A. (J. R.) VS. A. (G. D.)
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RENDERED: JUNE 11, 2010; 10:00 A.M.
TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2009-CA-001709-ME
J.R.A.
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
FAMILY COURT DIVISION
HONORABLE KEVIN L. GARVEY, SENIOR JUDGE
ACTION NO. 09-CI-501267
G.D.A.
APPELLEE
OPINION
REVERSING AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: CLAYTON, TAYLOR, AND THOMPSON, JUDGES.
TAYLOR, JUDGE: J.R.A. brings this appeal from an August 19, 2009, Order of
the Jefferson Circuit Court, Family Court Division, (family court) adjudicating him
the legal father of D.A.S. We reverse and remand.
On September 21, 2002, appellee married her first husband, S.L.S.
Three days later, appellee gave birth to a daughter, D.A.S. At that time, D.A.S.
took the last name of S.L.S. Appellee and S.L.S. were divorced by decree of
dissolution of marriage entered in the family court on July 29, 2003. The decree
makes no reference to any children of the marriage.1
Some three years later, on May 1, 2006, appellee married appellant.
At the time of the parties’ marriage, appellee’s daughter, D.A.S., was three years
old. On March 16, 2007, appellant and appellee executed and filed with the State
Registrar of Vital Statistics a Declaration of Paternity pursuant to Kentucky
Revised Statutes (KRS) 213.046.2 In so doing, both parties signed an affidavit
stating that appellant was the natural or biological father of D.A.S. Pursuant to the
declaration, D.A.S.’s last name was changed to that of appellant.
On April 13, 2009, appellant initiated the instant action by filing a
Petition for Dissolution of Marriage in the family court. Thereafter, appellant filed
a motion seeking “a hearing to Determine Petitioner’s Paternity Rights and
Obligations.” Therein, appellant averred that he was not the biological father of
D.A.S. Appellant further asserted that both he and appellee were aware that he
was not the biological father when executing the Declaration of Paternity in March
2007. Appellant asserts that he and appellee only executed and filed the
1
The July 29, 2003, Decree of Dissolution of Marriage made no reference to any children being
born of the marriage. The decree did incorporate a Property Settlement Agreement, but the
record on appeal is devoid of a copy of said agreement. However, appellee testified that S.L.S.
was not the biological father of D.A.S.
2
Although not relevant for purposes of this appeal, we have considerable doubt whether this
statute is applicable, or was otherwise properly utilized to determine paternity by the family
court.
2
Declaration of Paternity to obtain insurance coverage for D.A.S. through his
employer.
In response to appellant’s motion, appellee admitted that appellant
was not D.A.S.’s biological father. However, appellee claimed that appellant
should be estopped from denying parentage and claimed that appellee “assumed a
parental relationship with the child.” Appellee also maintained that appellant held
himself out as D.A.S.’s father throughout the marriage and continued to act as
D.A.S.’s father after the parties’ separated.
Following a hearing, the family court entered an order on August 19,
2009. Therein, the court concluded that appellant was equitably estopped from
denying his paternity of D.A.S. and that appellant was D.A.S.’s “father and shall
have all of the rights and responsibilities of a natural parent.” In so concluding, the
court reasoned:
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A child born during a marriage is presumed to be
the child of the husband and wife. Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§406.011. Therefore, Kentucky law would generally
presume that [D.A.S.] is the child of [appellee] and her
first husband. However, the presumption of paternity is
one that may be rebutted. In this case, the presumption
of paternity was rebutted when the parties signed
affidavits stating that [appellant] is [D.A.S.’s] father and
changing her surname from [S.] to [A.] The only issue
remaining is whether [appellant] can overcome the
presumption that he created pursuant to KRS 406.021(4)
when he and [appellee] signed affidavits swearing that he
is [D.A.S.’s] father.
Since March 16, 2007[,] when [appellant] swore
that he is [D.A.S.’s] father, he has held himself out to be
her father. [Appellant] introduced himself to people as
[D.A.S.’s] father and introduced her to people as his
daughter. [D.A.S.] calls [appellant] “daddy” and has
never referred to anyone else as “daddy.” [Appellant]
went to most of [D.A.S.’s] doctor’s appointments and
went to her soccer practices and games. [Appellant] was
involved in [D.A.S.'s] education. [Appellant]
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acknowledged that [D.A.S.] has depended on him
emotionally and financially as a daughter depends on a
father. [Appellant] further acknowledged that he was
aware that he would be held financially responsible for
[D.A.S.] when he signed the affidavit declaring his
paternity. [Appellee] testified that she believes [D.A.S.]
would be very upset if she lost her relationship with
[appellant] and that [D.A.S.] does not remember a time
when [appellant] was not in her life.
Kentucky case law has recognized that the doctrine
of equitable estoppel may be applied to prevent a party
who has held himself as a child's father from later
denying paternity and terminating the parent-child
relationship. In the case of S.R.D[.] v. T.L.B., where the
husband had represented to the child that he was her
father despite knowledge that he might not be the father,
the child was unaware that the husband may not be her
father, the husband had acted with the intention that the
child consider him to be her father, and the child relied
on his conduct to her detriment, the Kentucky Court of
Appeals found that the husband could not be relieved of
his parental obligation. S.R.D. v. T.L.B., 174 S.W.3d
502, 509 (Ky. App. 2005). It has been noted by the
Kentucky Court of Appeals that the doctrine of paternity
by estoppel was employed in the case of S.R.D. v. T.L.B.
in order "to preserve the relationship (both emotional and
financial) between the child and the only father she had
ever known." Boone v. Ballinger, 228 S.W.3d 1, 12 (Ky.
App. 2007).
In this case, [appellant] has, through his actions,
represented to [D.A.S.] that he is her father. Despite the
testimony by both parties that [D.A.S.] is aware that
[appellant] is not her biological father, the Court finds
that based on her young age; [D.A.S.] is unaware that
biology would mean that [appellant] may one day
terminate the father-daughter relationship. The Court
further finds that despite [appellant]'s testimony that he
signed the affidavit declaring his paternity of [D.A.S.]
only so that he could cover her on his health insurance,
[appellant] acted with the intention of [D.A.S.]
considering him as her father by signing said affidavit,
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allowing her to call him "daddy," introducing himself as
[D.A.S.'s] father and [D.A.S.] as his daughter, and by
attending regular doctor visits as well as soccer practice
and games. [D.A.S.] did rely on [appellant]'s conduct to
her determinant, which he acknowledged in his testimony
when he stated that [D.A.S.] has relied on him both
emotionally and financially.
[Appellant] is the only father that [D.A.S.] has
ever known, and the Court will not allow [appellant] to
deny the responsibility that he willingly and knowingly
undertook by signing the affidavit of paternity simply
because his relationship with [D.A.S.’s] mother ended.
To allow [appellant] to deny this responsibility would
pose potentially serious ramifications for [D.A.S.]. . . .
....
. . . For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that
[appellant] created a presumption of paternity pursuant to
KRS 406.021(4) when he signed the affidavit declaring
that he is [D.A.S.’s] father. Based on the doctrine of
paternity by estoppel set forth in S.R.D. v. T.L.B., the
Court concludes that [appellant] cannot overcome the
presumption that he is [D.A.S.’s] father and cannot deny
his obligations toward her. [Appellant] is [D.A.S.’s]
father and therefore has all of the rights and
responsibilities that any natural parent has.
This appeal follows.
Appellant contends that the family court erred by concluding that he
was equitably estopped from denying paternity of D.A.S. For the reasons
hereinafter stated, we agree.
The doctrine of paternity by estoppel was recently recognized in this
Commonwealth in the case of S.R.D. v. T.L.B., 174 S.W.3d 502 (Ky. App. 2005).
Therein, S.D. was married to T.B. when T.B. gave birth to a child. During the
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marriage, T.B. “threatened and intimated” to S.D. that he was not the biological
father of the child; nevertheless, S.D. conducted himself as the child’s father.
S.R.D., 174 S.W.3d at 503. Thereafter, the parties divorced, and S.D. was granted
joint custody of the child. Some six years later, the parties undertook a D.N.A.
test, and it was revealed that S.D. was not the child’s biological father. S.D. then
sought to discontinue his child support payments but also sought to continue
visitation and his parental relationship with the child.
Applying the doctrine of paternity by estoppel, the Court held that
S.D. was estopped from denying paternity and that S.D. was the child’s legal
father:
The factors relevant to equitable estoppel apply to
this case. S.D. represented to [the child] that he was her
father, even though he was aware this representation may
be a biological fiction; [the child] was unaware of this
fact; S.D. acted with the intention that [the child] would
consider him as her father; and [the child] relied upon
S.D.'s conduct to her detriment. Simply put, S.D. made a
material misrepresentation to [the child], upon which [the
child] relied, to [the child]'s detriment and prejudice.
....
We must disagree with that contention. The facts
of this case . . . indicate that S.D.'s conduct towards [the
child]-i.e., continuing his role as her father, even though
he had knowledge he may not be-effectively foreclosed
[the child] from obtaining support from her natural
father. Had S.D. chosen to conduct a paternity test at the
time he first learned in 1997 that paternity was
questionable, our conclusion may have differed. In that
situation, [the child] would have had the opportunity to
learn the identity of her natural father and, perhaps, to
form a bond with him. But, as it stands, because S.D. has
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continuously held himself out as [the child]'s father since
the child's birth, he has prevented [the child] from having
a relationship, financial or otherwise, with her natural
father. . . .
Id. at 508-510 (footnote omitted). Even though S.D. was not the child’s natural or
biological father, the Court recognized that he was, nonetheless, the child’s legal
father.3 Id. at 508. To apply the doctrine of paternity by estoppel, the Court
outlined the following factors that must be present:
(1) Conduct, including acts, language and silence,
amounting to a representation or concealment of material
facts; (2) the estopped party is aware of these facts; (3)
these facts are unknown to the other party; (4) the
estopped party must act with the intention or expectation
his conduct will be acted upon; and (5) the other party in
fact relied on this conduct to his detriment.
Id. at 506 (footnote omitted).
We think the facts of this case are clearly distinguishable from those
in S.R.D. First, unlike the relations in S.R.D., D.A.S. was not born during the
marriage so there existed no presumption of paternity under KRS 406.011. See
Boone v. Ballinger, 228 S.W.3d 1 (Ky. App. 2007). Second, unlike the child in
S.R.D., it is undisputed that D.A.S. knew that appellant was not her biological or
natural father. This is a most critical distinguishing factor. Under the doctrine of
paternity by estoppel, the true facts as to paternity must be unknown to the child.
S.R.D., 174 S.W.3d 502. Such ignorance is necessary in order for the child’s
reliance to be reasonable. Id.
3
The Court defined “legal father” as “[t]he man recognized by law as the male parent of a child.”
S.R.D. v. T.L.B., 174 S.W.3d 502, 508 (Ky. App. 2005)(quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed.
2004).
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Additionally, S.R.D. should not be so broadly interpreted as holding
that every male individual who acts as a father to a child will be considered that
child’s legal father. More is required under S.R.D.; particularly, such acts must
constitute a “material misrepresentation.” S.R.D., 174 S.W.3d at 508. While
appellant may have acted as D.A.S.’s natural father, D.A.S., as well as appellant
and appellee, knew that he was not; consequently, appellant made no material
misrepresentation to D.A.S. For these reasons, the doctrine of paternity by
estoppel is not applicable in this case.
This leads our review to a determination of what appellant’s legal
status was with D.A.S. at the time of the marriage and whether that status was
legally altered during the marriage. At best, at the time of the marriage, appellant’s
status with the child was one of step-father. Shortly thereafter, appellant signed an
affidavit of paternity pursuant to KRS 213.046. Under KRS 406.021, this created a
rebuttable presumption of paternity. However, appellant has acknowledged that
this sworn affidavit was false, which appellee has, likewise, acknowledged. Since
both parties admitted that appellant was not D.A.S.’s biological father, the
presumption of paternity was clearly rebutted.
Under the facts of this case, based upon our review of applicable law,
the only method by which a step-parent may acquire the legal status of parent with
a biological child of his spouse is through adoption as set forth in KRS 199.470, et
seq. Adoption is a statutory right that requires strict compliance with the statutory
proceedings to protect the rights of natural parents. R.M. v. R.B., 281 S.W.3d 293
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(Ky. App. 2009). Inherent in these procedures, which is most applicable here, is
the termination of parental rights of the natural or biological father pursuant to
KRS 199.502. In this case, none of these events occurred that were necessary for
appellant to establish a legal relationship as the father of D.A.S.
Accordingly, we hold the circuit court erred by equitably estopping
appellant from denying his paternity and by concluding that appellant was the legal
father of D.A.S. Any remaining arguments of appellant are moot.
For the foregoing reasons, the Order of the Jefferson Circuit Court,
Family Court Division, is reversed and remanded for proceedings consistent with
this opinion.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
David S. Stevenson
Louisville, Kentucky
Barbara A. Sullivan
Louisville, Kentucky
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