ENDERS (BRIAN) VS. ENDERS (JULIA)
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RENDERED: FEBRUARY 19, 2010; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2009-CA-000609-ME
BRIAN ENDERS
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON FAMILY COURT
HONORABLE DONNA DELAHANTY, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 08-CI-500158
JULIA ENDERS
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: ACREE, KELLER, AND LAMBERT, JUDGES.
KELLER, JUDGE: Brian Enders (Brian) appeals from the family court’s order
setting child support based on the Kentucky Child Support Guidelines (the
Guidelines) and the court’s order denying his motion to alter, amend, or vacate.
On appeal, Brian argues that the family court abused its discretion in refusing to
deviate from the Guidelines because the parties have nearly equal parenting time.
Furthermore, Brian argues that the family court erred when it took into
consideration the parties’ income in opting to follow the Guidelines. For the
following reasons, we affirm.
FACTS
The parties married on May 13, 2000. One child was born of the
marriage. On January 15, 2008, Brian filed a petition for dissolution of the
marriage. The parties ultimately reached an agreement through mediation
regarding all matters except for the issues of child support and attorney’s fees.
Following receipt of briefs on those issues from the parties, the court entered an
order requiring Brian to pay child support in the amount of $600 per month and a
portion of Julia Enders’ (Julia) attorney’s fees. Because the court’s award of
attorney’s fees is not in dispute, our recitation of the remainder of the facts will
focus only on the court’s award of child support.
In its order setting child support, the court noted the following: Brian
“parents the child forty-three percent (43%) of the time;” Brian pays health and
dental insurance for the child in the amount of $83.78 per month; the parties each
pay half of the $147.00 weekly child care expenses; Brian had income of
$4,615.00 per month; and Julia had income of $2,750.00 per month, giving Brian
$1,865.00 more income per month than Julia. Because the court determined that
there was a disparity in parenting time and income, it chose to follow the
Guidelines.
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Brian filed a motion to alter, amend, or vacate arguing, as he does
here, that the court erred by following the Guidelines. The court denied Brian’s
motion and he filed this appeal.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The trial courts have been given broad discretion in considering what
circumstances are relevant and what settings correspond in determining appropriate
child support. Van Meter v. Smith, 14 S.W.3d 569, 572 (Ky. App. 2000). While
the trial court’s discretion is not limitless, we will only disturb its findings if it fails
to follow the Guidelines or, when deviating from the Guidelines, the court
inadequately explains why it did so. Com. ex rel. Marshall v. Marshall, 15 S.W.3d
396, 400-01 (Ky. App. 2000). With these standards in mind, we address Brian’s
arguments. Before doing so, we note that Brian treats the family court’s alleged
errors as separate issues in his brief. However, because they are intertwined, we
will address them as one.
ANALYSIS
Brian argues that the trial court should have deviated from the
Guidelines because the parties have nearly equal parenting time and that the trial
court inappropriately looked to the parties’ incomes in determining to follow the
Guidelines. Kentucky Revised Statute(s) (KRS) 403.211(2) provides that:
the child support guidelines in KRS 403.212 shall serve
as a rebuttable presumption for the establishment or
modification of the amount of child support. Courts may
deviate from the guidelines where their application would
be unjust or inappropriate. Any deviation shall be
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accompanied by a written finding or specific finding on
the record by the court, specifying the reason for the
deviation.
Section 3(g) of KRS 403.211 sets forth a number of reasons that justify an award
of child support that varies from the Guidelines. Nearly equal parenting time and
the relative income of the parties are not listed factors. However, if the court
specifically identifies a factor “of an extraordinary nature . . . which would make
application of the guidelines inappropriate,” the court may deviate from the
Guidelines. It is within the discretion of the court to determine if a factor of an
extraordinary nature exists. KRS 403.211(4).
Brian argues that the nearly equal parenting time the parties share is a
factor of an extraordinary nature that would have permitted the family court to
deviate from the Guidelines. We agree. However, while the family court is free to
make a finding that such a parenting schedule is an extraordinary factor, it is not
required to do so.
In support of his argument, Brian cites primarily to two cases from
this Court, Brown v. Brown, 952 S.W.2d 707 (Ky. App. 1997); and Plattner v.
Plattner, 228 S.W.3d 577 (Ky. App. 2007). However, contrary to what Brian
argues, both Brown and Plattner are distinguishable and neither of those opinions
mandates a deviation from the Guidelines in this case.
In Brown, the children resided with their mother approximately 40%
of the time and with their father approximately 60% of the time. When a dispute
arose regarding child support, the trial court ordered the mother to pay the father
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$660.90 per month. In doing so, the court deviated from the Guidelines by
reducing the mother’s total obligation by the percentage of time the children spent
with her. On appeal, the mother did not argue that the trial court erred in deviating
from the Guidelines. She argued that the trial court should have ordered the father
to pay her child support because she had the children 40% of the time.
This Court found no error in the trial court’s refusal to award the
mother child support. In doing so, this Court noted that the children resided with
their father a greater percentage of time than with their mother, thus creating
greater ongoing financial obligations for their father. This Court held that the trial
court could legitimately consider such “household maintenance expenses” in
refusing to order the father to pay child support as a counterbalance for the time the
mother cared for the children. In Brown, this Court did indicate that deviation
from the Guidelines is acceptable in certain situations. However, this Court’s
ultimate holding in Brown is not related to the application of the Guidelines and,
despite Brian’s implication to the contrary, does not mandate deviation from the
Guidelines. In fact, this Court, in affirming the trial court, relied to a great extent
on the Browns’ parenting schedule to support its opinion. The Enders’ parenting
schedule divides time with the child on a proportionate basis similar to the
Browns’. Therefore, as with Mr. Brown, Julia’s greater parenting time places a
greater financial obligation on her and the family court was free to consider that
when determining child support.
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In Plattner, the parties entered into a shared parenting agreement postdissolution. Based on that agreement, the father was ordered to pay $1,103.63 in
child support to the mother. Subsequently, the father moved the court for an order
reducing his child support obligation. In doing so, the father noted that the
mother’s income had increased substantially and that the parties had nearly equal
parenting time. The trial court found that the parties’ incomes were nearly equal;
however, it refused to deviate from the Guidelines in setting child support. On
appeal, the father argued that he should have no child support obligation because
the parties had nearly equal income and nearly equal parenting time.
This Court reversed the trial court, noting that:
[w]hile Kentucky's child support guidelines do not
contemplate such a shared custody arrangement, they do
reflect the equal duty of both parents to contribute to the
support of their children in proportion to their respective
net incomes. They also provide a measure of flexibility
that is particularly relevant in this case. Under the
provisions of KRS 403.211(2) and (3), a trial court may
deviate from the child support guidelines when it finds
that their application would be unjust or inappropriate.
The period of time during which the children reside with
each parent may be considered in determining child
support, and a relatively equal division of physical
custody may constitute valid grounds for deviating from
the guidelines.
Id. at 579.
However, this Court also noted that the amount of shared parenting
time is not the only factor to be considered. The family court should also consider
the relative incomes of the parents. Taking those factors into consideration, this
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Court held that the family court should deviate from the Guidelines when it finds
that the parents have “almost identical responsibility for the day-to-day expenses
associated with [child] care,” and there “is no significant disparity between the
parties’ annual income.” Id. at 580. As this Court noted, in such cases, “the
expenses necessary to provide a home for the children (even when they are not in
residence) are also incurred by each party in equal proportion.” Id. Therefore,
neither party should be ordered to pay child support to the other.
Brian downplays the importance the parties’ incomes played in the
opinion in Plattner. However, we disagree with Brian’s assertion that the parties’
incomes are “secondary to parenting time and the resultant sharing of expenses.”
Parenting time and income are inexorably intertwined and the family court has the
discretion to weigh those factors as it sees fit. In this case, the family court placed
a greater emphasis on the parties’ disparate income, which it was within its
discretion to do.
Finally, we note that Brian has cited to a number of cases that indicate
a family court may deviate from the Guidelines and to one case that indicates that a
family court should deviate from the Guidelines when the parents have equal
parenting time and income. However, Brian has not pointed to any caselaw that
mandates a deviation from the Guidelines when the parties have approximately
equal parenting time but a significant disparity in income. As noted above, it was
within the discretion of the family court to weigh the various factors when
determining child support. Because the family court did so and gave reasonable
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explanation for its determination, we cannot say that it abused its discretion.
Therefore, we affirm.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Hugh W. Barrow
Louisville, Kentucky
James O Risch
Louisville, Kentucky
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