SERGENT (THOMAS), ET AL. VS. NOT BE PUBLISHED AUTO-OWNERS LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY
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RENDERED: OCTOBER 22, 2010; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2009-CA-001430-MR
THOMAS SERGENT, ON HIS
OWN AND AS EXECUTOR OF THE
ESTATE OF DARLA JO SERGENT
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM BOONE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE ANTHONY W. FROHLICH, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 08-CI-01459
AUTO-OWNERS LIFE INSURANCE
COMPANY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: CLAYTON AND LAMBERT, JUDGES; HENRY,1 SENIOR JUDGE,
CLAYTON, JUDGE: Thomas Sergent, Executor of the Estate of Darla Jo Sergent,
appeals from a Boone Circuit Court’s order granting summary judgment in favor
of Auto-Owners Life Insurance Company. Finding no error, we affirm.
1
Senior Judge Michael L. Henry sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the
Chief Justice pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and
Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 21.580.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
During the application process for new auto and home insurance,
Sergent claims that, in order to receive the best price for the insurance, he also
applied for a life insurance policy. Jack Lillie, an insurance agent with AutoOwners Life Insurance Company (hereinafter “Auto-Owners”) assisted him.
When Sergent realized that neither he nor his wife qualified for the “Simplified
Issue 5 Year Term Life Insurance,” he decided to apply for life insurance for his
adult daughter, Darla Jo Sergent. This particular life insurance policy does not
require a health examination.
To complete the application for the life insurance policy for Sergent’s
daughter, Lillie says that he asked Sergent several questions about his daughter’s
health. Sergent claims that he explained that his daughter had a muscular disorder
that prevented her from using her hands and legs. From the information indicating
a physical handicap, Lillie determined that such a muscular disorder did not affect
Darla’s eligibility for coverage and issued the policy. Apparently, Sergent either
failed to mention or, as he contends, did not know that his daughter had been
diagnosed since childhood with peripheral neuropathy. Significantly, he has never
denied that she was, in fact, diagnosed with peripheral neuropathy. Furthermore,
Sergent, who was listed as the “owner/applicant,” on the policy signed not only his
name under this designation but also signed Darla’s name under the designation of
“proposed insured.”
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Eight months later, on July 28, 2007, Darla died from an acute cardiac
arrest. After Sergent attempted to collect on the policy, Auto-Owners discovered
from Darla’s medical records that she had been diagnosed with peripheral
neuropathy. On the basis of this medical diagnosis, Auto-Owners denied the claim
and returned Sergent’s premium payment. It said that, had it known about the
diagnosis, it would not have accepted the application and issued the policy.
Moreover, Auto-Owners maintains that Sergent’s signing of Darla’s name on the
application, rather than Darla, also voided the policy.
Thereafter, Sergent filed suit against Auto-Owners for breach of
policy. Because of alleged misrepresentations in the application for the policy,
Auto-Owners denied the existence of a valid policy. Both Sergent and AutoOwners filed motions for summary judgment. The circuit court found that there
were no genuine issues of material fact and that Auto-Owners was entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. It denied Sergent’s motion for summary judgment
and granted Auto-Owners’ motion. Sergent appeals from this decision.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The standard of review on appeal when a trial court grants a motion
for summary judgment is “whether the trial court correctly found that there were
no genuine issues as to any material fact and that the moving party was entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” Scifres v. Kraft, 916 S.W.2d 779, 781 (Ky. App.
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1996); Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (CR) 56.03. “The trial court must view
the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, and summary
judgment should be granted only if it appears impossible that the nonmoving party
will be able to produce evidence at trial warranting a judgment in his favor.”
Lewis v. B & R Corp., 56 S.W.3d 432, 436 (Ky. App. 2001), citing Steelvest v.
Scansteel Serv. Ctr., Inc., 807 S.W.2d 476, 480-82 (Ky. 1991). In addition, “[t]he
moving party bears the initial burden of showing that no genuine issue of material
fact exists, and then the burden shifts to the party opposing summary judgment to
present ‘at least some affirmative evidence showing that there is a genuine issue of
material fact for trial.”’ Lewis, 56 S.W.3d at 436, citing Steelvest, 807 S.W.2d at
482. And the trial court “must examine the evidence, not to decide any issue of
fact, but to discover if a real issue exists.” Steelvest, 807 S.W.2d at 480. Finally,
since summary judgment involves only legal questions and the existence of any
disputed material issues of fact, an appellate court is not required to defer to the
trial court's decision and reviews the issue de novo. Scifres, 916 S.W.2d at 781.
With that standard of review in mind, we turn to the issues in this case.
ISSUE
The issue before this Court involves whether the contract for life
insurance between Sergent and Auto-Owners is enforceable. Sergent argues that
the circuit court erred in granting Auto-Owners’ motion for summary judgment
since genuine issues of material fact exist as to whether he made any material
misrepresentations on the life insurance application. Sergent argues that a policy
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cannot be declared void unless there was a material misrepresentation or a
fraudulent representation, and he asserts that such a claim did not occur because he
informed Lillie about Darla’s condition. It is Sergent’s contention that it is
immaterial whether he provided the name of the specific condition because he fully
informed Lillie about Darla’s condition.
Therefore, based on Sergent’s rendition, he claims that Lillie knew of
Darla’s health problems and still chose to issue a life insurance policy. Sergent
contends too that Auto-Owners is liable for the acts of its agents when the agents
are acting in the capacity as representatives of the insurance company and within
the scope of their authority. Finally, Sergent bolsters the argument that no
misrepresentation occurred by noting that her medical diagnosis had no
relationship to the actual cause of her death. From this position, he avows that
even if Auto-Owners could have voided the contract because of a
misrepresentation, it can no longer do so since Darla died before it disavowed the
contract. Sergent does not specifically address the argument that he forged Darla’s
signature in his brief, but counters in his reply brief that the evidence proffered by
him shows that there are genuine issues of material fact as to whether Darla was
dependent and consented to the life insurance policy.
Conversely, Auto-Owners maintains that misrepresentations in an
insurance application render the policy void. Thus, it declares that the policy was
void because Sergent misrepresented both Darla’s health and that she signed the
policy. Misrepresentation is material even if innocently done. Second, Auto-5-
Owners states that KRS 304.14-070 renders life insurance policies void if the
proposed insurer did not seek the insurance or consent in writing to its
procurement. Needless to say, Auto-Owners maintains that since Darla was an
adult and did not sign the insurance application, she did not seek or consent to the
application for insurance. Thus, the insurance policy is void. In sum, the ultimate
issue is whether the circuit court’s grant of Auto-Owners’ motion for summary
judgment was proper and that no genuine issues of material fact existed regarding
the denial of the life insurance benefits to Sergent.
ANALYSIS
1. Contract void for misrepresentation
Kentucky courts have said that, “[w]hen an insured misrepresents
material facts on the application, the insurer is justified in denying coverage and
rescinding the policy.” Hornback v. Bankers Life Ins. Co., 176 S.W.3d 699, 705
(Ky. App. 2005). Statutory guidance is provided by KRS 304.14-110:
All statements and descriptions in any application for an
insurance policy or annuity contract, by or on behalf of
the insured or annuitant, shall be deemed to be
representations and not warranties. Misrepresentations,
omissions, and incorrect statements shall not prevent a
recovery under the policy or contract unless either:
(1) Fraudulent; or
(2) Material either to the acceptance of the risk, or to the
hazard assumed by the insurer; or
(3) The insurer in good faith would either not have issued
the policy or contract, or would not have issued it at the
same premium rate, or would not have issued a policy or
contract in as large an amount, or would not have
provided coverage with respect to the hazard resulting in
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the loss, if the true facts had been made known to the
insurer as required either by the application for the policy
or contract or otherwise. . . .
Thus, the statute itself states, in contravention to Sergent’s assertion that it is too
late to rescind the policy, that misrepresentations shall not prevent a recovery
under the policy unless one of the listed exceptions occurs. In the situation at
hand, it appears that two exceptions exist. First, Sergent’s misrepresentation were
material to the acceptance of risk and also that Auto-Owners would not have
provided coverage if it had known the true facts. “[O]ur courts have in several
instances applied the principles set forth in that statute to invalidate various
policies of insurance based upon fraudulent or material misrepresentations.” State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Crouch, 706 S.W.2d 203 (Ky. App. 1986); Prudential
Insurance Co. v. Lampley, 297 Ky. 495, 180 S.W.2d 399 (1944); Citizens
Insurance Co. v. Whitley, 252 Ky. 360, 67 S.W.2d 488 (1944); Ford v.
Commonwealth Life Ins. Co., 252 Ky. 565, 67 S.W.2d 950 (1934). The law is that
if an insured obtained a policy of insurance through a material misrepresentation,
the policy is void.
“The rule is that a false answer is material if the insurer, acting
reasonably and naturally in accordance with the usual practice of . . . insurance
companies under similar circumstances, would not have accepted the application if
the substantial truth had been stated therein.” Cook v. Life Investors Ins. Co. of
Am., 126 Fed.Appx. 722, 724 (6th Cir. 2005) (quoting Mills v. Reserve Life Ins.
Co., 335 S.W.2d 955, 958 (Ky.1960)). And if the misrepresentation is material, as
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the misrepresentation in this case, then the applicant’s intent in making the
misrepresentation has no consequence. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v.
Conway, 240 S.W.2d 644, 646 (Ky. 1951). Thus, even if Sergent unknowingly
answered the questions incorrectly, it does not change that under the statute, either
an innocent material misrepresentation or a fraudulent non-material
misrepresentation may void the contract.
It is undisputed that Auto-Owners would not have issued a life
insurance policy on Darla if it had known that she had a nervous system disorder.
Sergent never contradicts that Lillie went over the questions on the application
with him and that he answered “no” to them. Moreover, it also is undisputed that
Sergent signed the application form and attested that the answers were correct, that
is, he said that Darla had no nervous system disorder.
By the same token, the insurance policy application says:
I represent that the statements and answers recorded on
this application are true and complete and agree that they
will form a part of any insurance policy issued hereon. I
also understand that the information on this application
will be relied upon to determine insurability and that
incorrect information may result in coverage being
voided, subject to the policy Incontestability Provision.
Sergent’s signature on the application represents that he had read the questions and
the answers in the application. It also puts forward that the information provided
by him was complete, true, and correctly recorded. Kentucky's courts have insisted
that the parties to a contract exercise “at least the degree of diligence which may be
fairly expected from a reasonable person.” Mayo Arcade Corp. v. Bonded Floors
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Co., 240 Ky. 212, 41 S.W.2d 1104, 1109 (Ky. App. 1931)(internal quotation marks
and citations omitted). From this legal admonition we believe that Sergent must be
responsible for his proffered answers on the relatively simple insurance application
form, which confirmed that his daughter had no “brain or nervous system
disorder.”
Regarding Sergent’s reliance on Rudolph v. Shelter Insurance
Company, 2008 WL 4091648 (Ky. App. 2008)(2007-CA-000799-MR), we note
initially that it has been ordered not to be published. Moreover, the situation
therein involved an insurance application where the questions on the insurance
application were not asked of the applicants. Here, no one disputes that Lillie
asked Sergent all the questions.
But Sergent’s answers were not accurate or complete. Based on the
wording in the application, he was on notice that he was attesting that his answers
were truthful. Even if, as he maintains, he did not know the name of his daughter’s
diagnosis, he certainly knew that she had been treated since childhood for more
than weakness in her arms and legs. His suggestion that he did not know about her
diagnosis, or in the alternative, that he explained the disorder adequately to the
agent, is at the least disingenuous, and mitigates against his claim to the life
insurance policy proceeds. Further, the application, signed by Sergent, clearly
states that coverage will not be issued to the “proposed insured” if she suffers from
certain health conditions. He most certainly understood the ramifications of this
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clause as he was aware that neither he nor his wife would qualify for the life
insurance.
So we surmise no uncertainty in our belief that Sergent’s failure to
inform the insurance agent about his daughter’s nervous system disorder was a
material misrepresentation. Consequently, if Auto-Owners had known, it would
not have issued the policy.
On another note, we also concur with Auto-Owners that Sergent’s
decision to sign Darla’s name on the application is also a material
misrepresentation and voids the policy. Sergent indicated to Lillie that he was
taking the application home to discuss it with his wife and daughter. Lillie had no
reason or ability to ascertain whether this implied action occurred. Sergent admits
that he did not discuss it with his wife or daughter. And he acknowledges that he
signed Darla’s name. His explanation for signing her name was that he owned the
policy. Regardless of Darla’s health issues, Auto-Owners would not have issued
the policy had it known that Darla did not sign it. Indeed, the application requires
that the “proposed insured” sign it. Obviously, one rationale behind such a
requirement is that the insured could verify the truth of the answers. Hence, we do
not find that any genuine issue of material fact has been demonstrated that would
allow for this case to go forward on whether the misrepresentations were material.
They were.
2. Contract void because Darla did not seek or consent to it.
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The second reason that Auto-Owners argues the life insurance policy
was void is also based on the fact that Sergent signed Darla’s name to the
application. In general, it is necessary for the insured to initiate the insurance
herself or consent in writing to the application being made on her behalf. This
requirement is delineated in KRS 304.14-080:
No life or health insurance contract upon an individual,
except a contract of group life insurance or of group or
blanket health insurance, shall be made or effectuated
unless at the time of the making of the contract the
individual insured having the power to contract as
provided in KRS 304.14-070 applies therefor or has
consented thereto in writing, except in the following
cases:
(1) A spouse may effectuate the insurance upon the other
spouse.
(2) Any person having an insurable interest in the life of
a minor, or any person upon whom a minor is dependent
for support and maintenance, may effectuate insurance
upon the life of or pertaining to the minor.
(3) Family policies may be issued insuring any two (2) or
more members of a family on an application signed by
either parent, a step-parent, or by a husband or wife.
None of the exceptions to the statute apply here. Exception 1 and 2 are not
relevant since Darla is Sergent’s 41-year old adult daughter. Exception 3 is not
applicable because the policy only insured one family member, Darla. Because
Darla did not know the application for life insurance was made and because she
did not sign the application, none of the exceptions to the statutory provisions were
met. Darla did not authorize Sergent to sign the application and she was competent
to sign the application herself.
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Sergent’s suggestion that it is unclear whether Darla was dependent is
erroneous. She was 41 years old, drove her own car, insisted on having her own
car insurance, attended her own church, and there were allegations or actions
suggesting any type of legal incapacity.
Moreover, Lillie was under the impression, based on Sergent’s actions
and words, that, after he signed the application as the owner of the policy, he was
taking it home for discussion with his wife and daughter, and also for Darla’s
signature. Under these circumstances, Lillie could not have known that Sergent
did not discuss it with his family members. If Auto-Owners had known Darla did
not sign the application, it would not have issued the policy, but the actions of
Sergent gave them no notice that Darla was not consenting to the application for
life insurance.
Again, no genuine issues of material fact exist. Therefore, the trial
court did not err in its grant of summary judgment.
The judgment of the Boone Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
T. Lawrence Hicks
Edgewood, Kentucky
Deanna M. Tucker
Louisville, Kentucky
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