ABNEY (ERNEST) VS. KENTUCKY FARM BUREAU MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY , ET AL.
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RENDERED: FEBRUARY 26, 2010; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2009-CA-000600-MR
ERNEST ABNEY
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM BOURBON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE ROBERT G. JOHNSON, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 08-CI-00087
KENTUCKY FARM BUREAU
MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY
AND JOHN SMOOT
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: CAPERTON AND STUMBO, JUDGES; KNOPF,1 SENIOR JUDGE.
STUMBO, JUDGE: Ernest Abney appeals from an order of the Bourbon Circuit
Court granting summary judgment in favor of Kentucky Farm Bureau Mutual
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Senior Judge William L. Knopf sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and Kentucky Revised Statutes
(KRS) 21.580.
Insurance Company (hereinafter KFB) and John Smoot, a KFB claims adjuster.
Abney filed suit against KFB and Smoot based on the events that transpired
following an October 1, 1999, motor vehicle accident. Abney asserted claims for
fraudulent misrepresentation, negligent misrepresentation, negligent training, and
negligent supervision. The trial court held that there was no evidence in the record
that Smoot or KFB made a misrepresentation to Abney and granted summary
judgment. We find the court correctly granted summary judgment and affirm.
On October 1, 1999, Abney was the passenger of a truck driven by
Arthur Brake. The truck rear-ended a car being driven by Tonya Wright. Wright
had stopped suddenly, causing the accident. Brake was insured by Nationwide
Mutual Insurance Company and Wright was insured by KFB.
Following the accident, Abney made a claim for damages against
Wright and KFB. Smoot was assigned to adjust the claim. KFB and Smoot
believed Brake was partly at fault and would not pay the full amount Abney was
seeking. During the negotiations seeking a settlement, Smoot informed Abney that
he could file a claim against Brake, individually, and his insurer Nationwide. This
statement is uncontroverted. A settlement was reached and Abney was given a
lump sum payment. Abney was required to sign a release in favor of KFB and
Wright in order to get the lump sum payment. The release discharged all of
Abney’s claims against KFB and Wright. In his complaint, Abney claims Smoot
advised him that a release would not prohibit a claim against Brake and
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Nationwide. Smoot claimed he never said anything regarding the release as it
pertains to a future claim against Brake.
Abney then brought suit in Bourbon Circuit Court against Brake and
Nationwide. Brake and Nationwide moved for summary judgment alleging that
the release Abney singed was a general release and released all claims against all
parties involved in the accident. They pointed to language in the release that stated
it was to release
all other persons, firms or corporations liable, or who
might be claimed to be liable, of and from any and all
actions, causes of action, claims, demands, costs, loss of
services, expenses and compensation, or suits at law or in
equity, of whatsoever kind or nature, arising out of any
and all known and unknown injuries and damages
resulting or to result from an accident that occurred on or
about the 2 day of October, 1999 at or near Bethlehem
Road Bourbon County Kentucky.
Abney v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 215 S.W.3d 699, 702 (Ky. 2006).
The circuit court granted summary judgment. Abeny appealed and a
previous panel of this Court affirmed. The Kentucky Supreme Court granted
review and held that the release was unambiguous and therefore it would be
enforced as written.
Abney then filed suit against KFB and Smoot alleging that they
misrepresented the effect of the release to him in order to obtain his signature.
Abney claims that Smoot knew or should have known that the release would
release all parties, not just KFB and Wright. KFB and Smoot moved for summary
judgment claiming there was no evidence Smoot ever made a misrepresentation
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regarding the effect of the release. The trial court granted the motion and this
appeal followed.
The standard of review on appeal of a summary judgment
is whether the trial court correctly found that there were
no genuine issues as to any material fact and that the
moving party was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (CR) 56.03 . . . .
“The record must be viewed in a light most favorable to
the party opposing the motion for summary judgment and
all doubts are to be resolved in his favor.” Steelvest, Inc.
v. Scansteel Service Center, Inc., Ky., 807 S.W.2d 476,
480 (1991). Summary “judgment is only proper where
the movant shows that the adverse party could not prevail
under any circumstances.” Steelvest, 807 S.W.2d at 480,
citing Paintsville Hospital Co. v. Rose, Ky., 683 S.W.2d
255 (1985). Consequently, summary judgment must be
granted “[o]nly when it appears impossible for the
nonmoving party to produce evidence at trial warranting
a judgment in his favor . . . .” Huddleston v. Hughes, Ky.
App., 843 S.W.2d 901, 903 (1992).
Scifres v. Kraft, 916 S.W.2d 779, 781 (Ky. App. 1996).
In order to maintain an action for fraudulent misrepresentation, one
must “establish six elements of fraud by clear and convincing evidence as follows:
a) material representation b) which is false c) known to be false or made recklessly
d) made with inducement to be acted upon e) acted in reliance thereon and f)
causing injury.” United Parcel Service Co. v. Rickert, 996 S.W.2d 464, 468 (Ky.
1999).
As for negligent misrepresentation,
[o]ne who, in the course of his business, profession or
employment, or in any other transaction in which he has
a pecuniary interest, supplies false information for the
guidance of others in their business transactions, is
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subject to liability for pecuniary loss caused to them by
their justifiable reliance upon the information, if he fails
to exercise reasonable care or competence in obtaining or
communicating the information.
Presnell Const. Managers, Inc. v. EH Const., LLC, 134 S.W.3d 575, 580 (Ky.
2004).
Abney argues that the trial court erred in finding there was no
evidence that Smoot made a false representation to him. He points to his affidavit,
the affidavit of his wife, and Smoot’s deposition testimony. He claims that there is
evidence that the release was only intended to release KFB and Wright, not Brake
and Nationwide. Also, in Smoot’s deposition, he admits that he told Abney that he
might have a claim against Brake, but that the statement was not made
contemporaneously with the execution of the release. Smoot also admitted that the
release was intended only to discharge the claims against KFB and Wright.
Smoot and KFB argue that even if Smoot said Abney would have a
claim against Brake, it was not a false statement. Abney did have a claim against
Brake before he signed the release. Further, KFB and Smoot argue that Smoot
never stated the release would not preclude a suit against Brake.
Abney brings our attention to the case of Johnson v. Cormney, 596
S.W.2d 23 (Ky. App. 1979)(overruled on other grounds), for the proposition that
direct evidence of fraud is not necessary, but that fraud may be established by
circumstantial evidence. Although not clear, it appears as though Abney is arguing
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that even if Smoot did not say the release would not affect any claims brought
against Brake and Nationwide, it can be inferred from other evidence.
We must affirm the trial court’s order for summary judgment. Even if
we were to assume Smoot said the release would not discharge Abney’s claims
against Brake and Nationwide, there is no evidence that this statement was known
to be false or that it was unreasonable for Smoot to think that statement was false.
At all times, Smoot has stated he did not know the release would also discharge the
claims against Brake and Nationwide. We note that when the Kentucky Supreme
Court considered Abney’s first appeal in Abney v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., supra,
the Court clearly stated that the case involved an issue of first impression, namely,
“does a release negotiated with one joint tortfeasor discharging ‘all other persons,
firms or corporations liable, or who might be claimed to be liable’ effectively
release another joint tortfeasor who had not negotiated or paid any consideration
for the release?” Abney at 701. Looking at the case in a light most favorable to
Abney, it appears that he could not produce any evidence at trial to show that
Smoot knew, or should have known, that the release would also discharge any
claims against Brake and Nationwide.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the Order granting summary
judgment in favor of KFB and Smoot.
KNOPF, SENIOR JUDGE, CONCURS.
CAPERTON, JUDGE, DISSENTS, AND FILES SEPARATE
OPINION.
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CAPERTON, JUDGE, DISSENTING: The question presented to our
Court is whether the Abneys have sufficient evidence to survive summary
judgment on their claim of fraud. The allegation of fraud was supported by the
affidavits of Ernest Abney, Christine Abney, and John Smoot. The Abneys say
that Smoot advised them that at the time of the signing of the release, the release
would not affect their claim against KFB. Smoot’s testimony is equivocal and
when all affidavits are viewed in a light most favorable to the Abneys, I believe
that the evidence is sufficient to withstand the motion for summary judgment.
While this matter was heard by our Supreme Court on prior appeal,
the issue of fraud was neither considered nor decided. In Abney v. Nationwide
Mut. Ins. Co., 215 S.W.3d 699, 704, n.1 (Ky. 2006) our Supreme Court stated “Our
review of the record reveals that Abney consistently argued below that the release
at issue should be reformed due to a mutual mistake on the part of Smoot and
Abney. Abney never argued fraud, undue influence or abuse of confidence on the
part of Smoot. Consequently, that issue was not before the trial court, and this
Court will not consider any argument based on that premise.”
I would reverse and remand for further proceedings.
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BRIEFS AND ORAL ARGUMENT
FOR APPELLANT:
James D. Decker
Lexington, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEES:
Guy R. Colson
Timothy A. West
Lexington, Kentucky
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLEES:
Guy R. Colson
Lexington, Kentucky
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