BETHEL FELLOWSHIP, INC. VS. ENVIRONMENTAL AND PUBLIC PROTECTION CABINET
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RENDERED: JUNE 18, 2010; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2009-CA-000603-MR
BETHEL FELLOWSHIP, INC.,
D/B/A BETHEL FELLOWSHIP
CHRISTIAN ACADEMY
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FRANKLIN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE PHILLIP J. SHEPHERD, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 06-CI-01175
ENVIRONMENTAL AND PUBLIC
PROTECTION CABINET
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: LAMBERT AND STUMBO, JUDGES; WHITE,1 SENIOR JUDGE.
STUMBO, JUDGE: Bethel Fellowship, Inc., d/b/a Bethel Fellowship Christian
Academy, appeals from an Opinion and Order of the Franklin Circuit Court
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Senior Judge Edwin M. White sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and Kentucky Revised Statutes
(KRS) 21.580.
affirming an administrative decision of the Environmental and Public Protection
Cabinet (now Energy and Environmental Cabinet). The instant action arose from
an administrative penalty imposed by the Cabinet resulting from Bethel’s alleged
failure to obtain an asbestos inspection of its school premises. Bethel maintains
that the circuit court erred in failing to determine that the Cabinet failed to prove
that Bethel is a corporation or owns real property. It also argues that the Cabinet
improperly reopened the case for submission of additional evidence, and that the
hearing officer admitted hearsay evidence and improperly shifted the burden of
persuasion. We find no basis for disturbing the Opinion and Order on appeal, and
accordingly affirm.
On July 3, 2003, the Cabinet filed an Administrative Complaint
against “Bethel Fellowship, Inc., d/b/a/ Bethel Fellowship Christian Academy”
alleging that Bethel failed to comply with various provisions of the Asbestos
Hazard Emergency Response Act (“AHERA”). AHERA requires all school
facilities to survey their premises for asbestos and to comply with various reporting
and corrective requirements. The action was based on the Cabinet’s claim that
Bethel improperly failed to inspect its premises for asbestos and to take corrective
action after receiving Notices of Violation from the Cabinet.
On March 11, 2005, the matter went before Hearing Officer Alan
Wagers who conducted a formal administrative hearing. After hearing proof,
Hearing Officer Wagers rendered a Hearing Officer’s Report and Recommended
Secretary’s Order. The report recommended in relevant part that the Secretary find
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Bethel to have violated 401 KAR 58:010 and 40 CFR 763, and impose a $10,000
penalty and order compliance with the asbestos testing requirement.
The matter went before the Secretary, who remanded it to the Hearing
Officer on February 23, 2006, for the limited purpose of determining whether
Bethel owned the “old school building” and the “radio station building.” On
remand, Hearing Officer Janet Thompson conducted the hearing, which resulted in
her conclusion that the buildings at issue were owned by Bethel. This
determination was made based on direct testimony, property record cards and
information from deed books.
On July 27, 2006, the Secretary rendered an Amended Final
Secretary’s Order, which incorporated Hearing Officer Wagers’ Report and
Recommended Secretary’s Order and Hearing Officer Thompson’s
recommendation. The Secretary found that Bethel violated the relevant regulations
and he assessed a monetary penalty in accordance with the Hearing Officer’s
recommendation. Bethel then appealed to the Franklin Circuit Court, which
affirmed. This appeal followed.
Bethel now argues that the circuit court erred in affirming the
Cabinet’s ruling. It first maintains that the Cabinet improperly determined that
Bethel is a corporation for purposes of applying 401 KAR 58:010 et al. Bethel
contends that the burden rests with the Cabinet to demonstrate that Bethel is a
corporate entity, and that Bethel’s corporate status can only be shown by the
introduction of a certified corporate charter. It contends that the Hearing Officer
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improperly determined that Bethel is a corporation, and that the Cabinet and circuit
court erred in adopting that determination.
We find no error on this issue. In examining this claim of error, the
circuit court noted that in response to the Cabinet’s Amended Administrative
Complaint, Bethel answered and admitted that it was a corporate entity. In its
Complaint, the Cabinet alleged in paragraph 6 that “Bethel Fellowship Christian
Academy . . . is a nonprofit LEA that is owned and operated by Bethel Fellowship,
Inc., a Kentucky Corporation.”2 In answering, Bethel denied that Bethel
Fellowship Christian Academy was listed as a nonprofit LEA, but admitted the
balance of the Cabinet’s allegation as set out in paragraph 6. This admission, taken
alone, forms a proper basis for the circuit court’s determination that Bethel is a
corporate entity for purposes of 401 KAR 58.010. The Cabinet does not bear the
burden of demonstrating something which Bethel acknowledged in its Answer.
Other evidence of Bethel’s corporate status was introduced, including deeds
indicating that Bethel is a corporation, and the circuit court found that “certified
copies of the articles of incorporation are indeed in the administrative record.”
Irrespective of this, Bethel’s acknowledgement of its corporate status in its Answer
was a sufficient basis for the Cabinet’s conclusion that Bethel was a corporate
entity, and the circuit court properly so found.
Bethel next argues that the Cabinet failed to demonstrate that Bethel
owns the subject parcel. It notes that Hearing Officer Thompson, who heard the
2
“LEA” is an abbreviation for “Local Education Agency” as set out in 401 KAR 58.010.
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matter on remand, relied on an Order issued by Hearing Officer Wagers on June 1,
2005, as proof that Bethel owned the property in question. Hearing Officer
Wagers concluded that the Cabinet proved by a preponderance of the evidence that
Bethel was a LEA, and in so doing cited a letter by a Pastor Lyons that referred to
“[a]ll of our buildings . . . .” Hearing Officer Wagers cited also Lyons’ testimony
at the hearing, and concluded that the letter and testimony of Lyons constituted an
admission by Bethel that it owns the buildings on its campus. Bethel now
maintains that statements of legal conclusions are not admissible as admissions, or
in the alternative would constitute an extrajudicial admission. Bethel also contends
that the statute of frauds precludes the oral testimony of Lyons from being
admissible to prove ownership of the property. In sum, Bethel maintains that the
Cabinet failed to prove that Bethel owns the premises at issue, and that as such is
without jurisdiction to hear and adjudicate the instant action.
We are persuaded by the Cabinet’s contention that the preponderance
of the evidence appearing in the administrative record as a whole supports the
Secretary’s Final Order and demonstrates that Bethel owns the property at issue.
As the circuit court properly noted, in order for the Cabinet to sustain its burden of
proof, it has to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that Bethel was a
LEA. One way to meet this burden was to establish that Bethel was the “owner of
any nonpublic, nonprofit elementary or secondary school building.” 401 KAR
58.010.
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The Cabinet offered proof of Bethel’s ownership of the subject parcel
in several ways. It offered the testimony of Pastor Lyons, who stated that Bethel
built the buildings and a letter from Lyons referring to the buildings’ construction
and to “our buildings.” Additionally, property record cards and information
gleaned from deed books was offered into evidence in support of the Cabinet’s
claim that Bethel owned both the real property and improvements of the subject
parcel. The totality of the evidence supports the Cabinet’s conclusion on this issue,
and we find no error.
Bethel’s third argument is that the circuit court improperly failed to
conclude that the Cabinet was unauthorized to remand the matter to the Hearing
Officer for a determination of whether Bethel owned the buildings at issue. Bethel
argues that such a remand is not supported by the law, that it gives the Cabinet “a
second bite at the apple,” and constitutes a gross violation of the Due Process of
Law to which Bethel is entitled. In support of this argument, Bethel cites case law
standing for the proposition that a judgment may not be reopened for the taking of
additional proof.
We find no error on this issue. 401 KAR 100:010, Section 3(6)(a)
gives the Secretary the authority to “remand the matter to the hearing officer.”
This is precisely what occurred below. Additionally, the matter was remanded
prior to the entry of the Cabinet’s Final Order, and no final judgment was reopened
for the taking of additional proof. We find no basis for disturbing the circuit
court’s Opinion and Order on this issue.
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Bethel next argues that the Hearing Officer improperly shifted the
burden of persuasion by placing the burden to prove or disprove an element of the
violation on Bethel instead of the Cabinet. Bethel bases this argument on
paragraph 7(a) of the Hearing Officer’s Recommended Order, which states,
Although Environmental Enforcement Specialist Hamm
was not able to identify which deed pertained to the old
school building and/or the radio station, he requested of
PVA Bland that he be provided documents showing
ownership of all properties owned by the church.
Defendant offered no evidence to show that Hamm was
not provided with ownership on all properties owned by
the church, or that the deeds introduced did not pertain to
the old school building and/or radio station.
Bethel maintains that this statement impermissibly places the burden
on Bethel to disprove its ownership of the subject parcel, rather than properly
placing the burden to prove ownership on the Cabinet. We are not persuaded by
this argument. Bethel correctly notes that the Cabinet bears the burden of proof in
administrative hearings. 401 KAR 100:010, Section 12(4). The Hearing Officer,
via the Recommended Order cited by Bethel, properly placed the burden on the
Cabinet. Once the Cabinet met that burden by a preponderance of the evidence,
the Hearing Officer merely noted that Bethel did not rebut the Cabinet’s proof or
otherwise demonstrate that it did not own the buildings at issue. The Hearing
Officer did not place the burden of proof on Bethel and the circuit court properly
so found.
Lastly, Bethel contends that the Hearing Officer improperly admitted
double hearsay testimony into evidence. It argues that Don Hamm, an
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Environmental Enforcement Specialist employed by the Cabinet’s Office of Legal
Services, was improperly allowed to testify as to what PVA Bland told him the
records reflected. Bethel maintains that not only was Hamm’s testimony hearsay,
but he was also placing into the record the hearsay evidence of PVA Bland. Bethel
also argues that no foundation was laid for the introduction of property record
cards and aerial photographs of the subject parcel.
We are not persuaded by Bethel’s argument on this issue. The circuit
court concluded that the deeds and public records admitted into evidence fall
within KRE 803(14), as they are records of “a document purporting to establish or
affect an interest in property.” The court additionally found that the deeds and
public records are certified copies which were signed and attested to by their
respective custodians. As such, the court concluded that they fall within the KRE
803(8), (14) and (15) exceptions to hearsay, and are self-authenticating under KRE
902. We find no error in this conclusion. Additionally, evidence may be
considered in an administrative proceeding which would not be admissible under
the Rules of Evidence. 401 KAR 100:010, Section 3(1)(b). We find no basis for
concluding that the Cabinet considered improper evidence in reaching its
conclusion.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the Opinion and Order of the
Franklin Circuit Court.
ALL CONCUR.
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BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT
FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT
FOR APPELLEE:
Ronald E. Hines
Elizabethtown, Kentucky
Jacquelyn A. Quarles
Frankfort, Kentucky
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