SCHAMBON (BARBARA) VS. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: OCTOBER 15, 2010; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2009-CA-000793-MR
&
NO. 2009-CA-000794-MR
BARBARA SCHAMBON AND
FLOYD SCHAMBON
v.
APPELLANTS
APPEALS FROM WARREN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JOHN R. GRISE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 89-CR-00635 & 89-CR-00636
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
REVERSING, VACATING, AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: KELLER AND MOORE, JUDGES; HARRIS,1 SENIOR JUDGE.
KELLER, JUDGE: Floyd and Barbara Schambon appeal from the circuit court’s
denial of their Kentucky Rule of Civil Procedure (CR) 60.02 motions for relief and
their companion motions for a hearing. On appeal they argue, as they did before
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Senior Judge William R. Harris sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and KRS 21.580.
the trial court, that they are innocent as evidenced by the complete or partial
recantation by three witnesses who testified at trial. The Commonwealth, in a brief
consisting of less than two pages of analysis, argues that the circuit court correctly
determined that the Schambons’ motions were not timely. For the following
reasons, we reverse, remand, and vacate.
FACTS
The Schambons appealed their convictions to the Supreme Court of
Kentucky and we take our recitation of the facts from the Court’s opinion.
Appellants were convicted of eight counts of first degree
sodomy, three counts of first degree criminal abuse,
twenty-one counts of second degree sodomy, and twentyeight counts of second degree cruelty to animals.
Appellant Barbara Schambon was also convicted of one
count of incest. Both were sentenced to a total of eightyfive years in prison and appeal as a matter of right.
In June of 1989, the Warren County Animal Shelter was
informed of the presence of animals in a garage. The
animals were without food or water and the garage was
without any ventilation. The shelter's employees
contacted the county dog warden who, accompanied by a
deputy sheriff, investigated the complaint. Upon arriving
at the location, they noticed a strong dog feces odor
coming from the house. The warden then walked to the
detached garage. Upon opening the door, he noticed
chain link pens containing some seventeen to twentythree poodles, Yorkshire terriers, and Pomeranians. The
garage was not ventilated and the temperature was in
excess of ninety degrees. The floor was covered with
three to five inches of dog feces, no dog food was
noticeable and the water dish was empty. In one of the
pens, a poodle was eating the remains of a Pomeranian.
The warden reported that the stench was “overpowering.”
The two officials removed the dogs from the garage.
After loading the dogs into a truck, the warden returned
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to the animal shelter while the deputy remained to
investigate the situation.
After loading the dogs into the warden's truck, the deputy
talked to several neighbors who had gathered to observe
the situation. The deputy attempted to locate the owners
of the house. One of the neighbors told him that the
children who lived in the house were across the street at
their babysitter's home. The deputy went to the house and
spoke to the sitter, but the sitter would not let him talk to
the children. However, one of the children overheard the
deputy's inquiries and volunteered that her mother was in
the house across the street. The girl left the babysitter and
went across the street and crawled in a window. A few
minutes later, appellant Barbara Schambon appeared at
the front door.
The deputy informed appellant that he and the warden
had removed the dogs from the garage. Appellant told the
deputy that if he walked around to the back, she would
talk to him inside the house. When the deputy entered the
house, he noticed that two walls were lined with cages
containing cats. He observed that the litter boxes were
overflowing with feces. He also could hear additional
animals barking and crying. While in the kitchen, he saw
a badly decomposed Pomeranian lying on the floor in its
bodily fluids. Dirty dishes and pots and pans were
scattered around the kitchen and the stove was “alive”
and “growing” with fungus and moss. A Guinea pig was
sitting in a cage on the kitchen counter.
Upon being questioned, appellant maintained that the
dogs had been fed and watered. She stated that the
animals belonged to her husband and that she had told
him to take care of them. She admitted that they had not
been groomed. The deputy went outside the house in an
effort to avoid becoming nauseated, and upon his refusal
to re-enter the house, appellant slammed the door. The
deputy left the premises.
After the dog warden returned the dogs to the animal
shelter, he obtained a search warrant for the house. Later
that afternoon, the warden, the animal shelter manager,
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and the deputy returned to the house. When they arrived,
appellant Floyd Schambon was standing in the driveway.
He was arrested for cruelty to animals. Upon searching
the house, the officials noted that dog feces was
everywhere, including the walls and the beds.
While the authorities were searching the house, the four
children returned from the babysitter's. The children were
C.S., a son age thirteen; E.S., a daughter age ten; A.S., a
daughter age eight, and R.S., a son age five. While the
deputy talked to the children, appellant Barbara yelled
and ordered them not to talk to anyone. She informed the
deputy that he had no right to talk to her children and that
she would contact her attorney and sue him.
After the animals were taken to the shelter, the staff
cleaned and treated them. Most of the dogs had to be
sheared because their hair was completely matted with
feces. One poodle was so badly matted that it had to be
sedated before it could be sheared. Most of the dogs were
underweight and infested with lice and fleas. Many of the
dogs had ear, eye and penis infections. Several of the
dogs had parvo and distemper. One Pomeranian puppy
died from parvo within an hour of arrival at the shelter
and a poodle died from distemper the following week.
Other dogs had mange and ringworm. A Yorkshire terrier
had toenails an inch and a half long and one gave birth to
puppies at the shelter. Both puppies died immediately
after birth.
Due to the unsanitary conditions of appellants' house, the
children were removed pursuant to an emergency custody
order and placed in foster homes. The two boys were
placed in the foster care of Mr. and Mrs. Bobby Bright
while the two girls were placed in another foster home.
The Brights noticed that the younger boy, R.S., while in
foster care, did not have good bathing habits and required
assistance and training in the bathroom. They also
noticed that he was terrified to go into the bathroom.
When questioned about his fear, he responded that he
was “afraid to go into the bathroom because you'll be
there,” and “you might hurt me.” The Brights also
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noticed that R.S. had a bedwetting disorder. In an attempt
to correct the disorder, the Brights would awaken the
child during the night so he could use the bathroom.
Upon entering the bathroom, the child would climb onto
the toilet, then up to the sink where he would blankly
stare at his foster parents.
The Brights also noticed that R.S. had severe
apprehensions of adults. Specifically, he would not allow
Mr. Bright to hold his hand while crossing the street and
was extremely apprehensive near public restrooms. Upon
questioning, R.S. informed the Brights of sexual
improprieties involving appellants and other persons. The
Brights notified the Cabinet for Human Resources (CHR)
who conducted several interviews with the four children.
Based on this investigation, appellants were indicted for
various sexual and physical abuse crimes involving the
children.
At trial, R.S., then six years old, testified that both
appellants forced him to engage in deviate sexual
intercourse. Specifically, he stated that Barbara placed
her mouth on his “privates” “a whole lot” and that she
had him place his mouth on her “privates” “more than ten
times.” R.S. stated that “a whole lot” constituted nine
times. He also stated that Barbara forced him to engage
in anal sex with her more than five times.
R.S. further testified that both appellants handled his
penis and that he touched Floyd's penis. He also testified
that Floyd performed oral sex on him, that he performed
oral sex on Floyd, and that he placed his penis in Floyd's
anus. R.S. stated that these activities occurred at night
when Floyd would awaken him, take him into the
bathroom, and have him climb onto the sink so that their
bodies would be at the same height. At this time, they
performed sexual activities on each other, including, but
not limited to anal sex.
Additionally, R.S. testified that Floyd took him to a park
to meet men and women “by a tree.” At the park,
appellant would tie him up with a rope and force him to
perform oral sex on men and women and allow the men
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to perform anal sex on him. He testified that he was
“afraid” of these people and that he would ask them to
stop. He also testified that at times his anus bled and that
sometimes the people would give his father money.
In addition to the above testimony, R.S. testified that
appellants took pictures and made movies of him naked
and, while filming him, Barbara would have him say
“bad words.” He also stated that Barbara spanked him
with “her hand and a belt” and Floyd with a “horse whip
and a little bitty whip.” He also testified that after he had
been placed in foster care Barbara warned him not to talk
about their sexual activities and threatened to harm him if
he discussed them.
The thirteen-year-old boy, C.S., was hesitant and evasive
in his testimony. He admitted, however, that Floyd
chased the children with a horse whip and that appellants
and the children walked around the house naked. When
asked directly about his sexual contact with appellants,
C.S. would only give vague answers. As a result, the trial
court allowed the Commonwealth to question him about
a report he had written detailing his sexual contacts with
appellants and question him concerning statements he
made to Detective Bill Jenkins.
In this report, C.S. wrote that as a form of punishment,
Floyd sometimes hit him on his penis. He further wrote
that the two “usually put our penises in each other
mouths, sometimes we put our penises up our butts, we
suck penises, put penises up each other's butts, and we
suck other people's for money.” In his interview with the
detective, C.S. stated that he and Floyd had engaged in
oral and anal sex. He also stated that Floyd had taken him
to a park to meet another guy to have sex “lots of times.”
C.S.'s written report also detailed sexual activities with
Barbara. In the report he wrote, “I put my penis up her
private or butt, and I sometimes suck her private.” C.S.
additionally told the detective that he and Barbara had
oral sex, sexual intercourse and anal sex.
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After receiving directed verdicts on numerous counts,
both appellants were convicted and sentenced to eightyfive years in prison. They now appeal.
Schambon v. Commonwealth, 821 S.W.2d 804, 806-08 (Ky. 1991).
In their appeal to the Supreme Court, the Schambon’s argued that the
trial court erred by trying them jointly, by trying the animal cruelty and sex
offenses together, by admitting certain evidence, by denying their motion for a
directed verdict on the sex offenses, and by permitting the prosecutor to make
improper arguments. The Supreme Court affirmed. We set forth additional facts
as necessary below.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
“The standard of review of an appeal involving a CR 60.02 motion is
whether the trial court abused its discretion.” White v. Commonwealth, 32 S.W.3d
83, 86 (Ky. App. 2000); see also Kurtsinger v. Board of Trustees of Kentucky
Retirement Systems, 90 S.W.3d 454, 456 (Ky. 2002); Brown v. Commonwealth,
932 S.W.2d 359, 362 (Ky. 1996). To amount to an abuse of discretion, the trial
court’s decision must be “arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound
legal principals.” Clark v. Commonwealth, 223 S.W.3d 90, 95 (Ky. 2007)
(quoting Commonwealth v. English, 993 S.W.2d 941, 945 (Ky. 1999)). Absent a
“flagrant miscarriage of justice,” the trial court will be affirmed. Gross v.
Commonwealth, 648 S.W.2d 853, 858 (Ky. 1983).
When “mere recantation of testimony” is involved, the granting of a
new trial is only justified “in extraordinary and unusual circumstances.” Thacker
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v. Commonwealth, 453 S.W.2d 566, 568 (Ky. 1970). Recanting testimony should
be viewed with suspicion and given very little weight. Id.; Hensley v.
Commonwealth, 488 S.W.2d 338, 339 (Ky. 1972). Statements recanting testimony
will form the basis for a new trial only when the court is
satisfied of their truth; the trial judge is in the best
position to make the determination because he has
observed the witnesses and can often discern and assay
the incidents, the influences and the motives that
prompted the recantation; and his rejection of the
recanting testimony will not lightly be set aside by an
appellate court.
Thacker, 453 S.W.2d at 568.
ANALYSIS
At the outset, we note that the Schambon children are all now adults;
therefore, we will use their first names rather than initials. In their brief, the
Schambons argue that three of their children, Amanda, Elisa, and Clayton (referred
to respectively as A.S., E.S., and C.S. in the Supreme Court’s Opinion), have now
changed their testimony, in whole or in part, thus justifying a new trial. We
separately address below each child’s testimony at trial and any current changes in
that testimony as well as other evidence of innocence offered by the Schambons.
1. Amanda
Amanda, who was nine at the time, testified at trial that the house she
lived in with her parents, brothers, and sister contained a number of dogs and cats,
smelled “horrible,” and was a mess. She indicated that dogs had died in the house
and their remains occasionally stayed in the house for several days. Amanda also
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testified that her parents spanked her, that her parents walked around the house
naked, and that her mother and father touched her “private parts” with their hands.
However, she could not remember how many times her parents did this or when.
She did state that her clothes were “probably on” and that she was alone with each
parent when this touching occurred.
On cross-examination, Amanda testified that she considered her
parents to be naked if they only had on their underwear. She denied that her
brothers ever touched her or that she ever touched them. Furthermore, she stated
that if her brothers said that they had touched her and that she had touched them,
they were not telling the truth.
In conjunction with their CR 60.02 motion, the Schambons filed a
“statement” signed by Amanda. In that statement, Amanda said that she had no
objection to her parents being released from prison. However, she did not state
that she wanted to change her trial testimony. Therefore, this statement does not
act as a recantation of Amanda’s trial testimony.
The Schambons state in their brief that Amanda told an investigator
that she does not believe that any abuse occurred, but she was not willing to take
“any active role in the case.” The Schambons believe that Amanda will, if called
to testify, say that no sexual abuse occurred. Because the Schambons have not
been able to procure any statement from Amanda recanting her trial testimony or
stating that no sexual abuse occurred, we agree with the trial court’s conclusion
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that the Schambons’ speculation about what Amanda might testify to at an
evidentiary hearing or on re-trial is not a basis for relief.
2. Elisa
Elisa, who was eleven at the time, testified that the family’s house was
“real messy” because of the number of dogs that lived there. Elisa remembered at
least ten dogs dying in the house and that their remains stayed in the house for
“one night or two.”
According to Elisa, all of the family members walked around the
house nude; however, no one ever touched her while she was nude and she did not
see anyone else get touched. She testified that both of her parents touched
themselves on their “private parts” while nude but did not touch each other. On
cross-examination, Elisa testified that neither of her brothers did anything of a
sexual nature with her or to her.
In support of their CR 60.02 motion, the Schambons offered Elisa’s
affidavit. In her affidavit, Elisa stated that, although her family was dysfunctional,
she had not been sexually abused by either her parents or her brothers.
Furthermore, she stated that the allegations of sexual abuse by her parents were
false and that her brothers lied.
As noted by the trial court, Elisa’s affidavit does not contradict but is
consistent with her trial testimony. Therefore, Elisa’s affidavit does not form a
basis for relief under CR 60.02.
3. Ross
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Ross, who was seven at the time, testified at trial that the house was a
mess and smelled because of the dogs. With regard to the sexual abuse allegations,
Ross testified on direct examination consistent with the Supreme Court’s summary
as set forth above.
On cross-examination, Ross testified that, after the children were
removed from their parents’ custody, he and Clayton lived in the same foster home
for a time. However, Clayton was removed from the foster home because he
“hurt” Ross.
Ross also testified that he and Clayton had conversations about girls
and that they discussed being together at a house where a woman sexually abused
him. The two also discussed a man named “David,” who Ross said was a real
person that he met at the park or at David’s house.
Ross testified that he, Clayton, and their father had sex with Amanda
and Elisa and that Amanda and Elisa had oral sex with their mother. According to
Ross, the children’s sexual encounters with each other occurred at the Schambon
home and at the babysitter’s house. However, the babysitter was unaware of these
activities.
The Schambons’ attorneys obtained conflicting testimony from Ross
regarding the race of some of the men who sexually abused him and his allegations
that his mother used cocaine. Finally, the Schambons’ attorneys obtained
testimony from Ross that at least one investigator had told him that his “private
part” is called a penis.
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Apparently anticipating that the Schambons would argue that Clayton
told Ross how to testify, the Commonwealth asked Ross on re-direct if Clayton
told him “to make up anything.” Ross responded that Clayton had not and that his
testimony was true.
According to the Schambons’ brief, “Ross . . . has expressed an
unwillingness to become involved in this case in any manner (either for or against
his parents.)” Therefore, the Schambons have produced no affidavit or other
evidence that Ross is willing to or will recant his testimony.
4. Clayton
Clayton, who was fourteen at the time, gave testimony that was, as the
Supreme Court stated, “vague.” With regard to the sexual abuse allegations,
Clayton testified on direct examination consistent with the Supreme Court’s
summary as set forth above. Additionally, we note that, when questioned about his
handwritten statement, Clayton testified that it was his handwriting but stated that
he did not remember what he wrote. In his testimony, he also appeared to be
somewhat surprised by what was in that statement. However, Clayton testified that
he did remember making statements to a detective regarding sexual activity with
his father, mother, and others. Furthermore, he testified that he might have said
that the story was not “made up” but he could not remember saying that. He did
remember saying that what he told the detective happened, “actually happened.”
On cross-examination, Clayton admitted that, in his handwritten
statement, he made up a person named “David Johnson” and that his allegations of
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sexual contact with David Johnson were not true. He also admitted that his
statements that he had sex with two of his friends’ and/or neighbors’ family
members and with his sisters were not true. Although he had accused his mother
of having oral sex with him, Clayton testified at trial that he did not know what
oral sex is. He also testified that he learned about oral sex from the detective and
social worker who interviewed him and that he and Ross discussed the case when
they lived with the same foster family. Finally, when questioned about specific
activities with his mother, Clayton stated that he could not answer.
In his affidavit, Clayton stated that he fabricated allegations of sexual
abuse against his parents because he was angry with them. He also stated that he
coached Ross to say that their parents and others had sexually abused them, and
that Ross did so because he wanted to do what his older brother did. Clayton
believes that any allegations of sexual abuse by Ross are false because Ross never
told him about and he never witnessed any such abuse; any activity in the park
would have been seen by passing motorists; and his parents were not at home long
enough to have done all that Ross said they did. Finally, Clayton stated that Ross
has indicated that he does not remember what occurred and that he does not want
to get involved.
5. Hon. Kelly Thompson
In addition to the affidavits summarized above, the Schambons have
offered the 2003 affidavit of the children’s guardian ad litem, Hon. Kelly
Thompson. Thompson stated, in pertinent part, that, prior to trial, Clayton said that
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he had not been abused; that he had deceived law enforcement and social service
personnel; that he had influenced Ross; and that he had been encouraged in his
deception by social services personnel. According to Thompson, Clayton said that
he would tell the truth when he testified; however, “no one ever really asked him
what happened” or “to tell the truth.” Thompson’s affidavit notwithstanding, we
note that Clayton was asked what happened and that, several times during crossexamination, counsel for the Schambons told Clayton that he needed to tell the
truth.
6. Polygraph Tests
The Schambons underwent polygraph testing which revealed that
neither was being deceptive when asked whether they had any sexual contact with
Ross.
7. Reports of Eric Y. Drogin, J.D., Ph.D., ABPP
Dr. Drogin reviewed the videotape of the August 10, 1989, interview
of Ross. Based on that review, he concluded that there were sufficient deficiencies
in the interviewer’s techniques to “cast significant doubt” on Ross’s responses and
his subsequent testimony.
Dr. Drogin also reviewed a 2003 videotaped interview of Clayton. In
that interview, Clayton apparently stated that he and Ross told investigators what
they wanted to hear in order to “get back” at their parents. Furthermore, Clayton
apparently stated that he had told Ross what to say. According to Dr. Drogin, this
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helps explain “Ross’ [sic] curious interview performance” and further detracts
from Ross’s credibility.
8. Affidavit of Ralph Underwager, Ph.D.
Dr. Underwager reviewed the four interviews of the children, an
interview of Mr. Schambon, and Clayton’s affidavit. Dr. Underwager concluded
that the 1989 videotaped interview of Ross was flawed and none of the information
obtained from that interview was credible.
9. Trial Court’s Order
After reviewing the record and the “new evidence,” the trial court
entered an order denying the Schambons’ motions. In doing so, the court noted
that the Schambons’ trial counsel thoroughly cross-examined Clayton and raised
the issues that Clayton had fabricated part, if not all, of his statement and that
Clayton had influenced Ross’s statements and testimony. Because the court
believed those issues had been litigated, it saw no reason to re-litigate them “nearly
two decades later.”
The court also noted that the affidavit of Elisa did not contradict her
testimony at trial. The court recognized the reports of the two psychologists
calling into question the interviewing techniques used with Ross. However, the
court also noted that it found Ross’s testimony to be credible and, more
importantly, that Ross had not filed an affidavit recanting his testimony.
Finally, the court noted the Schambons’ argument that the trial took
place in a “circus atmosphere;” that there was no physical evidence of abuse; and
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that the sexual abuse and animal cruelty charges had been tried together. As to
these issues, the court found that they had been previously tried and/or addressed.
Based on the above, the court found that the Schambons’ “claims do
not justify relief pursuant to CR 60.02 and they are not asserted in a timely
manner.” The court also denied the Schambons’ motions for hearings. Based on
the following, we hold that the court should have held a hearing before addressing
the merits of the Schambons’ CR 60.02 motions.
Initially, we note, as did the trial court, that the Schambons’
arguments regarding the atmosphere of the trial and the fact that the animal cruelty
and sexual abuse charges were tried together were previously addressed by the
Supreme Court of Kentucky. Furthermore, we note that their arguments that
Amanda and Elisa have recanted or changed their testimony are, at best, an
overstatement. As we noted above, the affidavit from Elisa is consistent with her
trial testimony and the affidavit from Amanda does not even address her trial
testimony. Therefore, the only possibly direct recantation testimony before the
lower court is Clayton’s.
At trial, Clayton’s testimony was equivocal at best. Because
Clayton’s testimony was equivocal, the trial court permitted the Commonwealth to
question Clayton at length about a report he had written. As noted above, Clayton
did not deny writing the report; however, he seemed surprised by the contents of
the report and equivocated when asked to verify the truth of its contents.
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In his affidavit, Clayton states that no sexual abuse took place and that
he fabricated the stories about sexual abuse. These statements by Clayton do not
directly contradict his equivocal testimony. However, they do directly contradict
the contents of the report, which formed the basis of his testimony. Therefore, we
hold that, in this case, Clayton’s affidavit sufficiently contradicts his trial testimony
and raises an issue of fact that merits an evidentiary hearing. In so holding, we
note that Clayton’s affidavit does not exist in a vacuum, which might have resulted
in a different outcome herein. It is supported by Thompson’s affidavit indicating
that Clayton advised him of the fabricated stories prior to trial. Furthermore, as
noted by the lower court during a hearing on the Schambons’ motions and by the
Schambons during oral argument, the Commonwealth will not be prejudiced by an
evidentiary hearing. The witnesses from the trial are all still living and available, if
not willing, to testify.
The preceding is not meant to be a determination as to what the result
of the evidentiary hearing should be. The lower court is free to judge the
credibility of any witness who testifies at that hearing and to determine, within its
discretion, whether to order a new trial.
As to the timelines of the Schambons’ motions, CR 60.02 requires
that motions for relief must be filed within a reasonable time after a judgment. The
Schambons argue that, because of the children’s minority and relegation to the
control of the Cabinet and foster care, they could not come forward any sooner.
The Commonwealth argues that the evidence presented in conjunction with their
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CR 60.02 motions was available at the time of trial and their delay in filing cannot
be excused. Because of the nature of this case and the nature of the evidence
presented by the Schambons in support of their CR 60.02 motions, we hold that the
lower court prematurely determined that the motions were not timely. The
Schambons should be permitted to present, through testimony at the evidentiary
hearing, the reasons for delay. The Commonwealth will be free to cross-examine
any witnesses regarding this issue and the court, after hearing that testimony, will
be free to determine if the Schambons have adequately explained the reason for the
delay. If they have not, the court will be free to dismiss this matter as untimely.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the trial court’s denial of the
Schambons’ motions for an evidentiary hearing and vacate its order denying their
motions for relief under CR 60.02. This matter is remanded to the circuit court
with instructions to hold an evidentiary hearing and to then re-visit the merits of
the Schambons’ motions for relief under CR 60.02.
HARRIS, SENIOR JUDGE, CONCURS.
MOORE, JUDGE, DISSENTS AND FILES A SEPARATE
OPINION.
MOORE, JUDGE DISSENTING: Respectfully, I dissent from the
majority’s opinion. I do agree that the affidavits and/or statements of Elisa and
Amanda do not constitute recantations. For purposes of analysis, I will therefore
focus primarily on Clayton’s affidavit.
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Initially, regarding the trial court’s decision that the Schambons’ CR 60.02
motion was not brought in a reasonable time, “[t]he ‘reasonable time’ requirement
is a factor for the trial court to take into consideration. It may do so based on the
record in the case. It is not required to hold a hearing to decide whether the
‘reasonable time’ restriction should apply.” Gross v. Commonwealth, 648 S.W.2d
853, 858 (Ky. 1983). This “is a matter that addresses itself to the discretion of the
trial court.” Id. “[T]he fading memories of witnesses” is a consideration that the
trial court may take into account in determining whether the passage of time
between judgment and a CR 60.02 motion is reasonable. Stoker v. Commonwealth,
289 S.W.3d 592, 596 (Ky. App.), disc. reviewed denied (2009) (citing Harris v.
Commonwealth, 296 S.W.2d 700 (Ky. 1956)).
The Schambons were tried and found guilty by a jury in 1990. The
individuals who signed the affidavits and/or statements, waited thirteen years after
the Schambons were convicted to do so. The Schambons argue that the
“reasonable time” clock of CR 60.02 should be judged against a 2006 timeline,
when they filed their CR 60.02 motion. Their theory is that the reasonable time
standard must be tempered as “[their] children . . . grew up and cleared themselves
of the boundaries imposed by the Personnel for the Cabinet for Human Resources
and of foster care persons affiliated with them.”
There are a number of inherent problems with the Schambons’ theory,
beginning with the fact that it is not supported by anything stated in the
Schambons’ children’s affidavits or statements. The Court should not condone a
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theory that children are prevented from coming forward with the “truth” about
allegations they have made just because they are in the care of the Cabinet or foster
care. Essentially, that is what the Schambons ask this Court to do. The
Schambons have not cited any case law or authority supporting their theory, and
my own research did not reveal any. Courts should not look favorably upon this
notion, absent some compelling circumstances, which are not present in this case.
Another, and perhaps more, troubling aspect of the Schambons’ argument is
the fact that Clayton was fifteen when he testified in 1990. So within a few years
thereafter, he would have reached the age of majority and been “cleared of the
boundaries” which the Schambons maintain kept him from coming forward. Yet,
he did not come forward at that time. In his affidavit, notarized in 2003, Clayton
states that he was 27; thus, he did not come forward with his affidavit until nearly a
decade later. The Schambons do not even attempt to explain this lapse in time, and
Clayton offers no explanation as to why he waited thirteen years after his parents’
trial and nearly ten years after he reached the age of majority to recant his
testimony.
Adding to the flaws of the Schambons’ theory that their children could not
come forward because they were in the care of the Cabinet and foster care is that
according to the affidavit of the Honorable Kelly Thompson, notarized in 2003,
Clayton relayed to him before the trial that he manufactured the story against his
parents. At that time, Clayton was within the very “boundaries” that the
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Schambons claim would not allow him to report that his allegations against them
were false.
Additionally, the affidavits supporting the Schambons’ CR 60.02 motion
were notarized in 2003, yet the Schambons did not file their CR 60.02 motion until
2006. They have not provided any reason for the nearly three-year delay in
moving the trial court for relief. Regardless of the circumstances or whether the
delay is measured against 1990, a few years later when Clayton reached the age of
majority, or 2003 when the affidavits and statements were made, I do not believe
that the trial court abused its discretion in finding that the CR 60.02 motion is
untimely. On this basis alone, the trial court’s decision should be affirmed.
Next, turning to the merits of the trial court’s denial of the
Schambons’ CR 60.02 motion, our Court reviews this determination for an abuse
of discretion. See Barnett v. Commonwealth, 979 S.W.2d 98, 102 (Ky. 1998);
Brown v. Commonwealth, 932 S.W.2d 359, 362 (Ky. 1996). We will only reverse
under an abuse of discretion standard if the trial court has acted arbitrarily,
unreasonably, unfairly or its decision is not supported by sound legal principles.
Clark v. Commonwealth, 223 S.W.3d 90, 95 (Ky. 2007). We affirm unless the
appellant has made a showing of a “flagrant miscarriage of justice.” Gross, 648
S.W.2d at 858. To justify relief, it is incumbent on the movant to present facts
which render the “original trial tantamount to none at all.” Brown, 932 S.W.2d at
361. I believe the trial court did not abuse its discretion, and I agree with the trial
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court that many of the Schambons’ arguments have already been scrutinized by a
jury.
First, as only Clayton’s affidavit comes close to being a recantation, I
will delve into the inherent problems in relying on it. I certainly do not intend to
be harsh toward Clayton or his motives for coming forward at the age of 27. Even
under the best light, from his trial testimony and his affidavit, his childhood
appears to have been a difficult one. Nonetheless, the starting point in reviewing
his recanting affidavit is that well-established law from all levels of the judiciary
hold that recantations are inherently unreliable, untrustworthy and viewed with
suspicion. See Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 423, 113 S.Ct. 853, 122 L.Ed.2d
203 (1993) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (Affidavits “produced . . . at the 11th hour
with no reasonable explanation for the nearly decade-long delay” are “suspect.”);
Taylor v. Commonwealth, 175 S.W.3d 68, 71 (Ky. 2005) (Where a recantation
came eleven years after a conviction, “[t]he truism that recanted testimony is not
reliable and should therefore be given little weight is even more relevant to this
case . . . .”) ; Commonwealth v. Spaulding, 991 S.W.2d 651, 656-57 (Ky. 1999)
(quoting Anderson v. Buchanan, 292 Ky. 810, 168 S.W.2d 53-54 (1943)) (“[I]t is
not enough [to warrant a new trial] to merely show that a prosecuting witness has
subsequently made contradictory statements or that he is willing to swear that his
testimony upon the trial was false, for his later oath is not more binding than his
former one.”); Thacker v. Commonwealth, 453 S.W.2d 566, 568 (Ky. 1970) (“The
general rules are that recanting testimony is viewed with suspicion; mere
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recantation of testimony does not alone require the granting of a new trial . . . .”);
Hensley v. Commonwealth, 488 S.W.2d 338, 339 (Ky. 1972) (“Affidavits in which
witnesses recant their testimony are quite naturally regarded with great distrust and
usually given very little weight.”). And, when the recantations are from children
who suffered sexual abuse, the Eight Circuit in United States v. Provost, 969 F.2d
617, 621 (8th Cir. 1992) has specifically spoken, stating that
the skepticism about recantations is especially applicable in cases of
child sexual abuse where recantation is a recurring phenomenon. See,
e.g., Myatt v. Hannigan, 910 F.2d 680, 685 n. 2 (10th Cir. 1990)
(noting that child recanting in sexual abuse case not atypical); State v.
Cain, 427 N.W.2d 5, 8 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988) (noting recantation is
“frequent characteristic of child abuse victims”); State v. Gallagher,
150 Vt. 341, 350, 554 A.2d 221, 225 (1988) (“observing the high
probability of a child victim recanting a statement about being
sexually abused”); see also Summit, Child Abuse Accommodation
Syndrome, 7 Child Abuse & Neglect 177, 188 (1973) (“whatever a
child says about sexual abuse, she is likely to reverse it.”).
Recantation is particularly common when family members are
involved and the child has feelings of guilt or the family members
seek to influence the child to change her story. See State v. Tharp,
372 N.W.2d 280, 282 (Iowa Ct. App. 1985) (upholding denial of new
trial request based on 14 year old victim's recantation and noting that
“where families are torn apart, there is great pressure on the child to
make things right.”); Cacciola, The Admissibility of Expert Testimony
in Intrafamily Child Sexual Abuse Cases, 34 U.C.L.A. L.Rev. 175,
184-88 (1986) (noting susceptibility of child victim to family pressure
and to recant the testimony to return things to “normal”). The Ninth
Circuit very recently affirmed a district court's finding that a
recantation by a child sex abuse victim was not credible and,
therefore, was insufficient to support a Rule 33 new trial motion
where the victim was subject to the influence of members of her
immediate family including her mother. United States v. Leroy
George, 960 F.2d 97, 101 (9th Cir. 1992).
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From any vantage point it is apparent that despite whatever reasons or
motives that Clayton may now have, little credence, credibility, or weight should
be given to his recanting affidavit. And, as the Eighth Circuit so diligently pointed
out, this is especially true in cases dealing with children who were sexually abused.
Accordingly, binding authority instructs that relying on Clayton’s affidavit for
grounds for granting CR 60.02 relief should be given very little weight.
Nonetheless, the Schambons argue that they have “pled specific new
evidence or changes in testimony warranting proof of actual innocence sufficient to
change the results of their trial.” The instruction of the Court in Thacker, 453
S.W.2d 566 compels me to conclude otherwise. In Thacker, the Court stated that
[t]he appellant seeks to apply the rule that a new trial will be granted
on newly discovered evidence if it is apparent that a different result
would have been reached at the trial had the new evidence then been
available. However, we think it is clear that the foregoing rule
does not apply to the situation of recanted testimony of principal
witnesses. If it did, the accused always would get a new trial where
the prosecuting witness recanted her testimony, because it would be
apparent that with the new testimony, that the accused was not guilty,
the result of the trial would be different.
435 S.W.2d at 568 (emphasis added).
Despite my belief that Clayton’s affidavit is untimely for purposes of
CR 60.02 and cannot form the foundation for a new trial pursuant to Thacker, there
are other problems with Clayton’s affidavit. I am greatly troubled by the fact that
Clayton in his affidavit attempts to repudiate Ross’s trial testimony. Many years
after the trial and after Ross was put through testifying against his parents, Clayton
renounces Ross’s testimony. The trial court reviewed the transcript of Ross’s
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testimony and found it to be detailed and credible. I too have reviewed Ross’s
testimony, which the jury apparently accepted, and agree with the trial court that it
is greatly detailed. I may question how some of the acts were physically possible
given Ross’s tender age, but this was a matter for the jury to decide.
Moreover, in light of the detailed testimony of Ross, I find Thacker
instructive again: “The age of the [child] was such that it would have been difficult
for [him] to be coachable to adhere faithfully to an untrue story.” Id. at 569.
Ross’s testimony at points was so incredibly and graphically descriptive for a sixyear old, it is difficult to conceive that Clayton could have coached him on so
many details that Ross could have recalled them all and testified to them.
Clayton’s affidavit is even more suspect in light of some of the
statements he made when compared with his trial testimony. In particular Clayton
states in regard to his earlier allegations against his parents, that at that time he
“hated and despised [his] parents for the mess they created in [their] home and in
[their] lives.” He wanted “revenge.” But, when he was exhibiting difficulty with
his trial testimony thirteen years earlier, he stated that he “just [didn’t] want to hurt
[his] parents.”
Regarding Clayton’s statement to the Honorable Kelly Thompson, who was
the GAL for the children, at best it can be summarized as the Court in Wallace v.
Commonwealth, 327 S.W.2d 17, 18 (Ky. App. 1959) stated: “the newly
discovered facts only involved a statement made by a witness prior to the trial
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which was inconsistent with [his] testimony under oath.” The Wallace Court
found such to be wholly insufficient for the purposes of CR 60.02. Id.
I also agree with the trial court that the Schambons seek to relitigate
issues that have been previously litigated. This is improper under our rules of Civil
Procedure. Stoker, 289 S.W.3d at 597. From a reading of the transcript in regard
to Ross and Clayton’s testimony, it is evident that the defense was arguing that
Clayton coached or influenced Ross’s testimony against their parents. For
example, at a bench conference, the Commonwealth argued that “[t]hroughout all
the questioning with the witnesses, they have made a big deal over the fact that
Clayton and Ross were together making this up at the Bright residence. . . .” Ross
was cross-examined and asked whether Clayton told him things about women and
their “private parts.” Ross answered in the negative. And asked if Clayton told
him to make up anything, Ross answered “no.” Ross was asked if what he told the
jury was true, and he stated it was. Further, on direct appeal, the Kentucky
Supreme Court noted that the Schambons “had attempted to show that . . .
[Clayton] had ‘planted’ the vivid sexual contact allegations in . . . [Ross’s] mind. . .
.” Accordingly, the theory that Clayton influenced Ross to falsely testify was
brought out for the jury to determine, and it did. Now, thirteen years later, the
Schambons seek to take another bite at that same apple.
As to the Schambons’ reliance on their performance on lie-detector
tests, this is absolutely insufficient to serve as any basis for their CR 60.02 motion.
Our Supreme Court has held that polygraphs tests are unreliable. Morton v.
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Commonwealth, 817 S.W.2d 218, 222 (Ky. 1991). The Schambons have not cited
any authority that a polygraph tests should be relied upon for CR 60.02 relief, and
given the Supreme Court’s pronouncement as polygraph tests as unreliable, I do
not believe they should.
Regarding the letter from Eric Y. Drogin, J.D., Ph.D., ABPP, and the
affidavit of Ralph Underwager, Ph.D., I do not believe these qualify under CR
60.02 as a basis for a new trial. Moreover, the Schambons have not shown how
these documents dated in 2003 are timely under CR 60.02.
In reviewing the trial court’s decision to deny the Schambons’ CR
60.02 motion and an evidentiary hearing, we are bound by the abuse of discretion
standard. I find no abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in either
denying the CR 60.02 motion or the evidentiary hearing. The trial court reviewed
the affidavits, statements and other documents submitted, as well as the trial
transcript and came to a very wise decision. The Schambons have not simply
moved for an evidentiary hearing and CR 60.02 relief in regard to the counts
involving Clayton, the only recanting witness, but as to all counts against them
involving Ross. From my viewpoint, one witness should not be permitted to
renounce another witness’s testimony in the absent of some other compelling
evidence, and there is no such evidence in this case. Thus, I would affirm.
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BRIEFS AND ORAL ARGUMENT
FOR APPELLANTS:
Marguerite Neill Thomas
Brian Ruff
Frankfort, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Jack Conway
Attorney General of Kentucky
Michael L. Harned
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLEE:
Michael L. Harned
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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