STEPHENS (SAMUEL) VS. COMP TRANS STAR AMBULANCE , ET AL.
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RENDERED: MARCH 12, 2010; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2009-CA-001887-WC
SAMUEL STEPHENS
v.
APPELLANT
PETITION FOR REVIEW OF A DECISION
OF THE WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BOARD
ACTION NO. WC-04-94270
TRANS STAR AMBULANCE;
J. LANDON OVERFIELD,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE;
AND WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BOARD
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: STUMBO, TAYLOR, AND VANMETER, JUDGES.
STUMBO, JUDGE: Samuel Stephens appeals from an opinion of the Workers’
Compensation Board (hereinafter Board) which affirmed the opinion of
Administrative Law Judge (hereinafter ALJ) J. Landon Overfield. ALJ Overfield
overruled a motion to reopen Stephens’ workers’ compensation claim on the basis
that Stephens had not made a prima facie case for reopening the claim. We affirm.
On February 2, 2004, Stephens was working for Trans Star
Ambulance as an emergency medical technician. On this date, while exiting an
ambulance, he rolled his right ankle and fell onto his left knee. He was diagnosed
with a probable tear of the lateral meniscus. Stephens filed a workers’
compensation claim. ALJ James Kerr presided over the claim. Stephens was
found to have a 4% impairment rating, but was able to return to work with some
restrictions, such as no climbing, squatting, or prolonged weight bearing.
On February 20, 2009, Stephens filed a motion to reopen his claim
arguing that his condition had gotten worse. Attached to the motion was the
previous workers’ compensation opinion and medical records showing Stephens
had undergone a left knee arthroscopic medial and lateral meniscectomy and left
knee chondroplasty of the patella. These surgical records note there was a tear
found at the posterior horn of the meniscus in the medial compartment and the
lateral compartment. Also attached were post-operative records noting that
Stephens was doing well, but still experiencing pain in his left knee.
Trans Star responded to the motion asserting that Stephens had failed
to make a prima facie case for a change in condition, which is required to reopen
the claim.
The motion to reopen was denied by ALJ Overfield. Stephens then
filed a petition to reconsider, which was overruled. ALJ Overfield stated in his
order denying the petition for reconsideration that the surgery Stephens underwent
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did not change his 4% impairment rating and the restrictions set forth by the
surgeon were similar to the previous restrictions set forth in the original claim.
Stephens then appealed to the Board. It was in this appeal that he first
stated that he believed he was totally and permanently disabled and unable to
continue to work. The Board affirmed the decision of ALJ Overfield. This appeal
followed.
Stephens moved to reopen his case pursuant to Kentucky Revised
Statute (KRS) 342.125(1)(d) which states that a workers’ compensation award may
be reopened upon a “[c]hange of disability as shown by objective medical evidence
of worsening or improvement of impairment due to a condition caused by the
injury since the date of the award or order.”
Although an award of workers’ compensation benefits
has the same finality as a court judgment, KRS 342.125
permits an award to be reopened due to post-award
changes. Beale v. Faultless Hardware, 837 S.W.2d 893,
896 (Ky. 1992). A party seeking to reopen a claim or
award “should be required to make a reasonable prima
facie preliminary showing of the existence of a
substantial possibility of the presence of one or more of
the prescribed conditions that warrant a change in the
Board’s decision before his adversary is put to the
additional expense of relitigation.” Stambaugh v. Cedar
Creek Mining Co., 488 S.W.2d 681, 682 (Ky. 1972).
Farris v. City of Louisville, 209 S.W.3d 486, 488 (Ky. App. 2006).
KRS 342.125(1)(d) requires a change of disability to be
shown by “objective medical evidence of a worsening . . .
of impairment.” The statute does not refer to the Guides
[to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment], to
permanent impairment rating, or to permanent disability
rating. We conclude, therefore, that although a greater
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permanent impairment rating is objective medical
evidence of a worsening of impairment, it is not the only
evidence by which the statute permits a worsening of
impairment to be shown. . . . If such findings demonstrate
that an injured worker suffers a greater loss, loss of use,
or derangement of a body part, organ system, or organ
function due to a condition caused by the injury, they
demonstrate a worsening of impairment. A worsening of
impairment may or may not warrant increasing the
worker’s permanent impairment rating under the Guides.
Colwell v. Dresser Instrument Div., 217 S.W.3d 213, 218 (Ky. 2006).
“Evidence of a worsening of impairment requires that there be a
comparison of impairment at two points in time.” Hodges v. Sager Corp., 182
S.W.3d 497, 501 (Ky. 2005). Further, it is left to the fact finder’s reasonable
discretion to determine if a prima facie showing has been made. Farris at 488.
Finally, “the function of the Court of Appeals in reviewing decisions of the
Workers’ Compensation Board is to correct the Board only when we perceive that
the Board has overlooked or misconstrued controlling law or committed an error in
assessing the evidence so flagrant as to cause gross injustice.” Daniel v. Armco
Steel Co., L.P., 913 S.W.2d 797, 797-798 (Ky. App. 1995). We find no error here.
Stephens put forth no evidence that compared his injury as it was back
in 2004 to the time of his motion to reopen. He also did not present any evidence
that the cause of his current condition related back to the work injury. While the
surgery was done on the knee that was injured at work, there was evidence in the
record that stated he had recently suffered a fall and injured that same knee. The
only evidence he presented was that he underwent knee surgery, but he did not
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show that this caused his condition to become worse. He did not present evidence
that his knee was worse after the surgery than at the time of the original workers’
compensation award. In fact, his 4% impairment rating did not change and the
movement restrictions he was given after the surgery were similar to those initially
given to him at the time of his work injury.
The ALJ and Board examined the evidence and the law, and we can
find no error. We therefore affirm the opinions of the ALJ and Board and hold
Stephens did not make a prima facie case for reopening his claim.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Stephanie L. Kinney
Glenn M. Hammond
Pikeville, Kentucky
James W. Herald III
Pikeville, Kentucky
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