CARTER (BENJAMIN WAYNE) VS. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
RENDERED: SEPTEMBER 17, 2010; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2009-CA-002295-MR
BENJAMIN WAYNE CARTER
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM ALLEN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JANET J. CROCKER, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 09-CR-00007
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: THOMPSON, VANMETER, AND WINE, JUDGES.
VANMETER, JUDGE: Benjamin Wayne Carter appeals from the final judgment
of the Allen Circuit Court sentencing him to two years’ imprisonment and
imposing a $100 fine (converted to time served). For the following reasons, we
affirm.
Carter was indicted on charges of fleeing and evading police in the
first degree, wanton endangerment in the first degree (two counts), reckless driving
and speeding after he failed to adhere to a state trooper’s attempt to stop his vehicle
for a speeding violation. The trial commenced on November 19, 2009, and
fourteen jurors were sworn in, duly admonished by the court, and then recessed for
lunch. During the recess, a juror approached the bench, informed the court that she
had previously worked for the defense counsel, held defense counsel in high
regard, and felt she could no longer remain impartial. The court excused her for
cause and Carter moved for a mistrial, which was denied.
After the lunch recess, the court asked the jury whether any juror
during voir dire had expressed an opinion about any of the attorneys to any of the
remaining jurors. One juror claimed her husband, who had been excused from the
panel, had spoken to her about the attorneys. The court again asked whether any
juror had a conversation about the attorneys, and no one else indicated that they
had. In chambers, the juror stated that her husband told her he would want to be
excused because of his feelings toward defense counsel. Carter moved to strike the
juror for cause, which the court granted. Carter then moved for a mistrial, which
the court denied. The trial proceeded with the remaining twelve jurors.
During trial, State Trooper Adam Morgan testified that he attempted
to pull over a vehicle which he registered traveling 81 m.p.h. in a 55 m.p.h. speed
zone. The vehicle did not stop, and a chase ensued. Trooper Morgan testified that
as he pulled alongside the vehicle he was able to identify the driver as Carter.
-2-
Trooper Morgan stated the chase occurred during daylight and neither vehicle had
activated their headlights. During cross-examination of Trooper Morgan, Carter
attempted to introduce as evidence a document from the naval observatory that
detailed the time of sunset on the day of the arrest to impeach Trooper Morgan’s
testimony that the chase occurred during daylight hours. The Commonwealth
objected to the introduction of the evidence, based on lack of foundation, and the
trial court sustained the objection on the basis that Trooper Morgan, as a lay
witness, could not authenticate the document, testify from the document, or
interpret the document. Carter then attempted to introduce the document by
avowal, and requested to testify from it. Again, the Commonwealth objected,
emphasizing that the document was not provided during discovery, and differing
interpretations exist amongst laypersons as to what constitutes a sunset. The court
sustained the Commonwealth’s objection on the basis that a lay witness’
interpretation of the document’s meaning would be speculative.
Further, the court rejected Carter’s proposed jury instruction which
included wanton endangerment in the second degree, menacing, reckless driving,
and speeding as lesser included offenses to the charge of wanton endangerment in
the first degree, and resisting arrest as a lesser included offense to the charge of
fleeing and evading in the first degree.
Carter was found guilty of fleeing and evading in the first degree, two
counts of wanton endangerment in the second degree, and speeding. The court set
aside both counts of wanton endangerment and sentenced Carter to two years’
-3-
imprisonment on the fleeing and evading in the first degree conviction and a $100
fine on the speeding conviction (converted to time served). This appeal followed.
Carter first argues the trial court erred by not admitting the naval
observatory document into evidence and thereby deprived him of a meaningful
opportunity to cross-examine Trooper Morgan. We disagree.
The standard for reviewing a trial court’s decision on the admission of
evidence is whether the trial court abused its discretion. Commonwealth v.
English, 993 S.W.2d 941, 945 (Ky. 1999) (citation omitted). The trial court abused
its discretion if the “decision was arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported
by sound legal principles.” Id. (citations omitted).
Carter argues the naval observatory document was admissible without
additional foundation under KRE1 902 which provides: “Extrinsic evidence of
authenticity as a condition precedent to admissibility is not required with respect to
the following: (5) Official publications. Books, pamphlets, or other publications
purporting to be issued by public authority.”
In this case, Carter sought to introduce the naval observatory
document as evidence that the chase and arrest did not occur during daylight hours,
based upon the time of sunset recorded by the United States Naval Observatory.
The Commonwealth argued, and the trial court agreed, that the report was not
sufficiently reliable because different interpretations exist as to what constitutes a
sunset, specifically the amount of natural light which remains after a sunset.
1
Kentucky Rules of Evidence.
-4-
Indeed, the record contains definitions provided by the United States Naval
Observatory stating that some illumination from natural light occurs after a sunset.
Under these circumstances, the trial court acted within its discretion by not
admitting the naval observatory document as evidence. See KRE 403 (“Although
relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the danger of undue prejudice, confusion of the issues, or
misleading the jury[.]”).
Next, Carter argues the trial court erred by not instructing the jury on
a charge of resisting arrest as a lesser included offense to the charge of fleeing and
evading in the first degree.2 We disagree.
Generally, “[a]lleged errors regarding jury instructions are considered
questions of law that we examine under a de novo standard of review.” Hamilton
v. CSX Transp., Inc., 208 S.W.3d 272, 275 (Ky.App. 2006) (citation omitted).
Under Kentucky law, “[a]n instruction on a lesser included offense is required only
if, considering the totality of the evidence, the jury could have a reasonable doubt
as to the defendant’s guilt of the greater offense, and yet believe beyond a
reasonable doubt that he is guilty of the lesser offense.” Commonwealth v. Day,
983 S.W.2d 505, 509 (Ky. 1999) (citations omitted). An offense is considered a
2
Additionally, Carter argues the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury on menacing,
reckless driving, and speeding as lesser included offenses of wanton endangerment in the first
degree. However, the record indicates the trial court set aside both of Carter’s convictions for
wanton endangerment in the first degree. Therefore, this claim of error is moot.
-5-
lesser included offense if it “includes the same or fewer elements than the primary
offense.” Id.
KRS3 520.095 provides, in relevant part:
(1) A person is guilty of fleeing or evading police in the
first degree:
(a) When, while operating a motor vehicle with intent
to elude or flee, the person knowingly or wantonly
disobeys a direction to stop his or her motor vehicle,
given by a person organized to be a police officer, and
at least one of the following conditions exists:
1. The person is fleeing immediately after
committing an act of domestic violence as defined
in KRS 403.720;
2. The person is driving under the influence of
alcohol or any other substance or combination of
substances in violation of KRS 189A.010;
3. The person is driving while his or her driver’s
license is suspended for violating KRS 189A.010;
or
4. By fleeing or eluding, the person is the cause,
or creates a substantial risk, of serious physical
injury or death to any person or property[.]
KRS 520.090 provides, in part:
(1) A person is guilty of resisting arrest when he
intentionally prevents or attempts to prevent a peace
officer, recognized to be acting under color of his official
authority, from effecting an arrest of the actor or another
by:
(a) Using or threatening to use physical force or
violence against the peace officer or another; or
3
Kentucky Revised Statutes.
-6-
(b) Using any other means creating a substantial risk
of causing physical injury to the peace officer or
another.
Our review of the statutes reveals that the two crimes each require
proof of different elements. Resisting arrest requires the defendant to create a
substantial risk of causing physical injury to a peace officer or another person,
while preventing a peace officer from affecting an arrest. Fleeing or evading in the
first degree requires the defendant to disobey a direction to stop given by a police
officer, who does not need to be effecting an arrest. Since the two crimes require
proof of different elements, resisting arrest is not required as a lesser included
offense of fleeing and evading in the first degree. Accordingly, the trial court did
not err by not instructing the jury to that effect.
Finally, Carter argues the trial court erred by denying both of his
motions for a mistrial when two jurors were struck for cause after being sworn in
by the court. Specifically, Carter contends because the jurors were already sworn
in before being struck for cause, they had an opportunity to taint the jury and create
the impression of impropriety. Additionally, Carter argues because the jurors were
struck after he had exercised his peremptory challenges, he was effectively
precluded from using his challenges to achieve his desired demographic for the
jury. We disagree.
The record indicates after the first juror brought to the attention of the
court her inability to remain impartial due to her prior employment relationship
with defense counsel, the court questioned the remaining jury members whether
-7-
any juror had expressed opinions about the attorneys. When a second jury member
answered in the affirmative, the court removed that juror to chambers, and again
asked the remaining twelve jurors whether any of them had discussed the
attorneys, and none responded that they had. Thus, no evidence indicates that the
jury was tainted by these two jurors. Furthermore, Carter fails to cite to any
authority entitling him to a certain demographic for the jury. Accordingly, we find
the trial court did not err by denying Carter’s motions for a mistrial.
The judgment of the Allen Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
David F. Broderick
Jason C. Hays
Bowling Green, Kentucky
Jack Conway
Attorney General of Kentucky
Gregory C. Fuchs
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
-8-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.