COCHRAN (JERRY) VS. PREMIER CONCRETE PUMPING, INC.
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RENDERED: APRIL 30, 2010; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2009-CA-000457-MR
JERRY COCHRAN
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE ANN O’MALLEY SHAKE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 06-CI-006650
PREMIER CONCRETE PUMPING, INC.,
A/K/A PREMIER CONCRETE
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: STUMBO, TAYLOR, AND VANMETER, JUDGES.
STUMBO, JUDGE: Jerry Cochran appeals two orders of the Jefferson Circuit
Court. One allowed Premier Concrete to amend its Answer to assert the
affirmative defense of statute of limitations. The other order granted summary
judgment in favor of Premier Concrete. Cochran argues that Premier Concrete
should not have been allowed to amend its Answer and that summary judgment
should not have been granted. We find no error and affirm.
On October 3, 2004, Cochran was on a construction site to pour
concrete from a concrete truck. While operating the truck’s pump hose, which
directs the flow of concrete, Cochran was flung to the ground and onto steel rebar.
The hose was connected to a boom, which is connected to the truck. The boom
was being operated by another employee via a remote control outside of the truck.
Cochran alleged that it was the negligent use of this boom that caused the hose to
fling him to the ground. Due to the accident, Cochran suffered physical injuries
and incurred medical expenses, as well as a loss of wages and the ability to
continue in his line of work.
On July 27, 2006, Cochran filed the underlying lawsuit against
Premier Concrete. In the Complaint, Cochran alleged that an employee of Premier
Concrete “carelessly and negligently operated a motor vehicle so as to cause it to
crash into” him. Cochran was utilizing the Kentucky Motor Vehicle Reparations
Act (MVRA) to bring the suit.
Premier Concrete tendered an Answer on August 9, 2006, and
affirmatively pled the provisions of the MVRA. Discovery proceeded and on
January 11, 2008, a deposition was taken of Appellant. It was after this deposition
that Premier Concrete moved to amend its Answer to include the statute of
limitations defense found in Kentucky Revised Statute (KRS) 413.140 which states
that an action for an injury to the person must be brought within one year. An
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action for injury under the MVRA must be brought within two years. Premier
Concrete alleged that the injury described by Cochran was not caused by a motor
vehicle and therefore should have been brought within a year.
A hearing was held before Judge Kathleen Voor Montano on March
31, 2008. The motion was subsequently denied. Judge Montano unexpectedly
died a week later. After a new temporary judge was appointed, Premier Concrete
tendered a motion to reconsider. On August 22, 2008, the new judge, Judge Ann
Shake, granted the motion to reconsider and allowed Premier Concrete to amend
its Answer. Judge Shake stated that Premier Concrete made a good faith argument
that it did not and could not have known the MVRA might not apply to this case
until after Cochran was deposed. Judge Shake was referring to the fact that the
Complaint alleged that a motor vehicle crashed into Cochran, but that it was not
until the deposition that it was discovered that a hose connected to the vehicle
while the vehicle was immobilized to pour concrete was the cause of the injury.
After Premier Concrete filed its Amended Answer, it then filed a
motion for summary judgment. At this time, a permanent judge was appointed,
Judge Irv Maze. Premier Concrete argued that the injury was not caused by a
motor vehicle accident and therefore, the MVRA and its two-year statute of
limitation did not apply. Premier Concrete believed that the one-year statute of
limitation provided by KRS 413.140 applied and since the injury occurred on
October 3, 2004, but the Complaint was not filed until July 27, 2006, the action
should be barred.
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The trial court granted the motion for summary judgment. The trial
court found that one of the goals of the MVRA is to ensure operators of motor
vehicles “procure insurance covering basic reparation benefits and legal liability
arising out of ownership, operation or use of such motor vehicles . . . .” KRS
304.39-010(1). It went on to find that for the MVRA to be applicable, the motor
vehicle in question must be in use as a motor vehicle at the time of the accident.
The court focused on KRS 304.39-020(6) which defines “use of a motor vehicle”
as:
any utilization of the motor vehicle as a vehicle including
occupying, entering into, and alighting from it. It does
not include:
(a) Conduct within the course of a business of repairing,
servicing, or otherwise maintaining motor vehicles unless
the conduct occurs off the business premises; or
(b) Conduct in the course of loading and unloading the
vehicle unless the conduct occurs while occupying,
entering into, or alighting from it. (Emphasis added).
The trial court held that at the time of the accident, the truck was
parked, braced,1 and unoccupied. The court went on to hold that at the time
Cochran was injured, the truck was not being used as a vehicle, but as a machine
that assisted in the pouring of concrete. Because it was not being used as a vehicle
at the time of the accident, the MVRA did not apply and its two-year statute of
limitations was inapplicable. Therefore, the one-year limitation applied and the
case was not brought timely. This appeal followed.
1
When the truck is being used to pour concrete, legs extend from the truck, lifting it off the
ground in order to better brace it.
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Cochran’s first argument on appeal is that the trial court erred in
allowing Premier Concrete to amend its Answer to include the KRS 413.140
statute of limitations. Cochran argues that Premier Concrete waived the statute of
limitation defense by not affirmatively pleading it in its first Answer. CR 8.03;
Thompson v. Ward, 409 S.W.2d 807 (Ky. 1966).
Premier Concrete claims that the court properly allowed it to amend
its Answer because as soon as it discovered all the relevant facts, i.e., that the
MVRA might not apply, it sought to amend the Answer.
We find there was no error. The trial court has broad discretion in
allowing a pleading to be amended. CR 15.01; Ashland Fin. Co. v. Hartford Acc.
& Indem. Co., 474 S.W.2d 364 (Ky. 1971); Lawrence v. Marks, 355 S.W.2d 162
(Ky. 1961). The trial court did not abuse that discretion in allowing Premier
Concrete to amend its Answer. Once Premier Concrete discovered that Cochran
was injured by the hose and boom while concrete was being unloaded, it moved to
amend. As the trial court held in its order granting the motion to amend, Premier
Concrete made a good faith argument that it could not have known the MVRA
may not have applied until after it deposed Cochran. We agree and affirm.
Cochran’s second argument is that the trial court should not have
granted summary judgment because the cement truck was being used as it was
intended to be used. He also argues that because the cement truck was a motor
vehicle, the MVRA applies, along with its two-year statute of limitations.
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Premier Concrete argues that summary judgment was properly
granted because at the time of the accident, the truck was being used as a pumping
machine and not a motor vehicle. Premier Concrete claims that the trial court was
correct in utilizing the one-year statute of limitations for this reason. We agree.
In order for the MVRA to be applicable, the vehicle must be used “as
a vehicle.” At the time of the accident, no one was occupying, entering into, or
alighting from the truck. Cochran brings our attention to Goodin v. Overnight
Transp. Co., 701 S.W.2d 131 (Ky. 1985). In Goodin, a person was injured while
unloading the trailer of a parked semi-truck. Unlike the case at bar, the injured
party was inside the trailer at the time of the injury. The court found that an injury
while unloading an attached trailer came under the purview of the MVRA. It also
found that the unloading of the trailer fit within the definition of “use of a motor
vehicle.” Cochran argues that the trailer in Goodin is similar to the hose and boom
in the case sub judice.
We disagree and find that the case of State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.
v. Hudson, 775 S.W.2d 922 (Ky. 1989), is more on point. In Hudson, Hudson was
injured when a log rolled off the back of his tractor trailer and struck him. At the
time of the injury, he was standing on the ground and unfastening the chain that
had secured the log. The Kentucky Supreme Court found that because Hudson
was unloading the truck, but not occupying, entering into, or alighting from it, he
was not entitled to MVRA benefits. The Court distinguished the fact situation in
Hudson from that of Goodin stating that the outcomes were different because in
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Goodin, the injured party was inside the trailer at the time of the injury, while
Hudson was not.
KRS 304.39-020(6) specifically states that loading or unloading a
vehicle while occupying, entering into, or alighting from it is using a motor vehicle
as a motor vehicle. The argument can be made that at the time of Cochran’s
injury, the cement was being unloaded from the truck. However, in the case at
hand, like that of Hudson, no one was occupying, entering into, or alighting from
the vehicle. Therefore Cochran’s activities at the time of the accident do not meet
the definition of using a motor vehicle as a motor vehicle, at least as it relates to
the loading and unloading of the cement.
We also find the cases of Bialochowski v. Cross Concrete Pumping
Co., 407 N.W.2d 355 (Mich. 1987), and McKenzie v. Auto Club Ins. Ass’n, 580
N.W.2d 424 (Mich. 1998), persuasive on this issue.2
John Bialochowski was rendered a paraplegic as a result
of a June 13, 1980 accident that occurred on a
construction site at a General Motors Assembly Division
facility. Plaintiff’s employer, the Emanuel Company,
was hired by General Motors for the construction project.
Construction of the facility involved the pouring of
cement at elevated levels. Emanuel contracted the
services of Cross Concrete Pumping Company for the
pouring of the cement. Cross Concrete brought onto the
job site a motorized, four-wheel, cement truck.
Permanently attached to this truck was a concrete pump
and a thirty- to thirty-five-foot boom, which was used to
pump concrete up to the elevated levels. Plaintiff was
injured in the course of his employment when the
concrete pump exploded, causing the boom to collapse
2
Bialochowski was overturned by McKenzie, but a discussion of both is required.
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upon plaintiff, crushing him. At the time of the accident,
the truck was parked and stabilized.
Bialochowski at 356.
One of the main issues in Bialochowski was whether the cement truck
was being used as a vehicle for purposes of Michigan’s version of the MVRA.
One of the defendants in the case argued that the truck was not being used as a
vehicle at the time of the accident, but was rather being used as a piece of
construction equipment, the same reasoning put forth by the trial court in the case
at hand.
The Michigan Supreme Court held:
Motor vehicles are designed and used for many different
purposes. The truck involved in this case is a cement
truck capable of pouring cement at elevated levels.
Certainly one of the intended uses of this motor vehicle
(a motor vehicle under the no-fault act) is to pump
cement. The accident occurred while this vehicle was
being used for its intended purpose. We hold that the
phrase “use of a motor vehicle as a motor vehicle”
includes this use.
Id. at 359.
However, two years later in McKenzie, the Michigan Supreme Court
found that Bialochowski had been wrongly decided and thoroughly discussed the
phrase “use of a motor vehicle as a motor vehicle.”
As a matter of English syntax, the phrase “use of a motor
vehicle ‘as a motor vehicle’ ” would appear to invite
contrasts with situations in which a motor vehicle is not
used “as a motor vehicle.” This is simply to say that the
modifier “as a motor vehicle” assumes the existence of
other possible uses and requires distinguishing use “as a
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motor vehicle” from any other uses. While it is easily
understood from all our experiences that most often a
vehicle is used “as a motor vehicle,” i.e., to get from one
place to another, it is also clear from the phrase used that
the Legislature wanted to except those other occasions,
rare as they may be, when a motor vehicle is used for
other purposes, e.g., as a housing facility of sorts, as an
advertising display (such as at a car dealership), as a
foundation for construction equipment, as a mobile
public library, or perhaps even when a car is on display
in a museum. On those occasions, the use of the motor
vehicle would not be “as a motor vehicle,” but as a
housing facility, advertising display, construction
equipment base, public library, or museum display, as it
were. It seems then that when we are applying the
statute, the phrase “as a motor vehicle” invites us to
determine if the vehicle is being used for transportational
purposes.
McKenzie at 426.
We find [the Bialochowski] holding utterly antithetical to
the language of § 3105 [(Michigan’s no-fault act)]. As
discussed above, § 3105’s requirement that injuries arise
out of the use of a motor vehicle “as a motor vehicle”
clearly distinguishes use “as a motor vehicle” from other
possible uses. Bialochowski eviscerates this distinction
by holding that the use of the vehicle at issue to pump
cement constitutes use “as a motor vehicle.” Obviously,
motor vehicles are designed and used for various
purposes as the Bialochowski Court noted. In fact, only
in the context of various possible uses would a limitation
to use “as a motor vehicle” be necessary. Where the
Legislature explicitly limited coverage under § 3105 to
injuries arising out of a particular use of motor vehicles use “as a motor vehicle” - a decision finding coverage for
injuries arising out of any other use, e.g., to pump
cement, is contrary to the language of the statute.
Accordingly, we are convinced that Bialochowski was
wrongly decided.
McKenzie at 428.
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The standard of review on appeal of a summary judgment
is whether the trial court correctly found that there were
no genuine issues as to any material fact and that the
moving party was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (CR) 56.03 . . . .
“The record must be viewed in a light most favorable to
the party opposing the motion for summary judgment and
all doubts are to be resolved in his favor.” Steelvest, Inc.
v. Scansteel Service Center, Inc., Ky., 807 S.W.2d 476,
480 (1991). Summary “judgment is only proper where
the movant shows that the adverse party could not prevail
under any circumstances.” Steelvest, 807 S.W.2d at 480,
citing Paintsville Hospital Co. v. Rose, Ky., 683 S.W.2d
255 (1985). Consequently, summary judgment must be
granted “[o]nly when it appears impossible for the
nonmoving party to produce evidence at trial warranting
a judgment in his favor . . . .” Huddleston v. Hughes, Ky.
App., 843 S.W.2d 901, 903 (1992).
Scifres v. Kraft, 916 S.W.2d 779, 781 (Ky. App. 1996).
Based on our statutory language and the case law discussed herein, we
hold that summary judgment was properly granted. At the time of the accident, the
cement truck was not being utilized “as a motor vehicle.” Therefore, the MVRA
and its two-year statute of limitations do not apply. The one-year statute of
limitations found in KRS 413.140 applies in this case. Cochran did not file his
Complaint until approximately one year and eleven months after his injury and is
therefore outside the applicable time limit for bringing this suit.
For the above reasons, we agree with the decisions of the trial court
and affirm.
VANMETER, JUDGE, CONCURS.
TAYLOR, JUDGE, DISSENTS AND FILES SEPARATE OPINION.
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TAYLOR, JUDGE, DISSENTING: Respectfully, I dissent. I believe
the trial court abused its discretion in allowing Premier Concrete to amend its
answer asserting the one-year statute of limitation set forth in KRS 413.140.
Accordingly, summary judgment based on this statute was improperly granted in
my opinion.
CR 8.03 provides that affirmative defenses shall be set forth in
answers to complaints. The one-year statute of limitation set forth in KRS 413.140
was an affirmative defense that was not asserted until almost eighteen months after
the complaint was filed. The rule is mandatory and failure to comply therewith
results in waiver of the defense, unless the complaint on its face shows the action is
barred by time, which in this case, did not occur. See Underwood v. Underwood,
999 S.W.2d 716 (Ky. App. 1999).
In this case, it is simply disingenuous for Premier Concrete to argue
that it did not know the actual facts surrounding Cochran’s claim until deposing
him in January 2008 – again, almost eighteen months after the complaint was filed
in this action. Premier Concrete’s position presupposes that it did not investigate
the accident before responding to the complaint or that it did not interview its own
employee, who was operating the vehicle at the time of the injury to Cochran, prior
to taking Cochran’s deposition. I find this presupposition to be simply
implausible. Additionally, any delay in deposing Cochran to fully understand the
circumstances surrounding the claim was caused by Premier Concrete, and thus
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there exists no valid excuse for not timely asserting the affirmative defense as
required by CR 8.03, in my opinion.
The Rules of Civil Procedure, as promulgated by the Supreme Court
of Kentucky, govern all procedures and practice of civil actions in the Court of
Justice. CR 1(2). If attorneys and their clients can circumvent the rules without a
valid excuse or otherwise ignore their use or application without any repercussion,
then the rules should be abolished, in my opinion.
Notwithstanding, I believe the MVRA was applicable to this case
including the two-year statute of limitations set forth in KRS 304.39-230. The
motor vehicle involved in this case is a concrete truck – and the boom, hose, and
other operating parts thereon are functioning, permanent parts of the truck. The
use and function of this motor vehicle is to dispense concrete, which was in
progress as part of the vehicle’s operation at the time of the accident. I believe this
use sufficiently satisfies the statute. Cf. Rawlings v. Interlock Industries, Inc.,
_____ S.W.3d _____ (Ky. App. 2010), 2010 WL 1006853.
Thus, if applicable, Premier Concrete waived the one-year statute of
limitation defense and the complaint was otherwise timely filed under KRS
304.39-230 of the MVRA. The trial court erred as a matter of law in granting
summary judgment for Premier Concrete. I would reverse the summary judgment
and reinstate the action on the merits.
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BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT
FOR APPELLANT:
Sheila P. Hiestand
Louisville, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Eric R. Collis
Joseph P. Hummel
Louisville, Kentucky
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLEE:
Eric R. Collis
Louisville, Kentucky
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