maintain a maximum degree of safety.” However, opinions by a police
practices expert and an accident reconstructionist do not render the task of securing
an accident scene ministerial, particularly under the facts of this case. “[M]ost
government officials are not expected to engage in the kind of legal scholarship
normally associated with law professors and academicians. . . . Thus, qualified
immunity protects all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate
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the law.” Rowan County v. Sloas, 201 S.W.3d 469, 475 (Ky. 2006) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
Further, KRS 70.150(1) merely states that a deputy should take measures to
maintain a maximum degree of safety. Therefore, it is up to the deputy’s
discretion which measures to take and, in the present case, Preston exercised his
discretion and determined that the activation of his cruiser’s emergency lights,
combined with the fact that he believed his cruiser was visible from the road
behind it, were the only measures necessary. Moreover, considering that only
three minutes passed between the time Preston parked his vehicle and the time that
the coal truck struck Brown and Burchett, Preston’s actions were reasonable,
particularly considering that during that time, he began to “run” Brown’s license
plate to begin the process of completing the accident report as soon as possible, as
required by KRS 70.150(2). Consequently, the measures that Preston took in
securing the accident scene were discretionary.
However, that does not end our analysis of determining whether Preston was
entitled to qualified official immunity. Pursuant to Yanero, we must next
determine whether Preston’s discretionary actions were made in good faith and
within the scope of his authority. Because Appellants do not contend that
Preston’s actions were made in bad faith, as they were required to show once the
burden of proof shifted to them after Preston showed that his actions were within
his discretionary authority, see Yanero, 65 S.W.3d at 523, we assume that
Preston’s actions were in good faith. See Rowan County, 201 S.W.3d at 475
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(stating that “‘good faith’ is just a presumption that exists absent evidence of ‘bad
faith.’”). Moreover, as discussed supra, Preston’s actions were within the scope of
his authority, pursuant to KRS 70.150. Therefore, the circuit court did not err in
determining that Preston was entitled to the defense of qualified official immunity.
B. CLAIM THAT PRESTON’S DUTY WAS ABSOLUTE, CERTAIN AND
IMPERATIVE
Appellants next contend that Deputy Preston’s duty at the scene was
absolute, certain and imperative, therefore negating any cloak of immunity.
However, as discussed supra, the measures Preston took to secure the accident
scene were discretionary, and he was entitled to the defense of qualified official
immunity. Therefore, this claim lacks merit.
C. CLAIM THAT CIRCUIT COURT ERRED IN GRANTING IMMUNITY
TO OFFICE OF THE SHERIFF
Finally, Appellants allege that the circuit court erred in extending the
immunity granted to Deputy Preston to his employer, the Office of the Sheriff.
Appellants contend that the Office of the Sheriff is vicariously liable for Preston’s
actions. However, “[p]ublic officers are responsible only for their own
misfeasance and negligence and are not responsible for the negligence of those
employed by them if they have employed persons of suitable skill.” Yanero, 65
S.W.3d at 528. Appellants do not assert that Preston lacked suitable skill to be
employed as a deputy sheriff. Therefore, the Sheriff’s Office cannot be held liable
for any negligence on the part of Deputy Preston. Consequently, the circuit court
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did not err in finding that the claim against the Office of the Sheriff should be
dismissed.
Accordingly, the order of the Johnson Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Mitchell D. Kinner
Prestonsburg, Kentucky
Jason E. Williams
London, Kentucky
J. Christopher Bowlin
Paintsville, Kentucky
Ned Pillersdorf
Prestonsburg, Kentucky
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