FRALEY (DALE WAYNE) BOURBON VS. RICE-FRALEY (GAIL ANN)
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RENDERED: MAY 7, 2010; 10:00 A.M.
TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2009-CA-002167-ME
DALE WAYNE FRALEY
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM BOURBON FAMILY COURT
HONORABLE TAMRA GORMLEY, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 09-D-00076
GAIL ANN RICE-FRALEY
APPELLEE
OPINION
REVERSING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: MOORE AND THOMPSON, JUDGES; WHITE,1 SENIOR JUDGE.
MOORE, JUDGE: Dale Wayne Fraley appeals the Domestic Violence Order
(DVO) that was entered by the Bourbon Family Court. After a careful review of
1
Senior Judge Edwin M. White, sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and Kentucky Revised Statute(s)
(KRS) 21.580.
the record, we reverse because the family court abused its discretion in entering the
DVO.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Gail Ann Rice-Fraley moved for an emergency order of protection
against Dale, and her motion was granted. She then filed a domestic violence
petition, alleging that she feared for her safety due to Dale’s
actions and inability to be reasonable. He has a drug
addiction problem that is more severe than what he led
me to believe before we were married. Although he has
been in an[d] out [of a] patient treatment program, I think
his perception of what is normal thinking and behavior is
severely damaged and perhaps cannot be corrected. I
met with a marriage counselor. . . . When I explained to
the counselor how Dale interprets things I say into things
not possible and there is no convincing him otherwise;
Dale was described as being a dangerous person. She
explained to me that what I experienced with him . . .
when he did not have . . . painkillers that he has a severe
or heavy addiction problem. She told me to divorce him
as soon as possible, run, get away from him that he is
dangerous. She said he is a sociopath and “I don’t think
he’s going to kill you right now but you need to run.”
Apparently Dale’s jealousy issues along with the
addiction and damage categorizes him as a sociopath. . . .
In addition, the marriage counselor said this was a man
with no conscience. Due to the above events, I have
received 100+ calls from this person and chose to speak
to [him one] time after the counseling appointment.
A hearing was held, in which the parties both proceeded pro se.2 The
family court explained to the parties that it was a civil proceeding, rather than a
2
A woman stood at the podium next to Gail, but the woman never provided her name, did not
speak to the court, and was not sworn in. Therefore, we are uncertain who she was, but she did
whisper some things to Gail during the proceedings which were inaudible on review of the
hearing.
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criminal proceeding, and that the burden of proof Gail had to meet for the DVO to
be entered was whether it was “more likely than not, or what we call a
preponderance of the evidence.”
The court then asked Gail if she was in fear that Dale might harm her,
and Gail responded affirmatively. However, the court asked whether, since they
were married ten months earlier, and even prior to that time, Dale had conducted
himself in a way that made Gail fear for her safety, and Gail said “not for my
safety.” Gail said that she and Dale would argue over things that had no substance,
and she felt that Dale was being unreasonable and that he had a lot of jealousy
issues. The family court asked Gail whether there had been a time other than what
she had written in her domestic violence petition when she had been fearful of him.
She responded in the negative, explaining that she did not feel fearful, but she
questioned how far his actions could go if he was so persistent that he wanted
answers. Gail gave an example of an instance that occurred before they were
married ten months earlier in which Dale could not get in touch with her by
telephone because she was asleep. So, he drove to her home and let himself in
with the key she had given him. Gail then awoke at 1:00 in the morning with Dale
walking into her bedroom. The court asked: “Did that unnerve you? Make you
fearful?” Gail responded by stating that it made her question how far his
persistence would go. The court asked whether, if the court did not give her a
protection order, she would feel unsafe, and Gail answered “yes.”
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Gail told the court that the one visit she made to the marriage
counselor (whom she visited alone, and whom Dale never visited) made her realize
that he was a sociopath and what it meant to be a sociopath. She said that
unnamed friends in the past had told her that one day they were going to read about
her in the papers, based on how Dale talked to her, how persistent he was and the
fact that he would get angry if he could not get in touch with her by telephone
while she was at work and at other times.
The court asked whether Dale had said anything about them getting
divorced. Gail said Dale had told her that if she felt divorce was the best for the
both of them, he would agree to it. However, Gail also testified that Dale had left
letters in her mailbox saying she would not “get off that easy.” Dale’s letters were
submitted to the court, and the court asked Gail if she recognized his handwriting
in the letters, to which Gail responded affirmatively.3
One of Dale’s letters stated as follows:
Hi Gail. It’s 1:00 in the morning[.] I could tell you were
out. I guess you will try and get me to believe you spent
the night with John or something. Well, I’ll see you in
the morn[ing] or tomorrow night or sometime [illegible].
If you could just quit lying to me. [sic] I could put this
in place[.] [W]e will see what you say. The truth would
help[.] I’m going to have it all figured out soon. Have a
[expletive] good time. I knew it. Your husband. I knew
something wasn’t right.
3
Two letters written by Dale were submitted as part of the record on appeal. However, upon
reviewing the record, we did not find any language in those letters saying that Gail would not
“get off that easy.”
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Dale’s other letter began by apologizing to Gail for thinking that
“another man might have anything to do with what [was] happening to” their
relationship. He explained that the reason he questioned whether she had been
faithful to him was because of the way she had handled the situation between them
– by not letting him come home, being “cold” towards him, refusing to speak with
him about the situation, and being reluctant to tell him that the situation between
them had nothing to do with another man. Dale’s letter primarily involved his
repeatedly expressing his love for Gail and apologizing for thinking that she was
cheating on him. He also stated: “I will not sign any divorce papers anytime soon
until I’m positive that we have no chance. I don’t take this commitment lightly.”
Furthermore, Dale’s letter stated: “I thought marriage counciling [sic] might help
like we talked, but then you tell me she only councils [sic] one spouse.”
After the letters were admitted in court, a woman in the back of the
courtroom, who was not sworn in, and who did not provide her name, stood up and
told the court that Gail had previously telephoned a crisis line with the Bluegrass
Domestic Violence Program “regarding these same issues” prior to court. The
woman did not specify to which issues she was referring. The court responded
“okay,” but the court did not admonish the woman that she had to be sworn in or
that the court could not consider her statement because she was unsworn and had
not provided her name.
Dale submitted a letter from his doctor, Piotr Zieba, M.D., at Central
Kentucky Psychiatry, stating: Dale had “been in opiate dependency treatment [for
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the past seven months]. Mr. Fraley has attended every appointment and has
followed treatment as directed. Mr. Fraley has passed his drug tests and is doing
well in the program.”
Dale also submitted a letter from Dr. Zieba that stated as follows:
Mr. Dale Fraley has been under my care since March 18,
2009. Mr. Fraley has expressed concerns about his
marriage in his visits. On September 23, 2009, Gail
Fraley, Mr. Fraley’s wife[,] accompanied him to his
appointment. I suggested marriage counseling and
referred the couple to a counselor. The couple reportedly
did not see this counselor.
Mrs. Gail Fraley states in an Emergency Protection Order
she sought counseling and was advised her husband had
antisocial tendencies. However, Mr. Fraley is compliant
with his treatment. He does not show any antisocial
tendencies while in treatment.
Gail informed the family court that Dale had previously told her that
he only spent about ten minutes at the doctor’s office each time he was there, so
she doubted the doctor could have accurately made that assessment regarding his
antisocial tendencies. Ironically, Gail failed to note that her “marriage counselor,”
who opined that Dale was sociopathic, never actually met or spoke with Dale; yet
Gail felt that Dale’s medical doctor, who had met Dale and spoken with him
repeatedly during his treatments, did not know Dale well enough to form an
opinion regarding his antisocial tendencies.
When Dale was permitted to speak, he asked who the marriage
counselor was with whom Gail had met because Dale contended that the counselor
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never interviewed him, despite providing an opinion concerning his mental health.
Gail asked the court whether she had to reveal the name of the counselor. Gail said
the counselor had told her the things Gail wrote in her statement in support of her
domestic violence petition. After meeting with the counselor the first time, Gail
had told Dale that she met the counselor. Dale told Gail he wanted to go see the
counselor to provide his side of the story. However, Gail informed the court that
she was under the impression that the counselor did not want Dale “there.”
Therefore, the court informed Dale that it was not going to force Gail to reveal her
counselor’s name.
Dale asked Gail why she feared him, as he was not violent, he had
never called her a bad name, and he never had committed an act of domestic
violence. The court asked Gail why she was fearful of Dale, and Gail said it was
because she had professionals who had told her she needed to “open her eyes and
see what was going on.” She said the one session with the counselor, who also
“does psychotherapy” turned “the light on for” her. Gail also said there was an
instance when she and Dale were arguing and she began to feel ill from the stress
of the argument, so she asked him to leave. Dale’s suitcase was in the hall sitting
next to the telephone. After he left and took his suitcase with him, Gail discovered
that the telephone had been unplugged. Gail opined that Dale had to have
purposely unplugged the telephone because if the telephone had been unplugged
simply by him moving the suitcase, damage would have been done to the box into
which it was plugged. Gail said the marriage counselor opined the telephone was
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unplugged because Dale did not want her to have outside contact. The court asked
if that was why she was fearful, because of what happened that day. Gail
responded in the affirmative.
Dale argued that the professional counselor did not know him. The
court replied: “Right, and . . . I cannot consider what they have said. I will not
consider what they have said. I can only consider the impact it’s had on her
thinking.”
The court then stated that, based on the hearing and the letters that
Dale had written to Gail, the court found that there was reason to believe domestic
violence or abuse had occurred and may occur again in the future if the court did
not enter the DVO. The court explained to Dale that the term “domestic violence”
includes conduct that causes someone to fear for their safety. The court explained
to Dale that domestic violence, therefore, could be words, it could be sending
flowers to someone that causes someone to be unnerved, and it could be driving by
someone’s house. The court told the parties to have no contact with each other.
Dale now appeals, contending that: (a) the family court abused its
discretion in applying an incorrect definition of “domestic violence”; (b) the family
court abused its discretion by allowing an unsworn, unidentified person to interject
in the proceedings; (c) the family court abused its discretion when it allowed the
admission of hearsay statements set forth in the domestic violence petition; (d) the
court abused its discretion in considering the impact of alleged hearsay statements
upon Gail; and (e) the court clearly erred when it found that it was established, by a
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preponderance of the evidence, that an act of domestic violence or abuse had
occurred and may occur again.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
This Court has previously noted that, pursuant to CR4 52.01,
a trial court’s findings of fact may be set aside if clearly
erroneous. However, we are mindful that in reviewing
the decision of a trial court the test is not whether we
would have decided it differently, but whether the court’s
findings were clearly erroneous or that it abused its
discretion. . . . Abuse of discretion occurs when a court’s
decision is unreasonable or unfair.
Gomez v. Gomez, 254 S.W.3d 838, 842 (Ky. App. 2008). “The test for abuse of
discretion is whether the trial judge’s decision was arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair,
or unsupported by sound legal principles.” Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co. v.
Thompson, 11 S.W.3d 575, 581 (Ky. 2000).
III. ANALYSIS
A. CLAIM REGARDING DEFINITION OF “DOMESTIC VIOLENCE”
Dale first argues that the family court abused its discretion in applying
an incorrect definition of “domestic violence.” Specifically, Dale contends that
when the family court noted during the hearing that someone being fearful of
another person constitutes domestic violence, the court failed to note that such fear
4
Kentucky Rule(s) of Civil Procedure.
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must be imminent and must be inflicted by the respondent to the petition. Dale
asserts that the court never addressed whether Gail’s fear was imminent and that all
of the alleged fears Gail claimed to have stemmed from things her marriage
counselor told her, rather than from things Dale said or did.
Before issuing a domestic violence order, the trial court
must first conduct a hearing and find by a preponderance
of the evidence “that an act or acts of domestic violence
and abuse have occurred and may again occur. . . .” KRS
403.750(1). The preponderance of the evidence standard
is met when sufficient evidence establishes that the
alleged victim was more likely than not to have been a
victim of domestic violence.
Gomez, 254 S.W.3d at 842 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Pursuant to KRS5 403.720(1), “‘Domestic violence and abuse’ means
physical injury, serious physical injury, sexual abuse, assault, or the infliction of
fear of imminent physical injury, serious physical injury, sexual abuse, or assault
between family members or members of an unmarried couple[.]” Further, KRS
403.720(2) states that a spouse is included in the definition of the term “family
member.” For purposes of KRS 403.720, the term “‘[i]mminent’ means
impending danger, and, in the context of domestic violence and abuse . . .[,] belief
that danger is imminent can be inferred from a past pattern of repeated serious
abuse.” KRS 503.010(3).
In the present case, Gail contradicted herself multiple times in the
hearing, stating at times that she was not fearful of Dale and that she did not worry
about her safety, and at other times stating that she would feel unsafe if the court
5
Kentucky Revised Statute(s).
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did not enter a protection order. Nonetheless, she never alleged that Dale had
acted violently toward her in the past, had injured her, or had threatened violence
in any way. She based her alleged fear of Dale on her marriage counselor’s
uninformed opinion that Dale had sociopathic tendencies and on the fact that her
counselor told her Dale had unplugged Gail’s telephone to keep her from having
outside contact. The family court properly stated that, under the circumstances of
this case, it would not consider the opinions that the marriage counselor provided
to Gail. However, the court stated that it would consider the “impact” of those
opinions on Gail; the court erred in doing so.
It was the marriage counselor who instilled fear in Gail. There were
no allegations or evidence that Dale had ever acted violently toward Gail or
threatened violent actions toward her. Consequently, the family court erred in
finding that the circumstances of this case met the definition of “domestic violence
and abuse” because there was no evidence that Dale inflicted the fear of imminent
physical injury on Gail. Thus, the family court abused its discretion in entering the
DVO against Dale in this case.
B. CLAIM REGARDING UNSWORN, UNIDENTIFIED PERSON
Dale also contends that the family court abused its discretion by
allowing an unsworn, unidentified person to interject in the proceedings. He is
referring to the woman from the back of the courtroom who stood up during the
proceedings and briefly told the court that Gail had previously telephoned a crisis
line with the Bluegrass Domestic Violence Program “regarding these same issues”
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prior to court. The woman did not specify to which issues she was referring, or
what, exactly, Gail had said during that telephone call to the crisis line. The court
responded “okay,” but the court did not admonish the woman that she had to be
sworn in or that the court could not consider her statement because she was
unsworn. Dale argues that the woman’s statement served to improperly bolster the
testimony provided by Gail and that this constituted substantial error pursuant to
CR 61.02.
Civil Rule 61.02 states: “A palpable error which affects the
substantial rights of a party may be considered by the . . . appellate court on appeal,
even though insufficiently raised or preserved for review, and appropriate relief
may be granted upon a determination that manifest injustice has resulted from the
error.” Because Dale did not object to the woman’s statement during the hearing,
we may only review this claim under the palpable error standard set forth in CR
61.02.
“[T]he task of the appellate court in review under CR 61.02 is to
determine if (1) the substantial rights of a party have been affected; (2) such action
has resulted in a manifest injustice; and (3) such palpable error is the result of
action taken by the court.” Childers Oil Co. v. Adkins, 256 S.W.3d 19, 27 (Ky.
2008) (emphasis added). In the present case, although it was improper for the
woman to stand up and interject her statement in the middle of the hearing without
first being sworn, this was not an action taken by the court. We believe the court
should have admonished the woman for making this statement in this manner and
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that the court should have stated that it would not consider her statement in
rendering its decision. However, in this case, we do not find that this error resulted
in a manifest injustice to Dale. Therefore, this claim is without merit.
C. CLAIM REGARDING ADMISSION OF HEARSAY STATEMENTS
Dale next alleges that the family court abused its discretion when it
allowed the admission of hearsay statements set forth in the domestic violence
petition. The hearsay statements to which he is referring were the statements
allegedly made by the marriage counselor. However, because the family court
stated that it was not going to consider the marriage counselor’s statements, it
appears that the court remedied the situation, and no error occurred.
D. CLAIM REGARDING COURT’S CONSIDERATION OF IMPACT OF
HEARSAY STATEMENTS UPON GAIL
Dale next asserts that the family court abused its discretion in
considering the impact of alleged hearsay statements upon Gail. As we stated
previously, the court erred in considering the impact of the counselor’s statements
upon Gail, particularly considering that it was the counselor’s statements, rather
than Dale’s actions or spoken words, that created Gail’s alleged fear.
E. CLAIM THAT FAMILY COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT AN ACT
OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE OR ABUSE HAD OCCURRED AND MAY
OCCUR AGAIN
Finally, Dale alleges that the family court clearly erred when it found
that it was established, by a preponderance of the evidence, that an act of domestic
violence or abuse had occurred and may occur again. As we stated previously, the
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family court erred in this finding and, therefore, the court abused its discretion in
entering the DVO against Dale.
Accordingly, the order of the Bourbon Family Court is reversed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Matthew R. Walter
Danville, Kentucky
Fred S. Bachmeyer
Lexington, Kentucky
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