STEGE, III (GEORGE C.) VS. STEGE (DIANE P.)
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RENDERED: JUNE 11, 2010; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2009-CA-001983-ME
GEORGE C. STEGE, III
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON FAMILY COURT
HONORABLE ELEANORE GARBER, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 02-CI-500923
DIANE P. STEGE
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: CLAYTON, TAYLOR AND THOMPSON, JUDGES.
THOMPSON, JUDGE: George C. Stege, III, (Dr. Stege) appeals the denial of his
motion seeking to recoup $35,989.30 in child support from Diane P. Stege, his
former wife. The issues presented are whether the doctrine of res judicata barred
Diane’s defenses and whether the Jefferson Family Court erred when it found that
Dr. Stege was not entitled to recoupment of excess child support payments
voluntarily paid to Diane. We conclude that there was no error and affirm.
Dr. Stege and Diane were married on June 18, 1976, and the marriage
was dissolved by decree on March 13, 2003. At the time of the divorce, the couple
had two children that had reached the age of majority and one child who was
twelve-years old. In addition to the division of property and custody matters, the
judgment of dissolution provided for the payment of child support and the child’s
private education at Louisville Collegiate School as follows:
If the parties jointly decide to continue (the child) in
Collegiate after the present school year, then each shall
be responsible for payment of tuition in proportion to the
family income, 61% for Dr. Stege and 39% for Diane
Stege. Dr. Stege shall be permitted to deduct his share of
the tuition from his child support payments to Diane.
From 2003-2007, the child continued to attend Collegiate during
which time Dr. Stege paid sixty-one percent of her tuition directly to Collegiate
and Diane paid thirty-nine percent of her tuition. In addition, Dr. Stege continued
to pay child support as required by the 2003 order in an amount equal to sixty-one
percent of $1,700, without any deduction for the child’s tuition.
In 2007, Dr. Stege filed a motion seeking to recoup from Diane his
portion of the tuition which he failed to deduct from his child support payments
made between May 2004 and May 2007. Diane objected arguing that the parties
and the court had consistently interpreted the 2003 order to allow Dr. Stege to
deduct thirty-nine percent of tuition payments from child support only if he paid
the entire tuition amount and, therefore, that it would be inequitable to permit
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recoupment. She further alleged that all excess child support had been expended
for the benefit of the child.
Following a hearing, the family court found that Dr. Stege’s proposed
interpretation of the 2003 order did not comport with the court’s intent and,
utilizing CR 60.01, amended the 2003 order to state:
If the parties jointly decide to continue (the child)
in Collegiate after the present school year, then each shall
be responsible for payment of tuition in proportionate to
the family income, 61% of Dr. Stege and 39% for Diane
Stege. Dr. Stege shall be permitted to deduct Diane
Stege’s share of the tuition from his child support
payments to Diane.
Under the terms of the amended 2003 order, the family court found that there was
no overpayment of child support and denied Dr. Stege’s motion.
Dr. Stege appealed the family court’s order and, in an unpublished
opinion, this Court held that the family court incorrectly utilized CR 60.01 to make
a substantive change to the 2003 order and reversed and remanded the case to the
family court.
On remand, Dr. Stege renewed his motion for recoupment. Following
a hearing, the family court denied his motion because Dr. Stege consented to the
child’s attendance at Collegiate and, therefore, the overpayment of child support
was voluntary and Dr. Stege was not otherwise entitled to recoupment pursuant to
Clay v. Clay, 707 S.W.2d 352 (Ky.App. 1986).
Dr. Stege’s initial contention is that Diane was precluded from
asserting her defenses to his claim for recoupment because the family court’s 2007
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order and this Court’s 2008 opinion conclusively adjudicated the matter. Dr. Stege
argues for the application of the doctrine of res judicata but does so with little
explanation of the law or how it might apply to the facts.
In Yeoman v. Com., Health Policy Bd., 983 S.W.2d 459 (Ky. 1998),
the concept of res judicata and its two-subparts, claim preclusion and issue
preclusion, were explained. To preclude repetitious suits involving the same cause
of action, claim preclusion bars a party from relitigating a previously adjudicated
cause of action in an entirely new action while issue preclusion bars parties from
relitigating an issue litigated and finally resolved in an earlier action. Id. at 464.
Both components require the finality of a prior litigation and a subsequent action.
The litigation concerning the potential recoupment of child support
does not involve multiple litigations. Dr. Stege filed a motion to recoup child
support and, although Diane presented her defenses, the family court chose to
apply CR 60.01. After this Court concluded that the family court erred when it
relied on CR 60.01, we remanded the case and the family court resolved the issue
on the merits. Under the circumstances, Dr. Stege’s assertion that res judicata
barred the family court’s consideration on the merits is baseless.
For similar reasons, we reject his contention that this Court’s prior
Opinion in which we reversed the family court’s application of CR 60.01 without
addressing the merits of the claim for recoupment or Diane’s defenses precluded
the family court from considering the merits. To the contrary, this Court remanded
the matter to the family court for a decision on the merits.
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The substantive issue presented on appeal is whether Dr. Stege was
entitled to recoup child support payments from Diane.
The pivotal case in this Commonwealth regarding the recoupment of
child support is Clay v. Clay, 707 S.W.2d 352. In Clay, the Court recognized the
prevailing rule that recoupment of child support is not permitted but held it may be
permitted when involuntary overpayments are made pursuant to a successfully
appealed court order. However, the holding is limited to situations where
recoupment is not detrimental to the child and the custodial parent has not
expended the overpayment for the support of the child and has it, or its equivalent,
available for repayment. Id. at 354. The facts in Clay are materially
distinguishable from the present.
Dr. Stege voluntarily paid his daughter’s tuition and child support
without seeking clarification of the 2003 order or otherwise objecting to the
payments. No public policy prevents parents from being as generous to their child
as they wish and, consequently, parents may agree to pay child support in excess of
their legal obligations. Pursley v. Pursley, 144 S.W.3d 820 (Ky. 2004). As a
result, unlike in Clay where the child support order was reversed and vacated on
appeal and the custodial parent knew that the amount of child support was
contested, Diane had no reason to believe that Dr. Stege considered the payments
excessive and would subsequently seek recoupment.
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Secondly, in Clay, the Court did not mandate that recoupment be
allowed but only remanded the case for findings of fact regarding recoupment. In
doing so, it stressed that recoupment remained within the trial court’s discretion:
Whether, and to what extent, the receiving parent in fact
used the “overpayment” for the support of the child and
has the funds from which to permit a proper recoupment
without depriving the child, is a determination that must
necessarily be made by the trial court, exercising its
discretion upon the relevant evidence before it. The
scope of discretion, and the principles applicable to its
exercise, with respect to allowing recoupment must be
substantially the same as pertain to the fixing of child
support in the first instance; and thus, the determination
of the court will not be disturbed on appeal unless it is
found to be clearly erroneous. (Emphasis in original.)
Id. at 354. In the present case, the trial court acted within its discretion when it
denied recoupment based on its findings of fact.
At the second hearing, Dr. Stege did not dispute that Diane spent the
excess child support payments for the child’s benefit but argued that the amount
spent was for unnecessary luxuries, including designer clothing. We agree with
the family court that the relevant inquiry is whether the funds were expended for
the benefit of the child and whether funds are available from excess child support
payments. Regardless of the necessity of the expenditures, it remains that there
was no evidence that funds were available from the accumulation of excess child
support. We conclude that the family court’s determination was not clearly
erroneous. Id.
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Based on the foregoing, the order of the Jefferson Family Court is
affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Sammy Deeb
Louisville, Kentucky
Richard H. Nash, III
Louisville, Kentucky
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