CRUCES (JOSE LUIS) VS. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: JULY 16, 2010; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2009-CA-001535-MR
JOSE LUIS CRUCES
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE THOMAS L. CLARK, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 08-CR-01602
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: ACREE AND STUMBO, JUDGES; LAMBERT,1 SENIOR JUDGE.
STUMBO, JUDGE: Jose Luis Cruces appeals from a Judgment of the Fayette
Circuit Court reflecting a conditional plea of guilty to one count each of rape in the
third-degree and sodomy in the third-degree. Cruces argues that the trial court
erred in failing to sustain his motion to suppress certain evidence because the
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Senior Judge Joseph E. Lambert sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and Kentucky Revised Statutes
(KRS) 21.580.
police did not obtain valid consent before searching an apartment where he was
residing. We are persuaded that the Fayette Circuit Court properly concluded that
the police obtained valid consent to search the apartment, and accordingly affirm
the Judgment on appeal.
On October 18, 2008, a Lexington, Kentucky police officer received a
complaint from a woman stating that the woman’s 15-year-old daughter, “E.L.,”
had run away from home. The woman believed that E.L. was at Cruces’
apartment, who is described in the record as E.L.’s adult boyfriend.
Two officers, accompanied by E.L.’s mother, then went to the
apartment to look for E.L. The parties disagree as to what transpired when the
police knocked on the apartment door. Officer McMinoway would later testify
that Cruces opened the door, and spoke to E.L.’s mother in Spanish. McMinoway
stated that Cruces gave verbal consent in Spanish for the police to enter the
apartment, as well as consent in broken English and via body language.
Officer Holland testified that Daniel Castille opened the door, and that
Castille gave verbal consent in English for the officers to enter. When they entered
the apartment, Officer Holland saw four hispanic males in the living room, and
Holland asked Castille if Holland could search the bedroom. According to
Holland, Castille gave verbal consent in English for Holland to search the
bedroom. Holland stated that he then went into the bedroom and found E.L.
The matter went before the Fayette County Grand Jury on December
15, 2008. Cruces was indicted on one count of rape in the third-degree and one
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count of sodomy in the third-degree, because E.L. was under the age of 16 and
statutorily unable to give consent.
On February 18, 2009, Cruces filed a motion to suppress all evidence
obtained as a result of the search, including testimony, statements made by Cruces,
fabric samples taken from a couch, and photographic evidence. As a basis for the
motion, Cruces maintained that the police were not given valid consent to search
the apartment. A motion on the hearing was conducted on March 17, 2009. The
court determined that the Commonwealth produced evidence that Castille, Cruces
or both had given verbal consent for the police to enter and search the apartment.
The court denied the motion to suppress the evidence obtained as a result of the
search.
On May 15, 2009, Cruces entered a plea of guilty as to each count of
the indictment, in exchange for the Commonwealth’s recommended one-year
sentence on each count. The plea was conditioned on the reservation of Cruces’
right to appeal the court’s Order denying the motion to suppress. This appeal
followed.
Cruces now argues that the Fayette Circuit Court erred in denying his
motion to suppress the evidence obtained as the result of what he contends was an
unlawful search of the apartment. He notes that the circuit court’s ruling on the
motion to suppress “leaves open the possibility of invalid consent,” and contends
that the Commonwealth did not prove consent whether Officer McMinoway’s
version of events or Officer Holland’s version is correct. Cruces maintains that if
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Officer McMinoway’s version is correct, consent cannot be found from his
testimony that Cruces spoke Spanish some of the time, broken English at other
times, and indicated his consent through body language. He also notes that E.L.’s
mother could not be relied on as a truthful interpreter because she had an interest in
gaining entry to the apartment to find her daughter.
Cruces goes on to argue that irrespective of whether Castille or Cruces
allegedly gave consent to enter and search the apartment, the Commonwealth did
not demonstrate that the individual giving consent had the apparent or actual
authority to do so. He also contends that the court improperly failed to make
proper findings of fact on the ruling. In sum, Cruces seeks an Order vacating the
circuit court’s Order denying the motion to suppress.
We have closely examined the record, the written argument and the
law, and find no error. The focus of Cruces’ argument is that the Commonwealth
did not demonstrate that valid consent was given for the police to enter the
apartment, nor that the person or persons giving consent had the actual or apparent
authority to do so. In denying Cruces’ motion, the circuit court determined either
that Cruces gave Officer McMinoway verbal consent to enter the apartment, or in
the alternative that Castille gave valid consent to Officer Holland. It concluded
that under the totality of the evidence, valid consent was given by one or both
individuals.
The record supports this conclusion. Officer Holland’s testimony is
supported by that of Castille, who acknowledged that he gave the officers consent
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to look for E.L. This testimony, taken alone, forms a sufficient basis for sustaining
the circuit court’s denial of Cruces’ motion to suppress. Additionally, evidence
was adduced that Castille gave the officers “a second permission” to continue their
search for E.L. after the officers had entered the apartment.
Officer Holland and Castille each testified that Castille opened the
door to the apartment when the officers knocked. This testimony, we believe, is
sufficient to support the Commonwealth’s claim that Castille had actual or
apparent authority to consent to the search. Castille also testified that his children
and nephew were asleep in the bedroom where E.L. was located; further bolstering
the conclusion that he had actual or apparent authority to consent to the search of
that area.
The burden of proof rests with the Commonwealth to prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that a warrantless residential search falls under an
exception to the warrant requirement. Cook v. Commonwealth, 826 S.W.2d 329
(Ky. 1992). “Consent to search is an exception to the warrant requirement.”
Farmer v. Commonwealth, 169 S.W.3d 50, 52 (Ky. App. 2005). In the instant
case, the Commonwealth offered the testimony of Officer Holland and of Castille,
each of whom stated that Castille opened the door and gave the officers consent to
enter the apartment. Additionally, Officer McMinoway testified that Cruces
consented to the search both through words and gestures. Consent to search may
be in the form of words, gestures or conduct. United States v. Griffin, 530 F.2d
739 (7th Cir. 1976). Ultimately, the circuit court concluded that under either
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scenario, and under the totality of the evidence presented, the Commonwealth met
its burden of proof on this issue. We find no error in that conclusion.
Lastly, Cruces maintains that the circuit court improperly failed to
make findings of fact on his motion as required by RCr 9.78. We are not
persuaded by this argument. RCr 9.78 requires that – on a motion to suppress –
“the trial court shall conduct an evidentiary hearing . . . and at the conclusion
thereof shall enter into the record findings resolving the essential issues of fact
raised by the motion . . . and necessary to support the ruling.” The rule does not
require written findings. In the matter at bar, the circuit court made findings which
were electronically recorded and entered into the record. This is sufficient to
comply with RCr 9.78, as it informs the parties as to the basis of the ruling. See
generally, Coleman v. Commonwealth, 100 S.W.3d 745 (Ky. 2002). We find no
error on this issue.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the Judgment of the Fayette
Circuit Court.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Brandon Neil Jewell
Assistant Public Advocate
Department of Public Advocacy
Frankfort, Kentucky
Jack Conway
Attorney General of Kentucky
J. Hays Lawson
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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