BOYD (STALLARD B.) VS. BOYD (DIANA LYNN)
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
RENDERED: FEBRUARY 26, 2010; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2009-CA-001040-MR
STALLARD B. BOYD
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FLOYD FAMILY COURT
HONORABLE JOHNNY RAY HARRIS, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 08-CI-00056
DIANA LYNN BOYD
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: KELLER AND VANMETER, JUDGES; GRAVES,1 SENIOR JUDGE.
GRAVES, SENIOR JUDGE: Stallard Boyd appeals from a Floyd Family Court
order, entered April 8, 2009, upholding the enforceability of a prenuptial
agreement. Stallard claims that the prenuptial agreement was not enforceable
1
Senior Judge John W. Graves sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and Kentucky Revised Statutes
(KRS) 21.580.
because it lacked full disclosure, was unconscionable, was not entered knowingly,
and failed to include consideration. We disagree with Stallard’s claims.
Two days prior to their marriage, on March 26, 2002, Stallard and
Diana entered into a prenuptial agreement. On January 8, 2008, Diana petitioned
the Floyd Circuit Court for dissolution of the marriage. During the divorce
proceedings, Diana petitioned the court to enforce the prenuptial agreement. On
April 8, 2009, the trial court granted the petition. Stallard moved the court to alter,
amend or vacate the order, and his motion was denied on May 5, 2009. This
appeal follows.
Prenuptial agreements are contracts to dispose of property in the event
a marriage terminates due to dissolution or death. In order to be enforceable,
prenuptial agreements, or antenuptial agreements, are subject to three limitations:
(1) full disclosure of property and income must be made by each party; (2) the
agreement must not be unconscionable at the time of enforcement; and (3) the
agreement may only apply to property disposition and maintenance. Edwardson v.
Edwardson, 798 S.W.2d 941, 945-46 (Ky. 1990).
First, Stallard claims that the prenuptial agreement is unenforceable
because it lacked full disclosure. Specifically, Stallard argues that the agreement
should have contained a list of assets owned by each spouse. A list of assets is not
required. Full disclosure is not intended to be a rigid hoop through which parties
-2-
must jump. Instead, the requirement exists to provide protection. “Before parties
should be bound by agreements which affect their substantial rights upon
dissolution of marriage, it should appear that the agreement was free of any
material omission or misrepresentation.” Id. at 945.
Although Stallard suggests that material misrepresentations and
omissions existed, he failed to explain what was misrepresented. Mere allegations
are insufficient. Thus, Stallard failed to show that the agreement was executed
without full disclosure.
Second, Stallard claims that the prenuptial agreement was
unconscionable because all titles to real property were in Diana’s name. The
prenuptial agreement states:
All property owned or acquired by any means after
marriage shall be either “Separate Property” or “Joint
Property”. The parties intend that they shall have the
freedom to determine whether the real estate, intangible
personal property, and, to the extent possible, tangible
personal property shall be separate or joint by the manner
in which title to the property is designated. Property, the
title to which is in the name of one of the parties, shall be
that party’s separate property. Property, the title to which
is in the name of both parties, shall be joint property.
Specifically, any bank account in one party’s name shall
be separate property and any bank account in both party’s
names shall be joint property.
Because the titles to all of the couples’ real property were in Diana’s name, under
the agreement, all real property would be deemed as Diana’s separate, non-marital
property.
-3-
In Blue v. Blue, 60 S.W.3d 585 (Ky. App. 2001), our Court explained
the importance of determining conscionability at the time of enforcement.
Unlike parties who execute a property settlement
agreement at the end of a marriage, parties entering into a
prenuptial agreement at the beginning of a marriage are
sometimes not as likely to exercise the fullest degree of
vigilance in protecting their respective interests. Often
there will be many years between the execution of a
prenuptial agreement and the time of its enforcement. It
is, therefore, appropriate that the court review such
agreements at the time of termination of the marriage,
whether by death or by divorce, to ensure that facts and
circumstances have not changed since the agreement was
executed to such an extent as to render its enforcement
unconscionable. [Citation omitted.]
Id. at 589.
Distribution of assets was clearly contemplated and detailed in the
agreement. However, Stallard continued to have control over the distribution
throughout the marriage. Knowing that title determined distribution, Stallard
allowed Diana to hold the title to all of the parties’ real property. Obviously, the
agreement’s enforcement results in an unequal distribution of the assets.
Nonetheless, we find that the enforcement was conscionable based upon the
agreement and Stallard’s actions during the parties’ marriage.
Third, Stallard claims that the prenuptial agreement was
unenforceable because it was not entered knowingly. As with all contracts,
prenuptial agreements must be entered into freely, knowingly, and voluntarily.
The attorney who prepared the agreement did not provide legal advice or counsel.
-4-
Therefore, Stallard argues that the parties did not enter the agreement knowingly.
We disagree.
Stallard’s failure to seek legal advice does not necessarily render the
agreement unenforceable. Stallard had ample opportunity to consult with an
attorney. Stallard did not provide an explanation for signing the agreement without
understanding it. Our review of the agreement indicates that it was written in plain
language. We find no evidence that suggests that Stallard did not knowingly enter
into the prenuptial agreement.
Finally, Stallard claims that the prenuptial agreement was not
supported by consideration. However, the purpose of the agreement was clearly to
induce marriage and to allow the parties to retain separate and distinct estates in
the event of dissolution. We conclude that adequate consideration thus existed.
Accordingly, we affirm the Floyd Circuit Court’s order.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Jerry A. Patton
Prestonsburg, Kentucky
John T. Chafin
Prestonsburg, Kentucky
-5-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.