GOLDSMITH (WILLIAM) VS. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
RENDERED: MAY 7, 2010; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2009-CA-000530-MR
WILLIAM GOLDSMITH
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM BALLARD CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE TIMOTHY A. LANGFORD, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 08-CR-00054
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: CAPERTON AND MOORE, JUDGES; BUCKINGHAM,1 SENIOR
JUDGE.
MOORE, JUDGE: William Goldsmith appeals the judgment of the Ballard Circuit
Court convicting him of first-degree sexual abuse. After a careful review of the
1
Senior Judge David C. Buckingham, sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief
Justice pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and KRS 21.580.
record, we affirm because the unpreserved error alleged did not amount to palpable
error.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Goldsmith was incarcerated at the Ballard County Detention Center.
He shared a holding cell close to the guard station with Frank Edgar and Richard
Coleman. Sandra Alvarado, a Deputy Jailer at the Ballard County Detention
Center, was called to the cell. Goldsmith asked her to turn off the lights so that
they could go to sleep. Coleman testified that after the lights were out, Goldsmith
and Edgar attacked him. The attack lasted about five minutes, then stopped for a
few minutes.
While the attack on Coleman was stopped, Alvarado came to the cell
and asked what they were doing and why they were being so loud, and Goldsmith
and Edgar told her that they were just playing with Coleman and everything was
fine. Coleman testified that Alvarado told them to quiet down and she left.
Coleman attested that he did not say anything to Alvarado at that time because he
was afraid of what Goldsmith and Edgar might do to him if Alvarado did not
remove him from the cell.
Coleman testified that Goldsmith attacked him again. Goldsmith
exposed himself to Coleman and stuck his penis close to Coleman’s face and told
him to look at it. Coleman then yelled out and asked the guards to take him out of
the cell. Deputy Jeff Byrum came to the door. Edgar and Goldsmith again said
that they were just playing with Coleman. Coleman attested that Byrum left, but
-2-
he returned two minutes later and removed Coleman from the cell. Byrum testified
that when he removed Coleman from the cell, Coleman was visibly shaken and
almost in tears.
Alvarado also testified at trial concerning the events of the evening in
question. Alvarado testified that on that evening, she heard a loud noise and went
to investigate. She heard a lot of joking and laughing in the holding cell that
contained Goldsmith, Edgar, and Coleman, but she did not think any foul play was
occurring in the cell. She peered through the window into the cell and saw that
Goldsmith, Edgar, and Coleman were all laughing. She told them to be quiet.
Alvarado checked again about thirty minutes later and saw that they were all
laughing and joking around, so she told them to settle down and quiet down. She
was able to talk to all three of them at that time, and all three said there was no
problem.
Alvarado testified that when the cell was checked a third time, Byrum
checked it instead of her. Coleman came to the door and said “take me out. These
guys are trying to rape me.” After mentioning this at trial, the prosecutor
instructed Alvarado not to state what someone else said, and Goldsmith’s defense
attorney stated “yeah” in agreement but did not object to this testimony. Alvarado
testified that after a period of time, Coleman was escorted out of the cell, and he
appeared “shaken, scared, [and] frightened.”
-3-
Goldsmith was indicted on two counts of first-degree sexual abuse,
violations of KRS2 510.110. The circuit court granted a directed verdict
concerning one of those counts, and Goldsmith was found guilty of the remaining
count and sentenced to four years of imprisonment, to be served consecutively to
his sentences previously imposed in other cases.
Goldsmith now appeals, contending that improper hearsay statements
introduced by Alvarado during her trial testimony bolstered the in-court testimony
provided by Coleman, thereby prejudicing Goldsmith and resulting in palpable
error.
II. ANALYSIS
Goldsmith asserts that Alvarado made improper hearsay statements
during her testimony, which bolstered Coleman’s in-court testimony and resulted
in prejudice to Goldsmith. The allegedly improper hearsay statements to which
Goldsmith refers concern Alvarado’s testimony that when the cell was checked the
third time by Byrum, Coleman came to the door and said “take me out. These
guys are trying to rape me.” Goldsmith acknowledges in his appellate brief that
this issue is unpreserved, but he contends that it should be reviewed for palpable
error.
Kentucky Rule of Criminal Procedure (RCr) 10.26 provides as
follows: “A palpable error which affects the substantial rights of a party may be
considered . . . by an appellate court on appeal, even though insufficiently raised or
2
Kentucky Revised Statute.
-4-
preserved for review, and appropriate relief may be granted upon a determination
that manifest injustice has resulted from the error.”
[T]he requirement of “manifest injustice” as used in RCr
10.26 . . . mean[s] that the error must have prejudiced the
substantial rights of the defendant, . . . i.e., a substantial
possibility exists that the result of the trial would have
been different. . . .
[The Kentucky Supreme Court has] stated that upon
consideration of the whole case, the reviewing court must
conclude that a substantial possibility exists that the
result would have been different in order to grant relief.
Castle v. Commonwealth, 44 S.W.3d 790, 793-94 (Ky. App. 2000) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
Goldsmith cites Smith v. Commonwealth, 920 S.W.2d 514 (Ky. 1995),
in support of his argument that hearsay evidence which bolsters a victim’s
credibility is highly prejudicial and, therefore, grounds for reversing a conviction.
However, Smith is distinguishable from the present case. First, in Smith, the issue
of hearsay evidence as bolstering credibility was preserved for appellate review,
but the issue was not preserved in the present case. Thus, we are required to apply
the higher “palpable error” standard in determining whether to reverse Goldsmith’s
conviction, rather than simply applying the “reversible error” standard that was
used in Smith.
Second, in Smith, the hearsay testimony at issue did not satisfy an
exception to the hearsay rule, but the evidence in the present case does satisfy one
of those exceptions, specifically, the excited utterance exception.
-5-
[A]n excited utterance is a statement describing a
startling event or condition made while the declarant was
under the stress of excitement caused by the event or
condition. For an out-of-court statement to meet that
definition, the declarant’s condition at the time must give
the impression that the statement was spontaneous,
excited, or impulsive rather than the product of reflection
and deliberation. The eight factors to consider in
determining if a statement is an excited utterance are:
(i) lapse of time between the main act and the declaration
. . ., (ii) the opportunity or likelihood of fabrication, (iii)
the inducement to fabrication, (iv) the actual excitement
of the declarant, (v) the place of the declaration, (vi) the
presence there of visible results of the act or occurrence
to which the utterance relates, (vii) whether the utterance
was made in response to a question, and (viii) whether
the declaration was against interest or self-serving.
Hartsfield v. Commonwealth, 277 S.W.3d 239, 245 (Ky. 2009) (footnote and
internal quotation marks omitted and emphasis removed).
In the present case, the declaration occurred immediately after the
main act; no allegation was made that Coleman fabricated the statement; shortly
after he made the statement, Coleman appeared frightened, visibly shaken, and
almost in tears; the statement was made from the jail cell where the assault
occurred; the utterance was not made in response to any question; and the
declaration was not against Coleman’s interest, nor have there been any reasons
given for why it would be self-serving. Therefore, the declaration qualifies for the
excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule, and no error occurred in
introducing it at trial. Thus, this claim does not meet the palpable error standard
for reversing a conviction.
-6-
Moreover, we note that there is not a substantial possibility that the
result of the trial would have been different if Alvarado had not repeated the
excited utterance during trial because Coleman himself testified that Goldsmith
and Edgar told him that they were going to rape him; Coleman attested that
Goldsmith had forcibly committed sexual acts against him; and Byrum and
Alvarado testified that Coleman appeared visibly shaken, frightened, and on the
verge of tears when he was removed from the cell.
Accordingly, the judgment of the Ballard Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Steven Buck
Department of Public Advocacy
Frankfort, Kentucky
Jack Conway
Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
Gregory C. Fuchs
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
-7-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.