GOINS (PAUL DAVID) VS. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: JUNE 18, 2010; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2009-CA-001780-MR
PAUL DAVID GOINS
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM PENDLETON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE ROBERT W. MCGINNIS, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 05-CR-00019
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: MOORE AND THOMPSON, JUDGES; WHITE,1 SENIOR JUDGE.
MOORE, JUDGE: Paul David Goins appeals the order of the Pendleton Circuit
Court denying his RCr2 11.42 motion to vacate or set aside his conviction. After a
1
Senior Judge Edwin M. White, sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and KRS 21.580.
2
Kentucky Rule of Criminal Procedure.
careful review of the record, we affirm because Goins failed to show that he
received the ineffective assistance of trial counsel.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Goins and his four children lived in Pendleton County. Mark Grieg,
the boyfriend of Goins’s oldest child, Kathy, moved into Goins’s home. Goins
contends that he was unaware that Grieg was Kathy’s boyfriend at that time. Grieg
was unemployed. Grieg told Goins that he would soon return to Florida to work as
a musician. Grieg also informed Goins that Kathy, who was eighteen years old,
was going to go to Florida with him.
Goins’s children were all staying with relatives during an ice storm
that had caused a power outage in Goins’s home. Goins and Grieg remained at
Goins’s home. At some time that evening, Goins shot and stabbed Grieg, then
drove him to the emergency room, dropped him off, and left. Grieg survived, but
he had multiple wounds.
Following a jury trial, Goins was convicted of first-degree assault and
he was sentenced to serve twenty years of imprisonment. He appealed the
judgment against him, and the Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed his conviction.
See Goins v. Commonwealth, No. 2006-SC-000193-MR, 2007 WL 541939, *1
(Ky. Feb. 22, 2007) (unpublished).
Goins filed his RCr 11.42 motion in the circuit court, contending that
his conviction should be vacated or set aside because he had received the
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ineffective assistance of trial counsel. The circuit court held an evidentiary hearing
and subsequently denied Goins’s RCr 11.42 motion.
Goins now appeals, contending that the circuit court erred in denying
his motion because: (a) he received the ineffective assistance of counsel when
counsel failed to introduce mitigating evidence during the sentencing phase of his
trial; and (b) he received the ineffective assistance of counsel when counsel failed
to request instructions on lesser-included offenses. Both of these claims are
preserved for appellate review.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
In a motion brought under RCr 11.42, “[t]he movant has the burden of
establishing convincingly that he or she was deprived of some substantial right
which would justify the extraordinary relief provided by [a] post-conviction
proceeding. . . . A reviewing court must always defer to the determination of facts
and witness credibility made by the circuit judge.” Simmons v. Commonwealth,
191 S.W.3d 557, 561 (Ky. 2006), overruled on other grounds by Leonard v.
Commonwealth, 279 S.W.3d 151, 159 (Ky. 2009). An RCr 11.42 motion is
“limited to issues that were not and could not be raised on direct appeal.” Id.
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III. ANALYSIS
A. CLAIM REGARDING MITIGATING EVIDENCE
Goins first alleges that he received the ineffective assistance of trial
counsel when counsel failed to introduce mitigating evidence during the sentencing
phase of his trial. The mitigating evidence that he contends should have been
introduced was evidence that Goins was raising and providing for his four children
by himself on his salary from Rumpke, a garbage collection company. He asserts
that his oldest daughter, Kathy, who subsequently became the battered spouse of
Grieg, would have made a good mitigation witness. Further, Goins alleges that,
despite her emotional outburst at trial, his youngest daughter Tabitha should have
been called as a mitigation witness, as had been planned.
To prove that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel, thus
warranting a reversal of his conviction, Goins must show that: (1) counsel’s
performance was deficient, in that it fell outside “the wide range of reasonable
professional assistance”; and (2) this deficient performance prejudiced his defense.
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 689, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674
(1984).
“Under Strickland, defense counsel has an affirmative duty to make
reasonable investigation for mitigating evidence or to make a reasonable decision
that particular investigation is not necessary. The reasonableness of counsel’s
investigation depends on the circumstances of the case.” Hodge v.
Commonwealth, 68 S.W.3d 338, 344 (Ky. 2001) (citations omitted). The Court in
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Hodge relied upon the holding in a case from the United States Court of Appeals
for the Eleventh Circuit, stating:
An attorney has a duty to conduct a reasonable
investigation, including an investigation of the
defendant’s background, for possible mitigating
evidence. In evaluating whether counsel has discharged
this duty to investigate, develop, and present mitigating
evidence, we follow a three-part analysis. First, it must
be determined whether a reasonable investigation should
have uncovered such mitigating evidence. If so, then a
determination must be made whether the failure to put
this evidence before the jury was a tactical choice by trial
counsel. If so, such a choice must be given a strong
presumption of correctness, and the inquiry is generally
at an end. If the choice was not tactical and the
performance was deficient, then it must be determined
whether there is a reasonable probability that, but for
counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result would have
been different.
Hodge, 68 S.W.3d at 344 (internal quotation marks omitted and emphasis
removed).
It appears the mitigating evidence of Goins being a father who was
raising his four children by himself and only on his salary was investigated by
Goins’s attorney, and counsel testified during the RCr 11.42 evidentiary hearing
that this evidence was presented during the guilt phase of the trial. Thus, this
evidence was placed before the jury, and this part of Goins’s mitigation claim lacks
merit.
Goins also contends that his youngest daughter, Tabitha, planned to
testify as a mitigation witness, and that she should have been called as such.
However, trial counsel attested that he ultimately decided not to use Tabitha as a
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mitigation witness during the sentencing phase of trial because Tabitha had had an
emotional outburst after the verdict was announced, in which Tabitha said some
“unhelpful” things to the jury. Thus, counsel did not have her testify in mitigation
because he was worried that she may say other things to the jury and essentially
cause further harm to Goins. Additionally, counsel attested that the facts he would
have evoked from Tabitha during the sentencing phase had already been presented
to the jury during the guilt phase of the trial. Therefore, because it was a tactical
decision not to have Tabitha testify and the mitigation evidence that would have
been presented through her was already before the jury following the guilt phase of
the trial, counsel did not err in failing to call her as a mitigation witness during the
sentencing phase.
Goins also argues that his oldest daughter, Kathy, should have been
called as a mitigation witness because she married Grieg after the assault and she
was later battered by him. However, counsel testified that Kathy was not a good
mitigation witness because she did not even want to come back to Kentucky from
New York for the trial and counsel thought she did not want to help Goins. From
what counsel had heard of Kathy, he thought she was not a very “stable” person
and, therefore, he did not think she would be a good mitigation witness. Because
this was a tactical decision on counsel’s part, we cannot say that counsel erred in
failing to present Kathy as a mitigation witness.
Therefore, because the decisions not to call Kathy or Tabitha as
mitigation witnesses were tactical decisions by counsel, we cannot say that counsel
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erred in failing to present them as witnesses. Moreover, counsel testified that the
evidence Goins wanted presented to the jury about him raising and providing for
his four children by himself had already been introduced during the guilt phase of
the trial. Thus, because this evidence had already been presented to the jury, we
cannot say that the result of the trial would likely have been different if this
evidence was re-introduced during the sentencing phase. Consequently, this claim
of ineffective assistance of counsel lacks merit.
B. CLAIM REGARDING LESSER-INCLUDED OFFENSES
Goins also contends that he received the ineffective assistance of trial
counsel when counsel failed to request jury instructions on the lesser-included
offenses of second-degree assault and first-degree assault under extreme emotional
disturbance. On direct appeal, the Kentucky Supreme Court held that the evidence
in this case did not support jury instructions for second-degree assault or firstdegree assault under extreme emotional disturbance. See Goins v. Commonwealth,
No. 2006-SC-000193-MR, 2007 WL 541939, at *2 (Ky. Feb. 22, 2007)
(unpublished).
In Leonard, 279 S.W.3d at 158-59, the Kentucky Supreme Court
confirmed a prior holding from the Court that
recognized the difference between an alleged error and a
separate collateral claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel related to the alleged error, and held that a claim
of the latter may be maintained even after the former has
been addressed on direct appeal, so long as they are
actually different issues.
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However, in the present case, the Supreme Court did not simply
address the alleged error concerning the jury instructions on direct appeal; the
Court actually held that the evidence did not even support jury instructions for
second-degree assault or first-degree assault under extreme emotional disturbance.
Therefore, counsel could not have performed deficiently by failing to request
instructions on lesser-included offenses when the evidence did not support
instructions on those offenses, and we cannot say that the trial court committed
error on this issue. See generally Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 689, 104 S. Ct. 2052,
80 L.Ed.2d 674. Consequently, this ineffective assistance of counsel claim lacks
merit.
Accordingly, the order of the Pendleton Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Bryan Underwood
Maysville, Kentucky
Jack Conway
Attorney General of Kentucky
Frankfort, Kentucky
Perry T. Ryan
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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