BURRESS (KENDALL) VS. COMPENSATION DON'S LUMBER , ET AL.
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RENDERED: FEBRUARY 26, 2010; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2009-CA-001697-WC
KENDALL BURRESS
v.
APPELLANT
PETITION FOR REVIEW OF A DECISION
OF THE WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BOARD
ACTION NO. WC-05-66203
DON'S LUMBER; HON. DOUGLAS GOTT,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE; AND
WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: COMBS, CHIEF JUDGE; CLAYTON AND STUMBO, JUDGES.
CLAYTON, JUDGE: Kendall Burress petitions for review of the August 18,
2009, opinion by the Workers' Compensation Board (Board) affirming the
February 16, 2009, decision by an administrative law judge (ALJ), which
dismissed Burress’s claim for occupational disability benefits filed against Don’s
Lumber. The claim was dismissed on the ground it was not filed within two years
of the date of the injury and, thus, was not timely. Burress also appeals from an
order dated March 23, 2009, which denied his petition for reconsideration. After
careful review, we affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
For a little over twelve years, Burress was employed by Don’s
Lumber as a contractor sales representative and still works in this capacity. As a
sales representative, he analyzed blueprints and determined the materials needed
for the construction of residential homes. Burress, at times, would travel to
construction sites and measure them to prepare estimates for the cost of materials.
On one such job, Burress was injured. His injury occurred on October 15, 2005,
when he traveled to the site of a home under construction. While measuring for
floor joists, he lost his balance and fell approximately 7 ½ feet into a basement
space. Burress landed on his feet but then fell down on his knees. He said that he
immediately knew he had suffered a serious injury and drove back to the store to
report the accident. On his return trip, he experienced discomfort in his lower
back, and testified that by the time he arrived at the store, his back had completely
“locked up.” Burress reported the accident to his supervisor, Chris Coyle, and
went home for the remainder of the day.
The next day, Burress began receiving medical care and has been
under constant medical care since then. At the time of the hearing with the ALJ,
he was scheduled to undergo surgery on his lower back. Besides the lower back
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injury, Buress also had surgery to repair an inguinal hernia in March 2006. The
record shows that in 2002 Burress had surgery for a similar hernia problem.
The issue here concerns the statute of limitations and whether the
application for income benefits was timely made. Since the injury occurred on
October 15, 2005, and Form 101 was not filed with the Office of Workers’
Compensation until May, 27, 2008, it is undisputed that more than two years
passed between the injury and the application. The issue, however, is not whether
Burress’s claim is barred by this section of the statute of limitations but whether
the two-year statute of limitation was tolled by Don’s Lumber payment to Burress
of his regular salary. In sum, the issue presented is whether the salary payment
constitutes voluntary “income benefits,” which toll the limitation period.
On February 16, 2009, the ALJ ruled that Burress’s claim was barred
by the applicable statue of limitations. Thereafter the ALJ denied his motion for
reconsideration. Burress then appealed to the Board, which, on August 18, 2009,
affirmed the ALJ’s dismissal of the claim for benefits. Both the ALJ and the
Board concluded that the application for workers’ compensation benefits was not
timely made. This appeal follows.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
On appeal, our standard of review of a decision of the Workers'
Compensation Board “is to correct the Board only where the the [sic] Court
perceives the Board has overlooked or misconstrued controlling statutes or
precedent, or committed an error in assessing the evidence so flagrant as to cause
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gross injustice.” Western Baptist Hosp. v. Kelly, 827 S.W.2d 685, 687-88 (Ky.
1992). The burden of persuasion is on the claimant to prove every element of a
workers' compensation claim. Wolf Creek Collieries v. Crum, 673 S.W.2d 735
(Ky. App. 1984). In other words, "[w]here the party with the burden of proof is
not successful before the ALJ, the issue on appeal is whether the evidence in that
party's favor is so compelling that no reasonable person could have failed to be
persuaded by it." Carnes v. Tremco Mfg. Co., 30 S.W.3d 172, 176 (Ky. 2000).
With this standard in mind, we now turn to the issues in the case before us.
ANALYSIS
Burress identifies two issues in his petition for review. First, he
contends that the ALJ misapplied statutory and caselaw; and second, he argues that
the ALJ erred when it did not consider Burress’s testimony at the final hearing.
With regard to the latter argument, that is whether the ALJ took into account
Burress’s testimony at the final hearing since the introduction to the ALJ’s opinion
states that the parties waived a hearing, we believe that the Board was correct in
not reversing the ALJ’s opinion on this point. We note, as did the Board’s opinion,
that this specific matter was not alleged in Burress’s petition for reconsideration.
Therefore, this issue was not properly preserved. In addition, it appears that the
ALJ inadvertently drafted a statement in his introduction that the parties submitted
briefs and waived a final hearing. Clearly, in the opinion the ALJ considered
Burress’s testimony at the December 22, 2008 hearing because he discusses it.
Moreover, Burress refers to the ALJ’s questioning of him at the hearing in his
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brief. Therefore, the issue was not preserved, and even if it had been, it was
merely a clerical error and harmless.
Next, we will focus our attention on the issue of whether the statute of
limitations was tolled since, as has been conceded, Burress filed his application for
workers’ compensation benefits more than two years after the injury. The issue is
whether the continuation of Plaintiff’s salary for days missed after his work injury
constitutes “payments of income benefits,” which are “voluntary payments” that
toll the period of limitation. Burress maintains that salary payments by Don’s
Lumber after the injury, when he missed work, constitute voluntary “income
benefits” and, pursuant to the Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 342.185(1),
extend the applicable statute of limitations.
We observe that KRS 342.185(1) requires an application for
adjustment of claim to be filed within two years of the date of injury, or within two
years of the suspension of “payments of income benefits.” KRS 342.270(1) further
provides that the application must be filed within two years of the date of injury, or
within two years of the “cessation of voluntary payments, if any have been made.”
Based on these statutes, Burress argues that the limitation period was
tolled. Burress maintains that the limitation period was extended because Don’s
Lumber paid him his regular base salary when he was absent from work on
account of a hernia, hernia surgery, and back pain. He alleges that all these
symptoms were a result of the October 15, 2005 accident.
Burress
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As stated above,
has the burden of proving every element of his claim, including that it was timely
filed in compliance with KRS 342.185. Snawder v. Stice, 576 S.W.2d 276 (Ky.
App. 1979). Hence, Burress must prove that the salary payments by Don’s
Lumber were voluntary “income benefits” made in order to toll the statute of
limitations.
“Voluntary payments” that toll the period of limitation are those that
either the employer intended or the worker had reasonable ground to believe were
in lieu of workers’ compensation payment. Kentucky West Virginia Gas Co. v.
Spurlock, 415 S.W.2d 849, 851 (Ky. 1967):
Voluntary payments which will toll the limitation
statute (KRS 342.270(1)) are those which either the
employer intended or the employee had grounds to
reasonably believe were in lieu of workmen's
compensation benefits. Larson, 2 Workmen's
Compensation Law, Section 78.43(c).
Now, we will address the issue of whether Don’s Lumber intended the
payments to be in lieu of workers’ compensation benefits or whether Burress had a
reasonable belief that the payments were in lieu of workers’ compensation
benefits. In order to ascertain if Don’s Lumber or Burress considered the salary
payments to be voluntary income benefits, it is necessary to define “income
benefits.” The Act defines “income benefits” as “payments made under the
provisions of this chapter to the disabled worker or his dependents in case of death,
excluding medical and related benefits[.]” KRS 342.0011(12). This
characterization of the payments as voluntary “income benefits” is a question of
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fact to be proven by Burress. He must show that Don’s Lumber intended the
payments as “income benefits” based on his disability.
The evidence shows that Burress never stopped working at Don’s
Lumber. Indeed, as found in the case record, he was still working there at the time
of the administrative proceedings. Moreover, Burress acknowledges that no
insurance carrier paid him workers’ compensation benefits and that his medical
bills were paid by his regular insurance carrier and not the workers’ compensation
carrier. In fact, the workers’ compensation insurance carrier was unaware that
Burress was absent from work because Don’s Lumber paid his regular salary when
he was off work for medical treatment or recuperation. Hence, Burress presented
no evidence that the payments were formally labeled as “income benefits” for the
purposes of workers’ compensation. And both Burress and Don’s Lumber referred
to them throughout the proceedings as salary payments not “income benefits.” The
fact that the payments were viewed by both parties as “salary” and not “income
benefits” puts in doubt whether the payments were “voluntary income benefits” as
defined under KRS 342.270(1).
We find it persuasive in the case at hand that salary payments
voluntarily made to Burress, without reference to the applicable workers'
compensation act or liability under such provisions, are not voluntary “income
benefits” that toll the running of limitations. Furthermore, the intent of the
employer alone is not controlling, but must be considered in connection with the
question of whether such payments caused the employee to believe that his or her
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claim was being recognized. Here, Burress referred to the payments as salary.
Accordingly, we find the ALJ’s and the Board’s analysis, that the salary payments
were not voluntary “income benefits” for the purpose of tolling the statute of
limitations, was a reasonable inference.
The rationale behind tolling the limitation period while an employer
makes voluntary “income benefits” is to prevent the injured worker from being
lulled into a false sense of security by the payments and, therefore, fail to timely
file a claim. City of Frankfort v. Rogers, 765 S.W.2d 579 (Ky. App. 1988).
Neither the ALJ nor the Board found any evidence that supported a finding that
Don’s Lumber was motivated to pay Burress a salary on the days he missed work
in order to lull him into missing his limitations deadline. Given the evidence
presented, we find this also is a reasonable inference by the ALJ and the Board.
Burress and Don’s Lumber acted as if his absences from work were
merely temporary. Coyle explained in his testimony that the decision to pay
Burress for his time off work was because “[w]e try to take care of our
employees.” The circumstances in this case are similar to those in Browning v.
Ford Motor Co., 287 Ky. 261, 152 S.W.2d 976 (Ky. App. 1941). In that case, the
Court held that the continued payment of the claimant’s salary after an injury “was
prompted by purely humane and sympathetic considerations and that such help was
in no wise intended to be or considered as payment to him of compensation.” Id.
at 980. We are aware of the fact that Browning was decided prior to the standard
enunciated in Spurlock, but we still find it instructive as to the motivation of the
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employer. Plus, Burress never established that Don’s Lumber acted in bad faith
and blatantly manufactured a limitations defense in this claim. See Newberg v.
Hudson, 838 S.W.2d 384 (Ky. 1992). Given our standard of review here, which is
to correct the Board only if we perceive that it committed an error in assessing the
evidence so flagrant as to cause gross injustice, we cannot find that the ALJ or the
Board did so when they determined that neither Burress or Don’s Lumber intended
the salary to be in lieu of “income benefits.”
Burress spends a great deal of time discussing the holding of
Holbrook v. Lexmark International Group, Inc., 65 S.W.3d 908 (Ky. 2001), and its
purported clarification of Spurlock. Holbrook, however, is inapposite because the
claimant in that case began to receive salary continuation payments already after
the two-year limitation had expired in regard to the original injury. Further, the
court held the payment did not toll the statute of limitations. We find no merit in
Burress’s suggestion that this case changes the necessary elements for ascertaining
whether “income benefits” are voluntary and extend the period of limitation.
During his testimony, Burress never suggested that his receipt of salary from Don’s
Lumber lulled him into a false sense of security. And the ALJ and the Board did
not ignore the Spurlock elements when determining whether Burress’s salary was a
“voluntary” payment that constituted “income benefits” and tolled the statute of
limitation.
Notwithstanding the requirements imposed by Spurlock to assess
whether the limitation period was tolled by voluntary “income benefits,” a
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secondary issue is whether Burress even proved that the salary payments were
“income benefits.” Regarding this issue, we focus on KRS 342.040 which states in
pertinent part:
(1) Except as provided in KRS 342.020, no income
benefits shall be payable for the first seven (7) days of
disability unless disability continues for a period of more
than two (2) weeks, in which case income benefits shall
be allowed from the first day of disability. All income
benefits shall be payable on the regular payday of the
employer, commencing with the first regular payday after
seven (7) days after the injury or disability resulting from
an occupational disease, with interest at the rate of twelve
percent (12%) per annum on each installment from the
time it is due until paid[.]
Thus, under KRS 342.040(1), an employer does not become obligated to pay
income benefits until such time as an injured worker has missed at least seven
consecutive days of work.
The evidence provided by Burress about the timing and purpose of the
salary payments is confusing. And, as such, Burress does not provide any specific
and particular evidence showing that he missed seven consecutive days of work
because of the back injury. To begin with, in their respective testimony, Burress
and his former supervisor, Coyle, specified that Burress’s employee benefits
entitled him to three weeks vacation pay and six sick days. Both parties said that,
when Burress was unable to work because of back pain, he first used these
allocated days. In particular, with regard to the back injury itself, Coyle confirmed
that Burress initially missed five days from work due to the back injury. Five days
does not trigger the payment of income benefits pursuant to KRS 342.040(1). In
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fact, Burress never provides evidence that the 25 to 30 days he alleges missing
because of the back injury were consecutive days.
Finally, Burress’s testimony that he was off work for several weeks
recuperating from the March 2006 hernia repair surgery does not place Burress’s
back injury under KRS 342.040(1). It is unclear whether Don’s Lumber would
have had any knowledge that this work absence was related to the October 15,
2005 work injury. Don’s Lumber had reason to believe that the 2006 hernia repair
was treatment for a recurrent inguinal hernia, which had previously been repaired
in 2002. According to Burress’s deposition, his hernia surgery was not paid for by
his workers’ compensation carrier but by him and his private insurance. And the
absence from his employment for the surgery occurred some time after the back
injury. As our Supreme Court has noted before, when an employee is absent from
work sometime after an accident, the employer may be legitimately unaware that
the absence was due to the previous occupational injury. See Newberg, 838
S.W.2d 384.
Therefore, we cannot say that the ALJ or the Board was in error when
it found that Burress failed to prove that he received voluntary “income benefits,”
which tolled the statute of limitations. Burress has not established that he was
entitled to “income benefits.” See J & V Coal Co. v. Hall, 62 S.W.3d 392 (Ky.
2001).
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CONCLUSION
Burress argues that the ALJ and the Board misapplied the standards in
Spurlock and erred in its reliance on Browning. We conclude in our analysis that
the characterization of the payments made in this type of case is a question of fact
based on the circumstances. Voluntary payments toll the limitation statute when
the employer intended the payments in lieu of workers’ compensation benefits or
the employee had grounds to reasonably believe the payments were in lieu of
workmen's compensation benefits. Here, the ALJ and the Board found that the
salary payments made to Burress did not meet this standard.
Moreover, our standard of review requires that when a party with the
burden of proof is unsuccessful in persuading the ALJ and the Board of their
version of the facts, in order for us to reverse the Board, the evidence must be so
overwhelming as to compel a finding in the appellant’s favor. For evidence to be
so compelling, it must be so overwhelming that no reasonable person could reach
the same conclusion as the ALJ. Western Baptist Hosp., 827 S.W.2d at 685. In the
case at bar, we find that the evidence is not compelling and, hence, does not permit
us to reverse the decision of the Board. Therefore, the decision of the Workers'
Compensation Board is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
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BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Ben T. Haydon, Jr.
Bardstown, Kentucky
Sherri P. Brown
Lexington, Kentucky
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