C. (C.) VS. CABINET FOR HEALTH AND FAMILY SERVICES , ET AL.
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RENDERED: MAY 28, 2010; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2009-CA-001947-ME
C.C.
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM LEWIS CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JEFFREY L. PRESTON, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 09-J-00038
CABINET FOR HEALTH AND FAMILY SERVICES,
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY; and N.R., A
MINOR CHILD
AND
NO. 2009-CA-001948-ME
C.C.
v.
APPELLEES
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM LEWIS CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JEFFREY L. PRESTON
ACTION NO. 09-J-00039
CABINET FOR HEALTH AND FAMILY SERVICES,
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY; and Z.C., A
MINOR CHILD
OPINION
AFFIRMING
APPELLEES
BEFORE: NICKELL AND STUMBO, JUDGES; WHITE,1 SENIOR JUDGE.
STUMBO, JUDGE: In this consolidated action, C.C.2 appeals from Disposition
Orders of the Lewis Circuit Court removing her two minor children from her
custody and placing them under the custody of the court based on the court’s
finding of neglect. C.C. (hereinafter referred to as Mother) contends that the court
improperly failed to compel the Cabinet’s compliance with her discovery request,
that its Adjudication Orders and findings of neglect were not supported by
substantial evidence, and that it improperly failed to consider less restrictive
alternatives to the continued removal of the children from the home. For the
reasons stated below, we affirm the Orders on appeal.
On May 15, 2009, the Cabinet for Health and Family Services,
Commonwealth of Kentucky, filed two juvenile petitions in Lewis Circuit Court
alleging that Mother’s minor children, Z.C., a five-year-old female (hereinafter
referred to as Child 1) and N.R., a young male (hereinafter referred to as Child 2)
were abused or neglected. The Petitions were filed after Beth Arnold, a social
worker with the Lewis County Office of the Cabinet for Health and Family
Services, visited Mother’s residence for the purpose of investigating a complaint
that Mother’s children were abused or neglected. Arnold was accompanied by a
Lewis County Deputy Sheriff.
1
Senior Judge Edwin M. White sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and Kentucky Revised Statutes
(KRS) 21.580.
2
C.C.’s initials are used in conformity with our practice of protecting the identity of juvenile
abuse victims.
3
According to the record, when Arnold and the Deputy Sheriff arrived
at the residence, Mother allegedly refused to allow them into the residence and was
non-compliant with the investigation. Mother allegedly was also very irate and
appeared to be irrational.
Based in part on Mother’s response to Arnold’s visit, the
Commonwealth sought an Emergency Custody Order on May 15, 2009. Social
worker Arnold and Lewis County Deputy Sheriff Johnny Bivens later testified that
they observed that Child 1 was bruised on her upper and lower back from a
spanking or beating given by Anthony Stevenson, Mother’s boyfriend. Evidence
was also tendered that Stevenson hit Mother and Child 1 with a belt; that Child 2
observed these events; and that Mother appeared irrational and irate, and refused to
cooperate with the investigation. Based on this evidence, the court granted the
Commonwealth’s request for the Emergency Custody Order.
On May 16, 2009, Arnold and a Kentucky State Police Trooper went
to Mother’s residence to enforce the Emergency Custody Order. While there, the
Trooper arrested Mother on an unrelated warrant. After being arrested, Mother
allegedly yelled to Stevenson not to give anything from the home to the children,
screamed about Child 1 in derogatory terms, and told Arnold that she did not want
Child 1 back in the home. Deputy Sheriff Bivens would later testify that prior to
her arrest, Mother came storming out of the residence in a belligerent manner,
again screamed that Child 1 was a liar, a thief and a b****, and that she would
“holler rape” if Bivens tried to take her into custody. As part of the investigation
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which followed, Arnold took pictures of bruises on Child 1’s right ear, upper back
and lower back.
A temporary removal hearing was conducted on May 21, 2009, where
Mother acknowledged making derogatory statements about her children. She also
stated that she was diagnosed as having ADHD and manic depression but had
stopped taking her medicine. Stevenson testified that he spanked Child 1 on May
14, 2009, which was the day before Arnold took photographs of Child 1’s bruises.
Mother, through counsel, filed a discovery motion the following day in which she
sought copies of the photographs and other documentary evidence.
In conformity with KRS 620.090(5), an adjudication hearing was
scheduled to occur within 45 days of the removal hearing.3 The adjudication
hearing was continued at the request of Mother’s counsel, based on counsel’s
contention that the Commonwealth had not complied with the discovery request
for the production of the pictures that Arnold took of Child 1’s bruised body. The
court determined that Mother had a right to inspect the record, but could not
compel the Commonwealth via a discovery request. It rendered an Order to that
effect on July 21, 2009, wherein it stated that while Mother was entitled to
discovery in preparation for the adjudication hearing, the discovery provisions of
KRS 620.100(3) did not apply to “pre-adjudicative matters.”
3
KRS 620.100 requires bifurcated hearings in juvenile proceedings. An “adjudication” hearing
shall be conducted to determine by a preponderance of the evidence the truth or falsity of the
allegations. The Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure are applicable in such hearings. Thereafter,
a “disposition” hearing is conducted to determine the action, if any, to be taken. See also, KRS
610.080.
5
The adjudication hearing was conducted on July 23, 2009, where both
parties tendered proof. As a result of the hearing, the court rendered pro forma
Orders (one each for Child 1 and Child 2) determining that the Commonwealth had
proven by a preponderance of the evidence that Child 1 and Child 2 were neglected
children, that the children’s best interest required a change of custody, that
reasonable efforts were made to prevent the children’s removal from the home, and
that there were no less restrictive alternatives to removal. As a basis for these
conclusions, the court found that Mother had allowed Stevenson to beat Child 1,
that Mother had been verbally abusive to Child 1, and that Child 2 had observed
these events.
Pursuant to KRS 620.090, a disposition hearing was conducted on or
about October 8, 2009. The court again determined that the best interests of the
children required a change in custody, with placement of the children outside the
home with relatives or other appropriate persons or agency. This appeal followed.
Mother’s primary argument on appeal is that the trial court’s failure to
compel discovery of the photographs taken by Arnold, as well as other
documentary evidence, is reversible error. Mother notes that the discovery motion
was tendered on the day following the May 21, 2009 temporary removal hearing,
and in anticipation of the adjudication hearing. Directing our attention to
Kentucky case law, Mother maintains that parental rights are basic and essential
civil rights which are far more precious than property rights. She argues that one
of the fundamental purposes of the Kentucky Unified Juvenile Code is the
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protection of the parent-child relationship, which can only be accomplished via
judicial proceedings in which Due Process and fundamental issues of procedural
fairness are exercised. Specifically, Mother points to KRS 620.100(3), which
states that “[T]he adjudication shall determine the truth or falsity of the allegations
in the complaint. The burden of proof shall be made by a preponderance of the
evidence. The Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure shall apply.”
Mother directs our attention to the discovery provisions set out in CR
26, CR 33 and CR 34, and notes that the Commonwealth admitted the photographs
into evidence at the adjudication hearing which it had not disclosed via discovery.
Mother argues that the court’s Order denying her motion to compel discovery was
violative of KRS 620.100(3), improperly denied her Due Process and prevented
her from having a meaningful basis for cross-examining the Commonwealth’s
witnesses.
In response, the Commonwealth contends that there are practical
reasons why general discovery practices are not applicable in the framework of
preliminary dependency, neglect and abuse cases. It maintains that it is not
possible to engage in protracted discovery in preliminary matters while still
complying with the statutory mandate to conclude adjudication and disposition
within 45 days. Further, the Commonwealth argues that due to the unique nature
of such cases, confidentiality issues would be compromised by the application of
general discovery. Ultimately, it contends that the procedural process afforded
Mother in the instant case fairly and adequately protected the rights of all involved
7
parties by providing the application of the Civil Rules beginning with the
adjudication hearing, and that no harm can be found by the introduction of the
photographs which were not made discoverable.
We find no error in the Lewis Circuit Court’s determination that
Mother was not entitled to discovery until the commencement of the adjudication
hearing process. In denying Mother’s motion to compel discovery, the court cited
KRS 620.100(3), which states that “[T]he adjudication shall determine the truth or
falsity of the allegations in the complaint. The burden of proof shall be upon the
complainant, and a determination of dependency, neglect, and abuse shall be made
by a preponderance of the evidence. The Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure shall
apply.” Nothing in the Civil Rules, the statutory law, or case law compels the
court to give effect to the Civil Rules, and therefore to compel discovery, prior to
the adjudication hearing. The Cabinet properly notes that dependency, neglect and
abuse procedure is a product of statute, namely KRS Chapter 600, et seq. KRS
620.090(5), for example, requires the court to conduct the adjudicatory hearing and
make a final disposition within forty-five days of the removal of the child. In most
cases, it would be not only impractical but indeed impossible to conduct
meaningful discovery, including the production of documents, depositions and
interrogatories, within the timeframe proscribed by statute.
We are also persuaded by the Cabinet’s contention that the process
afforded Mother fairly and adequately protected the rights of all parties involved.
Mother’s right to be represented by counsel, to confront and cross-examine
8
witnesses, etc., as set out in KRS 610.060, was satisfied by the appointment of
counsel, who assisted in Mother’s full participation in the adjudication and
disposition hearings. Furthermore, the record indicates that the Cabinet and the
court agreed that Mother would be permitted to examine the Cabinet’s evidence
prior to the adjudication hearing. Mother, through counsel, could have examined
the photographs of Child 1 and the other documentary evidence had she chosen to
do so, even though there is nothing in the statutory law or case law compelling the
Cabinet to provide access to its records.
The burden does not rest with the Cabinet to demonstrate that Mother
was not entitled to full discovery prior to the adjudication hearing. Rather, the
burden rests with Mother to overcome the strong presumption that the trial court’s
ruling on this issue was correct. Parrish v. Parrish, 432 S.W.2d 632 (Ky. 1968).
She has not met that burden, and accordingly, we find no error on this issue.
Mother next briefly argues that the trial court’s Adjudication Order
and findings of neglect were not supported by substantial evidence. The focus of
this argument is her contention that if the photographs at issue were not significant
enough to have been disclosed prior to the adjudication hearing, then they are not
properly characterized as substantial evidence. We are not persuaded by this
argument. To reiterate, Mother was availed of the opportunity to examine the
photographs prior to the adjudication hearing. There is nothing in the record
indicating that she did so, nor does she assert in her written argument that she
examined the photographs. This point aside, the Cabinet had only to demonstrate
9
by a preponderance of the evidence that Child 1 and Child 2 were abused or
neglected. KRS 620.100(3). The testimony of social worker Arnold, two law
enforcement officers and Stevenson, in conjunction with the photographs of Child
1’s bruised body, reasonably constitute substantial evidence for purposes of
concluding that the circuit court did not abuse its broad discretion in determining,
by a preponderance of the evidence, that the children were abused or neglected.
KRS 600.020; R.C.R. v. Commonwealth, Cabinet for Human Resources, 988
S.W.2d 36 (Ky. App. 1998). Accordingly, we find no error on this issue.
Lastly, Mother argues that the circuit court failed to consider less
restrictive alternatives to the continued removal of the children from the home as
required by KRS 620.130. She notes that the court failed to check off the box on
the disposition hearing form, and maintains that this represents a basis for
reversing the Orders on appeal. While Mother is correct that the “no less
restrictive alternatives” box was not checked on the disposition form, the circuit
court did note at the adjudication hearing that there were no less restrictive
alternatives than the removal of the children from the home. This is evidenced by
the court checking the “no less restrictive alternatives” box on the adjudication
form. This is sufficient to satisfy the statutory requirement that the court consider
less restrictive alternatives as set out in KRS 620.130, and we find no error.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the Disposition Orders of the
Lewis Circuit Court.
ALL CONCUR.
10
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Bryan Underwood
Maysville, Kentucky
Clayton G. Lykins, Jr.
Vanceburg, Kentucky
11
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