HARLOW (ELISA M.) VS. BEVERLY HEALTH AND REHABILITATION SERVICES, INC.
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RENDERED: NOVEMBER 19, 2010; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2009-CA-001852-MR
ELISA M. HARLOW,
EXECUTRIX FOR THE
ESTATE OF EUGENE SALESMAN
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE MARY M. SHAW, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 08-CI-011816
BEVERLY HEALTH AND
REHABILITATION SERVICES,
INC., D/B/A CAMELOT HEALTHCARE
SPECIALTY CENTER
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: MOORE, KELLER, AND STUMBO, JUDGES.
MOORE, JUDGE: Elisa M. Harlow, Executrix for the Estate of Eugene Salesman,
appeals the Jefferson Circuit Court’s decision affirming an arbitration order
dismissing arbitration in a nursing home abuse case. After careful review of the
record, we affirm.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Eugene Salesman filed a nursing home abuse case against four
defendants, including Appellee Beverly Health & Rehabilitation Services, Inc.
While the suit was pending, Salesman passed away on April 7, 2005.
On May 3, 2005, the court granted Beverly’s motion to amend its
answer. This amended answer asserted for the first time that the matter should be
sent to arbitration. On May 3, 2005, the court ordered the action to be held in
abeyance until further order. After a hearing on May 26, 2005, the court signed, on
June 3, 2005, an order which set aside the May 3, 2005 order for the limited
purpose of allowing the parties to conduct discovery on the issue of the validity of
the arbitration agreement. The case continued to be held in abeyance in all other
respects.
On May 25, 2005, Salesman’s niece, Elisa M. Harlow, was appointed
by the Jefferson Probate Court as Executrix of her uncle’s estate. Harlow, as
Executrix of Salesman’s estate, filed a response to Beverly’s motion to arbitrate.
On May 19, 2006, all defendants moved the court to dismiss the
actions filed against them because Harlow did not revive the action within one year
of Salesman’s death. Harlow submitted a memorandum and reply opposing the
defendants’ motions. A hearing was held before the trial court on August 14,
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2006, with two subsequent orders issued dismissing Beverly and the other
defendants.
After Harlow filed an appeal from the trial court’s dismissal of the
defendants, she asked Beverly if it still wished to arbitrate the case. There being a
mutual interest to arbitrate the case in lieu of extending litigation through an
appeal, Harlow agreed to voluntarily withdraw the appeal in consideration of
arbitrating the case. Beverly agreed, and Harlow dismissed the appeal for the
purposes of going to arbitration.
Once the case was submitted to arbitration, Beverly moved the
arbitrator to dismiss the case based on res judicata and collateral estoppel grounds.
The arbitrator denied Beverly’s motion and held that the trial court did not
previously have subject matter jurisdiction due to the arbitration agreement.
Therefore, the trial court’s order could not act as res judicata or collateral estoppel.
Beverly then filed a second motion to dismiss, this time based on
statute of limitations grounds and that Harlow had waived her right to arbitrate.
On October 2, 2008, the arbitrator granted Beverly’s second motion to dismiss.
Harlow moved the arbitrator for reopening and reconsideration on the
basis that the October 2, 2008 order was ambiguous and contained evident material
mistakes, including a failure to consider the Kentucky Saving Statute, Kentucky
Revised Statute (KRS) 413.270. The arbitrator subsequently denied Harlow’s
request for reopening and reconsideration.
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Harlow, on May 12, 2009, then moved the trial court to vacate the
arbitration order based on the award being procured by corruption, fraud or other
undue means under KRS 417.160(1)(a) and that the arbitrator exceeded his power
under KRS 417.160(1)(c). The trial court denied Harlow’s motion to reverse or
vacate the arbitration award. This appeal followed.
II. ANALYSIS
I.
THE ARBITRATION AWARD WAS NOT PROCURED BY
FRAUD OR UNDUE MEANS.
Harlow contends that the trial court erred (1) in its interpretation of
fraud regarding procuring arbitration awards and (2) failed to consider “undue
means” in procuring the arbitration award. We disagree.
Although deference is generally given to arbitration awards, the
Kentucky Uniform Arbitration Act (KUAA) instructs trial courts to vacate them in
given circumstances. Conagra Poultry v. Grissom Transp., 186 S.W.3d 243 (Ky.
App. 2006); KRS 417.160. The KUAA provides that a trial court shall vacate an
award when “[t]he award was procured by corruption, fraud or other undue
means.” KRS 417.160(1)(a). Harlow alleges both fraud and undue means, but not
corruption.
“[O]ur review of a trial court's ruling in a KRS 417.060 proceeding is
according to usual appellate standards. That is, we defer to the trial court's factual
findings, upsetting them only if clearly erroneous or if unsupported by substantial
evidence, but we review without deference the trial court's identification and
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application of legal principles.” Conseco Finance Services Corp. v. Wilder, 47
S.W.3d 335, 340 (Ky. App. 2001).
The trial court’s opinion and order denying Harlow’s motion to
reverse or vacate the arbitration order contains a recitation of facts, which
methodically identifies all of the allegations and procedural steps of the original
litigation, appeal, and arbitration. The trial court clearly discusses Harlow’s claim
that the arbitration was procured by fraud or undue means and identifies the six
elements of fraud upon which such facts must be reviewed. The trial court found
the facts, when applied to the law, did not support Harlow’s contentions:
Even when the Court considers the matter in a light most
favorable to Ms. Harlow, it cannot say her argument
concerning fraud or undue means is convincing.
Presume the Defendant specifically told Ms. Harlow,
“We want to arbitrate this case. We will agree to
arbitrate the case if you dismiss the appeal;” where is the
falsity in these representations? The Defendant did agree
to arbitrate; this is obviously so because the case came
before an Arbitrator for a decision. What Ms. Harlow
has not, and likely cannot, say is that the Defendant also
agreed to waive any defenses when it agreed to arbitrate.
Taking a case to an arbitrator and arguing that dismissal
is proper is not fraudulent. Indeed, without an agreement
between the parties that the Defendant would waive any
defenses it had at its disposal, it could be considered a
violation of counsel’s duty of representation not to
present those defenses.
The trial court specifically found that there was no false statement and thus no
fraud in the representation. Harlow had the burden of proving each element of
fraud by clear and convincing evidence. Wahba v. Don Corlett Motors, Inc., 573
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S.W.2d 357, 359 (Ky. App. 1978). Absent the required element of falsity,
Harlow’s argument fails.
We agree with the trial court’s analysis. Factually, the agreement was
to submit the case to arbitration, which was done. The arbitrator denied Beverly’s
motion to dismiss based on res judicata, allowing Harlow the opportunity to plead
her claim again without regard to the trial court’s prior dismissal. After dismissing
the arbitration, the arbitrator granted Harlow’s motion to reconsider, over objection
that the arbitrator lacked jurisdiction due to the pending appeal to the lower court.
Therefore, Harlow was given ample opportunity to plead her claim.
Harlow insists however that she was denied arbitration “on the merits”
because it was dismissed on statute of limitation grounds. A decision “on the
merits” is a determination of which party is in the right, based upon the facts, as
opposed to a dismissal without prejudice based solely on a procedural error that
permits a party to file again. See Black’s Law Dictionary, 6th ed. (1990) (“A party
who has received a judgment on the merits cannot bring the same suit again.”); see
also Snodgrass v. Snodgrass, 297 S.W.3d 878, 885 (Ky. App. 2009).
The arbitrator found that Harlow’s claim must be dismissed for the
same reason given by the trial court, i.e., failure to file within the applicable period
of limitations. The action had not been revived within one year of Salesman’s
death as required by KRS 395.278. As a statute of limitation, compliance with the
statute is mandatory. Frank v. Estate of Enderle, 253 S.W.3d 570 (Ky. App.
2008). Therefore, this was not a dismissal on mere procedural grounds, but a
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determination on the facts, with prejudice, on the merits. See e.g., Dennis v. Fiscal
Court of Bullitt County, 784 S.W.2d 608, 609 (Ky. App. 1990). Consequently,
Harlow did receive an arbitration decision on the merits. Accordingly, we cannot
say that the trial court’s decision was clearly erroneous.
II.
THE ARBITRATOR ACTED APPROPRIATELY AND
WITHIN HIS POWERS.
Harlow also contends that the arbitrator exceeded his powers
requiring the arbitration award to be vacated under KRS 417.160. We disagree.
Harlow first contends that the arbitrator exceeded his powers when he
denied Harlow’s request for reopening and reconsideration. As a basis for this
contention, Harlow argues that “the oral agreement between Appellant and
opposing counsel was presented to the arbitrator [and] fixed the boundaries of
deciding the matter submitted to those factors and grounds within the underlying
claim.”
There is no evidence in the record suggesting that any “boundaries”
were placed on the arbitration. It is clear from the record that there was an
agreement to arbitrate, but there was never an agreement between the parties to
waive substantive defenses such as the statute of limitations. Both the trial court
and arbitrator made it clear in their findings that there was no evidence of such
agreement to waive substantive defenses. Therefore, Harlow cannot establish
grounds to vacate the arbitration order under this contention.
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Harlow also contends that the arbitrator exceeded his power in ruling
that the action was not covered by the Kentucky Saving Statute, KRS 413.270.
Harlow argues that since the arbitration claim was filed within ninety (90) days of
the voluntary dismissal of the appeal, the statute “saves” the action from dismissal
under the statute of limitations. However, the Saving Statute requires that the
original action be timely filed. Here the original trial court action was filed by
Salesman within one year of the alleged negligent conduct. But Harlow, as the
Executrix of the Estate, failed to revive the action by substituting as the proper
plaintiff within one year of Salesman’s death as required by KRS 395.278 and CR
25.01(1). The civil action was dismissed on the merits because the statute of
limitations had run. The Saving Statute does not toll the statute of limitation, and
does not apply where the dismissal is based on the statute of limitations and not
lack of jurisdiction. See Lair v. Johnson, 313 S.W.2d 272, 273 (Ky. 1958).
Both the arbitrator and the lower court considered and rejected
application of the statute. The arbitrator provided a careful and detailed analysis of
the law and facts, concluding that the statute did not apply because the trial court
did not dismiss for lack of jurisdiction (as required by the statute), but for failure to
file within the statute of limitations. The trial court reviewed that analysis and
agreed. As we defer to the trial court’s findings of fact, we cannot say that the trial
court’s decision in this regard was clearly erroneous.
Accordingly, the order of the Jefferson Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
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BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Martha Marie Eastman
Louisville, Kentucky
A. Courtney Guild, Jr.
Louisville, Kentucky
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