BURGER (DAVID), ET AL. VS. WESTERN KENTUCKY NAVIGATION, INC.
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RENDERED: JUNE 11, 2010; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2009-CA-001249-MR
DAVID BURGER AND EARLINE BURGER
v.
APPELLANTS
APPEAL FROM LIVINGSTON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE CLARENCE A. WOODALL III, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 09-CI-00037
WESTERN KENTUCKY
NAVIGATION, INC.
APPELLEE
OPINION
REVERSING AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: CAPERTON AND CLAYTON, JUDGES; BUCKINGHAM,1 SENIOR
JUDGE.
CLAYTON, JUDGE: David and Earline Burger appeal from an order entered by
the Livingston Circuit Court dismissing their personal injury claim against Western
Kentucky Navigation, Inc. (WKN) on the grounds that it was barred by res
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Senior Judge David C. Buckingham sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and Kentucky Revised Statutes
(KRS) 21.580
judicata. The Burgers argue that, rather than res judicata, the previous case was
dismissed because of lack of jurisdiction and to quash service of process. Further,
they maintain that the trial court erred by failing to apply the provisions of KRS
413.270 so as to determine that the statute of limitations was tolled and the action
timely filed. WKN counters that the Illinois court dismissed the case on the merits
and, therefore, the court did not err when it dismissed the Burgers’ case on the
basis of the doctrine of res judicata. We concur with the trial court that KRS
413.270 is inapplicable; however, because the Illinois court’s order dismissing
WKN was unclear as to whether the dismissal was based on a lack of jurisdiction
or for failure to state a claim, res judicata will not act as a bar to the Burgers’ case.
Accordingly, we reverse and remand to the trial court.
In November 2007, the Burgers filed suit in Madison County, Illinois,
against WKN and thirty-seven other defendants for alleged exposure to toxic
chemicals. Specifically, Burger claimed negligence under the Jones Act and
unseaworthiness under general maritime law. At that time, WKN filed a motion on
January 25, 2008, to dismiss the action for lack of jurisdiction under Illinois
Compiled Statutes, Code of Civil Procedures, 735 ILCS 5/2-301(a), and, in the
alternative, for failure to state a claim under 735 ILCS 5/2-615. Subsequently, on
May 2, 2008, the Burgers’ Illinois counsel was granted a motion to withdraw from
the case. Ultimately, on December 17, 2008, after the Burgers had been granted
several motions for additional time, the Illinois Court entered an order dismissing
the Burgers’ claims against all parties. The order stated:
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This is a final judgment. Plaintiffs have thirty (30) days
to have this judgment set aside or take an appeal.
Following the entry of the order, the Burgers did not move to set aside the
judgment or appeal it. Instead, they filed a complaint against WKN in the
Livingston Circuit Court on March 17, 2009. Similar to the Illinois complaint, the
Burgers’ complaint alleged that because of WKN’s negligence under the Jones Act
and as a result of the unseaworthiness of its employees, equipment, and vessels,
Burger was exposed to toxic chemicals. In addition, the complaint also included a
derivative claim for loss of consortium by Mrs. Burger.
WKN moved to dismiss the claim under Kentucky Rules of Civil
Procedure (CR) 12.02(f) for failure to state a claim. It argued that because the
Illinois case had been dismissed for failure to state a claim, the case had already
been dismissed on the merits. Furthermore, WKN maintained that the Illinois
claims by the Burgers were identical to his Kentucky claims and, hence, the
doctrine of res judicata barred them from re-asserting these claims. A hearing was
held on April 15, 2009. Thereafter, on April 28, 2009, the court entered an order
granting WKN’s motion to dismiss the action. The court reasoned that since the
Illinois dismissal was on the merits and the Burgers’ claim in Kentucky was the
same claim as the dismissed Illinois claim, it was barred by the doctrine of res
judicata. Next, the Burgers filed a motion to alter, amend, or vacate the judgment,
which the court denied. The Burgers appeal from the order of dismissal and the
order denying the motion to alter, amend or vacate the judgment.
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The Burgers argue on appeal that the case was only dismissed in
Illinois for lack of jurisdiction and that, under KRS 413.270, the Livingston Circuit
Court has jurisdiction and the case should not have been dismissed. And, as the
case was dismissed in Illinois on jurisdictional and procedural grounds, res judicata
is not pertinent because the case was not dismissed on the merits. WKN contends
both that KRS 413.270 is not applicable to the Burgers’ case and also that the case
should be dismissed on grounds of res judicata.
Before stating the standard of review of this case, we observe that
WKN’s motion to dismiss was made under CR 12.02(f), that is for the failure to
state a claim. In ruling on a motion to dismiss under CR 12.02, “[a] court should
not dismiss for failure to state a claim unless the pleading party appears not to be
entitled to relief under any state of facts which could be proved in support of his
claim.” Weller v. McCauley, 383 S.W.2d 356, 357 (Ky. 1964). Because WKN’s
motion to dismiss was granted on the basis of the doctrine of res judicata, it
necessitated that the court consider documents outside the pleadings. Hence, under
CR 12.02, the motion for failure to state a claim is treated as a CR 56 summary
judgment motion.
If, on a motion asserting the defense that the pleading
fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted,
matters outside the pleading are presented to and not
excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one
for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in
Rule 56, and all parties shall be given reasonable
opportunity to present all material made pertinent to such
a motion by Rule 56.
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See CR 12.02. Moreover, because the resolution of this case concerns an issue of
law, rather than an issue of fact, we review de novo the court's application of the
doctrine of res judicata. Western Kentucky Coca-Cola Bottling Co., Inc. v.
Revenue Cabinet, 80 S.W.3d 787, 790 (Ky. App. 2001).
The first argument proffered by the Burgers is that, since the case was
dismissed by the Illinois court for lack of personal jurisdiction, they are permitted
to file the action in Livingston Circuit Court under KRS 413.270 within ninety
days. KRS 413.270, however, is not applicable to these facts. KRS 413.270
(referred to as Kentucky’s “savings statute”) says:
(1) If an action is commenced in due time and in good
faith in any court of this state and the defendants or any
of them make defense, and it is adjudged that the court
has no jurisdiction of the action, the plaintiff or his
representative may, within ninety (90) days from the time
of that judgment, commence a new action in the proper
court. The time between the commencement of the first
and last action shall not be counted in applying any
statute of limitation.
(2) As used in this section, “court” means all courts,
commissions, and boards which are judicial or quasijudicial tribunals authorized by the Constitution or
statutes of the Commonwealth of Kentucky or of the
United States of America.
Notably, the first section of the statute requires that, in order for a case to be
“saved” under this statute, it must have commenced “in any court of this state.”
This phrase, “in any court of this state” has been interpreted to include only federal
or state courts that are physically located in Kentucky. Support for this
interpretation of the statutory language is found in Blair v. Peabody Coal Co.:
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However, in the absence of anything to indicate that a
contrary meaning was intended, it is clear to us that the
phrase “in any court of this state” includes only those
federal or state “courts,” as defined in KRS 413.270(2),
which are physically located within the state of
Kentucky.
Blair v. Peabody Coal Co., 909 S.W.2d 337, 339 (Ky. App. 1995). Here, since the
Burgers’ original action was filed in a circuit court in Madison County, Illinois,
this statute is not applicable and does not provide grounds for reversal.
Second, the Burgers maintain that the Illinois case was not dismissed
on the merits and, therefore, the doctrine of res judicata is inapposite. The crux of
the Burgers’ argument is that the Illinois case was dismissed, as noted above, for
lack of personal jurisdiction and to quash service, which are not motions on the
merits. Indeed, CR 41.02(3) advises as follows:
Unless the court in its order for dismissal
otherwise specifies, a dismissal under this Rule, and any
dismissal not provided for in Rule 41, other than a
dismissal for lack of jurisdiction, for improper venue, for
want of prosecution under Rule 77.02(2), or for failure to
join a party under Rule 19, operates as an adjudication
upon the merits.
Therefore, because the case, according to them, was not dismissed on the merits,
they maintain that the doctrine of res judicata does not apply, and that their case is
still viable. Continuing on, they bolster the argument by observing that the Illinois
court had numerous motions before it when it entered its dismissal order. The
Burgers then cite language in the Illinois order dismissing the action:
All pending Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss, including
Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss for Failure to Prosecute
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and Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss for Failure to state a
claim, are GRANTED.
From this language, they contend that WKN, which was one of numerous
defendants, only had motions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction and to quash
service. Therefore, the Burgers reason that their case against WKN cannot be
dismissed on the basis of res judicata because it was merely dismissed on the
jurisdictional grounds and, therefore, was not adjudicated on the merits.
We point out, however, that in the Illinois case, WKN had an alternate
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. In WKN’s motion, they discuss the
Burgers’ failure to state a claim under counts X and XI in the complaint. So, based
on this motion itself and the language of the Illinois order wherein the judge
dismisses the case based on all pending motions, including motions for failure to
state a claim, WKN maintains that the Illinois case was dismissed for failure to
state a claim and, thus, adjudicated on the merits.
In sum, WKN argues that because the Burgers’ claims were
adjudicated on the merits and dismissed, the lawsuit is barred by res judicata. And,
since they are unable to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, a dismissal
of the lawsuit against WKN is proper under CR 12.02(f).
The doctrine of res judicata is an affirmative defense that operates to
bar repetitious suits involving the same cause of action. The key factor in
determining if a lawsuit concerns the same controversy as a previous lawsuit is
whether both actions arise from the same set of facts. And, if the actions concern
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the same controversy, then the previous suit is deemed to have adjudicated every
matter that could have been brought in support of it. Clemmer v. Rowan Water,
Inc., 277 S.W.3d 633, 635 (Ky. App. 2009).
Additional elucidation of the doctrine of res judicata is found in
Yeoman v. Com., Health Policy Bd., 983 S.W.2d 459, 465 (Ky. 1998), which
explains that there are three requirements that must be satisfied in order for claim
preclusion to bar subsequent litigation: “First, there must be identity of parties[;]
Second, there must be identity of the causes of action[; and] Third, the action must
have been resolved on the merits.” Id. at 465 (footnote and internal citations
omitted). In the case at hand, undoubtedly, the first two criteria are met. The cases
share the same parties and are based on an action for negligence. Nevertheless, the
question remains whether the third prong for res judicata is met, that is, whether
the claim asserted by the Burgers in the Illinois case was adjudicated on the merits.
The Burgers cite to Philpot v. Minton, 370 S.W.2d 402 (Ky. 1963), to
support their allegation that unless the court’s original decision is clear, it cannot
operate as res judicata.
In River Park, Inc., v. City of Highland Park, 184 Ill.2d 290, 703
N.E.2d 883 (Ill. 1998), it was held that under Illinois law it is clear that the
dismissal of a complaint for failure to state a claim is an adjudication on the merits.
The Illinois holding is in agreement with Kentucky’s rule that dismissal for failure
to state a claim is an adjudication upon the merits. Polk v. Wimsatt, 689 S.W.2d
363 (Ky. App. 1985). Nevertheless, WKN cannot point definitively to the Illinois
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court’s order and conclusively establish that the action was dismissed for lack of
personal jurisdiction or failure to state a claim. Since the order granted all pending
motions, the Illinois court certainly is not claiming personal jurisdiction over
WKN. If WKN was dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction, then the court no
longer had jurisdiction to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Significantly, as
Philpot says, “[w]hen the basis of an earlier decision is not made clear it cannot
operate as res judicata.” Philpot, 370 S.W.2d at 403.
Finally, we are cognizant that Mrs. Burger’s claim for loss of
consortium is not found in the original Illinois action but was part of the Kentucky
lawsuit. A wife’s claim for loss of consortium, however, is a derivative claim
since it “derives” from her husband’s injury. Daley v. Reed, 87 S.W.3d 247 (Ky.
2002). Because we are reversing the court’s dismissal of the Burgers’ action,
logically, the loss of consortium claim is now viable, too.
It is our conclusion that the Livingston Circuit Court carefully
examined the pleadings and the pertinent law but erred in dismissing the Burgers’
case under CR 12.02(f). Therefore, for the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the
Livingston Circuit Court is reversed, and this matter is remanded for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
ALL CONCUR.
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BRIEFS FOR APPELLANTS:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
James W. Owens
Paducah, Kentucky
Edward K. Box
Paducah, Kentucky
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