BEVERLY ENTERPRISES, INC., ET AL. VS. PING (DONNA), ET AL
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RENDERED: JULY 23, 2010; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2009-CA-001361-MR
BEVERLY ENTERPRISES, INC.;
BEVERLY ENTERPRISES-KENTUCKY,
INC.; BEVERLY HEALTH AND
REHABILITATION SERVICES, INC.;
GGNSC ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES,
LLC; GGNSC HOLDINGS, LLC; GGNSC
EQUITY HOLDINGS, LLC; GOLDEN
GATE NATIONAL SENIOR CARE, LLC;
GOLDEN GATE ANCILLARY, LLC;
AND GGNSC FRANKFORT, LLC
v.
APPELLANTS
APPEAL FROM FRANKLIN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE THOMAS D. WINGATE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 08-CI-01650
DONNA PING, EXECUTRIX
OF THE ESTATE OF ALMA
CALHOUN DUNCAN, DECEASED
AND
ANN PHILLIPS
APPELLEE
NO. 2009-CA-001379-MR
APPELLANT
v.
APPEAL FROM FRANKLIN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE THOMAS D. WINGATE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 08-CI-01650
DONNA PING, EXECUTRIX
OF THE ESTATE OF ALMA
CALHOUN DUNCAN, DECEASED
APPELLEE
OPINION
REVERSING AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: CAPERTON AND MOORE, JUDGES; BUCKINGHAM,1 SENIOR
JUDGE.
BUCKINGHAM, SENIOR JUDGE: Appellants (Beverly Enterprises, Inc., et al)
appeal from an order of the Franklin Circuit Court denying their motion to compel
arbitration in an action filed against them by Appellee (Donna Ping, executrix of
the estate of Alma Calhoun Duncan).2 We reverse and remand.
Alma Duncan was admitted to Golden Living, a long-term care
facility, by her daughter and power of attorney, Appellee Donna Ping. At the time
of Ms. Duncan’s admission to the facility, Appellee represented herself to the
facility as Ms. Duncan’s power of attorney and produced an executed copy of the
General Power of Attorney evidencing her authority. Appellee signed the facility’s
1
Senior Judge David C. Buckingham sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and Kentucky Revised Statutes
(KRS) 21.580.
2
Both Appeal No. 2009-CA-001361-MR and Appeal No. 2009-CA-001379-MR have been
consolidated pursuant to an order of this Court dated October 1, 2009.
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admission documents on Ms. Duncan’s behalf, although she states that she did not
read the documents despite having the opportunity to do so. Appellee also signed a
separate Alternative Dispute Resolution Agreement (“ADR Agreement” or
“Agreement”) on Ms. Duncan’s behalf as part of the admissions documents packet.
Ms. Duncan subsequently passed away, and Appellee, as executrix of
Ms. Duncan’s estate, filed this lawsuit alleging negligence with respect to the care
provided to Ms. Duncan while she was a resident of the facility. Thereafter,
Appellants filed an answer to Appellee’s complaint and a motion to dismiss or, in
the alternative, to stay the lawsuit pending alternative dispute resolution
proceedings. The Franklin Circuit Court ordered the parties to engage in limited
discovery regarding the enforceability of the ADR Agreement. After completion
of the limited discovery, Appellants filed a renewed motion to enforce the ADR
Agreement. The trial court entered an order denying Appellants’ motion, and this
appeal followed.
The ADR Agreement states in bold capital letters that it is a
RESIDENT AND FACILITY ARBITRATION AGREEMENT (NOT A
CONDITION OF ADMISSION – READ CAREFULLY). In the first paragraph
of the two-page Agreement, it states:
It is understood and agreed by Facility and Resident that
any and all claims, disputes and controversies . . . arising
out of, or in connection with, or relating in any way to
the [ADR] Agreement or any service or health care
provided by the Facility to the Resident shall be resolved
exclusively by binding arbitration to be conducted at a
place agreed upon by the Parties, or in the absence of
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such an agreement, at the Facility, in accordance with the
National Arbitration Forum Code of Procedure, which is
hereby incorporated into this [ADR] Agreement, and not
by a lawsuit or resort to court process. This [ADR]
Agreement shall be governed by and interpreted under
the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. Section 1-16.
This [ADR Agreement] includes, but is not limited to,
any claim for payment, nonpayment, or refund for
services rendered to the Resident by the Facility,
violations of any right granted to the Resident by law or
by the [ADR] Agreement, breach of contract, fraud or
misrepresentation, negligence, gross negligence,
malpractice, or claims based on any departure from
accepted medical or health care or safety standards, as
well as any and all claims for equitable relief or claims
based on contract, tort, statute, warranty, or any alleged
breach, default, negligence, wantonness, fraud,
misrepresentation, suppression of fact, or inducement.
The ADR Agreement further advises that the intention of the parties is
that the ADR Agreement will “inure to the benefit of and bind the parties, their
successors, and assigns, including without limitation the agents, employees, and
servants of the Facility . . . including any parent, spouse, sibling, child, guardian,
executor, legal representative, administrator, or heir of the Resident.” The ADR
Agreement adds that the parties intend that its provisions will survive the lives or
existence of the parties to the Agreement.
The second page of the ADR Agreement, which is the signature page,
contains in bold print an acknowledgement of the nature of the Agreement as an
arbitration agreement that results in the parties giving up their constitutional rights
to have any claims decided in a court of law before a judge and jury. Immediately
above the signature lines is the provision that states:
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The undersigned certifies that he/she has read this [ADR]
Agreement and that it has been fully explained to
him/her, that he/she understands its contents, and has
received a copy of the provision and that he/she is the
Resident, or a person duly authorized by the Resident or
otherwise to execute this [A]greement and accepts its
terms.
Appellee’s signature appears at the bottom of the page, and “Daughter/POA” is
written next to the statement “Relationship to Resident.”
This Court reviews a trial court’s factual findings in an order denying
enforcement of an arbitration agreement to determine if the findings are clearly
erroneous, but we review a trial court’s legal conclusions under a de novo standard.
Conseco Fin. Servicing Corp. v. Wilder, 47 S.W.3d 335, 340 (Ky. App. 2001).
Appellants first argue that they have established that a valid
arbitration agreement exists under 9 U.S.C. § 1-16 and that the ADR Agreement
includes the claims brought by Appellee in this lawsuit. Both the United States
Congress and the Kentucky General Assembly have enacted legislation to govern
certain types of arbitration agreements: the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) at 9
U.S.C. § 1 and the Uniform Arbitration Act (“KUAA”) at KRS 417.045-240.3
Both acts have been found to benefit arbitration agreements, at least to the point of
ensuring that arbitration agreements are reviewed using the same criterion that is
applied to other contracts. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10, 104 S.Ct.
3
The FAA and the KUAA have been construed consistently with each other by Kentucky courts.
Louisville Peterbilt, Inc. v. Cox, 132 S.W.3d 850, 857 (Ky. 2004) (“we have interpreted the
KUAA consistent with the FAA[.]”).
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852, 858, 79 L.Ed.2d 1 (1984); Kodak Min. Co. v. Carrs Fork Corp., 669 S.W.2d
917, 919 (Ky. 1984).
In this case, the ADR Agreement comes within the broad provisions
of both the FAA and the KUAA.4 The Agreement is a written pre-dispute
arbitration agreement involving interstate commerce.5 Moreover, by its terms the
ADR Agreement applies to negligence and malpractice claims. Appellee’s claims
are all based on negligence and medical malpractice and are, therefore, within the
scope of the ADR Agreement.
Both acts state that qualifying agreements6 are “valid, enforceable and
irrevocable, save upon such grounds as exist at law for the revocation of any
contract.” KRS 417.050 (emphasis added); 9 U.S.C. § 2. The last clause refers
“only to revocation based upon fraud, mistake or other defect in the making of the
agreement[.]” Kodak Min. Co., 669 S.W.2d at 919. Therefore, “the existence of a
valid arbitration agreement as a threshold matter must first be resolved by the
4
Because an appeal at the end of the litigation will not often afford an adequate solution to the
wrongful denial of a request to arbitrate, both the FAA and the KUAA provide that an appeal
may be taken from an interlocutory order denying an application to compel arbitration. 9 U.S.C.
§ 16; KRS 417.220.
5
Not only does the agreement involve interstate commerce, but the agreement states that it “shall
be governed by and interpreted under the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. Sections 1-16.” See
Volt Info. Sciences, Inc. v. Bd. of Tr. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 472, 109
S.Ct. 1248, 103 L.Ed.2d 488 (1989), and Conseco, 47 S.W.3d at 341, n.11.
6
The FAA applies to: “a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by
arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction, or the refusal to
perform the whole or any part thereof, or an agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an
existing controversy arising out of such a contract, transaction, or refusal[.]” 9 U.S.C. § 2. The
KUAA applies to: “[a] written agreement to submit any existing controversy to arbitration or a
provision in [a] written contract to submit to arbitration any controversy thereafter arising
between the parties[.]” KRS 417.050.
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court.” Mortgage Elec. Registration Sys., Inc. v. Abner, 260 S.W.3d 351, 353 (Ky.
App. 2008) (citing First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 115
S.Ct. 1920, 131 L.Ed.2d 985 (1995)). State contract law governs in determining
whether a valid arbitration agreement exists. Gen. Steel Corp. v. Collins, 196
S.W.3d 18, 20 (Ky. App. 2006). Further, “[t]he party seeking to avoid the
arbitration agreement has a heavy burden.” Cox, 132 S.W.3d at 857 (citing Valley
Constr. Co., Inc. v. Perry Host Mgmt. Co. Inc., 796 S.W.2d 365, 368 (Ky. App.
1990)).
The trial court here denied the motion to compel arbitration, finding
that Appellee did not have authority to sign the ADR Agreement, and, therefore,
that a valid agreement was not formed due to a lack of mutual assent between the
parties. The trial court concluded that there was no actual authority for Appellee to
enter into the Arbitration Agreement because the power of attorney did not contain
any specific or express language to that effect.
Appellee cites to a case holding that “any power of attorney which
delegates authority to perform specific acts that also contains general words, is
limited to the particular acts authorized.” Harding v. Kentucky River Hardwood
Co., 205 Ky. 1, 265 S.W. 429, 431 (1924). The case in Harding, however, dealt
with a power of attorney that was given for a specific limited purpose. The power
of attorney in Harding stated the following:
That the Commercial Bank of Raleigh, N.C., does hereby
appoint W.N. Cope, attorney of Jackson, Ky., as its
attorney to act for it in all respects in its behalf in a suit
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against the Kentucky River Hardwood Company and
other, with full power to sign in its name a bond for costs
and do other acts necessary.
Id. The court noted that the specific act authorized to be performed was to sign the
bank’s name to the cost bond, and therefore the power was limited to that act,
notwithstanding the general words contained therein. Id. at 431-32.
More recent guidance on the Kentucky Supreme Court’s approach
when confronted with a principal’s clear statement or intent in a power of attorney
appears in Ingram v. Cates, 74 S.W.3d 783 (Ky. App. 2002). In Ingram, this Court
stated the following:
Here, the power of attorney . . . grants a general power. . .
to “convey any personal property that I now or hereafter
own . . . .” It is an unlimited power of attorney
authorizing [the attorney-in-fact] to make any
conveyance of personal property. It is undeniable that
the power of attorney did not specifically bestow upon
[the attorney-in-fact] the power to make a gift to himself
or to another. Even so, it is clear that the general power
to convey any personal property . . . permits these
specific transfers. We know of no rule of law requiring
that a power of attorney specifically delineate each and
every transaction the attorney-in-fact is authorized to
perform.
Cates points out the general rule of construction that
when a power of attorney delegates authority to perform
specific acts and also contains general words, the powers
of attorney are limited to the particular acts authorized.
In this case, however, the power of attorney contained
general terms without limitation and the obvious purpose
was to give [the attorney-in-fact] authority to handle and
transact all financial affairs as agent for Mr. Ingram.
Id. at 787-88 (internal citations omitted).
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The power of attorney held by Appellee in this case was a general
power of attorney as evidenced by its title (General Power of Attorney). In its first
paragraph, Ms. Duncan appointed Appellee as “my true and lawful attorney” and
set forth the following powers:
[G]iving and granting to her full and complete power and
authority to do and perform any, all, and every act and
thing whatsoever requisite and necessary to be done, to
and for all intents and purposes, as I might or could do if
personally present, including but not limited to the
following[.]
Various specific powers were thereafter enumerated.
Later in the document, Duncan gave Appellee the following specific
power:
To make any and all decisions of whatever kind, nature
or type regarding my medical care, to execute any and all
documents, including, but not limited to, authorizations
and releases, related medical decisions affecting me[.]
On the second page of the General Power of Attorney, Ms. Duncan clearly stated
her intentions as follows:
It is my intention and desire that this document grant to
my said attorney-in-fact full and general power and
authority to act on my behalf and I thus direct that the
language of this document be liberally construed with
respect to the power and authority hereby granted my
said attorney-in-fact in order to give effect to such
intention and desire. The enumeration of specific rights
or acts or powers herein is not intended to, nor does it
limit or restrict, the general full power herein granted to
my said attorney-in-fact.
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We are not persuaded by Appellee’s arguments that the General
Power of Attorney in this case did not give Appellants the authority to enter into
the ADR Agreement on Ms. Duncan’s behalf. On page 5 of Appellee’s brief, she
cites language from a case that is over 175 years old, Southard v. Steele, 3 T.B.
Mon. 435, 19 Ky. 435 (1826). The language from Southard cited by Appellee
states that a general agent cannot bind his principal to arbitration without special
authority. A close reading of the case, however, reveals that the cited language
was not the words of the court; rather, it was the words of counsel in a petition for
rehearing. Further, the Harding case, discussed earlier herein, is distinguishable as
we have noted.
We conclude that Appellee had the actual authority to enter into the
ADR Agreement by the terms of the General Power of Attorney given to her by
Ms. Duncan.
Additionally, Appellee had apparent authority to enter into the
Agreement on behalf of Ms. Duncan. Under Kentucky law, “[a]pparent authority
is not actual authority, but rather ‘is that which, by reason of prevailing usage or
other circumstance, the agent is in effect held out by the principal as possessing.’”
Estell v. Barrickman, 571 S.W.2d 650, 652 (Ky. App. 1978), overruled on other
grounds by Mid-States Plastics., Inc. v. Estate of Bryan ex. rel. Bryant, 245 S.W.3d
728 (Ky. 2008). By designating Appellee as her power of attorney and giving her
the authority to make medical decisions and to execute releases on her behalf, Ms.
Duncan created the appearance that Appellee was authorized to act on her behalf.
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It was reasonable for Appellants to assume that Appellee had authority to enter into
the ADR Agreement on behalf of Ms. Duncan because of the language in the
power of attorney.7
The trial court also found, and Appellee argues, that the evidence in
this situation indicates fraud, thereby resulting in a defect in the formation of the
Agreement. Under Kentucky law, there are two types of fraud: fraud in the
inducement and fraud in the execution, or factum. To show fraud in the
inducement, one must show through clear and convincing evidence that there was
(1) a material representation; (2) which is false; (3) known to be false or made
recklessly; (4) made with inducement to be acted upon; (5) acted in reliance
thereon, and (6) injury. United Parcel Serv. Co. v. Rickert, 996 S.W.2d 464, 468
(Ky. 1999). Fraud in the execution occurs when a party’s signature to an
instrument is obtained without the knowledge of its true nature or content and
renders the contract void, such as when one party encourages the other to sign a
document by falsely stating that it has no legal effect. Hazelwood v. Woodward,
277 Ky. 447, 126 S.W.2d 857, 862 (1939).
The trial court found that the admissions director led Appellee to
believe that the papers presented to her, which included the ADR Agreement, were
7
These circumstances differentiate the present case from that of Beverly Enterprises, Inc. v.
Stivers, 2009 WL 723002 (Ky. App. 2009) (No. 2008-CA-000284-MR), and Beverly Health &
Rehab. Services, Inc. v. Smith, 2009 WL 961056 (Ky. App. 2009) (No. 2008-CA-000604-MR)
(non-final decision), particularly the latter case, in which the family member who executed the
challenged arbitration agreement directly advised the employee involved that she did not have
authority to sign on behalf of her father, and the power of attorney was held by her mother.
Stivers, 2009 WL 961056 at *1-2. This case presents no evidence that Appellee told anyone that
she did not have the authority to execute the admission documents or the ADR agreement.
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for purposes of admitting Ms. Duncan and nothing more, while in reality the ADR
Agreement had the effect of waiving her mother’s constitutional right to a trial by
jury. Therefore, the trial court concluded that Appellee’s signature could not serve
as evidence of her consent.
The only statement Appellee attributes to the admissions director
during the admissions process, however, was that he was presenting to her the
“standard admissions packet.” This statement was not a misrepresentation and
does not rise to the level of obtaining Appellee’s signature without her knowledge
of the Agreement’s true nature or contents.
The very title of the Agreement indicates in bold letters that it is an
arbitration agreement, contains the words “Read Carefully” in bold and capital
letters, and states that execution of the Agreement is not a condition for admission.
Moreover, Appellee never testified that she was in any fashion misled by any
employee of Appellants or by the language of the Agreement, which she did not
read before signing.
Additionally, the trial court found it significant that the admissions
director appeared to be in a hurry and that Appellee signed where he told her to
sign. Appellee, however, never stated that she was denied an opportunity to read
any of the papers. Even if Appellee was rushed when executing the documents,
she had the right under the Agreement to seek legal counsel and to rescind the
Agreement within 30 days. None of this evidence leads to the conclusion that any
type of fraud was present at the time Appellee signed the Agreement.
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The trial court also found that there was a lack of consideration
between the parties because if signing the ADR Agreement was not a condition of
admission, there was no reciprocal benefit to Appellee under the terms of the ADR
Agreement. It is not necessary, however, that both parties to an agreement have
reciprocal rights or obligations of the same kind or nature. David Roth’s Sons, Inc.
v. Wright & Taylor, Inc., 343 S.W.2d 389, 390 (Ky. 1961) (citing Bank of
Louisville v. Baumiester, 87 Ky. 6, 7 S.W. 170 (1888)).
In this situation, the rights and obligations incurred by Appellants and
Appellee were the same. The ADR Agreement stated that any claim stemming
from Duncan’s residency was to be submitted to arbitration, including any claims
that Appellants may have had, and not only Duncan’s claims. Therefore, both
parties were obligated under the Agreement to submit their claims to arbitration.
Additionally, we do not read the language that “[t]his Arbitration
Agreement is executed . . . in conjunction with an agreement for admission and for
the provision of nursing facility services” as a statement that the consent to
arbitrate is consideration for the provision of nursing facility services. Rather, it is
a preliminary statement of the subject matter of the Agreement. Therefore,
Appellants’ agreement to submit its own claims to arbitration provided sufficient
consideration under Kentucky law.
Appellee next contends, and the trial court agreed, that the ADR
Agreement is revocable because it is unconscionable. Kentucky law recognizes
unconscionability as a defense to the enforcement of an arbitration agreement.
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Wilder, 47 S.W.3d at 341. As stated by the Court in Wilder, however, “[a]
fundamental rule of contract law holds that, absent fraud . . . , a written agreement
duly executed by the party to be held, who had an opportunity to read it, will be
enforced according to its terms.” Id. (citing Cline v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 690
S.W.2d 764 (Ky. App. 1985)).
While the doctrine of unconscionability has arisen as an exception to
this rule, the doctrine “is directed against one-sided, oppressive and unfairly
surprising contracts, and not against the consequences per se of uneven bargaining
power or even a simple old-fashioned bad bargain.” Id. (citing Louisville Bear
Safety Serv., Inc. v. South Central Bell Tel. Co., 571 S.W.2d 438, 440 (Ky. App.
1978)). An unconscionable contract is “one which no man in his senses, not under
delusion, would make, on the one hand, and which no fair and honest man would
accept, on the other.” Id.
We agree with Appellants that the ADR Agreement was not abusive
or unfair. The Agreement was not hidden within the other admissions documents,
but rather was a separate document whose title was printed in bold capital letters.
Moreover, its terms are such that a person of ordinary experience and education is
likely to understand, and the Agreement does not affect the parties’ responsibilities
or liabilities but only the forum in which they are to be disputed. See Wilder, 47
S.W.3d at 343.
Moreover, the United States District Court for the Western District of
Kentucky has analyzed the exact same agreement and has come to the conclusion
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that the agreement was not unconscionable. Holifield v. Beverly Health and
Rehab. Serv., Inc., 2008 WL 2548104 (W.D. Ky. 2008) (Civil Action No. 3:08CV147-H). We find the analysis utilized by the Court in Holifield persuasive. In
Holifield, the Court found that the language of the agreement was not deceptive or
misleading and that none of its terms were hidden or concealed. It further stated
that “[t]his particular arbitration agreement is not unusual” and the institution’s
“failure to mention or separately identify the ADR Agreement does not rise to
‘unconscionable’ conduct.” Id. at *5. We conclude that the ADR Agreement is
not unconscionable.
Appellee also contends that the trial court does not have subject
matter jurisdiction to enforce the ADR Agreement because the Agreement does not
state that the arbitration must take place in Kentucky. See Alley Cat, LLC v.
Chauvin, 274 S.W.3d 451, 454 (Ky. 2009). The Alley Cat case stands for the
proposition that when an arbitration agreement “fails to comply with the literal
provisions of KRS 417.200,” then Kentucky courts lack subject matter jurisdiction
to enforce the agreement. Id. at 455-56. KRS 417.200 states:
The term “court” means any court of competent
jurisdiction of this state. The making of an agreement
described in KRS 417.050 providing for arbitration in
this state confers jurisdiction on the court to enforce the
agreement under this chapter and to enter judgment on an
award thereafter.
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Therefore, “[s]ubject matter jurisdiction to enforce an agreement to arbitrate is
conferred upon a Kentucky court only if the agreement provides for arbitration in
this state.” Id. at 455.
Here, the ADR Agreement states that the claims shall be resolved by
binding arbitration “to be conducted at a place agreed upon by the Parties, or in the
absence of such an agreement, at the Facility, in accordance with the National
Arbitration Forum Code of Procedure, which is hereby incorporated into this
Agreement[.]” Although there are no Kentucky cases directly on point, other
courts interpreting statutes identical to KRS 417.200 have held that where an
arbitration agreement contains a provision which could result in that particular
state being the site of arbitration, then that provision fulfills the statutory
requirement that the agreement provide for arbitration in that state. L.R. Foy
Constr. Co., Inc. v. Dean L. Dauley & Waldorf Assoc., 547 F.Supp. 166, 169
(D.C.Kan. 1982).
In this case, the parties could agree that the arbitration would take
place in Kentucky. Additionally, if the parties could not agree on a site to hold the
arbitration, the arbitration would take place at the facility, which is located in
Kentucky. Therefore, the Agreement complies with KRS 417.200 and is sufficient
to provide the court with subject matter jurisdiction to enforce the Agreement.
The trial court gave additional reasons to support its ruling, and
Appellee raises other arguments as well. We conclude that none of these have
merit or warrant discussion. Among these are the trial court’s holdings that a
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primary caregiver cannot reasonably be expected to enter into a contract when
transferring or admitting a patient, that Appellant’s agent, Mr. Brand, manipulated
the process to such an extent that it amounted to concealment, that the ADR
Agreement “causes confusion and is substantively manipulative,” and that
Appellee entered into the Agreement “under duress and/or undue influence.” We
also reject Appellee’s arguments that the terms of the Agreement are illusory and
that Appellants breached a fiduciary duty owed to Ms. Duncan by not fully
explaining the terms of the Agreement to Appellee.
The order of the Franklin Circuit Court is reversed and remanded for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion. The parties’ remaining arguments
are rendered moot.
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ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANTS:
Robert Y. Gwin
Marcia L. Pearson
Sara Clark Davis
Louisville, Kentucky
BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT
FOR APPELLEE:
Stephen M. O’Brien, III
Lexington, Kentucky
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLANTS:
Marcia L. Pearson
Louisville, Kentucky
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