G. (M.) VS. CABINET FOR HEALTH AND FAMILY SERVICES , ET AL.
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RENDERED: OCTOBER 8, 2010; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2009-CA-001765-ME
M.G.
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM ESTILL CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE THOMAS P. JONES, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 09-AD-00002
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY,
CABINET FOR HEALTH AND FAMILY
SERVICES; AND S.A.G., AN INFANT
AND
NO. 2009-CA-001827-ME
G.B.
v.
APPELLEES
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM ESTILL CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE THOMAS P. JONES, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 09-AD-00002
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY,
CABINET FOR HEALTH AND FAMILY
SERVICES; AND S.A.G., AN INFANT
APPELLEES
AND
NO. 2009-CA-001834-ME
G.B.
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM ESTILL CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE THOMAS P. JONES, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 08-AD-00004
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY,
CABINET FOR HEALTH AND FAMILY
SERVICES; K.D.B., AN INFANT;
T.L.B., AN INFANT; AND D.L.B.,
AN INFANT
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: CLAYTON AND KELLER, JUDGES; BUCKINGHAM,1 SENIOR
JUDGE.
BUCKINGHAM, SENIOR JUDGE: This case involves three appeals of separate
orders terminating the parental rights of the parents of four children. Appellant
G.B. is the biological mother and R.B. is the biological father of three of the
children: K.D.B., T.L.B., and D.L.B. The Estill Circuit Court entered orders on
1
Senior Judge David C. Buckingham sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and Kentucky Revised Statutes
(KRS) 21.580.
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August 26, 2009, terminating the parental rights of G.B. and R.B. as to those three
children. Appellant G.B. appealed from the orders, but R.B. did not. Appellant
G.B. and Appellant M.G. are the biological parents of S.A.G. The Estill Circuit
Court also entered orders on August 26, 2009, terminating their parental rights as
to S.A.G. Appellant G.B. and Appellant M.G. filed separate appeals from those
orders. Appellant G.B and Appellant M.G. allege the court erred in terminating
their respective parental rights. We disagree and thus affirm.
Following a routine home visit by a state worker in January 2005,
T.L.B. and D.L.B were removed from the residence occupied by G.B. and R.B.,
who was G.B.’s husband. The district court found that substantial environmental
risks factors, including animal feces on the floor and exposed wires, made the
residence unsafe for the children. G.B. and R.B. both stipulated to neglect of the
children.
At the time the two children were removed, G.B. was pregnant with
K.D.B. When K.D.B. was born, that child was placed in state custody due to
ongoing sanitary problems with the home and the parents’ lack of preparations to
take the baby home and care for it properly. G.B. and R.B. separated shortly after
the birth of K.D.B. although they have never divorced.
G.B. later gave birth to S.A.G. Although G.B. and R.B. were married
at the time, paternity testing showed that M.G. is S.A.G.’s biological father.
S.A.G. was removed from the custody of G.B. and M.G. in November 2006
because neither parent was able to provide proper care.
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G.B. contends that it was error to remove the children from her
custody and terminate her parental rights because she did not have legal counsel at
the initial district court hearing where she admitted to neglect and because there
was insufficient proof to terminate her parental rights. M.G. argues that
termination of his parental rights regarding S.A.G. was improper because there was
never a finding that he neglected the child and because there was insufficient proof
regarding his progress in completing his case plan so as to enable the child to be
returned to him.
When we review a termination of parental rights action, we will
affirm unless the trial court’s decision was clearly erroneous or lacking in clear and
convincing evidence. M.P.S. v. Cabinet for Human Resources, 979 S.W.2d 114,
116 (Ky. App. 1998). We must determine whether the trial court’s decision was
“supported by substantial evidence.” M.E.C. v. Commonwealth, 254 S.W.3d 846,
850 (Ky. App. 2008).
As it relates to G.B. and S.A.G., on November 20, 2006, a state
worker inspected the home following a domestic dispute and found it unsuitable
and unsafe for S.A.G., then three-months old. There were clear signs of a domestic
disturbance, including holes in the wall, and the child was very dirty with
blackheads on his face and chin. Further, the child’s sleeper was filthy, and there
were many dirty baby bottles with clabbered milk in them, no suitable baby bed,
and inappropriate stage II baby food. The child was removed from the home at
that time.
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G.B. was thereafter put on a case plan with the Cabinet in an effort to
have the child returned to her custody. Ultimately, the Cabinet felt her efforts were
lacking or unsuccessful, and termination of her parental rights was sought in the
circuit court. Evidence at the termination hearing supported the petition to
terminate. G.B. failed to take the child to scheduled appointments for treatment of
a club foot, failed to maintain a sanitary and hazard free home, and missed
visitation periods with the child. G.B. also failed to complete the mandated
parenting assessment in a timely manner, was unable to complete any domestic
violence counseling, made little to no progress in obtaining her GED, and did not
complete birth control education. The trial court acknowledged the tasks she had
completed or attempted, including finding steady employment, but found “no
reasonable expectation of improvement in parental care and protection[.]” Having
reviewed the record, we conclude that the trial court’s decision was supported by
substantial evidence.
As it relates to G.B. and the other children, there had been some
improvement such as retaining suitable employment, yet the children remained in
jeopardy. G.B. stated she was not sure she needed parenting classes. One child
had exhibited sexual behavior, yet G.B. planned to have that child sleep with
another child of the opposite sex if the children were returned to her. Further, there
was testimony that G.B. was sporadic in her visits with the children and that G.B.
had never attended and completed the domestic violence classes that she was
required by her case plan to attend. Also, there was testimony that G.B. had not
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completed additional requirements of her case plan that included completing her
GED and consulting with the local health department concerning birth control.
The trial court found “no reasonable expectation of significant improvement in the
parents’ conduct in the immediately foreseeable future[.]” Again, we reviewed the
record and conclude that the trial court’s decision was supported by substantial
evidence.
G.B also contends that her rights to due process were violated because
she does not know if a lawyer was appointed to represent her at the initial hearing
in district court where she stipulated the children were neglected as defined in
Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 600.020. As we have noted, there were two
termination cases: one involving the three children G.B. had by R.B. and one
involving the child G.B. had by M.G.
District court records clearly list an attorney for the hearing in Estill
County, and her own testimony affirmed the fact that she had counsel. The case
involving S.A.G., however, began in the Clark County District Court. Her
testimony regarding that case is cloudy. At one point she could not remember
whether or not she had counsel. At another point she was just unable to remember
the name of her lawyer. She also testified that someone told her she had an
attorney but that he rarely “showed up.”
It is not sufficient to rely on a lapse of memory to mount a due
process violation challenge. The circuit court found the necessary elements to
terminate her parental rights. The findings and orders of that court are silent
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regarding whether or not she was represented by counsel at the initial hearing in
the district court. Had there been a question regarding her representation, it was
incumbent on G.B. to request a specific finding from the circuit court. See Vinson
v. Sorrell, 136 S.W.3d 465, 471 (Ky. 2007). She did not do so.
Regarding the parental rights of M.G. to S.A.G., as we have noted, the
child was removed from the home and placed in state custody on November 20,
2006. Although he was assisted by Cabinet for Health and Family workers, M.G.
was not able to prove paternity by DNA testing until June 4, 2007. He was then
given a case plan to follow in an effort to have the child returned to his custody.
By that time, however, the district court had already made a finding that the child
was neglected. M.G. contends that it was improper to terminate his parental rights
as he was never before the district court and there was no finding that he had
neglected the child.
KRS 600.010(g) provides that the protections of the juvenile code
“belong to the child individually.” When a neglect action is filed in the district
court, the subject is the child. See KRS 620.070(1). The district court determines
whether the child is neglected. KRS 625.090(1). There is nothing that requires the
neglect be attributed to any specific person. The circuit court found S.A.G. was a
neglected child pursuant to KRS 600.020(1). The question of who were the
biological parents had no bearing on the neglect determination.
Following a determination that M.G. was not satisfactorily
progressing in the completion of his case plan, an action was filed to terminate his
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parental rights to S.A.G. The circuit court ultimately found termination of parental
rights was in the best interest of the child. Having reviewed the record, we
conclude there was sufficient evidence to support this conclusion. See M.E.C. v.
Commonwealth, 254 S.W.3d 846, 850 (Ky. App. 2008).
The court reviewed M.G.’s progress toward insuring a safe and
sanitary environment for the child and found him lacking. He failed to complete
parenting assessment and also parenting classes. Although he was prepared to
maintain adequate housing, he was unable to exhibit appropriate parenting skills
during visitation sessions with the child. Further, there was evidence that M.G.
failed to complete the Comprehensive Care assessment that was also a part of his
case plan. Again, there was sufficient evidence to support the determination of the
circuit court, and this court will not interfere. Id.
While G.B. and M.G. claim to have made progress, the fact is the trial
court found that over the last few years their efforts fell much short. There was
sufficient evidence before the trial court to warrant termination of the parental
rights of each parent. As in the case of V.S. v. Com., Cabinet for Human
Resources, 706 S.W.2d 420, 424 (Ky. App. 1986), “[t]he proof in this case lies in
past performance. The risks are too great to experiment further with the children’s
future.”
The orders of the Estill Circuit Court terminating the parental rights of
G.B. regarding the children T.L.B., D.L.B, and K.D.B., and G.B. and M.G.
regarding S.A.G., are affirmed.
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ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT, M.G.:
Monica S. Lacy
Stanton, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE,
COMMONWEALTH OF
KENTUCKY, CABINET FOR
HEALTH AND FAMILY
SERVICES:
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT, G.B.:
Kaye L. Leighton
Mt. Sterling, Kentucky
Sheila F. Redmond
Lexington, Kentucky
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