HASCH (JANICE) VS. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: JULY 2, 2010; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2009-CA-000463-MR
JANICE HASCH
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM BULLITT CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE RODNEY BURRESS, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 08-CR-00185
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
REVERSING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: DIXON AND NICKELL, JUDGES; LAMBERT,1 SENIOR JUDGE.
DIXON, JUDGE: Appellant, Janice Hasch, was convicted in the Bullitt Circuit
Court of reckless homicide and sentenced to two years’ imprisonment. She
appeals to this Court as a matter of right. For the reasons stated here, we reverse
1
Senior Judge Joseph Lambert sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and Kentucky Revised Statutes
(KRS) 21.580.
Appellant’s conviction and sentence.
On April 14, 2008, Appellant shot and killed her husband, Jerald
Hasch, in their Bullitt County home. During a video statement given to police
shortly after the shooting, Appellant maintained that she was a victim of domestic
violence and that she shot Jerald in self-protection. During the interview, Bullitt
County Detective Scott McGaha repeatedly asked Appellant if she could have fled
the house, thus avoiding the necessity to use deadly force.
In June 2008, Appellant was indicted by a Bullitt County Grand Jury
for murder. She thereafter moved to dismiss the indictment on immunity grounds
under KRS 503.085 and requested an evidentiary hearing. In addition, she moved
to suppress or redact her video interview to omit the questioning regarding her duty
to retreat.2 The trial court denied both motions.
During the February 2008 jury trial, the Commonwealth’s theory was
that Appellant intentionally shot and killed Jerald after becoming angry with him.
In her defense, Appellant took the stand and testified that Jerald had physically and
mentally abused her for a number of years. Appellant explained that on the day of
the incident, she had been cleaning a bedroom closet when she discovered a
handgun on the floor that Jerald had been missing. Appellant said that when she
showed Jerald the gun, still unloaded and zipped in its carrying pouch, he reacted
violently. Appellant claimed that Jerald kept coming toward her, demanding the
gun. A struggle broke out in the kitchen and Jerald pushed Appellant to the floor
2
We would observe that Deputy McGaha questioned Appellant about her ability to leave twelve
times during the twenty-seven minute statement.
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causing her to hit her head on the refrigerator. Appellant testified that she was
afraid that if Jerald got the gun from her he would kill her.
Appellant continued that she was able to get to another part of the
house but Jerald kept coming toward her repeatedly chanting, “Give me the gun. If
you intend to shoot that you better shoot to kill. Shoot me between the eyes.”
Appellant then removed the gun from the pouch, loaded the clip and pointed the
gun at Jerald, demanding that he back away from her. Appellant stated that she
asked Jerald to let her leave the house but that he had installed keyed dead bolts on
the doors and kept possession of the keys. Despite Appellant’s pleas, Jerald kept
approaching and when he lunged at her, she fired the gun. She testified that she
was determined that “she was not going to die” and that if she didn’t shoot him she
knew he would kill her.
At the close of evidence, the defense requested instructions on
intentional murder and self-protection. However, over defense objection, the trial
court also instructed the jury on wanton murder, a wanton or reckless belief
qualification to self-protection (otherwise known as “imperfect self-defense”),
second-degree manslaughter and reckless homicide. The jury returned a verdict
finding Appellant guilty of reckless homicide and recommended two years’
imprisonment. The trial court entered judgment accordingly and this appeal
ensued.
On appeal, Appellant argues that the trial court erred by (1) failing to
grant a pretrial hearing to determine immunity under KRS 503.085; (2) admitting
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the medical examiner’s report as an exhibit; (3) refusing to redact her video
interview wherein police repeatedly asked her whether she could have left the
residence; (4) excluding the testimony of two witnesses; (5) instructing the jury as
to lesser-included offenses not supported by the evidence; and (6) erroneously
instructing the jury during the penalty phase. As we conclude that the guilt phase
instructions were indeed erroneous and require reversal we need not reach the
evidentiary issues.
As previously noted, Appellant argued that the evidence only
supported instructions on intentional murder and self-protection. Nevertheless, the
trial court instructed the jury on several lesser-included offenses. The instruction
under which Appellant was convicted provided:
INSTRUCTION NO. 5
RECKLESS HOMICIDE
If you do not find Defendant guilty under Instruction No.
4, you will find the Defendant guilty of Reckless
Homicide under this instruction if, and only if, you
believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt all
of the following:
A. That in this county on or about April 14, 2008 and
before the finding of the Indictment herein, she killed
Jerald Hasch by shooting him with a handgun.
AND
B. That in so doing, she was acting recklessly or as
described in paragraph C.(2) of this Instruction;
AND
C. That in so doing,
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(1) She was not privileged to act in self-protection;
OR
(2) Though otherwise privileged to act in self protection,
the Defendant was mistaken in her belief that it was
necessary to use physical force against Jerald Hasch in
self protection, or in her belief in the degree of force
necessary to protect herself and that when she killed
Jerald Hasch, she failed to perceive a substantial and
unjustifiable risk that she was mistaken in that belief, and
that her failure to perceive that risk constituted a gross
deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable
person would have observed in the situation
The first part of the above instruction is essentially a standard reckless
homicide instruction requiring a finding that Appellant, in shooting Jerald, acted
recklessly as the term was defined in the instructions and was not privileged to act
in self-protection. Subsection C.(2) is a restatement of the reckless belief
qualification to self-protection. As stated in KRS 503.120(1),
When the defendant believes that the use of force upon or
toward the person of another is necessary for any of the
purposes for which such belief would establish a
justification under KRS 503.050 to 503.110 but the
defendant is wanton or reckless in believing the use of
any force, or the degree of force used, to be necessary in
acquiring or failing to acquire any knowledge or belief
which is material to the justifiability of his use of force,
the justification afforded by those sections is unavailable
in a prosecution for an offense for which wantonness or
recklessness, as the case may be, suffices to establish
culpability.
The purpose of KRS 503.120 is to limit the effect of the subjective
belief provisions of KRS 503.050 and the other KRS Chapter 503 justifications to
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the extent that a belief which is so unreasonable that it rises to the level of
wantonness or recklessness with respect to the circumstance then being
encountered by the defendant, e.g., whether he needed to act in self-protection,
does not result in acquittal, but rather in conviction of a lesser offense for which
wantonness or recklessness is the culpable mental state, such as second-degree
manslaughter or reckless homicide. Elliott v. Commonwealth, 976 S.W.2d 416,
420 (Ky. 1998). However, as reiterated by our Supreme Court in Commonwealth
v. Hager, 41 S.W.3d 828, 841 (Ky. 2001), “a mistaken belief in the need to act in
self-protection does not affect the privilege to act in self-protection unless the
mistaken belief is so unreasonably held as to rise to the level of wantonness or
recklessness with respect to the circumstance then being encountered by the
defendant.” (Emphasis added). Furthermore, because the language of KRS
503.120(1) “limits its application to whether the defendant was wanton or reckless
with respect to a circumstance, e.g., whether he needed to act in self-protection, it
has no application to whether he was wanton or reckless with respect to the result
of his conduct, e.g., whether his act would cause the death of another person.”
Elliott, 976 S.W.2d at 420.
In finding Appellant guilty of reckless homicide under Instruction No.
5, the jury had to conclude that Appellant’s conduct was reckless and she was not
privileged to act in self-protection at the time she shot and killed Jerald, or that her
mistaken belief in the need for self-protection was “so unreasonably held as to rise
to the level of wantonness or recklessness with respect to the circumstance then
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being encountered by the defendant.” Hager, 41 S.W.3d at 841. Our review of the
record and trial video leads to the inescapable conclusion that there was simply no
evidence to support such instruction.
As previously noted, the Commonwealth’s theory was that Appellant
intentionally shot and killed her husband. At trial and in its brief to this Court,
however, the Commonwealth maintains that Appellant’s ability to leave the home
at the time of the incident was relevant to whether she was mistaken in her belief in
the need for self-protection. Specifically, citing to Rodgers v. Commonwealth, 285
S.W.3d 740 (Ky. 2009), the Commonwealth argues that the “absence of a legal
duty to retreat does not make retreat/no retreat irrelevant. . . . [R]etreat remains a
factor to be considered among the totality of the circumstances . . . .”
We believe the Commonwealth has misconstrued the holding of
Rodgers. In discussing its prior opinion in Hilbert v. Commonwealth, 162 S.W.3d
921 (Ky. 2005), the Court noted that “as enacted in 1975 the Penal Code
incorporated the pre-code rule that while Kentucky does not condition the right of
self-defense on a duty to retreat, retreat remains a factor amidst the totality of
circumstances the jury is authorized to consider.” Importantly, however, the Court
specifically held that Hilbert and the pre-code rule were not applicable to conduct
occurring after July 12, 2006, the effective date of Senate Bill 38 providing that the
right to use force, including deadly force, in self-defense is not contingent upon a
duty to retreat. See KRS 503.050(4). Thus, we are of the opinion that whether
Appellant was or was not able to retreat did not go to whether she was mistaken in
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her belief in the need for self-protection. The record is simply devoid of any
evidence that Appellant’s belief in the need for self-protection was mistaken, much
less that any mistake was so “unreasonably held as to rise to the level of
wantonness or recklessness with respect to the circumstance then being
encountered.” See Hager, 41 S.W.3d at 841.
Nor do we find any merit in the Commonwealth’s and the trial court’s
belief that because Appellant closed her eyes when she fired the gun she acted
recklessly. Appellant indeed testified that she shut her eyes when she pulled the
trigger. However, when questioned as to why she did so she stated, “I shut my
eyes because I could not bear to see what was about to happen.” Appellant had
previously testified that she was experienced with guns and that she intentionally
loaded the handgun, pointed it at Jerald, and fired the weapon when he lunged at
her. That is plainly not evidence of reckless conduct.
The trial court has a duty to instruct upon the whole law applicable to
the case: “In a criminal case, it is the duty of the trial judge to prepare and give
instructions on the whole law of the case, and this rule requires instructions
applicable to every state of the case deducible or supported to any extent by the
testimony.” Taylor v. Commonwealth, 995 S.W.2d 355, 360 (Ky. 1999); see also
RCr 9.54(1). An instruction on a lesser included offense is not required unless the
evidence is such that a reasonable juror could doubt that the defendant is guilty of
the crime charged, yet conclude that he is guilty of a lesser included offense.
Webb v. Commonwealth, 904 S.W.2d 226, 229 (Ky. 1995). Based upon the
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evidence presented at trial, we agree with Appellant that only instructions as to
intentional murder and self-protection were supported by the evidence. We cannot
conclude that any evidence was introduced that Appellant acted wantonly or
recklessly in her conduct, or that she was wanton or reckless in her belief in the
need for self-protection. As such, the lesser-included instructions were clearly
erroneous.
As a general rule, retrial after reversal of a conviction is not barred by
double jeopardy principles. McGinnis v. Wine, 959 S.W.2d 437, 438 (Ky. 1998).
However, there are two exceptions to this rule. First, ‘the double jeopardy clause
precludes retrial ‘once the reviewing court has found the evidence legally
insufficient’ to support the conviction.” Id. at 438 (quoting Burks v. United States,
437 U.S. 1, 18, 98 S.Ct. 2141, 2150-51, 57 L.Ed.2d 1 (1978). Second, “the
conviction of a defendant of a lesser-included offense constitutes an acquittal of all
higher degrees of the offense. Accordingly, if the conviction of the lesser-included
offense is reversed on appeal, the defendant cannot be retried upon any other
higher degrees of the offense.” Smith v. Commonwealth, 737 S.W.2d 683, 688
(Ky. 1987) (citing Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 78 S.Ct. 221, 2 L.Ed.2d
199 (1957). Herein, by finding Appellant guilty of reckless homicide, the jury
obviously did not believe she was guilty of murder. While we cannot discern from
the verdict whether the jury believed Appellant acted recklessly in shooting Jerald
or whether she was reckless in her belief in the need for self-protection, our
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determination that the instruction was erroneous necessarily requires acquittal of
the higher offenses. Thus, Appellant cannot be retried on such offenses.
Although Appellant’s argument regarding the trial court’s error in
denying an evidentiary hearing on the immunity issue is rendered moot by our
decision herein, we feel it necessary to address the issue. In denying Appellant’s
motion for a pretrial hearing, the trial court ruled,
Defendant argues that the plain language of [KRS
503.085] entitles her to dismissal if she can establish the
use of force permitted in KRS 503.050. The Defendant
maintains that she is entitled to a pre-trial hearing to
determine if she is entitled to invoke the immunity
provisions of that statute.
...
The effect of Defendant’s motion is to request that this
Court substitute its judgment in determining whether
there was sufficient evidence to justify an indictment in
this action. To do so this Court would be required to
consider evidence tendered to the Grand Jury and
determine if the evidence supported the indictment given
the Defendant’s alleged immunity from prosecution.
...
The stage of the proceeding where the court has authority
to dismiss under these circumstances is not in a pretrial
proceeding.
KRS 503.085, enacted in 2006, grants immunity to those who
justifiably use self-defense. The statute provides in relevant part:
(1) A person who uses force as permitted in KRS
503.050, 503.055, 503.070, and 503.080 is justified in
using such force and is immune from criminal
prosecution and civil action for the use of such force,
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unless the person against whom the force was used is a
peace officer, as defined in KRS 446.010, who was
acting in the performance of his or her official duties and
the officer identified himself or herself in accordance
with any applicable law, or the person using force knew
or reasonably should have known that the person was a
peace officer. As used in this subsection, the term
“criminal prosecution” includes arresting, detaining in
custody, and charging or prosecuting the defendant.
(2) A law enforcement agency may use standard
procedures for investigating the use of force as described
in subsection (1) of this section, but the agency may not
arrest the person for using force unless it determines that
there is probable cause that the force that was used was
unlawful.
The statute is “purely procedural, and by prohibiting prosecution of one who has
justifiably defended himself, his property or others, it in effect creates a new
exception to the general rule that trial courts may not dismiss indictments prior to
trial.” Rodgers v. Commonwealth, 285 S.W.3d at 753.
Recently, the Kentucky Supreme Court addressed the difficulty in the
procedural implementation of KRS 503.085:
The trial judge's uncertainty regarding how to implement
the immunity provision is understandable because the
statute offers little guidance. Indeed, the only express
indication of legislative intent is in KRS 503.085(2)
which provides that immunity must be granted pre-arrest
by the law enforcement agency investigating the crime
unless there is “probable cause that the force used was
unlawful.” Because the statute defines the “criminal
prosecution” from which a defendant justifiably acting in
self-defense is immune to be “arresting, detaining in
custody and charging or prosecuting,” we can infer that
the immunity determination is not confined to law
enforcement personnel. Instead, the statute contemplates
that the prosecutor and the courts may also be called
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upon to determine whether a particular defendant is
entitled to KRS 503.085 immunity. Regardless of who is
addressing the immunity claim, we infer from the statute
that the controlling standard of proof remains “probable
cause.” Thus, in order for the prosecutor to bring charges
or seek an indictment, there must be probable cause to
conclude that the force used by the defendant was not
fully justified under the controlling provision or
provisions of KRS Chapter 503. Similarly, once the
matter is before a judge, if the defendant claims
immunity the court must dismiss the case unless there is
probable cause to conclude that the force used was not
legally justified.
Probable cause is a standard with which
prosecutors, defense counsel and judges in the
Commonwealth are very familiar although it often eludes
definition. Recently, in Commonwealth v. Jones, 217
S.W.3d 190 (Ky. 2006), this Court noted the United
States Supreme Court's definition in Illinois v. Gates, 462
U.S. 213, 232, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983):
“[P]robable cause is a fluid concept-turning on the
assessment of probabilities in particular factual contextsnot readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of
legal rules.” Just as judges consider the totality of the
circumstances in determining whether probable cause
exists to issue a search warrant, they must consider all of
the circumstances then known to determine whether
probable cause exists to conclude that a defendant's use
of force was unlawful. If such cause does not exist,
immunity must be granted and, conversely, if it does
exist, the matter must proceed.
Because immunity is designed to relieve a
defendant from the burdens of litigation, it is obvious that
a defendant should be able to invoke KRS 503.085(1) at
the earliest stage of the proceeding. While the trial courts
need not address the issue sua sponte, once the defendant
raises the immunity bar by motion, the court must
proceed expeditiously. Thus a defendant may invoke
KRS 503.085 immunity and seek a determination at the
preliminary hearing in district court or, alternatively, he
may elect to await the outcome of the grand jury
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proceedings and, if indicted, present his motion to the
circuit judge. A defendant may not, however, seek
dismissal on immunity grounds in both courts. Once the
district court finds probable cause to believe that the
defendant's use of force was unlawful, the circuit court
should not revisit the issue. In the case of a direct
submission or where a defendant has elected to wait and
invoke immunity in the circuit court, the issue should be
raised promptly so that it can be addressed as a threshold
motion.
The sole remaining issue is how the trial courts
should proceed in determining probable cause. The
burden is on the Commonwealth to establish probable
cause and it may do so by directing the court's attention
to the evidence of record including witness statements,
investigative letters prepared by law enforcement
officers, photographs and other documents of record.
Although Rodgers advocates an evidentiary hearing at
which the defendant may counter probable cause with
proof “by a preponderance of the evidence” that the force
was justified, this concept finds no support in the statute.
The legislature did not delineate an evidentiary hearing
and the only standard of proof against which a
defendant's conduct must be measured is the
aforementioned probable cause. We decline to create a
hearing right that the statute does not recognize.
Rodgers, 285 S.W.3d at 754-55.
In light of Rodgers, there is no question that Appellant was not
entitled to an evidentiary hearing. However, the trial court was mistaken in its
belief that it could not or should not reconsider the evidence presented to the grand
jury. Indeed, once Appellant raised the issue of immunity, she was entitled to a
determination by the trial court of whether the Commonwealth could meet its
burden of establishing that there was probable cause to conclude that the force used
by Appellant was not legally justified. Id.
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For the reasons discussed herein, judgment of the Bullitt Circuit Court
convicting Appellant of reckless homicide is hereby reversed.
NICKELL, JUDGE, CONCURS.
LAMBERT, SENIOR JUDGE, DISSENTS.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
G. Murray Turner
Louisville, Kentucky
Jack Conway
Attorney General of Kentucky
James C. Shackelford
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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