CECIL (ROBERT) VS. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: NOVEMBER 24, 2010; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2009-CA-000462-MR
ROBERT CECIL
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM BULLITT CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE ELISE GIVHAN SPAINHOUR, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 94-CR-00066
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: CAPERTON AND WINE, JUDGES; LAMBERT,1 SENIOR JUDGE.
WINE, JUDGE: In August 1994, a Bullitt County grand jury returned an
indictment charging Robert Cecil, Jr. with one count each of first-degree rape,
first-degree sodomy, attempted first-degree sodomy, and kidnapping. The charges
arose from allegations of a kidnapping and sexual assault upon C.M. in May 1994.
Thereafter, Cecil was also charged with being a second-degree persistent felony
1
Senior Judge Joseph E. Lambert sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and KRS 21.580.
offender. The first trial ended in a mistrial when the jury failed to reach a verdict
on any of the charges. But after a second trial, the jury convicted Cecil on all of
the charged offenses. The jury fixed his sentence at a total of forty-two years’
imprisonment, which the trial court imposed.
Cecil appealed his conviction to the Kentucky Supreme Court,
arguing that (1) the trial court erred by admitting evidence of his prior sexual
offenses; (2) the trial court erred by failing to provide a limiting instruction to the
jury regarding the relevance of his prior sexual offenses; (3) the trial court erred by
determining that the Kentucky Revised Statute(s) (“KRS”) 509.050 exceptions to
kidnapping did not apply to him; and (4) the trial court erred by refusing to admit
evidence that C.M. had a venereal disease at the time of the rape. Cecil conceded
that the second and third issues were not preserved, but requested palpable error
review. Kentucky Rule(s) of Criminal Procedure (“RCr”) 10.26. The Supreme
Court found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion on the preserved
evidentiary issues, and found no palpable error on the remaining issues. Cecil v.
Commonwealth, No. 2002-SC-0252-MR, 2003 WL 22975018 (Ky. 2004).
Thereafter, on March 15, 2005, Cecil filed a motion to vacate, set
aside or correct his sentence pursuant to RCr 11.42. The trial court conducted
evidentiary hearings on the motion on May 1, 2006, and November 16, 2007.
After considering the evidence and arguments of counsel, the trial court denied
Cecil’s motion in an order entered on February 3, 2009. Cecil now appeals from
this order.
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In order to prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a
movant must show that his counsel's performance was deficient and that, but for
the deficiency, the outcome would have been different. Strickland v. Washington,
466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984). The standard
for assessing counsel's performance is whether the alleged acts or omissions were
outside the wide range of prevailing professional norms based on an objective
standard of reasonableness. Id. at 688-89, 104 S. Ct. at 2065. A court must
indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of
reasonable professional assistance. Id. The defendant bears the burden of
identifying specific acts or omissions alleged to constitute deficient performance.
Id. at 690, 104 S. Ct. at 2066.
In measuring prejudice, the relevant inquiry is whether “there is a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the
proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability
sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. at 694, 104 S. Ct. at 2068.
The burden is on the movant to overcome a strong presumption that counsel's
performance was constitutionally sufficient. Id. at 689, 104 S. Ct. at 2065;
Commonwealth v. Pelfrey, 998 S.W.2d 460, 463 (Ky. 1999). When an evidentiary
hearing is held in an RCr 11.42 proceeding, RCr 11.42(6) requires the trial court to
make findings on the material issues of fact, which we review under a clearly
erroneous standard. Kentucky Rule(s) of Civil Procedure (“CR”) 52.01; Haight v.
Commonwealth, 41 S.W.3d 436, 442 (Ky. 2001).
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As an initial matter, the trial court declined to consider several of
Cecil’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, noting that the underlying
claims were raised and rejected in the direct appeal. In so ruling, the trial court
relied on the line of cases from Sanborn v. Commonwealth, 975 S.W.2d 905 (Ky.
1998), through Simmons v. Commonwealth, 191 S.W.3d 557, 561 (Ky. 2006),
which held that a defendant could not raise issues in a post-conviction motion if
those issues were reviewed as palpable error on direct appeal. However, in Martin
v. Commonwealth, 207 S.W.3d 1 (Ky. 2006), the Kentucky Supreme Court
rejected this reasoning, holding that palpable error review on direct appeal is a
fundamentally different analysis than collateral attack based on ineffective
assistance of counsel. Consequently, the Court concluded that the appellate
resolution of an alleged direct error cannot serve as a procedural bar to a related
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Id. at 5.
More recently, in Leonard v. Commonwealth, 279 S.W.3d 151 (Ky.
2009), the Supreme Court recognized that the reasoning in Martin conflicted with
the Sanborn-Simmons line of cases and the Court explicitly overruled the prior
rule. Id. at 157-59. Based on this change in the law, Cecil contends that the trial
court erred by declining to consider several of his allegations of ineffective
assistance of counsel.
We agree with Cecil that he was entitled to raise these issues in his
RCr 11.42 motion. Under Martin and Leonard, a movant in an RCr 11.42
proceeding may raise a collateral claim of ineffective assistance of counsel even
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when a related claim of error was previously addressed on direct appeal as palpable
error. The controlling question is whether the collateral claim actually presents a
different issue from that presented on direct review. Id. at 159.
In this appeal, Cecil raises three claims of ineffective assistance of
counsel which the Supreme Court previously addressed on direct appeal. The first
two issues concern L.K.’s testimony about a prior sexual offense. In 1988, Cecil
was charged with a sexual assault on L.K. At trial in this case, the Commonwealth
introduced the testimony of L.K to demonstrate a common modus operendi
between the two attacks. On direct appeal, the Supreme Court found that the
evidence of Cecil’s prior bad acts was admissible under Kentucky Rule(s) of
Evidence (“KRE”) 404(b). Cecil, supra at 2.
Cecil further argued on direct appeal that L.K. improperly testified
that Cecil “plea bargained” after a mistrial in that case. In addressing this issue,
the Supreme Court noted that Cecil’s counsel immediately objected to the
testimony and the Commonwealth withdrew the question. Since Cecil’s trial
counsel did not request a ruling from the court or an admonition to the jury, the
Supreme Court concluded that the error was not preserved. And upon
consideration of the case as a whole, the Supreme Court was not convinced that
L.K.’s motion resulted in manifest injustice. Id.
In this motion, Cecil maintains that his trial counsel was deficient for
failing to request a limiting instruction as to the use of evidence of his prior bad
acts and an admonition regarding L.K.’s testimony that he had pleaded guilty to a
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lesser charge in the 1988 trial. However, he does not develop this argument to any
significant degree.2 Although Cecil’s trial counsel testified at the evidentiary
hearing on the motion, Cecil did not ask his former counsel about his failure to
make these motions.
Moreover, he does support his bare assertions that trial counsel’s
failure to make these arguments was deficient or that it affected the outcome of the
trial. The Supreme Court specifically found that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion by allowing L.K. to testify about the circumstances surrounding the
1988 charges. Although a limiting instruction may have been appropriate, Cecil
makes no showing that it was necessary under the circumstances. Likewise, while
an admonition may have been appropriate after L.K. mentioned Cecil’s guilty plea,
Cecil makes no argument that it was required under the circumstances. Therefore,
he has failed to show that trial counsel’s failure to make these motions amounted to
ineffective assistance.
In the third issue which was previously addressed in the direct appeal,
Cecil challenges his trial counsel’s efforts to admit evidence that C.M. had a
venereal disease. At trial, Cecil argued that this evidence was relevant because he
would have contracted the disease if he had raped C.M. The trial court excluded
2
In his statement of the case, Cecil suggests that defense counsel contends that trial counsel
should have attempted to impeach L.K. by using prior, inconsistent statements rather than by
pointing to the mistrial in the 1988 case. But in the argument section of the brief, he only
discusses his trial counsel’s failure to request a limiting instruction and an admonition. In the
absence of any further argument on the former issues, we must conclude that he has waived
review of this matter.
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this evidence and the Supreme Court, reviewing the issue as preserved error,
upheld the trial court’s exclusion of this evidence. The Court first noted that there
was no evidence in the record to support any of his factual assertions. The
Supreme Court further found that the evidence was inadmissible under KRE 412.
Id. at 4.
In this motion, Cecil contends that his trial counsel should have
obtained expert testimony to demonstrate the relevance of this evidence. Again,
Cecil does not develop this argument, and he presents no evidence of what type of
expert testimony would have demonstrated this relevance. More to the point, even
if Cecil had established the factual basis for his assertions that C.M. had a venereal
disease, that he did not have a venereal disease, and that he would have contracted
it had he raped her, the Supreme Court held that the evidence was not admissible
under any of the narrow exceptions to KRE 412. Thus, the evidence would not
have been admitted even if trial counsel had obtained such expert testimony.
We now turn to the other two issues raised in Cecil’s motion. Cecil
first argues that his trial counsel failed to present the testimony of John Carr to
support his version and to contradict C.M.’s account of events during the time
period in question. He also contends that Carr would have testified that C.M.’s
demeanor on the day in question was not consistent with her allegations that she
had been sexually assaulted.
However, matters involving trial strategy, such as the decision to call
a witness or not, generally will not be second-guessed by hindsight. Moore v.
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Commonwealth, 983 S.W.2d 479, 484 (Ky. 1998). Trial counsel testified that he
found Carr’s testimony at the first trial to be more damaging than helpful. Carr’s
testimony was inconsistent on several significant points, and he had made
contradictory statements to police during their investigation of the matter. Under
the circumstances, we agree with the trial court that counsel’s decision not to call
Carr was within the range of sound trial strategy.
Finally, Cecil argues that his trial counsel failed to obtain a defense
expert to rebut the testimony of Dr. William King and Kentucky State Police Lab
Analyst Robert Thurman, who both testified for the Commonwealth at trial. Dr.
King was the emergency room physician who examined C.M. after the assault, and
Mr. Thurman analyzed the physical evidence collected by the police. Both experts
testified that the lack of semen or the absence of genital injuries would not
preclude a finding that C.M. had been raped. Cecil contends that an expert would
have effectively emphasized the lack of physical evidence showing that a sexual
assault had occurred. Cecil also argues that he may have successfully challenged
the qualifications of Dr. King and Mr. Thurman to render these opinions.
The trial court did not address this issue in its order denying the RCr
11.42 motion. However, Cecil and the Commonwealth each presented evidence to
support their respective positions. Cecil presented the testimony of a forensic
pathologist, Dr. Janice Ophoven. Dr. Ophoven testified that the presence of semen
and genital injury are both primary indicators that a forcible sexual assault has
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occurred. Dr. Ophoven opined that the absence of these indicators would not
support a conclusion that a forcible sexual assault had occurred.
In rebuttal, the Commonwealth presented the testimony of Dr.
William Smock, professor of emergency medicine at the University of Louisville.
Dr. Smock strongly disagreed with Dr. Ophoven’s opinion that the lack of semen
or injury indicates that a sexual assault did not occur. The Commonwealth also
pointed out that Cecil’s trial counsel vigorously cross-examined Dr. King and Mr.
Thurman about the lack of conclusive physical evidence of a sexual assault.
Finally, there was other physical evidence supporting C.M.’s allegations of a
sexual assault, most notably the presence of rope burns on her wrists.
Trial counsel will not be deemed ineffective merely because he failed
to retain a rebutting expert witness. Rather, the controlling question is whether
counsel’s failure to retain an expert rendered the verdict unreliable. Thompson v.
Commonwealth, 177 S.W.3d 782, 786-87 (Ky. 2005). The trial court must
consider counsel's overall performance in light of the totality of the evidence to
determine whether the acts or omissions are sufficient to overcome the strong
presumption that counsel provided effective assistance. Simmons, supra at 561;
overruled on other grounds in Leonard, supra.
In this case, the record shows that Cecil’s trial counsel attempted to
refute Dr. King’s and Mr. Thurman’s opinions through cross-examination. Given
the conflicting opinions by Dr. Ophoven and Dr. Smock and the presence of other
physical evidence corroborating C.M.’s account, Cecil has not shown a reasonable
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probability that the result of the trial would have been different if his trial counsel
had retained an expert witness. Consequently, we cannot find that trial counsel’s
actions were deficient or that Cecil was unfairly prejudiced as a result.
Accordingly, the order of the Bullitt Circuit Court denying Cecil’s
RCr 11.42 motion is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Michael L. Goodwin
Louisville, Kentucky
Jack Conway
Attorney General of Kentucky
Bryan D. Morrow
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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