JACKSON (JAMES) VS. DOUGLAS (CHRISTINA), ET AL.
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RENDERED: JANUARY 29, 2010: 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2009-CA-001020-MR
JAMES JACKSON
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM LYON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE CLARENCE A. WOODALL, III, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 08-CI-00212
CHRISTINA L. DOUGLAS;
JAMES A. HARRIS; AND
LEIGH A. DUNCAN
APPELLEES
OPINION AND ORDER
DISMISSING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: LAMBERT AND VANMETER, JUDGES; HENRY,1 SENIOR
JUDGE.
HENRY, SENIOR JUDGE: James Jackson, proceeding pro se, appeals from a
judgment of the Lyon Circuit Court that dismissed his declaratory judgment action.
1
Senior Judge Michael L. Henry sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and Kentucky Revised Statutes
(KRS) 21.580.
Jackson was found guilty of inappropriate sexual behavior with another inmate in a
prison disciplinary proceeding and was ordered to serve ninety days’ disciplinary
segregation. Jackson filed the declaratory judgment action in order to challenge
that decision. After our review, we conclude that Jackson failed to name a
necessary and indispensable party in his notice of appeal. Therefore, this appeal
must be dismissed.
Jackson is an inmate at the Western Kentucky Correctional Complex
in Fredonia, Kentucky. On October 3, 2008, while monitoring the prison’s camera
system, Lt. Don Sherrill and Sgt. Barry Dycus observed Jackson and another
inmate standing together in the restroom showers. The inmate bent down in front
of Jackson behind a shower wall, where he could not be seen. Sgt. Dycus
subsequently called Officer Jacob Bruce and asked him to go the showers to
investigate. Lt. Sherrill continued to monitor the camera system and observed
Officer Bruce walk by a restroom window. At that point, the inmate stood up and
turned on a shower faucet as Officer Bruce was entering the restroom. During an
ensuing investigation of the incident, Lt. Sherrill indicated that he believed the two
inmates were engaged in sexual activity. Jackson denied this accusation, but he
was subsequently placed in administrative segregation, and a prison disciplinary
hearing was scheduled for October 22, 2008.
Following this hearing, an adjustment committee found Jackson guilty
of inappropriate sexual behavior with another person based upon testimony given
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by the three officers who were involved in the subject incident. Jackson was
consequently ordered to serve ninety days’ disciplinary segregation. He appealed
this decision to Warden Becky W. Pancake, arguing that he was denied an
impartial tribunal because Christina L. Douglas, the chairwoman of the adjustment
committee, was also the institutional duty officer at the time of the subject incident
and had approved his initial administrative detention prior to the disciplinary
hearing. Jackson also contended that the committee’s decision was unsupported by
the evidence. Warden Pancake denied Jackson’s appeal.
Jackson subsequently filed a petition for a declaration of rights in
Lyon Circuit Court on December 10, 2008, in order to challenge the disciplinary
decision. He specifically sought a dismissal of the charged offense, to have his
prison record expunged, and to be reinstated to the sex offender treatment program,
from which he had been dismissed as a result of the subject incident. Jackson
named as respondents only the three individual members of the adjustment
committee: Douglas, James A. Harris, and Leigh A. Duncan. Importantly, Warden
Pancake was not included as a respondent. A motion to dismiss was filed in
response to Jackson’s petition, and the circuit court ultimately granted the motion
on April 27, 2009. This appeal followed.
On appeal, Jackson again argues that he was denied an impartial
tribunal and that the adjustment committee’s decision was not supported by
sufficient evidence. However, we are instead compelled to focus our attention on a
jurisdictional matter. In his declaratory judgment action below and in his notice of
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appeal here, Jackson named as respondents/appellees only the three adjustment
officers who conducted his prison disciplinary hearing. In doing so, Jackson failed
to include Warden Pancake as a party to this action. This failure is fatal to his
appeal for reasons set forth in this Court’s recent decision in Watkins v. Fannin,
278 S.W.3d 637 (Ky. App. 2009).
As we recognized in Watkins, “[t]he bulk of the power and authority
in the area of prisoner discipline has been properly delegated to the wardens of the
various penal institutions of Kentucky.” Id. at 641. This includes “final authority”
over questions regarding prisoner discipline and punishment, including forfeiture
of good-time credit. See id. at 642. Ultimately, the only entities with the power to
expunge a prisoner’s prison record or to restore good-time credit are the warden of
his correctional facility and the Kentucky Department of Corrections. Id.
Adjustment officers, standing alone, do not have this authority because their efforts
are “merely preliminary” in nature and essentially have no effect on prisoners
without final say and approval by the warden. See id. at 642-43. Accordingly,
because of their authority over prison disciplinary matters, we concluded in
Watkins that wardens are necessary and indispensable parties for appeals such as
the one before us. See id. at 640.
Because Jackson failed to name Warden Pancake – a necessary and
indispensable party – as a respondent/appellee in this action, his appeal must be
dismissed. The failure to name an indispensable party in a notice of appeal is
considered a defect in jurisdiction resulting in the appellate court’s inability to
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proceed. See City of Devondale v. Stallings, 795 S.W.2d 954, 957 (Ky. 1990).
Thus, “failure to name an indispensable party in the notice of appeal results in
dismissal of the appeal.” Slone v. Casey, 194 S.W.3d 336, 337 (Ky. App. 2006).2
This harsh result cannot be mitigated by the fact that Jackson is proceeding pro se,
since pro se litigants are still required to follow the Kentucky Rules of Civil
Procedure. Watkins, 278 S.W.3d at 643. Therefore, it is imperative for prisoners
seeking relief from a prison disciplinary determination via a declaratory judgment
action to include their wardens as respondents to their petitions and, subsequently,
as named appellees in their notices of appeal.3 In the absence of such inclusion,
their efforts are ultimately doomed.
This appeal is hereby dismissed for failure to name a necessary and
indispensable party.
ALL CONCUR.
ENTERED: _______________
__________________________________
SENIOR JUDGE, COURT OF APPEALS
2
The fact that this issue was only raised for the first time on appeal is irrelevant, as an appellate
court may not acquire jurisdiction through waiver. Wilson v. Russell, 162 S.W.3d 911, 913 (Ky.
2005).
3
With this said, we note that Watkins also insinuated that had the appellant there simply named
the Kentucky Department of Corrections as a respondent/appellee, that appeal ultimately could
have been considered on the merits. Watkins, 278 S.W.3d at 642 n.6. While we stand by this
statement, we urge prisoners in these situations to name their wardens as parties in order to
ensure that their appeals may be fully considered.
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BRIEF FOR APPELLANTS:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEES:
James Jackson, pro se
Fredonia, Kentucky
J. Todd Henning
Justice & Public Safety Cabinet
Office of Legal Services
Frankfort, Kentucky
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