HACK (JONATHAN) VS. FANNIN (MARLO), ET AL.
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RENDERED: JULY 16, 2010; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2009-CA-001402 -MR
JONATHAN HACK
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM ELLIOTT CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE REBECCA K. PHILLIPS, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 08-CI-00034
MARLO FANNIN AND
GREGORY S. HOWARD
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: CLAYTON AND KELLER, JUDGES; BUCKINGHAM,1 SENIOR
JUDGE.
CLAYTON, JUDGE: Jonathan Hack appeals from an order of the Elliott Circuit
Court dismissing his action for declaratory judgment. Hack asserts that his due
1
Senior Judge David C. Buckingham sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and Kentucky Revised Statutes
(KRS) 21.580.
process rights were violated in a prison disciplinary proceeding. For the reasons
stated below, we affirm.
On June 30, 2007, Jonathan Hack was being escorted to his prison cell
by Officer Robert Newsome. According to the Disciplinary Report form, the
following incident occurred: After Sergeant Riggs removed Hack’s leg restraints;
Officer Newsome escorted Hack to his cell door. As Officer Newsome began to
remove Hack’s hand restraints, Hack yelled, “Get off me” and elbowed Officer
Newsome in the stomach. Hack tried to pull away from Officer Newsome forcing
Newsome’s left arm into the top of a food port. Officer Newsome suffered a minor
abrasion to his left forearm. During the investigation, Hack denied elbowing or
placing his hands on Officer Newsome, but Hack admitted that he jerked his hands
away when Officer Newsome was removing his hand restraints. Hack was charged
with a “physical action against an employee or non-inmate,” a category VII, item 1
infraction.
A prison disciplinary hearing was held on July 10, 2007. At the
hearing, the Adjustment Officer, Sergeant Fannin, found Hack guilty of the
charged violation based upon Officer Newsome’s report and Hack’s statement that
he jerked his hand away, which resulted in Officer Newsome scraping his arm on
the food port. For the violation, Sergeant Fannin assigned Hack to disciplinary
segregation for a period of 180 days and assessed a forfeiture of 360 days of good
time. Hack appealed the findings to the Deputy Warden, Gregory S. Howard. On
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July 19, 2007, Deputy Warden Howard concurred with the Adjustment
Committee’s ruling and denied Hack’s appeal.
Hack then sought judicial review of the decision in Elliott Circuit
Court and filed an action for declaratory judgment on April 4, 2008. Hack
challenged the adjustment committee’s findings that he committed the charged
infraction and alleged that his due process rights were violated. In particular, Hack
argued that his due process rights were violated by the refusal to allow properly
requested staff to testify during the hearing, by the improper and inadequate
written summary of the evidence upon which the decision and subsequent
discipline were based, and by a decision, which was based upon evidence that did
not comport with the “some evidence” standard of Superintendent, Massachusetts
Correctional Institution, Walpole v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 105 S.Ct. 2768, 86 L.Ed.2d
356 (1985). Appellees filed a motion to dismiss. And, on February 27, 2009, the
Elliott Circuit Court entered an order sustaining appellees’ motion to dismiss and
dismissing Hack’s petition for declaration of rights. Hack then filed this appeal of
the court’s decision.
The issue on appeal is whether the circuit judge erred in dismissing
Hack’s petition claiming his due process rights were violated in connection with
the disciplinary proceedings at issue. Hack argues that his due process rights were
violated in two ways. First, Hack claims that a violation occurred when Sergeant
Fannin denied Hack the right to question Sergeant Riggs and Officer Newsome
during his prison disciplinary hearing. Second, Hack claims that the written
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summary of the evidence provided by Sergeant Fannin did not meet minimum due
process requirements.
Prison disciplinary proceedings are administrative rather than criminal
hearings. As such, prisoners are entitled to due process of law under the United
States and Kentucky constitutions, but these rights are greatly lessened in prison
disciplinary proceedings. Smith v. O'Dea, 939 S.W.2d 353, 355 (Ky. App. 1997).
Both federal and Kentucky due process standards are satisfied if there is "some
evidence" on the administrative record to support the prison's disciplinary decision.
Id. at 356-58. Accordingly, on appellate review the standard of judicial review for
a prison disciplinary committee’s findings is the “some evidence” standard of
review. Id. The some evidence standard of review does not require that an
adjustment committee's fact-finding be supported by compelling evidence; just
evidence that will support a reasonable inference of guilt. Id. at 357. Finally,
determining whether the “some evidence” standard has been satisfied does not
necessitate an examination of the entire record or weighing the credibility of the
evidence. Walpole, 472 U.S. at 455-456. The Court need only review the record
for “some evidence” sufficient to uphold a decision of the fact-finder. Yates v.
Fletcher, 120 S.W.3d 728 (Ky. App. 2003).
With regard to the level of due process required in prison disciplinary
hearings, the United States Supreme Court has stated that “[p]rison disciplinary
proceedings are not part of a criminal prosecution, and the full panoply of rights
due a defendant in such proceedings does not apply.” Wolff v. McDonnell, 418
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U.S. 539, 556 94 S.Ct. 2963, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974). The Court, however, stated
that prisoners are not fully stripped of their constitutional protections while in
prison. Id. at 555. Wolff held that:
[w]here a prison disciplinary hearing may result in
the loss of good time credits, . . . the inmate must receive:
(1) advance written notice of the disciplinary charges; (2)
an opportunity, when consistent with institutional safety
and correctional goals, to call witnesses and present
documentary evidence in his defense; and (3) a written
statement by the factfinder of the evidence relied on and
the reasons for the disciplinary action.
Walpole, 472 U.S. at 454, citing Wolff 418 U.S. at 563-567.
In the case at hand, Hack first argues that his right to due process was
violated when Sergeant Fannin denied Hack the right to question two witnesses,
Sergeant Riggs and Officer Newsome, during his prison disciplinary hearing.
Although Hack claims that he submitted a written request for witnesses, the record
does not support this assertion. The Write Up and Investigation portion of the
Disciplinary Report form does not contain a request to call such witnesses.
Additionally, the Hearing/Appeal portion of the Disciplinary Report form does not
reflect any request to call such witnesses. Included in the record is a handwritten
note from Hack that is signed and dated July 3, 2007, but the handwritten note
shows no signs of ever being received or reviewed by Sergeant Fannin. Since none
of the evidence supports Hack’s contention that he properly identified Sergeant
Riggs and Officer Newsome as witnesses, no evidence exists that his request to
call them was denied.
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Moreover, as the Elliot Circuit Court determined, even if a timely
request for witnesses had been received, Hack does not have an absolute right to
call witnesses at a prison disciplinary hearing. As stated above, the full panoply of
rights due to a defendant in criminal proceedings is not applicable to prison
disciplinary proceedings. Wolff, 418 U.S. at 556. Further, an inmate does not have
an unrestricted right to call witnesses from the prison population and prison
officials must have necessary discretion in this area. Id. at 566-567. Both the
witnesses that Hack requested at the time of the hearing were correctional officers.
To have both correctional officers appear at the hearing could result in an
interruption to prison operations, and such an occurrence could pose a safety risk.
In fact, prison officials can deny prisoners the right to call witnesses during
disciplinary hearings if the request would be “unduly hazardous to institutional
safety or correctional goals.” Id. at 566. So, even if Hack had notified Sergeant
Fannin prior to the hearing of his desire to call the witnesses, Sergeant Fannin had
discretion to deny such a request under the holding in Wolff. Here, we agree with
the Elliot Circuit Court that Hack’s due process rights were not violated with
regard to the testimony of these witnesses at the disciplinary hearing.
Next, Hack asserts that his due process rights were violated because
the written summary of the evidence provided by Sergeant Fannin did not meet
minimum due process requirements. In order to meet the due process requirements
guaranteed by Wolff, an inmate must be provided with a written statement by the
fact finder as to the evidence relied upon for the finding of guilt. Id. at 540. And
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the Sixth Circuit held that “[a] prisoner does not receive a statement of the
‘evidence relied on’ if he receives only a reference to an investigative report that
contains statements of ten different witnesses. The hearing report must refer to
‘each item’ of evidence.” King v. Wells, 760 F.2d 89, 94 (6th Cir. 1985).
Relying on Wells, Hack argues that an inmate has not received a
statement of the evidence relied on for disciplinary action if he receives a written
summary by the fact finder which only makes a reference to the reporting
employee’s report or investigative reports that contain statements of witnesses. He
goes on to maintain that Sergeant Fannin only referenced Officer Newsome’s
report and therefore his written statement did not meet minimum due process
requirements.
But Hack’s reliance on Wells is incorrect. First, our Court has not
found that due process violations occur when written findings incorporate by
reference the facts provided in the reporting employee’s report. When this
incorporation occurs, the information from the reporting employee’s report
becomes part of the written findings of the adjustment officer. Yates, 120 S.W.3d
at 731. Second, Sergeant Fannin’s written summary referenced both the reporting
employee’s report and Hack’s statement. It did not merely reference the report.
And finally, Sergeant Fannin determined that Hack’s action of jerking his arm
away caused the injury sustained by Officer Newsome. Therefore, Sergeant
Fannin found that Hack committed the violation based upon Officer Newsome’s
report and based upon Hack’s statement. Because Sergeant Fannin’s report
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contained all of the evidence relied upon during the hearing, the due process
requirements guaranteed by Wells and Wolff were satisfied.
Additionally, Hack is disputing a finding of fact made by Sergeant
Fannin. A determination of guilt or innocence is not made by this Court, for “[t]he
courts only review the decisions of the Adjustment Committee and prison officials
are afforded broad discretion.” Id. Moreover, this Court must affirm if there is
“some evidence” supporting the charge. Smith, 939 S.W.2d at 353. Thus,
Sergeant Fannin’s findings shall not be disturbed.
To summarize, Hack’s due process rights were not violated when
Sergeant Fannin denied Hack the right to question Sergeant Riggs and Officer
Newsome during his prison disciplinary hearing. Additionally, the written
summary of the evidence provided by Sergeant Fannin did meet the minimum due
process requirements guaranteed by Wells and Wolff; therefore, Hack’s due process
rights were not violated at any time during his disciplinary hearing.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Elliot Circuit Court is
affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Jonathan Hack, Pro Se
Eddyville, Kentucky
Angela T. Dunham
Frankfort, Kentucky
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