POWELL (ISHMAEL) VS. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: APRIL 30, 2010; 10:00 A.M
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2009-CA-000750-MR
ISHMAEL POWELL
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM KENTON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE GREGORY M. BARTLETT, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 05-CR-00220-003
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: DIXON AND NICKELL, JUDGES; KNOPF,1 SENIOR JUDGE.
KNOPF, SENIOR JUDGE: Ishmael Powell, proceeding pro se, appeals from the
denial of his motion for post-conviction relief brought pursuant to Kentucky Rules
of Criminal Procedure (RCr) 11.42. Powell claims that the Kenton Circuit Court
1
Senior Judge William L. Knopf sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and Kentucky Revised Statutes
(KRS) 21.580.
erred when it denied his RCr 11.42 motion without an evidentiary hearing.
However, after our review, we affirm that decision.
Facts and Procedural History
In April 2005, Powell was indicted on two counts of first-degree
robbery along with Kareem Derkson and Cameron Daniels.2 A charge of being a
second-degree persistent felony offender (PFO) was later added by separate
indictment. After he entered a “not guilty” plea, Powell’s case was tried before a
Kenton County jury in December 2005. The following facts come from testimony
given at that trial.
In the early-morning hours of January 7, 2005, Covington Police
Officer Brian Kane was on patrol when he came upon three men who appeared to
be in the process of robbing two other men at gunpoint. One of the men was
standing over a victim later identified as Joshua Thompson, who was lying prone
on the ground, and the other two were flanking a man named Donald Dixon.
Dixon testified that while he was talking to Thompson in his front yard, the three
men had appeared out of nowhere, brandished guns, and told him and Thompson to
empty their pockets. Dixon indicated that he could see the men’s faces and that he
recognized Powell from the neighborhood. While one of the men was rifling
through Dixon’s wallet, Officer Kane came driving out of an alley in his police
cruiser, which caused the robbers to flee.
2
Daniels also has an appeal pending before this court regarding a denial of his own RCr 11.42
motion for post-conviction relief. Daniels v. Commonwealth, No. 2009-CA-000683-MR.
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Officer Kane subsequently called for backup and gave chase on foot
and, as the men fled, he heard the crack of a firearm being discharged. He testified
that Daniels was found soon after the robbery hiding behind a large garbage can
and that he matched the description of one of the persons who had been flanking
Dixon during the robbery. Powell was stopped by another police officer and
apprehended soon thereafter after Officer Kane saw him walking down a nearby
street. No proceeds from the robbery were recovered from him. A third
individual, Derkson, was also apprehended. Two handguns were found in the
vicinity of the robbery scene the following day.
Derkson ultimately entered a guilty plea to second-degree robbery
(with a pending PFO charge being dismissed) and agreed to testify against Powell
and Daniels at trial. He indicated that he, Powell, and Daniels had gone to a bar in
Newport on the night of the subject incident and had left at approximately 1:00
a.m. to go to the home of Powell’s girlfriend. However, when they spotted two
men standing outside on 13th Street, they pulled their car over, brandished guns,
told the men not to move, and proceeded to rob them. Derkson also testified that
after he entered his guilty plea, Powell threatened to kill his mother and to rape his
little sister.
The jury ultimately acquitted Powell of one of the robbery charges but
found him guilty of one count of complicity to first-degree robbery. The jury also
found Powell guilty of being a second-degree PFO and recommended a sentence of
twenty years’ imprisonment. However, the Commonwealth subsequently moved
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that the PFO count be dismissed and that Powell be sentenced to thirteen years’
imprisonment on the robbery count in exchange for Powell’s cooperation and
sworn statement regarding a pending murder investigation. The court sentenced
Powell accordingly. Powell appealed his conviction to this Court, and the
conviction was upheld. Powell v. Commonwealth, 237 S.W.3d 570 (Ky. App.
2007).
On September 16, 2008, Powell filed a motion to vacate, set aside, or
correct judgment pursuant to RCr 11.42. As grounds for his motion, Powell
presented the following claims: (1) that his arrest was without a warrant or
probable cause and that any evidence obtained as a result of that arrest should have
been suppressed; (2) that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support
a conviction; (3) that his attorney allowed evidence to be admitted showing that a
prosecution witness who had also been indicted for the subject crime had entered a
guilty plea; (4) that he was erroneously required to serve 85% of his sentence
before being eligible for parole even though death or serious physical injury had
not been inflicted on a victim; and (5) that he was denied the effective assistance of
counsel. Powell also filed a corresponding motion for an evidentiary hearing.
However, on March 31, 2009, the circuit court entered an order denying Powell’s
motion for RCr 11.42 post-conviction relief without an evidentiary hearing. This
appeal followed.
Analysis
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On appeal, Powell argues that the circuit court erroneously denied his
motion for RCr 11.42 post-conviction relief without a hearing. In Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), the United
States Supreme Court set forth a two-pronged analysis to be used in determining
whether the performance of a convicted defendant’s trial counsel was so deficient
as to merit relief from that conviction.
First, the defendant must show that counsel’s
performance was deficient. This requires showing that
counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not
functioning as the “counsel” guaranteed the defendant by
the Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant must show
that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.
This requires showing that counsel’s errors were so
serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial
whose result is reliable.
Id., 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. at 2064. Here, the circuit court denied Powell’s RCr
11.42 motion without an evidentiary hearing. Accordingly, “[o]ur review is
confined to whether the motion on its face states grounds that are not conclusively
refuted by the record and which, if true, would invalidate the conviction.” Lewis v.
Commonwealth, 411 S.W.2d 321, 322 (Ky. 1967). RCr 11.42 requires an
evidentiary hearing “[i]f the answer raises a material issue of fact that cannot be
determined on the face of the record[.]” RCr 11.42(5); see also Stanford v.
Commonwealth, 854 S.W.2d 742, 743 (Ky. 1993). However, there is no need for
an evidentiary hearing if the record refutes the claims of error or if the defendant’s
allegations, even if true, would not be sufficient to invalidate the conviction.
Harper v. Commonwealth, 978 S.W.2d 311, 314 (Ky. 1998).
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Powell first claims that he was entitled to RCr 11.42 relief because he
was tried and convicted of complicity to first-degree robbery even though the
Commonwealth failed to prove all of the elements of that offense. This claim must
fail, however, because “[i]t is not the purpose of RCr 11.42 to permit a convicted
defendant to retry issues which could and should have been raised in the original
proceeding, nor those that were raised in the trial court and upon an appeal
considered by this court.” Thacker v. Commonwealth, 476 S.W.2d 838, 839 (Ky.
1972). Our courts have specifically held that a claim of insufficient evidence for a
conviction is not a basis for RCr 11.42 relief. See Johnson v. Commonwealth, 473
S.W.2d 823, 824 (Ky. 1971); Boles v. Commonwealth, 406 S.W.2d 853, 855 (Ky.
1966). Thus, this claim was rightfully rejected without a hearing.
Powell also contends that he was entitled to RCr 11.42 relief because
his arrest was made without a warrant or probable cause and because evidence
obtained as a result of that illegal arrest was used to convict him. Once again, our
courts have held that Powell’s claims are not a basis for relief under RCr 11.42
since they are of the sort that can be raised on direct appeal. See Carter v.
Commonwealth, 450 S.W.2d 257, 258 (Ky. 1970); Triplett v. Commonwealth, 439
S.W.2d 944, 945 (Ky. 1969); Wahl v. Commonwealth, 396 S.W.2d 774, 775 (Ky.
1965). Consequently, they were rightfully rejected.
Powell also raises a related contention that he “was denied the
effective assistance of counsel, when trial counsel failed to move to suppress his
illegal arrest.” It is somewhat unclear what Powell means by this statement, but
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even assuming – as Powell argues – that his arrest was unsupported by probable
cause and was consequently illegal, “[a]n illegal arrest, without more, has never
been viewed as a bar to subsequent prosecution, nor as a defense to a valid
conviction.” United States v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463, 474, 100 S.Ct. 1244, 1251, 63
L.Ed.2d 537 (1980); see also Howell v. Commonwealth, 445 S.W.2d 123, 123 (Ky.
1969). While an invalid arrest may call for the suppression of a confession or
other evidence, it does not entitle a defendant to be discharged altogether from
responsibility for the offense. O’Riordan v. State, 665 S.W.2d 255, 257 (Ark.
1984). Thus, an illegal arrest, without more, is not a basis for a motion to suppress.
It appears likely that Powell is actually contending that his trial
counsel should have filed a motion to suppress any evidence that resulted from his
allegedly illegal arrest. However, he has directed us to nothing that would indicate
that the arrest and subsequent search produced a confession by him or any other
evidence of a crime that was used in his prosecution. Consequently, there is
nothing that a motion to suppress would have accomplished in this case since the
exclusionary rule was inapplicable under these circumstances. Cf. Crews, 445 U.S.
at 470-74, 100 S.Ct. at 1249-51. Powell argued below that since the police
illegally arrested him without probable cause, they “should not have been entitled
to the fruits of Derkson’s confession.” However, Powell’s arrest and Derkson’s
confession have no relation to one another for suppression purposes since the
confession did not result from Powell’s arrest and was instead obtained
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independent of it. Accordingly, the circuit court did not err in denying this claim
for relief without a hearing.
Powell further contends that he was entitled to post-conviction relief
because he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to confront and to crossexamine Joshua Thompson, who did not testify at trial, but – again – this is an
issue that could have and should have been raised on direct appeal. Powell also
raises a related argument that his counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the
denial of his right to confront and to cross-examine Thompson. However, “[t]he
right of confrontation is limited to witnesses” at trial and nothing “requires the
Commonwealth to produce at the trial all witnesses, or any particular witness, to a
crime.” Flatt v. Commonwealth, 468 S.W.2d 793, 794 (Ky. 1971); see also Harris
v. Commonwealth, 315 S.W.2d 630, 632 (Ky. 1958). Powell makes no allegation
that any out-of-court statements from Thompson were used against him at trial, so
there was essentially nothing to which his trial counsel could offer an objection.
Thus, these claims were also properly rejected without an evidentiary hearing.
Powell next argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to
object to the Commonwealth’s questioning of Derkson with respect to Derkson’s
entry of a guilty plea to second-degree robbery in the subject incident and his
agreement to provide truthful testimony as a witness against Powell and Daniels.
We agree with Powell that ordinarily it is “improper for the Commonwealth to
show during its case-in-chief that a co-indictee has already been convicted under
the indictment[.]” St. Clair v. Commonwealth, 140 S.W.3d 510, 544 (Ky. 2004).
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However, it is apparent from the record before us that Powell’s trial counsel
attempted to use this information as part of her trial strategy in order to attack
Derkson’s credibility by showing that he was testifying in exchange for a more
lenient sentence. Derkson was extensively cross-examined about his deal with the
Commonwealth, and he acknowledged that he was facing the possibility of life in
prison as a persistent felony offender prior to entering his guilty plea and that he
received only a five-year sentence. Our Supreme Court has recently reaffirmed
that use of a co-indictee’s plea agreement in this manner is appropriate trial
strategy, holding: “[I]f it is apparent from the record that the defendant did not
object to the introduction of this evidence and that the defendant tried to use that
information as part of his trial strategy, no reversible error occurred.” King v.
Commonwealth, 276 S.W.3d 270, 277 (Ky. 2009). Clearly the use of Derkson’s
plea agreement was trial strategy on the part of Powell’s counsel. Accordingly,
counsel was not ineffective, and an evidentiary hearing was not warranted.
Powell finally contends that he was denied his right to due process
when his trial counsel failed to object to the trial court’s determination that he must
serve 85% of his sentence before being eligible for parole without indicating in its
judgment that a victim had suffered death or serious physical injury. He claims
that such is required pursuant to KRS 439.3401(1), which provides that “[t]he
court shall designate in its judgment if the victim suffered death or serious physical
injury.” This argument lacks merit.
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Powell seems to believe that he could only be classified as a violent
offender if his crime actually caused “death or serious physical injury.” However,
he was convicted of complicity to first-degree robbery, which is considered a
violent offense under KRS 439.3401(1)(l) even if the victim does not suffer death
or serious physical injury. The trial court specifically noted in its judgment that
complicity to robbery in the first degree “is a violent offense as defined by KRS
439.3401, requiring the service of at least 85% of the sentence imposed before
parole eligibility” pursuant to KRS 439.3401(3). Nothing more was required. See
Fambrough v. Dep’t of Corr., 184 S.W.3d 561, 562-63 (Ky. App. 2006).
Therefore, Powell’s claim of error was rightfully rejected without a hearing.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Kenton Circuit Court is
affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Ishmael Powell, pro se
Burgin, Kentucky
Jack Conway
Attorney General
Ken W. Riggs
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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