BROWN (BRIAN D.) VS. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: OCTOBER 8, 2010; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2009-CA-001546-MR
BRIAN D. BROWN
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JAMES D. ISHMAEL, JR., JUDGE
ACTION NO. 07-CR-01010
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: TAYLOR, CHIEF JUDGE; DIXON, JUDGE; HENRY,1 SENIOR
JUDGE.
DIXON, JUDGE: In August 2008, Appellant, Brian D. Brown, entered a
conditional guilty plea in the Fayette Circuit Court to charges of first degree
possession of a controlled substance, giving an officer a false name, and being a
second-degree persistent felony offender. Appellant was sentenced to five years’
1
Senior Judge Michael L. Henry sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110 (5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and Kentucky Revised Statute
(KRS) 21.580.
imprisonment, probated for a period of five years. Pursuant to the plea agreement,
Appellant now appeals the denial of two suppression motions. Finding no error,
we affirm.
On June 16, 2007, Lexington Police Officer Charles Burkett received
a report of suspicious activity in an area of Lexington known for drug activity and
prostitution. Specifically, an anonymous caller reported that cars had been coming
and going from an empty house located at 351 Chestnut Street. The caller
described several people at the scene including a black male wearing jeans and no
shirt; a black male wearing a tank top and green shorts; and a female wearing a
pink top and jeans. The caller further stated that a third black male was hiding in
the bushes in front of the house.
Upon arriving at the scene, Officer Burkett observed three individuals
walking away from the house that matched the descriptions provided by the caller.
When Officer Burkett asked them to stop, the three turned around and walked back
toward the house, but did so by way of passing behind some bushes which
obscured Officer Burkett’s view of their hands. At this point, Officer
Williams arrived as back-up and detected Appellant hiding in the same bushes.
When questioned, Appellant initially gave the officers a false name. However,
once all of the individuals provided their identities, the officers discovered that
Appellant and the female, Ariane Brown, had outstanding warrants. Both were
arrested and transported in separate vehicles to the jail.
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At the jail, Appellant was placed in a holding cell while Officer
Burkett completed the booking process with Ms. Brown. After Officer Burkett
was finished with Ms. Brown, he walked by Appellant’s holding cell and noticed
that he had a white powdery substance around his mouth and appeared to be
chewing on something. Fearing that Appellant may have ingested crack cocaine,
Officer Burkett ordered him to spit the substance out of his mouth. Appellant
replied, “I can’t spit it out, I am numb.” It is unclear from the record whether
Officer Burkett then actually removed the substance from Appellant’s mouth or
whether he was able to spit it out. Regardless, Officer Burkett collected the
substance from Appellant’s mouth as well as what he had already spit on the
ground. Officer Burkett also discovered what looked like more crack cocaine on
and under the bench where Appellant was seated. Everything was collected in one
evidence bag and sent for testing, which confirmed that it was, in fact, crack
cocaine.
In August 2007, Appellant was indicted by a Fayette County Grand
Jury for first-degree trafficking in a controlled substance, first-degree promoting
contraband, tampering with physical evidence, giving an officer a false name, and
for being a second-degree persistent felony offender. Appellant thereafter filed a
motion to suppress all of the physical evidence on the grounds that he was
unlawfully searched and seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the
United States Constitution.
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The trial court held a suppression hearing on October 29, 2007. At
the conclusion of such, the trial court denied the motion, finding that given the
totality of the circumstances, Officer Burkett had reasonable and articulable
suspicion of criminal wrongdoing to stop Appellant and conduct further
investigation. The trial court observed,
So the court feels like the initial stop of the defendant,
[sic] asked to come out of the bushes, the totality of the
circumstances – the information from the anonymous tip;
the corroboration at the scene; the fact that the defendant
was hiding – all this was a reasonable and articulable
suspicion that criminal activity was afoot. It was
perfectly proper for the officers to get the defendant out,
ask him further questions.
At a subsequent hearing in November 2007, Appellant again moved to
suppress evidence of the crack cocaine, this time on the grounds that it had been
subject to “spoilation” when it was collected by Officer Burkett in the holding cell.
Specifically, Appellant maintained that Ms. Brown had been in the holding cell
with him and she dropped the cocaine on the floor. As such, when Officer Burkett
improperly combined the substance that Appellant spit from his mouth with the
substance he found on the floor, he essentially prevented Appellant from being
able to prove through testing that what was in his mouth was not, in fact, crack
cocaine.
In denying Appellant’s motion, the trial court concluded:
Although the Defendant testified that he remembered a
co-defendant or another person in the holding cell with
him . . . , the Court makes a finding of Fact, based upon
Officer Burkett’s sworn testimony, the Defendant was
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alone in the holding cell at all times pertinent to this
issue. The Court finds as Fact that Officer Burkett was
able to observe the white powdery substance around the
Defendant’s lips, the substance that had been spit out by
the Defendant and could also observe and handle the
substance on and under the bench where the Defendant
had been sitting. Officer Burkett testified, and the Court
so finds that the “other” substances on and under the
bench, were also wet. This fact is consistent with Officer
Burkett’s testimony that he was able to observe the
Defendant chewing and spitting out the substance and
that the only substance in the holding cell was substance
belonging to this defendant.
Recognizing that the Defendant gave different
testimony at the Suppression Hearing, this argument is
really one of “weight” as opposed to “admissibility.” At
trial, Defendant can certainly deny that all of the
substance came from him and the jury can weigh that
credibility with that of any contrary testimony by Officer
Burkett.
The trial court further noted that there was no evidence of bad faith or misconduct
on the part of Officer Burkett and that at the time the substances were collected,
“[the] evidence was not so clearly of an exculpatory nature that was apparent . . . .”
Appellant thereafter entered a conditional guilty plea to first-degree
trafficking in a controlled substance, giving an officer a false name, and PFO II,
reserving his right to appeal the trial court’s suppression rulings. The promoting
contraband and tampering with physical evidence charges were dismissed. This
appeal ensued.
In this Court, Appellant first argues that he was unlawfully detained in
violation of the Fourth Amendment because the anonymous tip did not have
sufficient detail, was not corroborated, and did not create reasonable articulable
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suspicion of criminal activity. As a result, Appellant contends that any contraband
seized as a result of the unlawful detention was “fruit of the poisonous tree” and
should have been suppressed. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 83
S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963). We disagree.
Our standard of review of a trial court's decision on a suppression
motion following a hearing is twofold. First, the factual findings of the court are
conclusive if they are supported by substantial evidence. RCr 9.78; Adcock v.
Commonwealth, 967 S.W.2d 6, 8 (Ky. 1998); Stewart v. Commonwealth, 44
S.W.3d 376 (Ky. App. 2000). The second prong involves a de novo review to
determine whether the court's decision is correct as a matter of law.
Commonwealth v. Opell, 3 S.W.3d 747, 751 (Ky. App. 1999). Kentucky has
adopted the standard of review approach articulated by the United States Supreme
Court in Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 698-700, 116 S.Ct. 1657, 1663,
134 L.Ed.2d 911 (1996), wherein the Court observed:
[A]s a general matter determinations of reasonable
suspicion and probable cause should be reviewed de
novo on appeal. Having said this, we hasten to point out
that a reviewing court should take care both to review
findings of historical fact only for clear error and to give
due weight to inferences drawn from those facts by
resident judges and local law enforcement officers.
In Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 110 S.Ct. 2412, 110 L.Ed.2d 301
(1990), the United States Supreme Court discussed the standards applicable to
establishing reasonable articulable suspicion with respect to an anonymous
telephone tip. The Court held that even when an unverified tip would have been
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insufficient to establish probable cause for an arrest or search warrant, where the
information supplied carries sufficient “indicia of reliability,” it would support a
forcible investigatory stop under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20
L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). Alabama, 496 U.S. at 328, 110 S.Ct. at 2415. See also
Raglin v. Commonwealth, 812 S.W.2d 494 (Ky. 1991). The Alabama Court held
that the “totality of the circumstances” approach adopted in Illinois v. Gates, 462
U.S. 213, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983), applied to the reasonablesuspicion analysis for an anonymous tip. “Reasonable suspicion ... is dependent
upon both the content of information possessed by police and its degree of
reliability.” Alabama, 496 U.S. at 330, 110 S.Ct. at 2416. The information must
be viewed based on the personal observation and independent investigation of the
police that would tend to corroborate significant, but not necessarily all, of the
facts supplied by the informant.
At the conclusion of the October 2007 suppression hearing, the trial
court specifically found that the totality of the circumstances -- the fact that the
area was known for drug activity, that the individuals at the scene matched the
physical and clothing descriptions provided by the anonymous caller, and further
that Appellant was found hiding in the bushes -- created a reasonable and
articulable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot. We agree and conclude that
evidence supported Officer Burkett’s investigatory stop.
However, even if we were to conclude that Officer Burkett was
without reasonable suspicion to stop and detain Appellant, the discovery that
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Appellant had an outstanding warrant was an intervening circumstance that cured
any possible illegality in the initial stop. In Birch v. Commonwealth, 203 S.W.3d
156, 159 (Ky. App. 2006), a panel of this Court held:
[T]he United States Supreme Court “has rejected a ‘but
for’ test when determining whether an ‘intervening
circumstance’ is sufficient to dissipate the taint caused by
prior unlawful conduct on the part of the police.” Hardy
v. Commonwealth, 149 S.W.3d 433, 435 (Ky. App. 2004)
(quoting United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268, 276,
98 S.Ct. 1054, 55 L.Ed.2d 268 (1978)). Rather, we have
previously held that “a valid arrest may constitute an
intervening event that cures the taint of an illegal
detention sufficient to rebut the application of the
exclusionary rule to evidence recovered in a search
incident to an arrest.” Baltimore v. Commonwealth, 119
S.W.3d 532, 541 n. 37 (Ky. App. 2003) (citing United
States v. Green, 111 F.3d 515 (7th Cir.1997)). Kentucky
is not alone in adopting this rule. In fact, several other
courts have also adopted the rule that a valid arrest, such
as one incident to a valid, outstanding warrant, is a
sufficiently independent, untainted justification for the
arrest and concomitant search. We adopt the opinion of
our sister court in [McBath v. State, 108 P.3d 241, 248
(Alaska Ct. App. 2005)] as the best summation of this
rule:
If, during a non-flagrant but illegal stop, the police
learn the defendant's name, and the disclosure of
that name leads to the discovery of an outstanding
warrant for the defendant's arrest, and the execution
of that warrant leads to the discovery of evidence,
the existence of the arrest warrant will be deemed
an independent intervening circumstance that
dissipates the taint of the initial illegal stop vis-à-vis
the evidence discovered as a consequence of a
search incident to the execution of the arrest
warrant.
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It is undisputed that the warrant for Appellant’s arrest was valid.
Furthermore, there is no allegation that Officer Burkett’s encounter with Appellant
was unduly lengthy or that Officer Burkett engaged in dilatory tactics. So the
seizure, even if illegal, was not so flagrant as to destroy the independent, untainted
nature of the arrest warrant pending against Appellant. See Birch, 203 S.W.3d at
160. Therefore, since Appellant’s arrest was lawful, the subsequent seizure of the
crack cocaine was also lawful. Accordingly, the trial court did not err by denying
Appellant's motion to suppress the evidence on constitutional grounds.
Next, Appellant argues that Officer Burkett essentially destroyed
exculpatory evidence when he combined the substance initially spit from
Appellant’s mouth with that found on the jail floor. As previously noted, it was
Appellant’s theory that the substance found on the floor was thrown there by Ms.
Brown and that it should have been tested separately from the substance spit from
Appellant’s mouth. Appellant maintains that as a result of Officer Burkett’s
alleged misconduct, the evidence should have been suppressed. Again, we
disagree.
Before a motion concerning “spoliation of evidence” can result in a
due process violation, a criminal defendant must show bad faith on the part of the
police. Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 58, 109 S.Ct. 333, 102 L.Ed.2d 281
(1988). In Arizona, the State failed to refrigerate the victim's clothing for the
purposes of preserving it for semen tests, as well as failed to properly preserve
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semen samples which were collected. In holding that no due process violation
occurred, the United States Supreme Court stated:
[T]he Due Process Clause requires a different result
when we deal with the failure of the State to preserve
evidentiary material of which no more can be said than it
could have been subjected to tests, the results of which
might have exonerated the defendant.... We think that
requiring a defendant to show bad faith on the part of the
police both limits the extent of the police's obligation to
preserve evidence to reasonable bounds and confines it to
that class of cases where the interests of justice most
clearly require it, i.e., those cases in which the police
themselves by their conduct indicate that the evidence
could form a basis for exonerating the defendant. We
therefore hold that unless a criminal defendant can show
bad faith on the part of the police, failure to preserve
potentially useful evidence does not constitute a denial of
due process.
Id. at 57-58, 109 S.Ct. at 337. The same bad faith criterion has been adopted in
Kentucky. See Collins v. Commonwealth, 951 S.W.2d 569 (Ky. 1997).
As previously noted, the trial court was of the opinion that because
Officer Burkett testified that Appellant was alone in the holding cell, but Appellant
testified that Ms. Brown was placed in the cell with him, the issue was one of
credibility rather than admissibility. Importantly, however, the trial court also
specifically found neither any apparent exculpatory value of the evidence nor any
bad faith or misconduct on the part of Officer Burkett in collecting it. Thus, even
if we were to determine that Officer Burkett was negligent in failing to separate the
substances he collected, mere negligence simply does not rise to the level of bad
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faith required by Youngblood. Collins, 951 S.W.2d at 573. Accordingly, the trial
court did not err in refusing to suppress the evidence on spoliation grounds.
The judgment and sentence of the Fayette Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEFS FOR APPELLEE:
Kate D. Dunn
Lexington, Kentucky
Jack Conway
Attorney General of Kentucky
Michael L. Harned
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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