WALTHALL (SHERRI) VS. CAVERNA MEMORIAL HOSPITAL
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
RENDERED: JUNE 4, 2010; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2009-CA-001320-MR
SHERRI WALTHALL
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM HART CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE CHARLES C. SIMMS, III, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 07-CI-00245
CAVERNA MEMORIAL HOSPITAL
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: DIXON AND KELLER, JUDGES; KNOPF,1 SENIOR JUDGE.
1
Judge William L. Knopf concurred in this opinion prior to the expiration of his term of Senior
Judge service on May 7, 2010. Release of this opinion was delayed by administrative handling.
DIXON, JUDGE: Sherri Walthall appeals an order of the Hart Circuit Court
granting a directed verdict in favor of Walthall’s former employer, Caverna
Memorial Hospital. Finding no error, we affirm.
On September 20, 2006, Pam Cooper, the hospital’s compliance
officer, received notice of potential misconduct involving Walthall, the hospital’s
director of nursing. Walthall, a registered nurse, had been employed at the hospital
for twenty-six years. Cooper initiated an internal investigation and discovered that
Walthall and another nurse, Pam Hester, had used hospital resources to treat
Walthall’s mother, Jeannie Whiles, outside of the hospital. According to Whiles’s
medical records, on September 2, 2006, Dr. Todd Williams prescribed outpatient
antibiotic therapy for Whiles. The records indicate that, on eight consecutive days,
Walthall registered Whiles at the hospital for outpatient treatment and provided
Whiles’s Medicare card to the billing clerk.2 Whiles, however, was never
physically at the hospital. Instead, Walthall obtained medication from the hospital
pharmacy, and Hester left the hospital to administer the intravenous medication to
Whiles at Walthall’s home. Following each IV treatment, Hester made the
appropriate notation in Whiles’s medical chart.
Cooper conducted several interviews with hospital employees, and on
September 28, 2006, she and Alan Alexander, the hospital’s CEO, interviewed
2
Specifically, the admissions records indicate Whiles was classified as a “Medicare emergency
room outpatient.”
-2-
Walthall regarding Whiles’s treatment. Since the hospital did not have a home
health license or retail pharmacy license, all treatment had to occur at the hospital
on an outpatient or inpatient basis. Nevertheless, Walthall admitted her
involvement in Whiles’s treatment, but denied she had done anything wrong.
Thereafter, Walthall gave Alexander a personal check to pay for Whiles’s
medication, along with a note, which stated in pertinent part:
Let me know what the other charges are[,] and I will take
care of them. Change her account to self-pay. I certainly
don’t want to get anyone in trouble over this. Like I had
told you, I’m not the only one that has done this
practice[,] and I’ve tried to keep up with charges and be
honest.
On October 4, 2006, Alexander terminated both Walthall and Hester
for misappropriation of medication and falsification of medical records.
In July 2007, Walthall filed suit against the hospital, alleging
retaliation based on age discrimination, in violation of the Kentucky Civil Rights
Act. Following lengthy discovery, the case went to trial in May 2009. At the close
of Walthall’s proof, the trial court directed a verdict in favor of the hospital.
Walthall unsuccessfully moved to vacate the court’s judgment, and this appeal
followed.
“On a motion for directed verdict, the trial judge must draw all fair
and reasonable inferences from the evidence in favor of the party opposing the
motion[,]” Bierman v. Klapheke, 967 S.W.2d 16, 18 (Ky. 1998), and the motion
cannot be granted “unless there is a complete absence of proof on a material issue
-3-
or if no disputed issues of fact exist upon which reasonable minds could differ.”
Id. at 18-19. On appellate review of a directed verdict, we will not disturb the trial
court’s decision unless it was clearly erroneous. Meyers v. Chapman Printing Co.,
Inc., 840 S.W.2d 814, 821 (Ky. 1992).
Walthall based her claim on KRS 344.280(1), the anti-retaliation
provision of the Kentucky Civil Rights Act (KCRA). The statute states in relevant
part:
It shall be an unlawful practice for a person . . . [t]o
retaliate or discriminate in any manner against a person
because he has opposed a practice declared unlawful by
this chapter, or because he has made a charge, filed a
complaint, testified, assisted, or participated in any
manner in any investigation, proceeding, or hearing
under this chapter[.]
We interpret that the civil rights provisions of KRS Chapter 344 are
consistent with federal anti-discrimination laws. Williams v. Wal-Mart Stores,
Inc., 184 S.W.3d 492, 495 (Ky. 2005). In Brooks v. Lexington-Fayette Urban
County Housing Authority, 132 S.W.3d 790, (Ky. 2004), the Court stated:
A prima facie case of retaliation requires a plaintiff to
demonstrate ‘(1) that plaintiff engaged in an activity
protected by [the Act]; (2) that the exercise of his civil
rights was known by the defendant; (3) that, thereafter,
the defendant took an employment action adverse to the
plaintiff; and (4) that there was a causal connection
between the protected activity and the adverse
employment action.’
Id. at 803 (quoting Christopher v. Stouder Memorial Hospital, 936 F.2d 870, 877
(6th Cir. 1991)). “If and when a plaintiff has established a prima facie case, the
-4-
burden of production of evidence shifts to the employer to articulate some
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions.” Morris v. Oldham County
Fiscal Court, 201 F.3d 784, 792-93 (6th Cir. 2000). Thereafter, “[t]he plaintiff . . .
must demonstrate that the proffered reason was not the true reason for the
employment decision.” Id.
In the case at bar, Walthall contends a directed verdict was clearly
erroneous because she met her burden of proof, and the court misapplied the law.
After an exhaustive review of the record and relevant case law, we disagree.3
As the first element of her prima facie case, Walthall asserts that she
engaged in a protected activity by opposing her own age-based termination.
Walthall testified that it was an “acceptable practice for years” for hospital
personnel to obtain medication for themselves or family members at the pharmacy,
a contention supported by the testimony of three former employees. Prior to
Walthall and Hester, no employee had been fired for taking medication to a family
member; accordingly, Walthall infers that the hospital terminated her because she
was the oldest full-time RN on staff. Walthall claims she opposed this
discriminatory practice by offering to pay for the medicine and by telling
Alexander she did not deserve to be fired after twenty-six years with the hospital.
Essentially, Walthall argues the hospital terminated her in retaliation for opposing
its practice of terminating her based on her age, and her opposition to being
3
In her appellate brief, Walthall makes confusing and repetitive arguments, mischaracterizes trial
testimony, and improperly cites unpublished cases. Because we are satisfied a directed verdict
was appropriate, we will not separately address each of Walthall’s arguments.
-5-
terminated constituted an activity protected by the anti-retaliation provision of the
KCRA.
We are mindful that “an employee need not file a formal EEOC
complaint to engage in protected activity - rather it is the assertion of statutory
rights that triggers protection under the [Act]’s anti-retaliation provision.” Fox v.
Eagle Distributing Co., Inc., 510 F.3d 587, 591 (6th Cir. 2007). In Booker v.
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co., Inc., 879 F.2d 1304, 1313 (6th Cir. 1989), the
Court explained:
An employee may not invoke the protections of the Act
by making a vague charge of discrimination. Otherwise,
every adverse employment decision by an employer
would be subject to challenge under either state or federal
civil rights legislation simply by an employee inserting a
charge of discrimination.
Even viewed most favorably to Walthall, we cannot conclude that her
statements to Alexander were statements made in opposition to a discriminatory
employment practice. Because Walthall was not engaged in an activity protected
by the KCRA, she failed to establish a prima facie case of retaliation pursuant to
KRS 344.280(1).
While Walthall was understandably dissatisfied with the decision to
terminate her employment, the record simply did not indicate that the hospital fired
her in retaliation for exercising her civil rights. It is well settled that “the jury may
not be permitted to reach a verdict based on mere speculation or conjecture.”
-6-
Gibbs v. Wickersham, 133 S.W.3d 494, 496 (Ky. App. 2004). Accordingly, we
find no error in the trial court’s directed verdict in favor of the hospital.
For the reasons stated herein, we affirm the judgment of the Hart
Circuit Court.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Nancy Oliver Roberts
Bowling Green, Kentucky
Patrick A. Ross
Nathaniel Crenshaw
Horse Cave, Kentucky
-7-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.