CLARK (JAMES) VS. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: MAY 14, 2010; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2009-CA-001355-MR
JAMES CLARK
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM CUMBERLAND CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE EDDIE C. LOVELACE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 08-CR-00014
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING IN PART,
REVERSING IN PART, AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: CAPERTON AND MOORE, JUDGES; BUCKINGHAM,1 SENIOR
JUDGE.
MOORE, JUDGE: James Clark appeals the judgment of the Cumberland Circuit
Court concerning his conviction for third-degree burglary. After a careful review
of the record, we affirm the court’s denial of Clark’s motion to withdraw his guilty
1
Senior Judge David C. Buckingham, sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief
Justice pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and Kentucky Revised
Statute(s) (KRS) 21.580.
plea on the basis of his alleged actual innocence. However, we reverse the court’s
order denying Clark’s motion for a competency evaluation and a competency
hearing, and we remand the case for further proceedings.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
According to the uniform citation that was issued following the events
in question, an officer received a telephone call that a burglary was in progress at
the residence of Keen Grant. The citation continued, as follows:
Upon entry through front door [the officer] heard several
people upstairs. Made contact with 2 juveniles coming
down front steps. 3 more juvenile females came back
downstairs. [James Clark] was hiding in attic. [The
officer] spoke to homeowner on phone who is in Boston
who advised no one is to be inside the house. He wants
all prosecuted. 2 juvenile females had been drinking
from a bottle of whiskey – 1 female juvenile is 13 years
old. [James Clark] was upset at the situation and used
loud offense language as well as cursed the situation. . . .
All juveniles except 1 had been drinking.
(Capitalization changed).
In the offense report that was subsequently written, it was reported
that, upon being caught at the house, Clark told the officer that he had permission
to be there. The officer asked dispatch to obtain the homeowner’s telephone
number. The officer then spoke with the homeowner, who was in Boston, over the
telephone. The homeowner informed the officer that “no one was supposed to be
in the residence and he did not give anyone permission.”
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Clark was indicted on the charges of: (1) burglary in the second
degree, a violation of KRS2 511.030; (2) unlawful transactions with a minor in the
third degree, a violation of KRS 530.070; and (3) disorderly conduct in the second
degree, a violation of KRS 525.060.
Clark filed various motions on his behalf, including a motion for a bill
of particulars; a motion for bond reduction; a motion for a speedy trial; a motion to
exclude prior bad acts evidence, pursuant to KRE3 404(b), unless a hearing is first
held concerning such bad acts; a motion for discovery pursuant to Brady v.
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963); and a motion to act
as his own legal counsel.
At his arraignment, Clark initially appeared without counsel. He
informed the court that he and the attorney from the Department of Public
Advocacy (DPA) who had been assigned to him did not agree with each other.
Thus, Clark asked that he be permitted to proceed pro se. The DPA attorney
informed the court that it is the DPA’s policy not to obtain conflict counsel for a
defendant simply because the defendant did not like the attorney who had been
assigned to him. The DPA attorney then proceeded to represent Clark for purposes
of the arraignment only. Clark entered a plea of not guilty. The court scheduled a
pretrial conference for a later date, at which time the court stated it would also
conduct a hearing to determine whether Clark could proceed pro se. The court
2
Kentucky Revised Statute(s).
3
Kentucky Rule(s) of Evidence.
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stated that any motions, including one for bond reduction, would be heard at that
hearing.
Ultimately, the court appointed an attorney to represent Clark. In
exchange for Clark’s guilty plea, the Commonwealth offered to dismiss the
charges of third-degree unlawful transaction with a minor and second-degree
disorderly conduct. The Commonwealth also offered to amend the second-degree
burglary charge to third-degree burglary. The Commonwealth’s plea offer
provided that, “[u]pon a plea of guilty to Burglary 3rd Degree, the Defendant shall
receive a sentence of one and one-half (1 1/2) years pretrial diverted for three (3)
years. Diversion is to be supervised. The Defendant shall receive credit for time
served (102 days).” Clark moved to enter a guilty plea in accordance with the
Commonwealth’s offer on a plea of guilty. Clark’s motion to enter a guilty plea
included the following statement: “I have reviewed a copy of the indictment and
told my attorney all the facts known to me concerning my charges. I believe
he/she is fully informed about my case. We have fully discussed and I understand
my charges and any possible defenses to them.” Clark also moved for pretrial
diversion, and he withdrew his prior motion to proceed pro se.
The circuit court entered an order noting that Clark pled guilty and
granting Clark’s motion for pretrial diversion. The court ordered Clark’s pretrial
diversion period to be three years in length. Clark was ordered to, inter alia, “obey
all rules and regulations imposed by Probation and Parole.” The court’s order
noted that, pursuant to KRS 533.030(1), Clark was required not to “commit
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another offense during the period of the Pretrial Diversion. Specifically, the
defendant shall have no violation of the Penal Code or the Controlled Substances
Act.”
Approximately seven months later, the Commonwealth moved to
revoke Clark’s pretrial diversion on the bases that: (1) Clark had been charged
with theft by unlawful taking under $300 in Warren County, Kentucky, and he had
been ordered to appear in Warren District Court on a particular date, but he did not
appear in court that day; and (2) Clark had absconded from probation by not
reporting to his probation officer nor responding to the correspondence or
messages left by his probation officer for several months.
A hearing was held on the Commonwealth’s motion, in which his
probation officer testified that Clark was charged with shoplifting in Warren
County and he failed to report it to his probation officer until his probation officer
confronted him with the charge. The probation officer also attested that Clark had
failed to appear in court when required, and he also did not report back to his
probation officer when required. Clark presented no evidence at the hearing. In
summation, Clark’s counsel argued that, pursuant to the presentence report, Clark
had not graduated from high school, and when he was in school, he was in special
education classes. Clark’s counsel also asserted that Clark could not read and
write to the point of understanding the conditions of his probation. Following the
hearing, the circuit court entered an order voiding Clark’s pretrial diversion for the
reasons set forth in the Commonwealth’s motion to revoke pretrial diversion.
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Clark’s counsel, who also represented Clark during the guilty plea
proceedings, moved on Clark’s behalf for a competency determination. The bases
for the motion were: (1) that Clark could “show that reasonable cause exists to
believe [he] may not be competent to stand trial”; (2) that Clark’s “ability to
communicate with his attorney regarding formulating a defense and understanding
the consequences of his case is limited”; and (3) that “counsel feels that [Clark] is
not able, at the present time, to fully appreciate the nature of the proceedings
against him, and/or assist counsel adequately in preparing his defense or consider
alternative courses of action that may or may not be more appropriate for [him].”
Counsel also moved, on Clark’s behalf, to withdraw his guilty plea on
the following bases: (1) Clark previously received psychiatric treatment and he
lacked the capacity to fully appreciate the severity of the charges; and (2) Clark
“recently advised Counsel that he had an affirmative defense of consent to the
felony charge of Burglary. [Counsel then spoke] with the property owner who . . .
advised that he never wanted to pursue charges against [Clark] and that [Clark] had
consent to be inside the residence.”
A hearing was held, in which Clark’s counsel argued that Clark did
not enter his guilty plea intelligently. Counsel also informed the court that Clark
had psychiatric problems and that he, in fact, had recently been placed in
segregation in jail because he had made a suicide attempt. Thus, counsel
contended that Clark should be evaluated for competency to determine whether he
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was competent to plead guilty. The Commonwealth responded by informing the
court that it was not opposed to Clark being evaluated for competency.
However, the court stated that it was not going to order a competency
evaluation because Clark never appeared to have any emotional or psychiatric
problems. The court noted that Clark filed various pro se motions, he had
excellent handwriting, he seemed to understand the nature of the charges against
him, and he filed motions that the court believed were better than it had seen from
some lawyers. The court stated that Clark had not previously raised his defense of
consent to enter the premises and he did not exercise due diligence in bringing
forth this evidence, despite knowing about this all along. The court noted that such
a showing is essential, citing Spradlin v. Commonwealth, 473 S.W.2d 818 (Ky.
1971). Therefore, the circuit court denied both motions and proceeded to
sentencing.
The court entered its judgment finding Clark guilty of second-degree
burglary and sentencing him to a term of one and one-half years of imprisonment,
with credit for 141 days of jail time served. The court also entered an order,
pursuant to the plea agreement, dismissing the charges of third-degree unlawful
transaction with a minor and second-degree disorderly conduct.
Clark now appeals, contending that: (a) his statutory and
constitutional rights were violated when the circuit court failed to have his
competency evaluated and failed to hold a competency hearing; and (b) the circuit
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court abused its discretion in denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea
despite compelling evidence of his actual innocence.
III. ANALYSIS
A. CLAIM REGARDING CLARK’S COMPETENCY
Clark first contends that his rights were violated when the circuit court
failed to have his competency evaluated and failed to hold a competency hearing.
Pursuant to KRS 504.090, “[n]o defendant who is incompetent to stand trial shall
be tried, convicted or sentenced so long as the incompetency continues.”
Additionally, KRS 504.100(1) provides: “If upon arraignment, or during any stage
of the proceedings, the court has reasonable grounds to believe the defendant is
incompetent to stand trial, the court shall appoint at least one (1) psychologist or
psychiatrist to examine, treat and report on the defendant’s mental condition.”
The standard of review in a case where the circuit court failed to hold
a competency hearing is: “Whether a reasonable judge, situated as was the trial
court judge whose failure to conduct an evidentiary hearing is being reviewed,
should have experienced doubt with respect to competency to stand trial.” Mills v.
Commonwealth, 996 S.W.2d 473, 486 (Ky. 1999) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
An incompetency hearing is only required when the trial
judge is presented with sufficient evidence of reasonable
doubt of competency to stand trial. If no reasonable
grounds exist for doubting a defendant's competency, no
error occurred in not holding a hearing. Reasonable
grounds must be called to the attention of the trial court
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or must be so obvious that the trial judge cannot fail to be
aware of them.
Lear v. Commonwealth, 884 S.W.2d 657, 659 (Ky. 1994) (internal citations
omitted).
In Bishop v. Caudill, 118 S.W.3d 159 (Ky. 2003), the Kentucky
Supreme Court noted that in Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 396, 113 S. Ct.
2680, 2685, 125 L.Ed.2d 321 (1993),
the United States Supreme Court held that a defendant is
competent if he can “consult with his lawyer with a
reasonable degree of rational understanding” and has “a
rational as well as factual understanding of the
proceedings against him.” The Court noted that a
competent defendant can make a “reasoned choice”
among the alternatives available to him when confronted
with such crucial questions as whether he should testify,
waive a jury trial, cross-examine witnesses, put on a
defense, etc.
Bishop, 118 S.W.3d at 162-63 (quoting Godinez, 509 U.S. at 397-98, 113 S. Ct. at
2686).
In a competency determination, there are two matters for a court to
examine:
(1) whether the defendant is sufficiently coherent to
provide his counsel with information necessary or
relevant to constructing a defense; and
(2) whether he is able to comprehend the significance of
the trial and his relation to it. The defendant must have
an ability to confer intelligently, to testify coherently, and
to follow the evidence presented. It is necessary that the
defendant have a rational as well as a factual
understanding of the proceedings.
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Would defendant recognize false testimony by a witness
and would he know to advise counsel of that fact? Does
he understand the roles of trial participants (i.e. that the
prosecutor is his adversary, that the judge decides his
fate, that his counsel acts in his best interest, etc.)? Does
he understand that convictions will result in sanctions?
The inquiry is a factual one that necessarily depends
upon the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case.
Id. at 163 (internal quotation marks omitted).
In the present case, Clark made a failed suicide attempt while he was
incarcerated. Clark moved for a competency evaluation, and the Commonwealth
did not oppose the motion. Based on the attempted suicide, there were reasonable
grounds for the circuit court to doubt Clark’s competency. Therefore, pursuant to
KRS 504.100(1), the court erred in failing to order a competency evaluation.
B. CLAIM REGARDING WITHDRAWAL OF GUILTY PLEA
Clark next asserts that the circuit court abused its discretion in
denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea despite compelling evidence of his
actual innocence. Specifically, Clark contends that he had permission to be in the
residence and, therefore, he could not be guilty of burglarizing the home.
After pleading guilty, a criminal defendant
may move the trial court to withdraw the guilty plea,
pursuant to RCr[4] 8.10. If the plea was involuntary, the
motion to withdraw it must be granted. However, if it
was voluntary, the trial court may, within its discretion,
either grant or deny the motion . . . . The trial court’s
determination on whether the plea was voluntarily
entered is reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard.
A decision which is supported by substantial evidence is
not clearly erroneous. If, however, the trial court
4
Kentucky Rule(s) of Criminal Procedure.
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determines that the guilty plea was entered voluntarily,
then it may grant or deny the motion to withdraw the plea
at its discretion. This decision is reviewed under the
abuse of discretion standard. A trial court abuses its
discretion when it renders a decision which is arbitrary,
unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by legal principles.
Rigdon v. Commonwealth, 144 S.W.3d 283, 288 (Ky. App. 2004) (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted).
Further,
[p]ursuant to KRS 533.250, pre-trial diversion essentially
delays the final adjudication of a criminal complaint
against a defendant. Our Supreme Court has described
pre-trial diversion as an interruption of prosecution prior
to final disposition. Thus, withdrawal of a guilty plea
pursuant to RCr 8.10 remains a viable possibility in cases
where pre-trail diversion has been granted since by
definition those cases have not been finally adjudicated.
Commonwealth v. Lopez, 267 S.W.3d 685, 689-90 (Ky. App. 2008) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted).
During his plea colloquy, Clark told the court that he and his counsel
had discussed any and all defenses he had to the charge against him. Clark’s
motion to enter a guilty plea also stated that his guilty plea was being entered
“freely, knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily.” The offense report written by
the arresting officer following Clark’s arrest on the burglary charge stated that
Clark claimed he had permission to be in the house, but the homeowner denied
giving such permission when the officer spoke with the homeowner. Therefore,
Clark and his counsel had this information regarding Clark’s possible defense
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before Clark pleaded guilty. Accordingly, Clark is not entitled to withdraw his
guilty plea based on this allegedly new evidence of his actual innocence because
Clark and his counsel had this evidence in their possession at the time he entered
his plea.
Accordingly, the order of the Cumberland Circuit Court denying
Clark’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea on the basis that he had a defense of
actual innocence is affirmed. However, the order of the Cumberland Circuit Court
denying Clark’s motion for a competency evaluation and a competency hearing is
reversed. This case is remanded to the circuit court with the instruction that
Clark’s competency should be evaluated and a competency hearing held to
determine whether Clark is incompetent and whether he should be permitted to
withdraw his guilty plea on that basis.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Erin Hoffman Yang
Frankfort, Kentucky
Jack Conway
Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
Michael J. Marsch
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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