PEYTON (BRANDI) VS. NEONATAL INTENSIVE CARE EXPERTS II, PLLC, ET AL.
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RENDERED: NOVEMBER 19, 2010; 10:00 A.M.
TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2009-CA-001411-MR
BRANDI PEYTON
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE SUSAN SCHULTZ GIBSON, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 08-CI-004132
NEONATAL INTENSIVE CARE
EXPERTS, II, PLLC; KETAN MEHTA, M.D.
AND NORTON HOSPITALS, INC., D/B/A
NORTON SUBURBAN HOSPITAL
APPELLEES
OPINION
REVERSING AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: COMBS, KELLER AND LAMBERT, JUDGES
LAMBERT, JUDGE: Brandi Peyton appeals from a Jefferson Circuit Court order
entered on May 21, 2009, which granted summary judgment in favor of Appellees,
Neonatal Intensive Care Experts II, P.L.L.C., Ketan Mehta, M.D., and Norton
Hospitals, Inc. d/b/a Norton Suburban Hospital. Peyton filed lawsuits against
Appellees, alleging gross negligence and malpractice in the generation and reading
of a toxicology report rendered in conjunction with the labor and delivery of
Peyton’s son. Appellees reported incorrect toxicology results to Child Protective
Services, who in turn removed Peyton’s son from her care. The trial court
determined that Appellees were immune from civil liability pursuant to Kentucky
Revised Statutes (KRS) 620.030 and KRS 620.050. Finding a genuine issue of
material fact precluding summary judgment, we reverse and remand for
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
On or about April 14, 2007, Peyton, who was pregnant, checked into
Norton Suburban Hospital to undergo an induction procedure. Upon intake,
Peyton provided hospital staff with a detailed medical history. She also read and
executed all necessary admission documents. During these interactions, Peyton
displayed no signs of intoxication and, in fact, was noted as being alert and
oriented. Peyton admitted to nurses that she had a history of drug and alcohol
abuse. However, she denied any current use.
Thereafter, a toxicology screen of Peyton’s blood was performed.
This report indicated that Peyton’s blood alcohol concentration was 0.3 milligrams
per deciliter (mg/dl). For comparison, the report stated that the level for
intoxication under Kentucky law is 80 mg/dl. Despite being nowhere near the
level for intoxication in Kentucky, the report reflected an “H” marked near the
result, which allegedly indicated “high.”
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The toxicology report also stated that to convert the above result into a
blood alcohol percentage, the above result must be divided by 1,000. Thus,
Peyton’s blood alcohol percentage was 0.0003%. By comparison, the level for
intoxication under Kentucky law is 0.08%.
Upon reviewing the report, Dr. Mehta, the attending neonatologist on
duty, misread the report to indicate that Peyton had a blood alcohol percentage of
0.3%. Mistakenly believing that Peyton was four times the legal limit for
intoxication, Dr. Mehta authorized the reporting of an erroneous intoxication level
to Child Protective Services. In reliance on this false information, Child Protective
Services caused the newborn to be removed from Peyton’s care. The two-day-old
infant was sent to foster care and has not since been returned to his mother’s
custody.1
Thereafter, Peyton filed a complaint against Appellees. She alleged
that the hospital’s agents were negligent and/or grossly negligent in failing to use
reasonable care in the generation, reading, and reporting of Peyton’s toxicology
results. Appellees countered that they were immune from any responsibility for
their allegedly negligent conduct pursuant to KRS 620.050(1). The trial court
agreed with Appellees and granted summary judgment in their favor. An appeal to
this Court now follows.
In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, our inquiry focuses on
“whether the trial court correctly found that there were no genuine issues as to any
1
Once the mistake in this case was discovered, other grounds were utilized to justify not
returning Peyton’s son to her care.
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material fact and that the moving party was entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.” Scifres v. Kraft, 916 S.W.2d 779, 781 (Ky. App. 1996); Kentucky Rules of
Civil Procedure (CR) 56.03. “[T]he proper function of summary judgment is to
terminate litigation when, as a matter of law, it appears that it would be impossible
for the respondent to produce evidence at the trial warranting a judgment in his
favor.” Steelvest v. Scansteel Service Center, Inc., 807 S.W.2d 476, 480 (Ky.
1991). Kentucky black-letter law directs that “summary judgment is to be
cautiously applied and should not be used as a substitute for trial.” Id. at 483.
“Even though a trial court may believe the party opposing the motion may not
succeed at trial, it should not render a summary judgment if there is any issue of
material fact.” Id. at 480.
In her first argument on appeal, Peyton contends the trial court
improperly granted summary judgment because KRS 620.050(1) does not provide
Appellees with immunity for reporting incorrect and/or misleading toxicology
results to Child Protective Services. KRS 620.050(1) provides as follows:
Anyone acting upon reasonable cause in the making of a
report or acting under KRS 620.030 to 620.050 in good
faith shall have immunity from any liability, civil or
criminal, that might otherwise be incurred or imposed.
Any such participant shall have the same immunity with
respect to participation in any judicial proceeding
resulting from such report or action. However, any
person who knowingly makes a false report and does so
with malice shall be guilty of a Class A misdemeanor.
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The trial court found that Appellees were immune because they were acting under
KRS 620.030(1) in good faith. KRS 620.030(1) states, in pertinent part, the
following:
Any person who knows or has reasonable cause to
believe that a child is dependent, neglected, or abused
shall immediately cause an oral or written report to be
made to a local law enforcement agency or the
Department of Kentucky State Police; the cabinet or its
designated representative; the Commonwealth’s attorney
or the county attorney; by telephone or otherwise. Any
supervisor who receives from an employee a report of
suspected dependency, neglect, or abuse shall promptly
make a report to the proper authorities for investigation. .
. . Nothing in this section shall relieve individuals of
their obligations to report.
Peyton argues that the immunity established in KRS 620.050(1) is not
applicable in this instance because Appellees were not acting under KRS
620.030(1). Peyton claims that her toxicology screen was performed only at the
behest of Child Protective Services, and thus, Appellees never had an independent
belief that Peyton’s newborn son was dependent, neglected, or abused. The trial
court’s order granting summary judgment indicates that the test was performed
before the abuse report was filed, and thus that the test was not performed at the
request of Child Protective Services. However, the record conflicts with this
finding in several respects.
First, in Dr. Mehta and Neonatal’s memorandum in support of
summary judgment, the appellees clearly state that during Peyton’s pregnancy,
CPS requested that Dr. Mehta have a toxicology screen performed on the infant
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immediately after birth. Second, in its memorandum in support of its motion for
summary judgment, Norton also states that CPS requested that Dr. Mehta obtain a
toxicology screen of both Peyton and her child. Finally, in her brief to this Court
on appeal, Peyton attaches as an exhibit a screen capture of Peyton’s obstetric
admitting record, which states in the comments section, “NEEDS TOX SCREEN
PER SOCIAL SERVICES!!!!!!!!!!!” (Emphasis in original).
Thus, it is unclear how the trial court determined that there was no
genuine issue of material fact regarding whether the testing was performed at the
request of CPS or whether Peyton’s admissions to prior drug use triggered the
screening. Because the outcome of Peyton’s case, in particular the applicability of
the immunity conferred under KRS 620.050(1), depends upon who initiated the
report of abuse, this issue of fact must necessarily be resolved by the trial court,
and summary judgment was premature.
Peyton also contends that even if the negligent reporting of abuse is
not subject to civil liability, the negligent performance of medical diagnostic
procedures is excepted from immunity pursuant to KRS 620.050(14). Peyton
specifically claims that both Dr. Mehta and Norton committed direct negligence in
the performance of medical diagnostic procedures.2
KRS 620.050(14) sets forth the following:
As a result of any report of suspected child abuse or
neglect, photographs and X-rays or other appropriate
medical diagnostic procedures may be taken or caused to
2
Dr. Mehta was allegedly negligent in reading and interpreting the report and Norton was
allegedly negligent for including a misleading indicator (“H”) next to Peyton’s toxicology result.
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be taken, without the consent of the parent or other
person exercising custodial control or supervision of the
child, as a part of the medical evaluation or investigation
of these reports. These photographs and X-rays or results
of other medical diagnostic procedures may be
introduced into evidence in any subsequent judicial
proceedings. The person performing the diagnostic
procedures or taking photographs or X-rays shall be
immune from criminal or civil liability for having
performed the act. Nothing herein shall limit liability for
negligence.
“Subsection (14) of KRS 620.050 specifically provides an exception
to immunity if the person acted negligently in performing medical diagnostic
procedures at the request of the Cabinet based upon a report of abuse.” Garrison
v. Leahy-Auer, 220 S.W.3d 693, 700 (Ky.App. 2006). In Garrison, a medical team
was alleged to have acted negligently in the performance of medical diagnostic
procedures. Id. The Garrison Court determined that the medical team was
immune from any civil liability for the negligent performance of these procedures
pursuant to KRS 620.050(1). Id. Because the procedures had not been performed
at the request of the Cabinet, this Court reasoned that the exception to immunity
provided in KRS 620.050(14) did not apply.
Again, in the instant case there is conflicting evidence in the record as
to whether Child Protective Services requested the screening performed on Peyton
or whether her admissions to prior drug use triggered the screening. The record
seems to indicate that Child Protective Services requested the screening, but the
order granting summary judgment presumptively states that Peyton’s admissions
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triggered the screening. Thus, a genuine issue of material fact exists, and summary
judgment was granted in error.
Accordingly, we reverse the May 21, 2009, order of the Jefferson
Circuit Court, and this matter is remanded for further proceedings consistent with
this opinion, including a determination of whether Peyton’s admissions triggered
the screening or whether Child Protective Services requested that the screening be
conducted based on a prior report of abuse.
COMBS, JUDGE, CONCURS.
KELLER, JUDGE, CONCURS AND FILES SEPARATE OPINION.
KELLER, JUDGE, CONCURRING: I concur with the majority in its
conclusion that summary judgment was prematurely granted. Specifically, I agree
that it is unclear at this point whether the toxicology screen was performed
pursuant to a request by Child Protective Services (CPS) or whether the toxicology
screen was triggered by Peyton’s admission during her intake interview that she
had a history of drug and alcohol use. I agree that if CPS requested the toxicology
screen, then KRS 620.050(14) would apply.
However, I disagree with the majority in that I do not believe that the
immunity conferred under KRS 620.050(1) depends on who initiated the report of
abuse. KRS 620.030(1) requires “[a]ny person who knows or has reasonable cause
to believe that a child is dependent, neglected or abused” to report that information
to an appropriate state or local agency. KRS 620.050(1) provides immunity from
criminal and civil liability to anyone who makes such a report “in good faith.”
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Nothing in KRS 620.030(1) indicates that the requirement to report suspected
dependency, neglect, or abuse must be triggered by a report from CPS. Therefore,
the immunity granted KRS 620.050(1) to a person making such a good faith report
attaches whether or not the basis for the report came from CPS. Because I agree
with the trial court that there is no evidence of bad faith, I believe the court
correctly determined that the Appellees are immune from civil and criminal
liability under KRS 620.050(1) for making the report.
However, the trial court did not address whether the Appellees are
entitled to immunity from liability under KRS 620.050(14). KRS 620.050(1) only
provides immunity from criminal and civil liability to those who make a good faith
report of dependency, neglect, or abuse. KRS 620.050(14) extends immunity from
criminal and civil liability to those who perform diagnostic testing on a child
without the consent of a parent or guardian. That immunity attaches if the
diagnostic testing is performed “[a]s a result of any report of suspected child abuse
or neglect . . . .” I note that, as with KRS 620.030(1), KRS 620.050(14) does not
state that the “report” of suspected child abuse must come from CPS or any other
state or local agency in order to trigger the immunity.3 However, the testing must
be based on a report from some source. Therefore, I agree with the majority that
this matter must be remanded to the trial court so it can determine whether the
3
I note that Garrison v. Leahy-Auer, 220 S.W.3d 693 (Ky. App. 2006) appears to hold that a
request to perform the diagnostic testing must come from CPS in order to trigger the immunity
provided by KRS 620.050(14). However, to the extent Garrison does make such a holding, I
believe its interpretation of KRS 620.050(14) is too narrow. As noted above, I believe that the
immunity in KRS 620.050(14) is triggered regardless of the source of the report and is not
dependent on a request for testing by CPS.
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Appellees performed the diagnostic testing based on a report of suspected abuse or
neglect and whether they have immunity under KRS 620.050(14) for performing
that testing.
Finally, I note that, even if the trial court finds that the Appellees have
immunity from criminal and civil liability under KRS 620.050(14), that immunity
does not extend to any liability they may have for negligence in performing the
testing. On remand, the trial court should take this into consideration when
addressing any subsequent motions for summary judgment.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT/
CROSS-APPELLEE:
BRIEFS FOR APPELLEES/
CROSS-APPELLANTS:
Jeremy J. Nelson
Louisville, Kentucky
Beth H. McMasters
M. Jude Wolford
Louisville, Kentucky
ATTORNEYS FOR KETAN
MEHTA, M.D. AND NEONATAL
INTENSTIVE CARE EXPERTS II,
PLLC
William P. Swain
Joseph M. Effinger
Patricia C. Le Meur
Louisville, Kentucky
ATTORNEYS FOR NORTON
HOSPITALS, INC. D/B/A NORTON
SUBURBAN HOSPITAL
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