THOMAS (ERSKIN) VS. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: OCTOBER 22, 2010; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2009-CA-001242-MR
ERSKIN THOMAS
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JAMES D. ISHMAEL, JR., JUDGE
ACTION NO. 97-CR-01069
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: CLAYTON, DIXON AND WINE, JUDGES.
DIXON, JUDGE: Appellant, Erskin Thomas, appeals from an order of the Fayette
Circuit Court denying his motion for post-conviction relief pursuant to RCr 11.42.
Finding no error, we affirm.
On June 13, 1997, Osama Shalash was fatally shot in the parking lot
of a Perkins restaurant in Lexington, Kentucky. Appellant, Gerald Young and
Darrell Morbley were arrested and subsequently indicted for various charges
relating to the murder. Following a trial, Appellant was convicted of murder and
sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for twenty-five
years. Appellant’s conviction and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal to the
Kentucky Supreme Court. Young v. Commonwealth, 50 S.W.3d 148 (Ky. 2001).
In October 2001, Thomas filed a Cr 60.02 motion claiming that he
was not the shooter. The trial court denied the motion on October 30, 2001, and
that denial was affirmed by a panel of this Court. Thomas v. Commonwealth,
2001-CA-002476-MR (August 23, 2003). Appellant thereafter filed a pro se RCr
11.42 motion raising several claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.1 He also
filed motions for the appointment of counsel and an evidentiary hearing. In
February 2005, the trial court appointed counsel, who thereafter filed a
supplemental memorandum in support of the RCr 11.42 motion. On June 3, 2009,
the trial court issued an opinion and order denying Appellant post-conviction
relief. This appeal ensued.
In an RCr 11.42 proceeding, the movant has the burden to establish
convincingly that he was deprived of some substantial right that would justify the
extraordinary relief afforded by the post-conviction proceeding. Dorton v.
1
Thomas’ pro se RCr 11.42 was initially filed on August 20, 2004, within the three-year time
limit. However, the Clerk did not file the motion but rather returned it to Thomas because “the
name on the motion and the name on the envelope did not match.” (It was an inmate litigator
who had mailed the motion and put his name on the return address.) On September 2, 2004,
Thomas again filed the RCr 11.42 along with a motion to compel the Clerk to cause it to be
timely filed. Although there is no order in the record specifically granting the motion, a docket
notation on the same date states “Case Reopened.” The Commonwealth briefly raised the issue
in its response to the RCr 11.42 motion but has not since raised it again.
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Commonwealth, 433 S.W.2d 117, 118 (Ky. 1968). An evidentiary hearing is
warranted only “if there is an issue of fact which cannot be determined on the face
of the record.” Stanford v. Commonwealth, 854 S.W.2d 742, 743-44 (Ky. 1993),
cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1049 (1994); RCr 11.42(5). See also Fraser v.
Commonwealth, 59 S.W.3d 448, 452 (Ky. 2001); Bowling v. Commonwealth, 981
S.W.2d 545, 549 (Ky. 1998), cert. denied, 527 U.S. 1026 (1999). “Conclusionary
allegations which are not supported by specific facts do not justify an evidentiary
hearing because RCr 11.42 does not require a hearing to serve the function of a
discovery deposition.” Sanders v. Commonwealth, 89 S.W.3d 380, 385 (Ky.
2002), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 838 (2003), overruled on other grounds in Leonard
v. Commonwealth, 279 S.W.3d 151 (Ky. 2009). However, when the trial court
conducts an evidentiary hearing, the reviewing court must defer to the
determinations of fact and witness credibility made by the trial judge. McQueen v.
Commonwealth, 721 S.W.2d 694 (Ky. 1986); Commonwealth v. Anderson, 934
S.W.2d 276 (Ky. 1996); McQueen v. Scroggy, 99 F.3d 1302 (6th Cir. 1996).
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d
674 (1984), sets forth the standards which measure ineffective assistance of
counsel claims. In order to be ineffective, performance of counsel must fall below
the objective standard of reasonableness and be so prejudicial as to deprive a
defendant of a fair trial and a reasonable result. Id. “Counsel is constitutionally
ineffective only if performance below professional standards caused the defendant
to lose what he otherwise would probably have won.” United States v. Morrow,
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977 F.2d 222, 229 (6th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 975 (1993). Thus, the
critical issue is not whether counsel made errors, but whether counsel was so
“manifestly ineffective that defeat was snatched from the hands of probable
victory.” Id .
In considering ineffective assistance, the reviewing court must focus
on the totality of evidence before the trial court or jury and assess the overall
performance of counsel throughout the case in order to determine whether the
alleged acts or omissions overcome the presumption that counsel rendered
reasonable professional assistance. Strickland; see also Kimmelman v. Morrison,
477 U.S. 365, 106 S.Ct. 2574, 91 L.Ed.2d 302 (1986). A defendant is not
guaranteed errorless counsel, or counsel judged ineffective by hindsight, but
counsel likely to render reasonably effective assistance. McQueen v.
Commonwealth, 949 S.W.2d 70 (Ky. 1997), cert. denied, 521 U.S. 1130 (1997).
The Supreme Court in Strickland noted that a court must indulge a strong
presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable
professional assistance. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. at 2065.
In this Court, Appellant first claims that trial counsel was deficient by
failing to adequately investigate or call as a witness, David Mullins, the manager of
the restaurant that was on duty at the time of the shooting. Appellant attached to
his supplemental memorandum a 2007 affidavit from Mullins, wherein he stated
that he “heard five pops that sounded like popcorn. When I looked through the
window, I saw the man who purchased the cookie holding a gun.” The reference
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to “the man who purchased the cookie” was to a person who had come into the
restaurant earlier that day and had purchased a cookie from Mullins. Mullins
claimed that it was not until years later that he learned the man he saw was
Appellant’s co-defendant, Gerald Young.
In finding that trial counsel was not ineffective with respect to her
investigation of Mullins, the trial court noted in its opinion:
It is undisputed that Mullins was interviewed by law
enforcement after the shooting and denied any personal
knowledge of the shooting or the perpetrator. . . .
Even accepting, for sake of argument only, the
factual statements set out in the Mullins Affidavit, it is
obvious Mullins does not claim to have seen the actual
shooting itself or who fired the gun. Mullins was not an
eyewitness to the actual shooting itself. . . . Further, it is
total speculation whether or not Mullins would have told
[t]rial [c]ounsel the above mentioned facts from his
[a]ffidavit as opposed to his statements to law
enforcement that he had no personal knowledge
concerning the shooting.
Further, this Court specifically finds as a [m]atter of
[f]act and concludes as [m]atter of [l]aw that there is no
reasonable probability . . . that even had Mullins testified
at trial consistent with his [a]ffidavit that the outcome of
the proceedings would have been different. There was
overwhelming evidence at this trial from unbiased
witnesses and persons whose credibility was challenged
by [t]rial [c]ounsel that Thomas was the shooter.
After reviewing the evidence herein, we must agree with the
Commonwealth that Mullins’ affidavit is suspect at best. Mullins had direct
contact with police immediately after the shooting and never divulged any of the
information he later set forth in his affidavit. Further, Mullins version of events
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contradicts the multiple eyewitness accounts of the shooting. Finally, Mullins’
affidavit was executed on May 10, 2007, while he was incarcerated in the Fayette
County Detention Center. We are of the opinion that Appellant has failed to
demonstrate that trial counsel’s performance with respect to David Mullins fell
below the objective standard of reasonableness or that such deprived him of a fair
trial and a reasonable result. Strickland.
Next, Appellant argues that counsel was deficient by failing to locate
and secure the trial testimony of Joyce Combs, the waitress who was on duty and
witnessed the shooting through a restaurant window. It was Combs that provided
police the initial physical description of the shooter that was broadcast over the
police radio. However, when Combs was later interviewed a second time by
police, she gave a different description of the assailant. Further, she was unable to
pick Appellant out of a police line-up. Because of these discrepancies, Appellant
claimed in his RCr 11.42 motion that Combs’ testimony was crucial to establishing
that he was not the shooter.
In ruling on this claim, the trial court observed:
The Commonwealth had issued a [s]ubpoena for Combs
for trial but, despite all efforts, Combs could not be
located or served with the [s]ubpoena. Trial [c]ounsel
was relentless at the trial in seeking to get Combs’
inconsistent descriptions of the shooter into evidence to
no avail. This issue was raised on direct appeal and
rejected by the Kentucky Supreme Court. How on earth
[t]rial [c]ounsel was ineffective in failing to get Combs to
trial as a witness when that could not be accomplished by
the Commonwealth Attorney’s Office or the Lexington
Police Department has not been demonstrated to the
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Court by Thomas or his DPA [a]ttorney. Yes, it may
have been beneficial to Thomas at trial had Combs’
inconsistent descriptions of person involved in the crime
been available. However, it is not [i]neffective
[a]ssistance of [c]ounsel to not be able to accomplish
what the Commonwealth Attorney’s Office and the entire
Lexington Police Department could not accomplish . . . .
Further, once again, in light of the trial evidence against
Thomas, this Court does not believe that the outcome of
the proceeding would have been different even had
Combs testified.
Certainly, Strickland and its progeny mandate that that counsel has a
duty to make reasonable investigation. However, “[a] reasonable investigation is
not an investigation that the best criminal defense lawyer in the world, blessed not
only with unlimited time and resources, but also with the benefit of hindsight,
would conduct.” Haight v. Commonwealth, 41 S.W.3d 436, 446 (Ky. 2001),
overruled on other grounds in Leonard v. Commonwealth, 279 S.W.3d 151 (Ky.
2009). We agree with the trial court that the record herein establishes that trial
counsel rendered as effective representation as she was able with respect to Combs.
As noted by the trial court, counsel cannot be faulted for failing to secure a witness
that neither the Commonwealth nor law enforcement was able to locate.
Finally, Appellant argues that the trial court erred in denying his RCr
11.42 motion without an evidentiary hearing. We disagree. When the trial court
denies a motion for an evidentiary hearing, appellate review is limited to whether
the motion “on its face states grounds that are not conclusively refuted by the
record and which, if true, would invalidate the conviction.” Lewis v.
Commonwealth, 411 S.W.2d 321, 322 (Ky. 1967). An evidentiary hearing is only
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required if there is an issue of fact that cannot be determined on the face of the
record. Stanford v. Commonwealth, 854 S.W.2d 742 (Ky. 1993), cert. denied, 510
U.S. 1049 (1994); See also RCr 11.42(5). As all of Appellant’s claims were
clearly refuted by the record, he was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing.
The order of the Fayette Circuit Court denying Appellant’s motion for
post-conviction relief pursuant to RCr 11.42 is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Melanie A. Foote
Assistant Public Advocate
Frankfort, Kentucky
Jack Conway
Attorney General of Kentucky
Matthew R. Krygiel
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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