WAXMAN (DANIEL) VS. KENTUCKY HORSE RACING AUTHORITY
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RENDERED: MAY 14, 2010; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2009-CA-000904-MR
DANIEL WAXMAN
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FRANKLIN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE PHILLIP J. SHEPHERD, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 07-CI-00059
KENTUCKY HORSE RACING AUTHORITY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
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BEFORE: CLAYTON AND NICKELL, JUDGES; KNOPF,1 SENIOR JUDGE.
NICKELL, JUDGE: Daniel Waxman, pro se, owner of a standardbred filly named
Loyal Opposition, appeals from an order of the Franklin Circuit Court affirming
the Kentucky Horse Racing Authority’s disqualification of the filly from a race it
1
Judge William L. Knopf concurred in this opinion prior to the expiration of his term of Senior
Judge service on May 7, 2010. Release of this opinion was delayed by administrative handling.
won after testing positive for the drug flunixin and ordering redistribution of the
$80,000.00 purse. Upon considering the briefs, the record and the law, we affirm
the circuit court’s well-reasoned, thorough opinion, adopt it as if it were our own,
and set it out in full:
This matter is before the Court on Petitioner’s
Appeal from the Final Order of the Kentucky Horse
Racing Authority in case number 06-100, which
disqualified the filly Loyal Opposition in the eighth race
at The Red Mile on October 8, 2005, and ordered the
purse in that race redistributed for violations of 811 KAR
1:090, which prohibited the use of certain drugs within a
certain period before a race, and provides for testing after
a race to determine whether the regulation has been
violated. The court, having considered the arguments
and being otherwise sufficiently advised, hereby issues
the following Opinion and Order AFFIRMING the final
administrative decision of the Racing Authority.
Facts
Petitioner Waxman is the owner of the filly at
issue in the case. Loyal Opposition was tended by trainer
Ervin Miller and veterinarian Rick Mather. Dr. Mather
treated Loyal Opposition with flunixin prior to the race,
as is his standard practice. Loyal Opposition won the
eighth race, and subsequently had urine and blood
samples drawn at the test barn for later testing. The
initial sample tested positive for flunixin, and Mr.
Waxman requested that the “split-sample,” a secondary
sample taken for possible use by a referee laboratory in
the event that an owner wishes to contest the initial
findings, be tested. The initial sample was tested at Iowa
State University, with the split-sample being tested at
Louisiana State University. The split-sample also tested
positive for flunixin. The blood samples drawn were also
tested and found to be positive for flunixin.
During the Grand Circuit Meet, which spanned ten
days, four horses tested positive for flunixin, all on
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October 8, 2005. Three of these horses were tended by
Dr. Mather. Dr. Mather testified that he treated the filly
with banamine and flunixin in accordance with the
regulation, 48-53 hours prior to the race. He also
testified that the flunixin was administered as part of a
normal routine to help the filly relax and rest up for the
race, and was not administered in an attempt to mask or
care for any injury or pain. According to the record,
flunixin is an anti-inflammatory medication similar to
human analgesics. It is frequently used in horses to
lessen the discomfort and soreness from training.
However it can also be used to mask injury or pain in an
effort to race an injured horse. This presents a danger to
both the horse, the driver, and the other horses and
drivers on the track. However, both Dr. Mather and the
KHRA veterinarian for the meet, Dr. Miles, agreed that
there was no reason to believe that the filly was not
healthy on the day of the race.
TOBA2 testing was performed on two days of the
meet, including the relevant day, which has been the
regular practice of the KHRA in recent years. TOBA is a
protocol developed for thoroughbred horses, but is used
randomly in standardbred racing in place of the regular
testing protocols. Testimony from experts established
that TOBA is a more extensive battery of tests, rather
than a more rigorous testing regime. In other words,
TOBA tests for more chemicals, but does not do so in a
way that is necessarily any more sensitive than the
standard testing.
Iowa State University was the contract lab for all
KHRA urine testing during 2005. Their initial screening
of Loyal Opposition’s urine was positive for flunixin, and
further testing was conducted to confirm the presence of
flunixin. After several tests, the sample was reported as
positive. No numerical concentration was reported, but
none was required, as the relevant regulation is a “zerotolerance” policy. The lab issued its finding along with
the methodology and equipment used.
2
Thoroughbred Owners and Breeders Association (footnote added).
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Mr. Waxman retained Dr. Scott Stanley of the
University of California at Davis as an expert witness.
He reviewed the analyses of the blood and urine samples,
and testified as to irregularities in the processes used by
ISU and LSU. Dr. Stanley’s testimony as to the potential
problems with the processes used by ISU and LSU were
addressed by the KHRA and the laboratory directors for
both universities.
The presiding administrative judge issued his
Notice of Fine on December 27, 2005, and found that
Petitioner had violated 811 KAR 1:090 §§ 1-5, 7, and 9,
and ordered that the purse be redistributed. The
veterinarian and trainer were fined as well under the
relevant regulations, and paid their fines and waived their
rights to appeal. The Court notes that the fines assessed
against these parties were significantly less, and therefore
they had less at stake in challenging the finding. The
trainer’s fine was $250, and the veterinarian was fined
$500 per violation for each of his three violations. On
the other hand, Mr. Waxman faced forfeiture of the purse
for the race his filly won, which was approximately
$80,000.
Mr. Waxman appealed the Judge’s ruling to the
KHRA on January 3, 2006. Discovery was conducted
and an evidentiary hearing was held on September 14,
2006. Three laboratory experts, two veterinarians, track
personnel, the presiding judge, the owner and trainer of
the filly, and the Executive Directory of the KHRA were
called as witnesses, among others. On November 16,
2006, the Hearing Officer issued Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law, and Recommended Order, which
recommended upholding the ruling of the administrative
judge. He declined to rule on a constitutional challenge
to the regulation. On December 18, 2006, the KHRA
issued its Final Order upholding the ruling of the
presiding judge and ordered the purse be redistributed.
Mr. Waxman initiated a timely appeal to this Court on
January 10, 2007.
Standard of Review
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In reviewing an agency decision, this Court may
only overturn that decision if the agency acted arbitrarily
or outside the scope of its authority, if the agency applied
an incorrect rule of law, or if the decision itself is not
supported by substantial evidence on the record.
Kentucky State Racing Comm’n v. Fuller, 481 S.W.2d
298, 300-301 (Ky. 1972). If there is substantial evidence
in the record to support the agency’s findings, this Court
must defer to that finding even though there is evidence
to the contrary. Kentucky Comm’n on Human Rights v.
Fraser, 625 S.W.2d 852, 856 (Ky. 1981). If the court
finds the correct rule of law was applied to the facts
supported by substantial evidence, the final order of the
agency must be affirmed. Brown Hotel Company v.
Edwards, 365 S.W.2d 299, 302 (Ky. 1963). The function
of the Court in administrative matters “is one of review,
not of reinterpretation.” Kentucky Unemployment Ins.
Comm’n v. King, 657 S.W.2d 250, 251 (Ky. App. 1983).
Discussion
I. Petitioner’s Claim on Judicial Review of the Final
Administrative Decision of KHRA.
The Petitioner presented a wide range of evidence
at the administrative level which he reasserts here at
length. The Petitioner presented a well qualified expert
witness to challenge the procedures followed by the ISU
and LSU laboratories and their analyses of the blood and
urine samples, the procedures followed by the presiding
judge and the KHRA at the meet, and the chain of
custody of the samples during the analyses. This
information was presented in full to the administrative
hearing officer, who considered all evidence. The
evidence was in sharp conflict. The Petitioner’s expert
testified that the laboratories relied on by the KHRA
conducted the testing improperly. The testimony from
KHRA witnesses and the laboratory personnel asserted
that all correct procedures and protocols were followed.
This Court does not weigh the factual basis of an
agency’s finding de novo, and may only reverse the
agency on its findings of fact where there is a lack of
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substantial evidence to support the agency’s findings.
KRS 13B.150(2). Here there is an abundance of
evidence presented by both Petitioner and Respondent.
While this evidence, on a de novo review, could
potentially lead the Court to find in favor of either
Petitioner or Respondent, the Court is not at liberty to
perform such an analysis. The hearing officer was in the
best position to weigh the evidence and the credibility of
witnesses, and it appears that he did so in a manner that is
consistent with the law. He obviously found the
evidence and witnesses presented by the KHRA to be
more credible than that presented by Respondent (sic),
and therefore found that a preponderance of the evidence
supported the judge’s initial decision to fine Mr.
Waxman. KRS 13B.090(7). The evidence Mr. Waxman
presents to this Court is not sufficiently compelling to
find a lack of substantial evidence for the agency’s
conclusion and therefore the Court finds that the agency
acted within its authority in issuing its findings of fact,
which held Mr. Waxman in violation of 811 KAR 1:090.
II. Petitioner’s Argument that 811 KAR 1:090 is
Unconstitutional [.]
Mr. Waxman additionally argues that 811 KAR
1:090 as it existed at the relevant time is unconstitutional
in that it violates the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, and
violates Sections 1, 2, and 59 of the Kentucky
Constitution, also on equal protection grounds. The
essence of [his] claim is that the regulations governing
the permissible post-race blood and/or urine
concentrations of flunixin differ between thoroughbred
and standardbred horses, and that there is no rational
basis for this difference. Thoroughbred horses are held
to a quantitative 20ng/ml maximum concentration of
flunixin, while standardbred horses are held to a “zerotolerance” standard, meaning that there cannot be
detectable levels of flunixin in the blood or urine of the
horse after a race.
This case does not involve a suspect class or a
fundamental right, and accordingly, equal protection
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analysis is limited to determining whether the difference
in treatment between the owners of different classes of
horses “rationally furthers a legitimate state interest.”
Commonwealth v. Meyers, 8 S.W.3d 58, 61 (Ky. App.
1999); see Mobley v. Armstrong, 978 S.W.2d 307 (Ky.
1998). The Meyers Court further articulated [its]
definition by stating that “the equal protection clause is
satisfied so long as there is a plausible policy reason for
the classification [. . .] and the relationship of the
classification to its goal is not so attenuated as to render
the distinction arbitrary or irrational [. . . .]” Id. at 61.
Despite this low standard for the state to overcome,
Petitioner alleges that the regulation at issue fails to
satisfy the rational basis test.
Petitioner also asserts that the regulation at issue is
a prohibited “special law” which is unconstitutional
under Section 59 of the Kentucky Constitution. That
section provides that “the General Assembly shall not
pass local or special acts.” The provision has been
interpreted to apply to lesser legislative bodies, including
administrative agencies. See Parker v. Rash, 236 S.W.2d
687 (Ky. 1951). The Courts have defined the difference
between a general law and a special law as follows: “A
statute which relates to persons or things as a class is a
general law, while a statute which relates to particular
persons or things of a class is special.” Johnson v.
Commonwealth ex rel. Meredith, 165 S.W.2d 820 (Ky.
1942) (internal citations omitted, emphasis in original).
As cited by Petitioner, “special laws” are those:
Made to depend, not on any natural, real or
substantial distinction, inhering in the
subject matter, such as suggests the
necessity or propriety of different legislation
in regard to the class specified, but upon
purely artificial, arbitrary, illusory, or
fictitious conditions, so as to make the
classification unreasonable, and unjust. . . .
It is well established that in order for a law
to be constitutionally general and not special
legislation, the classification must be based
upon a reasonable and natural distinction
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which relates to the purpose of the act and
the legislation must apply equally to all in a
class.
St. Luke Hospital, Inc. v. Health Policy Board, 913
S.W.2d 1, 3 (Ky. App. 1996) (quoting Reid v. Robertson,
200 S.W.2d 900, 903 (Ky. 1947)).
The Court, however, fails to see the reasons why
811 KAR 1:090 would be considered a special law. It
does, indeed, differ from the regulations set forth for
thoroughbred horses, but this distinction is not “artificial,
arbitrary, illusory, or fictitious.” St. Luke Hospital, Inc.,
913 S.W.2d at 3. The regulation differentiates based on
breeds of horses which are vastly different. Petitioner’s
own brief cites the differences between these horses, and
notes that thoroughbreds are more high strung and more
prone to injury. The Court would also note that the
breeds compete in entirely different circuits, and that the
racing conditions themselves differ greatly between the
breeds. Thoroughbreds are raced with a jockey riding
atop the horse, while standardbred horses such as the
ones Petitioner races are driven by a person riding in a
two-wheeled cart behind the horse. The different
regulations are based on distinctions which actually exist
between the breeds. These distinctions are “substantial
and real,” and therefore Section 59 does not apply to
invalidate the regulation. Id.
The Court is left to determine whether a rational
basis exists for the difference in treatment of
thoroughbred owners versus standardbred owners, and
finds that such a basis has been articulated by the KHRA.
On this point, the Court finds that Allen v.
Commonwealth, cited by the KHRA, is controlling. 136
S.W.3d 54 (Ky. App. 2004). That Court dealt with
exactly the same equal protection argument regarding the
differing flunixin regulations between thoroughbred and
standardbred horses (in particular, 811 KAR 1:090), and
found that there was a rational basis for the distinction
between the regulations. The KHRA’s expert testified
that harness racing horses are subject to increased risk
from the use of flunixin to mask injuries, because they
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lack the agility of a thoroughbred horse to avoid a
downed horse, as they are attached to a racing bike.
Thus, they are unable to step sideways or jump in order
to avoid a horse, which creates risks both to the other
horses in the field as well as their drivers. The Allen
Court also cited a U.S. Supreme Court case dealing with
the same issues, and finding that the difference in
regulations between thoroughbred horses and harness
racing standardbred horses satisfied the rational basis
test. Barry v. Barchi, 443 U.S. 55 (1979).
The argument by Petitioner that this Court should
disregard Allen is without merit. This case is a binding
precedent. The fact that it arose from a different
administrative proceeding before the KHRA does not
impair its precedential value, nor does it in any way
diminish this Court’s duty to follow the binding
precedent of the state’s appellate courts. Once there has
been a rational basis established for the regulation, and
that basis has been upheld in a reported decision of the
appellate courts, the state need not present the same
evidence again in a different administrative tribunal. The
issue of whether the regulation complies with equal
protection requirements has been decided. While
Petitioner presents strong arguments why this regulation
can be considered arbitrary, this Court is not at liberty to
disregard the appellate precedent that has already been
established rejecting those arguments. There is simply
no legal authority that would allow this Court to ignore
the holding of the Allen Court on the identical issue
presented.
The Court also notes that it finds no basis on which
to consider the regulation void for vagueness or any
evidence to support a selective enforcement claim. The
language of the regulation is sufficiently clear to provide
notice to the parties regulated, and there is nothing to
indicate that the regulation was being selectively
enforced. Winning horses are uniformly tested to ensure
compliance with the regulation, and the fact that the
KHRA used a more extensive testing battery on certain
random days of the meet, as was its practice, does not
amount to selective enforcement. According to the
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testimony of record, the TOBA testing was not more
strenuous, but rather tested for more conditions and
chemicals, and all horses who were found to be in
violation of the rules regarding flunixin were fined
equally as provided for by the relevant regulations, as
were the persons responsible for their care.
Finally, Petitioner argues that the subsequent
amendments to 811 KAR 1:090, which adjust the
permissible post-race flunixin levels to those acceptable
for thoroughbred horses amount to an admission that the
previous regulation in effect at the time of the race was
unconstitutional. The Court disagrees. An amendment
to a regulation which was found to pass scrutiny under
the equal protection clause does not amount to an
admission that the prior version of the regulation was
unconstitutional. Indeed, a court of competent
jurisdiction has found that the prior version had a rational
basis and was therefore constitutional under the equal
protection clause. The Supreme Court of the United
States has held that amendments to laws previously
found to pass equal protection analysis does not amount
to an admission that the previous version was
unconstitutional. See Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313,
320 (1977).
Conclusion
While there clearly is conflicting evidence in the
administrative record, there can be no question that there
is substantial evidence that supports the decision of the
KHRA. The decision of the KHRA was not arbitrary or
capricious. Moreover, the evidence fails to establish that
811 KAR 1:090, as it existed at the relevant time, was
unconstitutional for any reason. Accordingly, for the
foregoing reasons, Petitioner’s appeal is DENIED. The
ruling of the KHRA in case 06-100 is AFFIRMED.
There being no just cause for delay, this is a final and
appealable order.
It is clear from Waxman’s brief that he disagrees with the circuit
court’s opinion. However, mere disagreement will not justify reversal. In
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reviewing a “circuit court’s affirmance of an administrative decision [we]
determine whether the circuit court's findings upholding the [agency’s] decision
are clearly erroneous.” 500 Associates, Inc. v. Natural Resources and
Environmental Protection Cabinet, 204 S.W.3d 121, 131-32 (Ky. App. 2006)
(internal citations omitted). Based upon a review of the appellate record, we
discern no error, and therefore no clear error in the circuit court’s opinion
affirming the KHRA’s disqualification of Loyal Opposition and its redistribution
of the purse. The circuit court eloquently rejected each of Waxman’s arguments
and we do the same.
For the reasons expressed in the circuit court’s opinion, which we
adopt as our own, the opinion of the Franklin Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Daniel I. Waxman, pro se
Lexington, Kentucky
Nicole S. Biddle
Public Protection Cabinet
Kentucky Horse Racing Authority
Lexington, Kentucky
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