BELL (DENNIS) VS. WARNER (DEBBIE)
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RENDERED: FEBRUARY 19, 2010; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2009-CA-000550-MR
DENNIS BELL
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM MCCRACKEN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE ROBERT J. HINES, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 08-CI-00276
DEBBIE WARNER
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: ACREE AND MOORE, JUDGES; BUCKINGHAM,1 SENIOR
JUDGE.
MOORE, JUDGE: Dennis Bell appeals the McCracken Circuit Court’s order
granting judgment on the pleadings to the Appellee. After a careful review of the
record, we affirm because the circuit court had proper jurisdiction.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
1
Senior Judge David C. Buckingham sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 11(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and Kentucky Revised Statute (KRS)
21.580.
In March of 2008, Bell contracted to purchase a mobile home from
Jack Zeilenga. Bell breached the contract by failing to pay $10,000 of the
purchase price. In a notarized document, Zeilenga assigned his rights and interests
in the underlying contract (between Zeilenga and Bell) to Debbie Warner in
consideration of $10,000. Unable to collect the $10,000 balance on the contract,
Warner filed a complaint against Bell for breach of contract.
McCracken Circuit Court Judge Craig Clymer recused sua sponte.
The case was then transferred to Circuit Court Judge Robert J. Hines, and the case
was set for bench trial.
On October 15, 2008, Bell filed a motion to disqualify Judge Hines
calling Judge Hines “argumentative” and his conduct “outrageous.” The Chief
Justice of the Kentucky Supreme Court denied the motion to disqualify, ordering
that the motion was “insufficient to demonstrate any disqualifying circumstance
which would require the appointment of a special judge.”
Upon denial of the motion to disqualify, the bench trial proceeded
before Judge Hines. At that time, Bell filed a motion to dismiss asserting that
Warner lacked standing to assert the claim. Judge Hines denied this motion. Due
to deficiencies in discovery, the bench trial was rescheduled.
The day before trial, Bell filed a second motion to disqualify Judge
Hines, which was substantively identical to the first motion to disqualify. At trial,
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the court denied the motion and issued a finding that the second motion to
disqualify did not contain any new facts “demonstrating prejudice and warranting
disqualification.” The trial court also found that the second motion did not comply
with local rules as it was not noticed for a hearing.
The court entered a judgment on pleadings because Bell was in
default for failing to file an answer to the amended complaint, failing to comply
with the order to file a brief, and for failure to answer requests for admissions.
Bell now appeals.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
The question of jurisdiction is one of law, meaning that the standard
of review to be applied is de novo. Appalachian Regional Healthcare, Inc. v.
Coleman, 239 S.W.3d 49 (Ky. 2007). See also Grange Mut. Ins. Co. v. Trude, 151
S.W.3d 803 (Ky. 2004).
III. ANALYSIS
Bell’s first ground for reversal is that the trial court lacked jurisdiction
because Warner was not a real party in interest. There is abundant authority for the
proposition that an assignee of contract rights is the real party of interest. See e.g.,
Maxwell v. Moorman, 522 S.W.2d 441 (Ky. 1975); Louisville & N.R. Co. v. Mack
Mfg. Corp., 269 S.W.2d 707 (Ky. 1954). A real party in interest is one having
actual substantial interest in the subject matter of action. Harris v. Jackson, 192
S.W.3d 297 (Ky. 2006); Combs v. Richards, 63 S.W.3d 193 (Ky. App. 2001);
Cannon v. Metry, 208 S.W.2d 520 (Ky. 1948).
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In this case, Zeilenga assigned his rights in interest to the underlying
contract to Warner for consideration of $10,000. A notarized document evidencing
this agreement between Zeilenga and Warner is included in the record. As an
assignee, Warner was a real party in interest and therefore, had proper standing to
bring this action.
Bell’s second argument is that the case should have been stayed
pending resolution of his second motion to disqualify the trial judge to which he
attached his affidavit. The second motion is substantively identical to the first
motion which was denied by the Chief Justice for being insufficient to demonstrate
any disqualifying circumstance under Kentucky Revised Statutes 26A.020(1) and
26A.015(2)(a) and (2)(d). “A party’s mere belief that a judge will not afford a fair
and impartial trial is not sufficient grounds to require recusal.” Webb v.
Commonwealth, 904 S.W.2d 226, 229 (Ky. 1995) (internal citations omitted). The
affidavit must contain facts which necessarily show prejudice or bias. See
generally Foster v. Commonwealth, 348 S.W.2d 759, 760 (Ky. 1961). Bell did not
present any facts to create even a remote appearance of bias. Additionally, the
second motion to disqualify did not comply with local rules as it was not noticed
for a hearing. Thus, the trial judge’s refusal to recuse himself was not error.
IV. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, the order of the McCracken Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
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BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Dennis Bell, Pro Se
Paducah, Kentucky
L. Lansden King
Paducah, Kentucky
Todd A. Farmer
Paducah, Kentucky
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