ASPEN TRANDITIONS, INC. VS. KENTUCKY ASSOCIATED GENERAL CONTRACTORS SELF-INSURERS' FUND, ET AL.
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RENDERED: OCTOBER 1, 2010; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2009-CA-000733-MR
ASPEN TRADITIONS, INC.
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM OLDHAM CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE KAREN A. CONRAD, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 08-CI-00297
KENTUCKY ASSOCIATED
GENERAL CONTRACTORS
SELF-INSURERS' FUND; AND
HON. KAREN A. CONRAD, JUDGE
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: ACREE, KELLER, AND LAMBERT, JUDGES.
ACREE, JUDGE: Aspen Traditions, Inc. appeals the March 23, 2009 order of the
Oldham Circuit Court granting its Workers’ Compensation insurance provider,
Kentucky Associated General Contractors Self-Insurers’ Fund (KAGC), summary
judgment and denying Aspen’s motion to dismiss. For the following reasons, we
affirm the order of the circuit court in its entirety.
Facts and procedure
Aspen is a construction contractor which periodically engages
subcontractors. Two men who performed work for Aspen during 2006 and 2007,
Jim Peterson and Matt Engle, were employed by such subcontractors.
Aspen was a member of KAGC, a self-insurance fund which provides
its members Workers’ Compensation coverage. Aspen’s policy through KAGC
contained the following provision:
Premium for each work classification is determined by
multiplying a rate times a premium basis. Remuneration
is the most common premium basis. This premium basis
includes payroll and all other remuneration paid or
payable during the policy period for the services of:
1. all your officers and employees engaged in work
covered by this policy; and
2. all other persons engaged in work that you have
subcontracted, work for you involving removal[,]
excavation or drilling of soil, rock or mineral, or cutting
or removal of timber from land, or work for you
performed of a kind which is a regular and recurrent part
of the work of your trade, business, occupation or
profession. This includes but is not limited to sole
proprietorships, partnerships, subcontractors,
laborers with NO employees and or NO certificates of
workers’ compensation insurance. If you do not have
payroll records for these persons, the contract price for
their services and materials may be used as the premium
basis. This paragraph #2 will not apply if you give us
proof that the employers of these persons lawfully
secured their workers’ compensation obligations.
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(Emphasis added). An audit revealed Aspen had not paid the entire amount owed
as premium, and KAGC demanded that Aspen pay the bill. Aspen alleges the
failure to pay is the result of KAGC’s erroneous calculation, which improperly
treats the two workers as employees instead of independent contractors. Aspen
asserts it is not required to pay a premium for those two men because Kentucky
Revised Statutes (KRS) Chapter 342 does not provide for Workers’ Compensation
coverage of independent contractors.
When Aspen did not promptly pay the outstanding premium amounts
in full, KAGC proceeded to the circuit court for resolution of the dispute. In its
answer, Aspen denied the enforceability of the contract on various grounds. Aspen
also filed a counterclaim alleging that KAGC had improperly procured $640 from
Aspen and improperly retained Aspen’s $1,674 escrow deposit; that KAGC’s
actions were based on a contract that was unenforceable; that KAGC’s behavior
amounted to extortion and was done in bad faith; and that Aspen was entitled to
punitive damages.
KAGC moved for summary judgment, arguing that no facts were in
dispute, but that all facts undeniably led to the conclusion that Aspen had breached
its contract and KAGC should be reimbursed, and that KAGC should prevail as a
matter of law. KAGC argued the counterclaim failed because, contrary to Aspen’s
position, punitive damages are not available for breach of contract, the contract
was supported by adequate consideration, and the claims of bad faith and extortion
were completely unsupported by the facts.
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Aspen moved to dismiss the action, claiming the circuit court had no
subject matter jurisdiction. According to this argument, because the underlying
dispute concerned whether the two workers were really independent contractors or
employees pursuant to Ratliff v. Redmon, 396 S.W.2d 320 (Ky. 1965), jurisdiction
properly lay with the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) of the Board of Workers’
Claims.
The circuit judge granted KAGC’s motion and overruled that of
Aspen, ordering Aspen to pay $10,165.79 plus $1.83 per day from September 15,
2008, until the amount was paid in full. This appeal followed.
On appeal, Aspen contends the circuit court erred in two respects: (1)
determining the court had jurisdiction over the dispute and (2) determining the
insurance contract did not fail for want of consideration.
The circuit court had jurisdiction over the subject matter
“Whether the court has acted outside its jurisdiction is a question of
law, and the standard of review on appeal is therefore de novo.” Whaley v.
Whitaker Bank, Inc., 254 S.W.3d 825, 827 (Ky. App. 2008)(citing Grange Mutual
Insurance Co. v. Trude, 151 S.W.3d 803, 810 (Ky. 2004)).
KRS 342.325 provides that jurisdiction over “all questions arising
under this chapter, if not settled by agreement of the parties interested therein”
properly lies with the Administrative Law Judge of the Board of Workers’ Claims.
However, when the dispute is a contractual issue between the insurer and the
employer, but does not affect the rights of a worker to receive Workers’
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Compensation benefits, jurisdiction is in the circuit court. Custard Insurance
Adjusters, Inc., v. Aldridge, 57 S.W.3d 284, 287 (Ky. 2001); see also Wolfe v.
Fidelity & Casualty Insurance Company of New York, 979 S.W.2d 118, 120 (Ky.
App. 1998)(“Interpretation of insurance contracts and the enforcement of the right
of the insured concern matters which are beyond the purview of the authority
vested in the ALJ.”).
The disagreement regarding jurisdiction can be resolved by proper
characterization of the issue. Aspen attempts to characterize the issue as a matter
of classifying the workers for whom KAGC charged a portion of the premium: are
they employees, or are they independent contractors? Because the parties don’t
agree on this matter, argues Aspen, the issue must first be brought before an ALJ in
compliance with KRS 342.325. KAGC, on the other hand, argues this is truly a
contract dispute; Aspen voluntarily agreed to the terms of the insurance contract
and failure to pay the premium as calculated pursuant to the terms of that contract
amounts to breach. If KAGC is correct, the circuit court properly asserted
jurisdiction.
We agree with KAGC. Whether the two “independent contractors” in
question are actually independent contractors or employees is irrelevant to whether
Aspen has to pay the premium as calculated by KAGC, because their status is
irrelevant according to the contract. Their actual employment status would
become an issue only if one of the two workers filed a claim for Workers’
Compensation benefits. The only matter before the circuit court in this dispute was
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whether the parties complied with the terms of the contract. Both parties agree the
contract required Aspen to make premium payments for policy coverage of these
two workers, who did not produce certificates of coverage. KRS 342.325 does not
confer jurisdiction upon the ALJ.
This is ultimately an issue of the contractual obligations between
Aspen and KAGC. Accordingly, the circuit court had jurisdiction over the action,
and the circuit judge’s ruling on this matter was correct.
The contract was supported by adequate consideration
Aspen next argues the circuit court incorrectly determined KAGC
provided consideration in exchange for Aspen’s premium payments. We disagree.
Of course, for a contract to be enforceable, it must be supported by
consideration from both parties. Consideration is defined as
A benefit to the party promising, or a loss or detriment to
the party to whom the promise is made. “Benefit,” as
thus employed, means that the promisor has, in return for
his promise, acquired some legal right to which he would
not otherwise have been entitled. And “detriment”
means that the promisee has, in return for the promise,
forborne some legal right which he otherwise would have
been entitled to exercise.
Phillips v. Phillips, 294 Ky. 323, 171 S.W.2d 458, 464 (1943)(quoting Luigart v.
Federal Parquetry Mfg. Co., 194 Ky. 213, 238 S.W. 758, 760 (1922). Analysis
begins with the written agreement itself to which Aspen admits being a party. “A
written instrument signed by a party imports a consideration.” Francis’ Ex’r v.
Francis, 280 S.W.2d 192, 195 (Ky. 1955). Furthermore, there is a “presumption of
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universal application that an admitted and duly executed writing is supported by a
legal consideration, and the burden is cast on the one executing it to overcome that
presumption.” Shrout’s Adm’r v. Vaughan, 305 Ky. 637, 204 S.W.2d 969, 970
(1947).
To overcome the presumption, Aspen argues that its payment of the
premium intended to cover the two “independent contractors” was in exchange for
nothing from KAGC. This is purely a legal argument because it is based upon, and
can be resolved by, an examination of the agreement and applicable law.
According to Aspen, although KAGC purports to guarantee coverage in the event
Aspen becomes liable for a work-related injury, this is an empty promise because
the two workers in question, as independent contractors, can never create liability
for Aspen pursuant to KRS Chapter 342; i.e., there are no circumstances in which
KAGC will ever become liable for the workers’ injuries, and therefore KAGC has
not provided valuable consideration. This is not so, however.
The terms of the policy require Aspen to pay a premium based upon
the risk of injury to employees, in addition to subcontractors who cannot produce
certificates of coverage for Workers’ Compensation claims. The reason for this is
that, pursuant to KRS 342.610(2), employers are liable for “up the ladder”
coverage:
A contractor who subcontracts all or any part of a
contract and his carrier shall be liable for the payment of
compensation to the employees of the subcontractor
unless the subcontractor primarily liable for the payment
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of such compensation has secured the payment of
compensation as provided for in [KRS Chapter 342].
KRS 342.610(2).
It is therefore possible that an employer may become liable for
payment of the injuries of a subcontractor the employer considers an independent
contractor. In that instance, the employer’s Workers’ Compensation insurance
provider would bear ultimate responsibility for making the payments. KAGC
determined its insureds should pay an increased premium for subcontracted
workers they could not guarantee were covered by another policy for that very
reason.
Aspen still faces the possibility of liability for injuries to workers it
considers independent contractors. This is especially true when the workers cannot
produce certificates of coverage; in fact, that is precisely the scenario which would
create liability for Aspen and, in turn, pursuant to the contract of insurance, for
KAGC. That is valuable consideration – KAGC undertakes the risk of paying
compensation in the event these two workers are injured and determined to be
employees of the subcontractor, in exchange for Aspen’s premium payments,
which are calculated based on inclusion of the two workers. The circuit court
therefore properly determined the contract did not fail for lack of consideration.
Conclusion
The circuit court correctly ruled on the issues of jurisdiction and
validity of the contract. The order is affirmed.
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ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
James D. Howes
Louisville, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE
KENTUCKY ASSOCIATED
GENERAL CONTRACTORS SELFINSURERS’ FUND:
Ronald M. Sullivan
Owensboro, Kentucky
NO BRIEF FOR HON. KAREN A.
CONRAD, JUDGE
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