B., A/K/A T. (B. J) VS. CABINET FOR HEALTH AND FAMILY SERVICES, COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
RENDERED: FEBRUARY 19, 2010; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2009-CA-000613-ME
B. J. B., A/K/A T.
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM SHELBY CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JOHN DAVID MYLES, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 08-AD-00015
CABINET FOR HEALTH AND FAMILY
SERVICES, COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
REVERSING AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: CAPERTON AND DIXON, JUDGES; HENRY,1 SENIOR JUDGE.
CAPERTON, JUDGE: This is an appeal from a March 5, 2009, order of the
Shelby Family Court, terminating the parental rights of Appellant, BJB, the
biological mother of CPB, following a trial. BJB now asserts that the court below
relied on hearsay testimony in making its decision to terminate parental rights, and
1
Senior Judge Michael L. Henry sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and Kentucky Revised Statutes
(KRS) 21.580.
further, that the termination of parental rights was not supported by clear and
convincing evidence. After a thorough review of the record, the arguments of the
parties, and the applicable law, we reverse and remand for additional proceedings
not inconsistent with this opinion.
BJB and EEB, one of the respondents alleged to be a father in the
action below, were married in 2004, and had one child, CPB, on February 21,
2007. At that time, BJB had five other children, four of whom were residing with
a former husband in Kentucky and one of whom was residing with another former
husband in Tennessee. After giving birth to CPB, BJB later claimed that CL, the
other respondent father in this action, was the father of this child. CL and CPB
submitted to DNA testing and it was determined that CL was in fact the biological
father of the child.
The Cabinet for Health and Family Services first received a report
pertaining to CPB on March 27, 2007. The reporting source alleged that BJB and
EEB were using drugs, including marijuana, cocaine, and crack cocaine, and that
BJB was breastfeeding CPB while under the influence of drugs. CPB was
removed from the home on that date, and at that time, BJB was arrested for
flagrant non-support, a charge to which she eventually pled guilty, and for which
she was incarcerated at the Shelby County Detention Center and the Kentucky
Correctional Institute for Women until June of 2008.
On March 29, 2007, the Cabinet filed a Petition for Abuse,
Dependency and Neglect in the Shelby Family Court, alleging that CPB was a
-2-
neglected child because her parents had been arrested, her mother had admitted to
breastfeeding the child and using marijuana and crack cocaine, and because the
mother had reported that the father also used cocaine and crack cocaine.
The Shelby Family Court held an emergency custody hearing and
entered an order on March 29, 2007, placing CPB in the emergency custody of the
Cabinet. On March 30, 2007, the court conducted a temporary removal hearing
and entered an order on that date placing the child in the temporary custody of the
Cabinet.
Thereafter, on April 11, 2007, the court held an adjudication hearing
on the Cabinet’s petition, at which time BJB and EEB were still incarcerated. At
that time, the parents stipulated to neglect of CPB. The court accordingly entered
an April 12, 2007, order adjudicating the child as neglected, and ordering her to
remain in the custody of the cabinet. On June 15, 2007, following a disposition
hearing, an order was issued committing the child to the Cabinet, where she
remains at present.
Subsequently, on July 9, 2008, the Cabinet filed a petition for
involuntary termination of parental rights against the “parents” of CPB, to include
EEB, BJB, and CL. Separate counsel was appointed for each parent, and trial was
held in this matter on January 15, 2009, and February 23, 2009.2 During the trial,
the court heard testimony from Dr. Paul Ebben, a psychologist who evaluated BJB
and EEB; Gail Birkholz, a child support worker with the Shelby County Attorney’s
2
The trial began on January 15, 2009, and was continued to February 23, 2009, in order for the
Cabinet to subpoena a witness to testify as to two of BJB’s positive drug screens.
-3-
Office; Stacy McClure and Emily Thomas, social service workers for the Cabinet;
Leilani Churchman, a probation supervisor for the Kentucky Alternative Program;
Dena Riley, the foster mother of the child; Angela Haggard, the sister of EEB, and
BJB herself.
Counsel stipulated as to Dr. Ebbens’s credentials as an expert witness
and as a qualified mental health professional pursuant to KRS 600.020(48)(c). Dr.
Ebben received a referral from the Cabinet to evaluate BJB and EEB for purposes
of determining their ability to parent CPB and any risk factors that might affect
their parenting abilities. Dr. Ebben testified that he was somewhat hampered in his
evaluation of EEB because he had no records from the Cabinet to review and had
to rely solely on self-reports from EEB. Dr. Ebben met with EEB on September
13, 2007, and October 30, 2008, and issued reports after each examination.
Dr. Ebben also conducted a clinical interview with and took a social
history from BJB on October 30, 2008. BJB apparently described a “fairly
significant substance abuse history that has complicated her life and has affected
her ability to independently function as a parent.”3 BJB also stated that she
“started using and abusing marijuana when she was 15 years of age and used it on
a daily basis”4 until she was arrested in 2007. Further, BJB stated that she used
“cocaine or crack on a daily basis from age 28”5 until she was arrested in 2007.
3
See Petitioner’s Exhibit #2 at 2.
4
Id. at 5.
5
Id.
-4-
BJB apparently obtained money for her drugs by sleeping with strangers, cleaning
houses, and stealing from her mother.
Dr. Ebben administered several tests to BJB, including a structured
interview which he created consisting of questions designed to assess 57 variables
which would evaluate risk factors associated with child maltreatment. Dr. Ebben
testified that he devised this test himself because he could not find anything in the
literature which would assist him in making this determination. Dr. Ebben testified
that BJB responded positively to nine variables, including past drug abuse,
inability to feel like a parent with her child, inability to report age-appropriate
chores/expectations for a child, and inability to articulate appropriate and effective
methods to solve conflicts with a child. Dr. Ebben also administered a Personality
Assessment Inventory. He testified that the validity scales from that inventory
indicated that BJB was “highly defensive …reflect[ing] a significant distortion and
minimization of problems in certain areas.”6 Dr. Ebben also noted that BJB
reported a “history of antisocial behavior, distrust, suspiciousness, irrational fear,
drug abuse and dependence, and poor control over anger.”7
Following his evaluation, Dr. Ebben recommended that BJB meet
with a child psychologist or family therapist to address her parenting issues. He
also recommended that she continue receiving substance abuse assistance through
Alcoholics Anonymous and Narcotics Anonymous, and that she continue to have
6
Petitioner’s Exhibit #2 at 9.
7
Id.
-5-
random drug screens to ensure that she remained drug-free for at least one year
from the last date that she used drugs. Dr. Ebben also stated that if BJB and EEB
lived together, they both needed to be compliant with their case plans. As a result
of Dr. Ebben’s recommendation, BJB enrolled in an Early Childhood Intervention
Program through Seven Counties Services in LaGrange.
At trial, BJB objected to the first paragraph of Dr. Ebben’s report,
which contained information supplied by the Cabinet from its initial investigation
because she claimed it contained “double hearsay,” as the person who collected the
information was not present to testify about it. In addressing the issue, the court
below held that Dr. Ebben was an expert witness, and that it had already read the
report because it had been introduced into evidence in the underlying dependency
action. Accordingly, the Court overruled BJB’s objection and admitted the report.
Gail Birkholz, a caseworker with the Child Support Division of the
Shelby County Attorney’s Office, also testified at trial. Birkholz testified that she
had been in her position for the past 15 years, and that her duties included
monitoring child support payments. Birkholz testified that BJB had a child support
obligation of $195.00 per month, effective March 29, 2007. Birkholz testified that
BJB had not made any of her scheduled support payments.
Stacy McClure, a social worker with the Cabinet, testified that she has
been employed by the Cabinet for almost nine years. McClure was assigned to
BJB and her family between March of 2007 and April of 2008. McClure was
-6-
involved in the early stages of the investigation of BJB and EEB, and was present
when Sarah Long, the investigating social worker, spoke to BJB in jail.
McClure testified that at that time, BJB admitted to using a significant
amount of drugs before going to the hospital to give birth to one of her other
children who lived in Tennessee. BJB apparently also admitted to using drugs
early in her pregnancy with CPB, as well as after she was born. BJB apparently
told the social worker that she used marijuana one week after CPB was born, and
crack cocaine five weeks after she was born. BJB also admitted to using drugs
while breastfeeding CPB, and that she and EEB would use drugs while the baby
slept. BJB apparently also admitted that she was nervous and smoking cigarettes
while she was in the park with the baby because she had been “on the run” for
three years after leaving a treatment program that she was required to attend as a
result of her conviction for non-support of her four oldest children. Finally, BJB
admitted to the social worker that she could stay clean and sober for about nine
months at a time, but would then return to using drugs.
McClure testified that she held the first case treatment planning
meeting on April 4, 2007, at which time she developed a case treatment plan for
BJB and EEB to regain custody of CPB. McClure testified that she wanted each
parent to have a psychological and parenting assessment with Dr. Ebben, and to
follow all of his recommendations. In addition, she wanted each parent to have a
chemical dependency assessment and to follow all recommendations of that
assessment, including submitting to random drug screens at the request of the
-7-
Cabinet. McClure also wanted each parent to create a list of “triggers” that made
that parent want to use drugs. She wanted each parent to visit with CPB on a
regular basis, to develop a budget, and obtain stable housing and employment for a
minimum of six months.
McClure testified that BJB was incarcerated for the entire time that
McClure worked with the family. McClure encouraged BJB to attend AA and NA
meetings while in jail, which BJB began doing in September of 2007. McClure
recommended that BJB complete the chemical dependency program offered by
Seven Counties Services, Inc., which BJB started in early 2008. BJB also enrolled
in and completed parenting classes while in jail. McClure arranged for the foster
parents to bring CPB to the jail to visit with BJB on a weekly basis. BJB
apparently did not have any drug screens while she was incarcerated, other than
her initial drug screen upon entry into the facility.
Emily Thomas, also a social worker with the Cabinet, testified that
she has been employed by the Cabinet since 2007, and was assigned to the family
of BJB in May of 2008. At that time, BJB remained incarcerated, and the
whereabouts of EEB were unknown. Thomas testified that when BJB was released
from jail on June 2, 2008, she went to live at a friend’s house in Carrollton,
Kentucky. Thomas had her first home visit with BJB at that house on July 1, 2008,
at which time she learned that BJB resided there with EEB. At that time, EEB
apparently told Thomas that he was not going to work on the case treatment plan,
-8-
although he later changed his mind, telling Thomas in February of 2009 that he did
want to work on the plan.
Thomas also testified that BJB moved several times during the time
that she monitored her, sometimes residing with EEB, and sometimes not. Thomas
testified that BJB had held several jobs since being released from jail in June of
2008. At the time of the trial on February 23, 2009, BJB was doing odd jobs for
her landlord on the farm where she lived to pay the rent. Thomas testified that BJB
did not provide her with any proof of her income. Thomas also testified about
BJB’s visits with CPB. Thomas testified that BJB has seen CPB regularly on a
weekly basis, the visits initially being supervised in June of 2008, and later
unsupervised in September of 2008. They were again supervised in November and
December of 2008, and unsupervised again thereafter.
Thomas also testified about BJB’s various convictions, at which time
certified copies of those convictions were introduced into evidence. Thomas
testified that BJB was convicted of flagrant non-support of her four oldest children,
for which she was sentenced to five years, probated for five years, in June of 2000.
BJB was also convicted of Theft by Deception under $300 in November of 2008,
for which the court ordered her to pay restitution, fees, and costs. Thomas
admitted that BJB began seeing a counselor at Seven Counties Services, Inc. for
drug and alcohol treatment starting on July 1, 2008, and that she also went to that
center for counseling on certain parenting issues after she was released from jail.
-9-
Thomas also admitted that she sent BJB for 16 drug screens since July of 2008.
Two of those screens were positive for marijuana in November of 2008.
Both McClure and Thomas testified that CPB’s parents did not
provide any child support or other financial assistance for her while she was in the
care of the Cabinet, nor did they provide any food, clothing, shelter, care, or
support for her while she was in the care of the Cabinet, other than snacks during
visits and a few articles of clothing.
Leilani Churchman, a probation supervisor and office manager for the
Kentucky Alternative Program, also testified in this matter, stating that she
monitors people on probation and administers drug screens. Churchman testified
that BJB submitted to 16 drug screens in her office, starting on July 16, 2008.
Churchman testified that BJB’s specimens indicated the presence of marijuana on
November 12, 2008, and November 17, 2008, although the earlier specimen was
slightly below the threshold for a positive drug screen. BJB’s specimen was
negative for marijuana on November 26, 2008. Churchman testified that another
employee collected the urine from BJB for these two screens and then mailed the
urine samples to a lab out of state where the screens were analyzed. The results of
those screens were then faxed to the Kentucky Alternative Program office in
Shelbyville.
Churchman admitted on cross-examination that marijuana can stay in
a person’s system for about 30 days, and admitted that the results of her test on
November 17 2008, were invalid due to “possible oxidant activity.” Churchman
-10-
also admitted that a person can take medication which would dilute a drug screen,
resulting in a negative screening like that conducted on November 26, 2008.
BJB objected to the introduction into evidence of Churchman’s
testimony, as well as the results of the drug screens, arguing that the evidence must
be presented by the person who conducted the tests. The Court overruled the
testimony and admitted the drug screens.
Dena Riley, the foster mother of CPB, also testified at trial, stating
that she and her husband have two children of their own, in addition to being foster
parents for two years. Riley testified that CPB has resided in their home since
March of 2007. Riley testified that at that time, CPB was very dirty, and weighed
only eight pounds, which was only nine ounces more than her birth weight five
weeks prior to placement.
Riley also testified that while BJB and EEB were incarcerated, she
brought CPB to visit at the jail every week on Sunday. Riley testified that after
EEB was released from jail, he visited CPB at the Cabinet office, but that his visits
became sporadic in early 2008, and stopped all together in February or March of
2008.8 Riley testified that they continued to take CPB to the jail to visit with BJB.
She stated that although she attempted to leave CPB and BJB alone, BJB would
come out in the hall and visit with them also.
8
For the record, we note that in its March 5, 2009, order, the court below found that respondent
fathers EEB and CL had abandoned CPB for a period in excess of ninety days. The respondent
fathers do not appeal the termination of their rights and, accordingly, we do not address that issue
further herein.
-11-
Riley further testified that after BJB was released from jail, she
initially had weekly supervised visits with CPB at the Cabinet office. Riley stated
that during some of those visits, BJB gave CPB soda, tea, and Cheetos, so Riley
began packing healthy snacks for CPB in her diaper bag. Riley stated that BJB
started having weekly unsupervised visits with her child in August or September of
2008. Nevertheless, Riley testified that in spite of those weekly visits, CPB never
talks about her parents while in Riley’s home, nor has Riley heard CPB call BJB
anything, such as “mother.”
Riley also testified that BJB told her that she had used drugs on the
day that CPB was removed from her care. Riley also stated that BJB told her that
she didn’t know why she used drugs, that she had slept with people and stolen
property in order to obtain drugs, and that she was not depressed when she used
drugs. Riley testified that since being released from jail in June of 2008, BJB has
rarely called the foster parents about CPB, and has only spoken to CPB one time
on the telephone.
BJB also testified at trial. She stated that she is now forty years old.
She had four children with her first husband. BJB began seeing these children
again in December of 2008, ten years after her divorce from her first husband in
1998. BJB admitted that she owed over $35,000 in child support for these
children, and that the government had recently intercepted her income tax return as
partial payment toward that obligation. BJB also testified that she had one child
-12-
with her second husband, and that they reside in Tennessee. BJB has not seen that
child since 2005, and has not paid child support for that child or CPB.
BJB also admitted to smoking marijuana in the past, and to using
crack cocaine beginning in 1996, sometimes on a daily basis. BJB claimed that the
last time she used drugs was when she was arrested in March of 2007. Although
BJB admitted going to a party in November of 2008, she denied that anyone was
smoking marijuana at the party.
BJB testified that she has held several jobs since being released from
jail in June of 2008. She held a seasonal job as a cook at a country club between
June and November of 2008. She also worked at Waffle House for one month, but
left because her employer would not give her two days off during the week to visit
with her child and attend therapy. BJB also stripped tobacco for about one month,
and at the time of trial, was doing odd jobs for her landlord. BJB testified that she
has resided at the same address since October of 2008. She denied that EEB was
living with her, but admitted that he was helping her with her bills.
BJB testified that she has “grown up” and “turned her life around.”9
She stated that she stopped using drugs in March of 2007 and has maintained her
sobriety. BJB testified that she was willing to do what needed to be done to get
CPB back.
Angela Haggard, the sister of EEB, testified that BJB and EEB lived
with her when CPB was born. Haggard was aware the two had used drugs in the
9
VR no. 2:02/23/09; 17:02:30 and 17:03:45.
-13-
past, but denied reporting them to the Cabinet. Haggard testified that she has
permitted BJB to visit with CPB in her home for the past 10 visits, and that she has
observed BJB teaching CPB words and showing her animals on the computer.
Haggard also testified that she has observed CPB calling BJB “Mama.”
As noted, the Shelby Family Court ultimately granted the Cabinet’s
Petition for Involuntary Termination of Parental Rights, and entered its Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law on March 5, 2009, along with an order terminating
parental rights on the same date. It is from that order that BJB now appeals to this
Court.
At the outset, we note that on review of a decision to terminate
parental rights, this Court must determine if the family court's conclusion was
based upon clear and convincing evidence and, in so doing, must apply the clearly
erroneous standard of appellate review. Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (CR)
52.01; JMR v. Commonwealth of Kentucky, Cabinet for Health and Family
Services, 239 S.W.3d 116, 120 (Ky. App. 2007). “Clear and convincing proof
does not necessarily mean uncontradicted proof. It is sufficient if there is proof of
a probative and substantial nature carrying the weight of evidence sufficient to
convince ordinarily prudent-minded people.” M.P.S. v. Cabinet for Human
Resources, 979 S.W.2d 114, 117 (Ky.App. 1998), citing Rowland v. Holt, 253 Ky.
718, 70 S.W.2d 5, 9 (Ky.App. 1934). Pursuant to this standard, an appellate court
is obligated to give a great deal of deference to the family court's findings and
-14-
should not interfere with those findings unless the record is devoid of substantial
evidence to support them. K.R.L. v. P.A.C., 210 S.W.3d 183, 187 (Ky.App. 2006).
The trial court's standard for involuntary termination of parental rights
is set out in KRS 625.090. The statute creates a three-prong test whereby the
Cabinet must prove, and the court must determine that: 1) the child is abused or
neglected; 2) termination would be in the child's best interest; and 3) one of several
listed grounds exists. In deciding whether the child is abused or neglected, the trial
court may base its finding on a prior dependency finding or upon independent
findings under the definition set out in KRS 600.020(1).
As her first basis for appeal to this Court, BJB argues that the family
court erred in admitting hearsay evidence on behalf of the Cabinet at trial.
Specifically, BJB asserts that the court erred in admitting the lab reports pertaining
to BJB’s drug screens, and in allowing Churchman to testify as to the results of
those screens.
In support thereof, BJB asserts that the crux of the Cabinet’s case for
termination of her parental rights was her history of substance abuse. However,
BJB states that the only evidence of her relevant drug use was that she tested
positive for marijuana twice in November of 2008, which she states discredited her
efforts to show compliance with the case plan, and was most prejudicial to her case
at trial. BJB argues that the Kentucky Alternative Program did not do the analysis
on the urine specimens itself, but instead mailed the samples and requested an
analysis from Medtox Laboratories, Inc.
-15-
As noted, BJB objected to the admission of this report at trial. The
court admitted the reports under the business records exception of Kentucky Rules
of Evidence (KRE) 803(6), ruling that the reports and the testimony of the
probation officer would be allowed as it was in the normal course of business for
the Kentucky Alternative Program to collect such reports. BJB asserts that the
reports are not part of the normal course of business for the Kentucky Alternative
Program, but was instead the regularly conducted business activity of Medtox
Laboratories, Inc., which had no representatives present at trial. BJB asserts that
the Kentucky Alternative Program is not in the regular practice of preparing drug
analysis reports and did not make the report that was presented. Accordingly, BJB
argues that the report did not meet the criteria of the business records exception
and, therefore, the court erred in admitting it.
As support for her argument, BJB cites this Court to the Texas
decision rendered in In re KCP, 142 S.W.3d 574 (Tex.App. 2004). In that case, as
in the matter sub judice, the mother objected to introduction of positive drug tests
under the business records exception, on the ground that the entities providing the
records were not the entities who actually conducted the tests.
In KCP, each record had an attached affidavit from the custodian
stating that the records were business records. The Texas appellate court
ultimately held that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the test results
with no information as to the qualifications of the person or equipment used, the
method of administering the test, and whether the test was a standard test for the
-16-
particular substance at issue. Ultimately, however, the Texas court found the error
not to be reversible, finding that admission of the evidence likely did not cause the
rendering of an improper verdict, in light of other evidence establishing ongoing
drug usage by the mother, including track marks on her arms, personal admissions,
and admissions to a counselor that she was continuing to use drugs.
In analogizing the KCP case to her own, BJB argues that the drug
screens in the matter sub judice were improperly admitted under the business
records exception because no one from the lab where the records were actually
created was available to testify. Accordingly, BJB asserts that it was impossible
for the family court to know whether the person conducting the test followed
standard operating procedure, whether the equipment used for the testing was in
good working order, or if the person conducting the testing had been properly
trained. BJB therefore asserts that the court below committed reversible error in
admitting the drug screens.
In response, the Cabinet disputes BJB’s contention that her drug usage
was the crux of its case, and cites to many other factors as well, including inability
to hold a permanent job, inability to support herself or any of her other children,
and frequent changes of residence. Further, the Cabinet states that the drug tests
were only part of the evidence establishing BJB’s drug usage, stating that other
overwhelming evidence existed, including Appellant’s own testimony that she had
used marijuana in the past and had started using cocaine, sometimes on a daily
basis in 1996; her testimony that she had used drugs while pregnant and
-17-
breastfeeding; her admissions to a social worker that she had previously relapsed
after nine months; and that she used drugs on the day CPB was removed from her
home. The Cabinet also states that BJB told her social worker that drugs came into
the prison, and conceded that she did not take any drug screens while incarcerated.
Finally, the Cabinet notes that although BJB denied that anyone was smoking
marijuana at a party she attended in November of 2008, she did admit to eating
some brownies.10
In addition, the Cabinet states that Churchman testified about the
procedures which were followed to collect a urine specimen from BJB and to
ensure that the urine was not mixed up with other specimens, and that the
specimens were returned from the lab in 24 hours. The Cabinet also notes that the
Court was already aware of the drug screens in question because the Cabinet had
presented evidence of them to the Court in the underlying dependency action in
order to temporarily suspend BJB’s unsupervised visits with CPB. Thus, the
Cabinet asserts that the court was able to weigh the trustworthiness and reliability
of the evidence presented, and that competent evidence beyond the drug screens
existed to establish BJB’s ongoing drug usage.
Having reviewed the arguments of the parties, and the applicable law,
we are of the opinion that the court below improperly admitted the drug screens
under the business records exception. The Cabinet itself concedes that, although
the urine specimen itself was collected by Kentucky Alternative Program, the
10
We presume that these were brownies containing marijuana.
-18-
sample was tested, and the report prepared, at Medtox Laboratories. No Medtox
representative was available to testify at trial, thereby preventing the Cabinet from
establishing a chain of custody in this matter.
The importance of the chain of custody evidence is two-fold. First, as
BJB argues, there was no representative of Medtox to testify to the procedure used
or the test performed on the sample. See KRE 901 (b)(9). Secondly, the lack of
chain of custody evidence deprived the trial court of evidence which it could have
considered in determining identification and integrity of the sample. See KRE
901(a) and Robert Lawson, The Kentucky Evidence Law Handbook, §11.00 [2] and
[3], pp. 840-846 (4th Ed. Matthew Bender 2003). Accordingly, we believe the
court interpreted our jurisprudence too broadly in admitting test records, which
would be hearsay under the business records exception, without the test records
qualifying under a hearsay exception. See KRE 805.
Under the business records exception to the hearsay rule, the facts sub
judice present a classical case for the application of KRE 805, and the application
of that rule requires each level of hearsay to conform to a hearsay exception. The
drug screen report is hearsay as are the business records, and just as the business
records must conform to a hearsay exception to be admissible into evidence, so
must also any hearsay contained within them. In that the drug screens do not
conform based on the facts sub judice to any hearsay exception, they are
proscribed by KRE 80211 and not admissible.
11
Certainly such tests can be admissible but, to be admissible, consideration must be given to
identification, integrity and other appropriate testimony.
-19-
Having so found, we are also of the opinion that the improper
admission of the failed drug tests was prejudicial to BJB. As the Cabinet correctly
notes, the admission of incompetent evidence in a bench trial may be viewed as
harmless error but only if the Court did not base its decision on that evidence or if
there was other competent evidence to prove the matter in issue. See Prater v.
Cabinet for Human Resources, Com. of Ky., 954 S.W.2d 954 (Ky. 1997), citing
GEY v. Cabinet for Human Resources, 701 S.W.2d 713 (Ky.App 1985), Escott v.
Harley, 308 Ky. 298, 214 S.W.2d 387 (Ky. 1948), and KRE 103.
Unfortunately for the Cabinet in this instance, we are of the opinion
that the other evidence which it has offered, while competent, establishes BJB’s
past drug usage, and not ongoing drug usage after the time that she began
attempting to comply with the case plan. The copies of the laboratory reports and
the testimony of Churchman were the only evidence relating to the drug screen
results which would tend to show ongoing usage.
In so finding, we recognize the Cabinet’s assertion that BJB’s
substance abuse was not the crux of its case. Although we recognize that the
Cabinet made a number of arguments for termination, including inability to hold a
permanent job, changing of residence, and inability to parent appropriately, issues
of ongoing substance abuse were certainly of central importance of trial, to the
extent that we cannot say for certain that the Court did not, at least in part, base its
decision on that evidence. Accordingly, because we do not believe these screens
-20-
were properly admitted for the foregoing reasons, we are compelled to reverse on
this issue.
Having so found, we now turn to BJB’s second basis for appeal,
namely, her argument that the testimony and report of Dr. Ebben were erroneously
admitted by the trial court because they contained double hearsay. BJB asserts that
Dr. Ebben should not have been allowed to testify as to allegations he learned from
reading the Cabinet’s records, nor should his report, which contained references to
the Cabinet’s records, have been admitted. BJB asserts that Dr. Ebben’s testimony
and the statements contained in his report were double hearsay. BJB notes that in
his report, Dr. Ebben made numerous citations to the Cabinet’s records, stating, for
example, that “there was also an allegation that the caregivers were ‘blowing
smoke in the baby’s face and would leave the baby lying on the bench while they
walked around.’”12
BJB asserts that such statements made by Dr. Ebben were gleaned
from his review of the Cabinet records. BJB argues that other than the factual
observations of social workers, the Cabinet’s report provided to Ebben was
inadmissible hearsay. In support of that argument, BJB directs the attention of this
Court to Prater v. Cabinet for Human Resources, Com. of Ky., 954 S.W.2d 954
(Ky. 1997).
12
Another example of a statement included in Dr. Ebben’s report was, “It was noted that she
went from church to church while residing in Tennessee asking for money for assistance and she
would put dirt on the children and dress them up in the worst clothes she could find in order to
look sad and hopeless in order to get money.” (Dr Ebben’s report, Plaintiff’s Exhibit 2, p. 1).
-21-
In Prater, the Cabinet filed a termination action against the parents of
three children and the case proceeded to trial. The mother’s niece, who was
unavailable for the termination trial, had made statements accusing the parents of
physically and sexually abusing the children in question. During the trial, a social
worker testified about a Cabinet case report regarding sexual abuse of the children,
which included statements made by the niece. Another social worker testified that
the report accurately reflected the statements made to her by the niece.
On appeal in that case, the Cabinet argued that the case report was
properly admitted as a business record pursuant to KRE 803(6). In addressing that
argument, our Supreme Court held that KRE 803(6) does not authorize a carte
blanche admission of each individual entry contained in a report, and found that
KRE 803(6) and KRE 803(8) only satisfy the hearsay aspects of the business or
public record itself. Thus, the Supreme Court held that if a particular entry in the
record would be inadmissible for another reason, it does not become admissible
just because it is included in a business or public record. See Prather at 958.
Having so held, the Supreme Court therefore found that the social
worker’s report containing the statements made by the niece were hearsay, and that
the other social worker’s testimony about the accuracy of the statements
themselves was double hearsay. Nevertheless, the Court held that the admission of
the statements and report was not reversible error because there was other
competent evidence to prove the matter at issue.
-22-
Based upon the foregoing precedent, BJB asserts that inadmissible
testimony should not become admissible simply because it is memorialized in the
Cabinet’s case report, and therefore argues that the first paragraph of Dr. Ebben’s
report setting out the allegations against BJB should have been redacted.
In response, the Cabinet asserts that Prather is distinguishable from
the matter sub judice, because in the matter sub judice, the information was not
being offered for the truth of the matter asserted, but instead was used by Dr.
Ebben to gauge the consistency of the information provided to him by BJB.
In support of its argument in that regard, the Cabinet notes that Dr.
Ebben, after reviewing the records which were summarized in the first paragraph
of his report, questioned BJB about the Cabinet’s findings. He confirmed that the
information she relayed to him correlated with the Cabinet’s findings of a fairly
significant substance abuse history that has complicated her life and her ability to
independently function as a parent. Indeed, the Cabinet notes that Dr. Ebben
described BJB as “honest and contrite while talking,” and that she “admitted to
past parenting problems.”13 Accordingly, the Cabinet argues that the information
contained in the report and repeated in Dr. Ebbens’s letter was not offered for the
truth of its contents, but instead for purposes of consistency.
Having reviewed the arguments of the parties, the record, and the
applicable law, we affirm the decision of the trial court to admit the report,
13
VR No. 1:01/15/09; 09:42:20.
-23-
although not on the basis of the arguments made by the Cabinet. Having reviewed
the record, we believe the facts or data, in this instance, are likely of the type of
information reasonably relied upon by experts in Dr. Ebbens’s field when drawing
inferences or forming opinions on a particular subject.14 As is established by KRE
703, when this is the case the facts or data itself need not be admissible into
evidence;15 accordingly, even though the information contained in the report is
hearsay, we find no error on the part of the court below in admitting it, as it is
allowed by KRE 703.
As her final basis for appeal, BJB asserts that the evidence presented
at the hearing required a dismissal of the termination action because the Cabinet
failed to meet its burden of clear and convincing evidence. BJB specifically
asserts that the court erred in finding that there was no reasonable expectation of
improvement in parental care and protection, considering the age of the child, nor
was there any reasonable expectation of significant improvement in her conduct in
the immediately foreseeable future insofar as providing food, clothing, shelter,
medical care, or education for the child was concerned.
BJB argues that from the time of her release from the detention center
in June of 2008, until the hearing in January of 2009, she found employment,
14
We are unaware of any objections made to the admission of Dr Ebben’s report or testimony on
this basis.
15
It is important to note that even though an expert may rely upon “hearsay” in forming his
opinion, this does not admit the hearsay into evidence for substantive purposes. Further, the
value of the expert’s opinion is only as good as either the facts or methods upon which he relied
in forming his opinion, and that “value” will be revealed upon cross-examination.
-24-
completed a psychological evaluation, and met the recommendations of the
psychological evaluation by enrolling in an early childhood intervention program.
BJB also points out that she enrolled in substance abuse counseling as soon as it
was available to her. Further, BJB states that she missed only one visit with her
child from March of 2007 through February of 2009. For these reasons, BJB
argues that there was a reasonable expectation of significant improvement in her
conduct in the immediately foreseeable future and that, accordingly, there was not
clear and convincing evidence to support the court’s finding.
In response, the Cabinet directs the attention of this Court to
testimony and evidence which it asserts establishes that BJB had a significant drug
problem, for which she “remains at risk for relapse,”16 and for which she continued
to receive treatment at the time of trial. Further, the Cabinet cites evidence
establishing numerous residences and jobs held by BJB since her release in 2008,
as well as the admission of BJB that she still relied upon her husband for support,
although they were not living together. In addition, the Cabinet notes, BJB
admitted owing more than $35,000 in support for her oldest children, and the fact
that she had paid no support at all for her youngest children. Accordingly, the
Cabinet asserts that the record clearly indicates that by clear and convincing
evidence, it met its burden to prove parental neglect and that, accordingly, the trial
court was correct in ruling as it did.
16
Petitioner’s Exhibit #2 at 12.
-25-
Having found that reversal is appropriate in this matter based on the
aforementioned reasons, we need not address this argument at this time.
Accordingly, we hereby reverse and remand to the Shelby Family Court for
additional proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
All concur.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Nathan T. Riggs
Shelbyville, Kentucky
Barbara M. Gunther
Shelbyville, Kentucky
-26-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.