LLOYD (JUAN) VS. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: OCTOBER 22, 2010; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2009-CA-001273-MR
JUAN LLOYD
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE MARY M. SHAW, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 07-CR-003698
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: CAPERTON AND WINE, JUDGES; LAMBERT, SENIOR JUDGE.
WINE, JUDGE: On November 15, 2007, a Jefferson County grand jury returned
an indictment charging Juan Lloyd with one count each of possession of a handgun
by a convicted felon (Kentucky Revised Statute (“KRS”) 527.040, a class C
felony), and first-degree fleeing or evading police (KRS 520.095, a class D
felony). Lloyd moved to suppress the handgun and all evidence seized from him
as a result of a stop and arrest which occurred during the early morning hours of
July 25, 2007. After conducting an evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied the
motion to suppress, finding that the officer had reasonable suspicion to stop Lloyd.
Thereafter, the trial court severed the charges and the matter
proceeded to trial on the possession of a handgun charge. Following a trial, the
jury found Lloyd guilty of possession of a handgun by a convicted felon and fixed
his sentence at seven years’ imprisonment. Subsequently, Lloyd entered a guilty
plea to an amended charge of second-degree fleeing or evading police. The trial
court sentenced Lloyd to twelve months’ imprisonment on the fleeing or evading
charge and five years on the possession of a handgun charge, to run concurrently
for a total of five years.
Lloyd now appeals, arguing that the trial court erred by denying his
motion to suppress the handgun and by excusing a juror during trial. On the first
issue, the trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing on the motion to suppress
the handgun. Officer Daniel Miracle of the Louisville Metro Police Department
testified about the circumstances surrounding Lloyd’s arrest. Prior to starting his
shift at midnight, Officer Miracle was informed about an armed robbery which had
occurred earlier in the day around 18th and Ormsby Streets. The robbery suspect
was described as an African-American male wearing dark clothing. No other
details were provided.
Around 2:30 a.m. on the morning of July 25, 2007, Officer Miracle
was patrolling in the area of 18th and Dumesnil Streets in the vicinity of the
reported robbery. He observed an African-American male wearing dark clothing
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who was riding a bicycle. That individual was later identified as Lloyd. Officer
Miracle testified that Lloyd was circling the area near the intersection, “not
particularly going anywhere, just riding around.” Officer Miracle relayed his
observations to Officer Roger Koofer, who was also patrolling the area in another
police car. Officer Koofer also observed Lloyd’s behavior.
After observing Lloyd for about five minutes, Officer Miracle pulled
his car up next to Lloyd, got out of the vehicle, put his hand up and shouted for
Lloyd to stop. Lloyd immediately raced off on his bicycle. Officer Miracle
pursued Lloyd in his cruiser. At some point during the chase, Lloyd abandoned the
bicycle and threw a silver object. Officer Miracle continued the pursuit on foot.
After Lloyd was apprehended, Officer Miracle went back to the area where the
silver object was thrown and retrieved a loaded, silver .38 revolver.
Lloyd maintains that Officer Miracle lacked any reasonable suspicion
for the initial stop. However, we conclude that Lloyd waived this issue by entering
an unconditional guilty plea to the fleeing or evading charge. Officer Miracle did
not recover the handgun as a result of the initial stop, but following the subsequent
pursuit after Lloyd fled. By pleading guilty unconditionally to that charge, Lloyd
waived all defenses except that the indictment charged no offense. Centers v.
Commonwealth, 799 S.W.2d 51, 55 (Ky. App. 1990). In his guilty plea, Lloyd
necessarily admitted to the elements of the offense, including that the officer
giving the direction to stop “has an articulable reasonable suspicion that a crime
has been committed by the person fleeing . . . .” KRS 520.100(1)(a). Thus, Lloyd
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waived his claim that Officer Miracle lacked any articulable and reasonable
suspicion to detain him.
Furthermore, even if this issue were not waived, we find two other
grounds which would support the trial court’s admission of the handgun. First, not
every encounter with police officers amounts to a restraint on a person’s liberty.
Police officers are free to approach citizens on the street without the encounter
constituting a "seizure" or violating the Fourth Amendment. Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1, 19 n.16, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1879, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). “Only when the
officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, has in some way
restrained the liberty of a citizen may we conclude that a ‘seizure’ has occurred.”
Id. Here, Officer Miracle merely approached Lloyd and signaled that he wanted to
speak with him.
Secondly, even assuming that Officer Miracle’s initial stop of Lloyd
amounted to a restraint on his liberty, Lloyd fled from the attempted stop. A
seizure does not occur if, in response to a show of authority, the subject does not
yield. In that event, the seizure occurs only when the police physically subdue the
subject. Taylor v. Commonwealth, 125 S.W.3d 216, 219-220 (Ky. 2003), citing
California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 111 S.Ct. 1547, 113 L.Ed.2d 690 (1991).
Since Lloyd abandoned the gun before he was apprehended, the seizure of the
handgun did not result from the allegedly improper stop. Therefore, the trial court
properly denied Lloyd’s motion to suppress the handgun.
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Lloyd’s second argument is that the trial court abused its discretion by
dismissing a juror during trial. On the second day of trial one of the jurors did not
appear on time as instructed. In addition, the juror could not be contacted at the
phone number she had given. When the juror finally arrived over two hours later,
the trial court questioned her concerning her absence. The juror explained that she
awoke that morning with a very bad headache. She also told the court that she had
taken some medicine and was feeling better. When asked, however, the juror
admitted that she would rather go home.
The Commonwealth moved to strike the juror based on her tardiness
and further alleging that this juror had been inattentive or sleeping during the
previous day’s proceedings. Lloyd’s counsel objected, noting that dismissing the
juror would leave the trial with only twelve members on the jury panel.
Nevertheless, the court excused the juror on account of illness.
The trial court's decision to exclude or dismiss a juror will not be
overturned absent an abuse of discretion. Lester v. Commonwealth, 132 S.W.3d
857, 863 (Ky. 2004). Furthermore, Kentucky Rule of Civil Procedure (“CR”)
47.021 contemplates that a court may dismiss a juror for illness during trial as long
as the number of jurors is not reduced below the number required by law. Davis v.
Commonwealth, 795 S.W.2d 942, 949 (Ky. 1990). In this case, the juror explained
that she was tardy due to a severe headache, possibly a migraine. The
1
Pursuant to Kentucky Rule of Criminal Procedure (“RCr”) 13.04, the Kentucky Rules of Civil
Procedure are applicable to criminal proceedings to the extent they are not superseded by or
inconsistent with the criminal procedural rules.
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Commonwealth also had concerns about the juror’s ability to pay attention to the
trial. Finally, twelve jurors remained after the court excused this juror. Under the
circumstances, we cannot find that the trial court abused its discretion.
Accordingly, the judgment of conviction by the Jefferson Circuit
Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Annie O’Connell
Assistant Public Defender
Louisville, Kentucky
Jack Conway
Attorney General of Kentucky
Christian K.R. Miller
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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