NORTHERN (NORMA F.) VS. NOT BE PUBLISHED KENTUCKY COUNCIL ON POSTSECONDARY EDUCATION
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RENDERED: OCTOBER 8, 2010; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2009-CA-002146-MR
NORMA F. NORTHERN
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FRANKLIN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE THOMAS D. WINGATE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 06-CI-001694
KENTUCKY COUNCIL ON
POSTSECONDARY EDUCATION
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: ACREE AND NICKELL, JUDGES; HARRIS,1 SENIOR JUDGE.
HARRIS, SENIOR JUDGE: Norma Northern appeals from a Franklin Circuit
Court summary judgment in favor of the Kentucky Council on Postsecondary
Education (CPE). In its judgment, the Circuit Court concluded that Northern’s
1
Senior Judge William R. Harris sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and Kentucky Revised Statutes
(KRS) 21.580.
claim did not meet the necessary requirements of the Kentucky Whistleblower Act
(Act). On appeal, Northern contends that she submitted ample evidence to indicate
that her position was terminated based upon a series of communications that were
protected by the Act. After a careful review of the briefs and the record, we are not
persuaded by Northern’s arguments. For reasons stated herein, we affirm the
Franklin Circuit Court summary judgment.
I. Factual and Procedural History
In 2003, Northern was employed by CPE and held the position of
Chief Operating Officer (COO) for the Kentucky Virtual University (KYVU).
Shortly after Northern was given the title of COO, she was appointed as the
Interim Chief Executive Officer.
KYVU provides internet and web-based post-secondary courses. Based
upon the nature of the educational system, KYVU is reliant upon the CPE
information technology (IT) department to function properly. During her
employment, Northern repeatedly complained about the IT department.
Northern’s complaints primarily involved allegations of incompetence.
Northern complained to the Executive Director of KYVU and CPE officials that
the IT department had an unreasonable backlog of requests and failed to test
software and address problems in a timely manner. She also complained that
various IT employees were distracted from their work by family issues and
personal matters.
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In March 2005, a non-technical employee located a rogue file on the
KYVU server. An investigation revealed that the file was placed upon the server
by a hacker two years before it was found. Based upon this discovery, KYVU
officials were concerned that the security of student information had been
compromised. Northern recommended that the IT department immediately notify
those students whose private information might have been leaked. The IT
department did not provide such notification, but did not attempt to conceal the
file’s discovery.
Northern repeatedly met with CPE general counsel, Dennis Taulbee,
and IT supervisor, Miko Pattie, concerning the problems with the IT department.
She also met with CPE Vice President, Sue Moore, about Pattie’s alleged
mismanagement of the IT department. Northern also discussed her concerns with
officials in the Kentucky Community and Technical College System (KCTCS) and
officials in the Kentucky Department of Education.
In May 2005, a panel appointed by the Southern Association of Colleges
and Schools reviewed KYVU. The panel suggested that CPE make the following
changes: (1) CPE should employ a permanent CEO for KYVU; (2) CPE should
establish a more effective administration for KYVU; and (3) CPE should conduct a
comprehensive review of KYVU’s staff in order retain employees experienced in
academic affairs and student services. In response to the panel’s recommendation,
CPE President, Dr. Thomas Layzell, hired Al Lind as the permanent CEO of
KYVU, and Northern was reassigned to her prior COO position. Over the course
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of the next year, Lind conducted a comprehensive review of KYVU. Lind
concluded that the COO position could no longer be justified. On September 21,
2006, Northern was notified that her position would be eliminated effective on
October 30, 2006.
On December 6, 2006, Northern filed a complaint in the Franklin
Circuit Court claiming that she was terminated in violation of the Act based upon
her reports of waste and mismanagement of the IT department. On June 6, 2007,
Northern amended her complain to include a claim that the reorganization of CPE
was implemented in violation of KRS 12.028.2 On June 11, 2009, CPE moved for
summary judgment on the grounds that Northern failed to state a sufficient claim
for relief under the Whistleblower Act. The Franklin Circuit Court granted
summary judgment in favor of CPE. This appeal follows.
II. Standard of Review
Summary judgment is properly granted when no genuine material of
fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (CR) 56.03. When ruling upon a motion for
summary judgment, the trial court must view the evidence in the light most
favorable to the party opposing the motion. Steelvest v. Scansteel Service Center,
Inc., 807 S.W.2d 476, 480 (Ky. 1990). In this case, there is no dispute concerning
material facts. Consequently, we need only consider the question of whether
Northern’s complaint was viable under the Whistleblower Act. As this is a
2
Northern has not argued on appeal that the trial court erred in dismissing her claim under KRS
12.028.
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question of law, our Court must examine this question under a de novo standard of
review. Id.
III. The Kentucky Whistleblower Act
In 1983,3 the Kentucky General Assembly enacted the Whistleblower
Act, codified in KRS Chapter 61, as a means “to protect employees who possess
knowledge of wrongdoing that is concealed or not publicly known, and who step
forward to help uncover and disclose that information.” Davidson v.
Commonwealth, Dept. of Military Affairs, 152 S.W.3d 247, 255 (Ky. App. 2004)
(quoting Meuwissen v. Dep’t of Interior, 234 F.3d 9, 13 (Fed Cir. 2000); KRS
61.102.
The Kentucky Whistleblower Act provides:
No employer shall subject to reprisal, or directly or
indirectly use, or threaten to use, any official authority or
influence, in any manner whatsoever, which tends to
discourage, restrain, depress, dissuade, deter, prevent,
interfere with, coerce, or discriminate against any
employee who in good faith reports, discloses, divulges,
or otherwise brings to the attention of the Kentucky
Legislative Ethics Commission, the Attorney General,
the Auditor of Public Accounts, the General Assembly of
the Commonwealth of Kentucky or any of its members or
employees, the Legislative Research Commission or any
of its committees, members or employees, the judiciary
or any member or employee of the judiciary, any law
enforcement agency or its employees, or any other
appropriate body or authority, any facts or information
relative to an actual or suspected violation of any law,
statute, executive order, administrative regulation,
mandate, rule or ordinance of the United States, the
Commonwealth of Kentucky, or any of its political
3
The Whistleblower Act was amended in 1993. See Commonwealth, Dept. of Agriculture v.
Vinson, 30 S.W.3d 162 (Ky. 2000).
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subdivisions, or any facts or information relative to actual
or suspected mismanagement, waste, fraud, abuse of
authority, or a substantial and specific danger to public
health or safety. No employer shall require any
employee to give notice prior to making such a report,
disclosure, or divulgence.
KRS 61.102 (1).
In order to establish a claim under KRS 61.102, a party must prove the
following four elements: (1) the employer is an officer of the state; (2) the
employee is employed by the state; (3) the employee made, or attempted to make,
a good faith report of a suspected violation of state or local law to an appropriate
authority; and (4) the employer took action, or threatened to do so, to discourage
the employee from reporting. Woodward v. Commonwealth, 984 S.W.2d 477, 48081 (Ky. 1998); Davidson v. Commonwealth, Dept. of Military Affairs, 152 S.W.3d
at 251. Once the claimant shows, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the
“disclosure was a contributing factor in the personnel action,” the burden of proof
shifts to the state employer “to provide by clear and convincing evidence that the
disclosure was not a material fact in the personnel action.” KRS 61.103(3).
IV. Northern’s Claim
Northern claims that the trial court erred by finding that her claim did
not meet the required elements under the Whistleblower Act. Specifically, the
court concluded that Northern’s reports of poor supervision and incompetence do
not fall within the disclosure protected by the Act. We agree with the trial court’s
conclusion.
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The vast majority of Northern’s complaints involved the IT
department’s alleged negligence and ineffective work practices. Reports of simple
negligence are not included in the list of protected communications covered by the
statute. Davidson v. Commonwealth, Dept. of Military Affairs, 152 S.W.3d at 254.
Although the statute specifically provides protection for disclosures concerning
mismanagement and waste, Northern’s claims do not rise to that level. Cf.
Consolidated Infrastructure Management Authority, Inc. v. Allen, 269 S.W.3d 852
(Ky. 2008).
Northern’s most significant disclosures involve the “rogue” file and
potential security breach. Northern reported that a hacker placed a file on the
KYVU servers, which was undetected by the IT department for two years. Once
the file was discovered, the IT department quickly worked to secure the server.
Although the IT department did not report the potential breach to students, there is
no evidence that the department attempted to conceal the file’s discovery. These
practices certainly raise questions concerning the competence of the IT department
and lack of supervision. However, these acts constitute oversight and negligence
rather than mismanagement and fraud. To expand the Whistleblower Act to
encompass negligence and poor performance could create hostility between
coworkers and open the flood gates to potential Whistleblower claims. Such an
expansion would not further the purpose of the Act.
As previously mentioned, Northern must show all four elements in
order to prevail in her Whistleblower claim. Given our conclusion, we need not
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consider whether she was terminated as punishment for the disclosure. However,
we note that Northern was terminated after years of complaining about the IT
department. More specifically, she was terminated almost two years after the
discovery of the rogue file. This timeline does not suggest that Northern’s
termination was a punishment.
Accordingly, we affirm the Franklin Circuit Court summary judgment.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
David Leightty
Louisville, Kentucky
Katherine M. Coleman
Kevin G. Henry
Lexington, Kentucky
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