SPAULDING (MARK) VS. SPAULDING (JULIE)
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RENDERED: SEPTEMBER 3, 2010; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2009-CA-002032-ME
MARK SPAULDING
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM BOONE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE LISA O. BUSHELMAN, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 01-CI-00895
JULIE SPAULDING
APPELLEE
OPINION
REVERSING AND REMANDING
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BEFORE: MOORE AND THOMPSON, JUDGES; WHITE,1 SENIOR JUDGE.
THOMPSON, JUDGE: Mark Spaulding appeals from an order of the Boone
Circuit Court that increased his child support obligation for his two children from
$1,200 to $2,000 per month based on an increase in his income. The issues
presented are whether the family court erred when it ordered Mark to pay an
amount above the Kentucky Child Support Guidelines and whether it made
1
Senior Judge Edwin M. White sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and KRS 21.580.
sufficient written findings of fact. We conclude that the family court applied an
erroneous standard when determining Mark’s child support obligation and that it
made insufficient findings of fact. We, therefore, reverse and remand for further
findings of fact.
Mark and Julie Spaulding were divorced by a decree of dissolution of
marriage entered on October 15, 2001, which incorporated by reference the parties’
separation agreement. Pursuant to the agreement, the parties agreed to share joint
custody of the parties’ minor children who were then six and three-years old with
Mark designated as the primary residential custodian. In addition to $1,200 per
month for child support to Julie, Mark agreed to pay the children’s public
education costs, daycare expenses, and medical and dental expenses not covered by
insurance. There was no provision in the agreement regarding the payment of
extracurricular activities or interests.
Five years after entry of the decree, Julie filed a pro se motion
seeking an increase in Mark’s child support obligation. After she retained counsel,
a hearing was held at which the parties produced the following evidence:
Since the date of the decree, Mark’s gross income from operating
Mark Spaulding Construction Co. and Mark Spaulding Properties, LLC, increased
from $7,600 to over $27,359 per month. Julie’s income increased from zero to
$2,465.28 per month. The remaining evidence focused on the lifestyles enjoyed by
the parties and their children following the decree.
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Mark’s lifestyle is commensurate with his income level. He resides in
a $194,600 four-bedroom home with an in-ground pool on thirty-five acres that he
inherited. The evidence established that Mark frequently enjoys vacations on his
yacht, valued at $425,000. In the fourteen months preceding the motion for an
increase in child support, Mark had taken the parties’ children to Florida six times
and on one vacation to Gatlinburg, Tennessee. Mark Spaulding Construction
provides Mark with a 2007 Chevrolet Tahoe, a cell phone, health insurance, and as
reflected in his business tax returns, substantial reimbursements for meals and
entertainment.
Julie resides in a three-bedroom house appraised at $127,500, which
she received debt free as a result of the dissolution. However, she testified that the
house needed maintenance, including a new roof, windows and carpet, which she
financed through a home equity loan. Julie owns a 2004 Ford Expedition subject
to a $475 monthly installment loan and a salvage car. Julie’s roommate owns a
boat which Julie helped finance in exchange for free access to the boat and for
which the roommate pays Julie $437 per month.
As his income increased, Mark voluntarily paid expenses for the
children beyond those mandated in the decree. He pays for the children’s
extracurricular activities including riding lessons, cheerleading and music lessons.
Additionally, Mark frequently provides the children with money for shopping.
Prior to the motion for increase in child support, Mark willingly reimbursed Julie
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for expenses she incurred on behalf of the children but Julie ceased requesting
reimbursement in anticipation of an increase in child support.
.
The family court found the parties’ combined monthly gross income
was $29,824.87 of which Julie earns eight percent while Mark earns ninety-two
percent. Because the amount exceeded the uppermost level of the Kentucky Child
Support Guidelines set out in KRS 403.212, which currently terminates at $15,000,
the family court deviated from the guidelines and awarded $2,000 per month as
child support to be paid by Mark.
Mark contends that the children’s reasonable needs are met under the
child support established in the decree. He points out that both residences are
suitable for the children, their medical and clothing needs are met, and their
entertainment and extracurricular activities are paid. In essence, despite the
substantial increase in income following the decree, he urges that the status quo be
maintained. Julie argues that the reasonable needs of the children must be assessed
in the context of the parties’ incomes and are to be defined in that context. She
does not dispute that Mark has paid the children’s expenses beyond those ordered
in the decree but argues that the money should go directly to her as child support
rather than paid based on Mark’s generosity to the children.
The child support guidelines establish a rebuttable presumption for an
original award or modification of child support. The trial court may deviate from
the guidelines when it makes specific findings that the application of the guidelines
would not be just or appropriate. KRS 403.212(2). The trial court may invoke its
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broad judicial discretion to determine child support when the combined parental
adjusted gross income exceeds the uppermost level of the guidelines. KRS
403.212(5). “As long as the trial court’s discretion comports with the guidelines,
or any deviation is adequately justified in writing, this Court will not disturb the
trial court’s ruling in this regard.” Downing v. Downing, 45 S.W.3d 449, 454
(Ky.App. 2001). However, the discretion is not unrestricted. “The test for abuse
of discretion is whether the trial judge’s decision was arbitrary, unreasonable,
unfair, or unsupported by sound legal principles.” Id.
This Court made clear in Downing that a legal principle to which the
trial court must adhere is that “any decision to set child support above the
guidelines must be based primarily on the child’s needs, as set out in specific
findings.” Id. at 456.
The focus of this inquiry does not concern the lifestyle
which the parents could afford to provide the child, but
rather it is the standard of living which satisfies the
child’s reasonable and realistic needs under the
circumstances.
Id. at 457. Any method of calculating child support that resulted in an amount
above the children’s reasonable needs was rejected because to accept such a result
would accrue to the benefit of the custodial parent by transferring the discretionary
spending on the children to the parent receiving the support. Id. at 455-456.
Unfortunately, the family court’s approach in this case has such a result.
The family court found that as the children aged, their expenses
increased. However, its order is devoid of any specific findings that identify the
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increased expenses. Furthermore, no finding is stated as to what, if any, of the
children’s reasonable needs are not being met by the current child support paid by
Mark. Instead, the family court focused on the disparity in the parties’ incomes
and justified the increase in child support on the basis that it “serves to regulate the
children’s ability to live in similar environments under each parent.” Thus, in the
family court’s view, in joint custody arrangements, the children’s reasonable needs
are not the controlling factor when considering support; rather, it is the
equalization of the standard of living provided by both households.
Although such an approach may be appropriate when considering
maintenance, we reiterate the holding in Downing that the children’s reasonable
needs are the predominate factor when considering whether to deviate from the
child support guidelines. We adopt the reasoning of the Minnesota Appellate
Court when confronted with the same misapplication of the law:
[C]hild support should not be used as a means of
equalizing income between parents who share the
obligation of physical custody. Disparity in income must
be related to the needs of the children. Absent a showing
that the children's needs require a higher level of support
from the parent with higher income, we believe the
guidelines should be straightforwardly applied.
Broas v. Broas, 472 N.W.2d 671, 674 (Minn.App. 1991)(quoting Hortis v. Hortis,
367 N.W.2d 633, 635-36 (Minn.App. 1985)).
Accordingly, we reverse and remand the order of the family court
with instructions to reconsider the motion to modify child support under the proper
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standard set forth in Downing and to make specific findings of fact as to the
reasonable needs of the children.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Thomas L. Rouse
Ft. Mitchell, Kentucky
Michael J. McMain
Rebecca M. Simms
Florence, Kentucky
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