JOHNSON (JOYCE) VS. KENTUCKY STATE POLICE , ET AL.
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RENDERED: JULY 16, 2010; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2009-CA-000452-MR
JOYCE JOHNSON
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM CLAY CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE OSCAR G. HOUSE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 05-CI-00453
KENTUCKY STATE POLICE; AND
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
BOARD OF CLAIMS
APPELLEES
OPINION
REVERSING AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: ACREE, CAPERTON AND THOMPSON, JUDGES.
ACREE, JUDGE: Joyce Johnson appeals an order of the Clay Circuit Court
affirming a decision of the Kentucky Board of Claims granting summary judgment
to the Kentucky State Police (KSP). For the following reasons, we reverse and
remand.
Johnson was traveling north on U.S. Highway 421 on the evening of
November 22, 2003, in Clay County, Kentucky, when her automobile was struck
by a vehicle driven by Kentucky State Trooper James C. Smith. In the moments
prior to the collision, Johnson had yielded to three other police vehicles by moving
her car to the right shoulder of the road. Subsequently, Johnson resumed travel as
normal. The vehicle driven by Trooper Smith, with lights and sirens on,
approached Johnson’s car from behind and attempted to pass in the southbound
lane. Unfortunately, as the KSP vehicle approached, Johnson’s vehicle turned into
the southbound lane, toward a side road, and the police vehicle collided with the
left rear of Johnson’s car. Johnson filed a claim with the Board for her injuries.
In various pleadings, motions, and sworn statements before the Board,
Johnson admitted that at the time of the collision she had been aware of another
emergency vehicle somewhere behind her, in addition to the three other KSP cars
she had allowed to pass. Johnson also admitted had seen additional emergency
lights in the distance; furthermore, she believed other emergency vehicles would
be approaching shortly. However, Johnson also stated that she did not see Trooper
Smith’s vehicle or flashing lights or hear the siren prior to the collision. Johnson’s
stated reason for turning left was to exit the road entirely to permit additional
emergency vehicles easier passage; she also stated she believed she had sufficient
time to turn left before any additional emergency vehicles approached her. She
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claimed she could not safely move her car off the road to the right because there
was no shoulder at that point, only a ditch.
The KSP contended the accident was entirely the result of Johnson’s
negligence. In support of its position, the KSP presented the traffic collision report
for the incident, in which the responding officer reported Johnson had admitted she
had seen Trooper Smith’s lights approaching her. Trooper Smith also submitted
statements that he had seen Johnson tap her brakes prior to turning, which led him
to believe she was properly yielding. An important piece of evidence submitted to
the agency was a very brief video of the accident recorded from the camera
mounted in the KSP vehicle. This video captured the few seconds immediately
prior to the collision and ends abruptly as the vehicles collide.
Before the hearing officer, the KSP moved for summary judgment.
The hearing officer recommended the Board grant the motion, stating “the sole and
proximate cause of the accident” was Johnson’s failure to yield to the KSP vehicle
in violation of Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 189.930. The Board adopted the
hearing officer’s recommended order in its entirety. An opinion of the Clay
Circuit Court affirmed the Board’s decision without elaboration. This appeal
followed.
On appeal, Johnson asserts it was improper for the Board to grant
summary judgment to the KSP because the issue of negligence cannot properly be
resolved on summary judgment. In response, KSP asserts summary judgment was
proper given the evidence, because the video recording of the collision was
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sufficient to permit the Board to disregard any of Johnson’s evidence. Our review
of summary judgments is de novo. Blevins v. Moran, 12 S.W.3d 698, 699 (Ky.
2000).
The Board of Claims was created pursuant to Section 231 of the
Kentucky Constitution, which permits the legislature to waive the
Commonwealth’s sovereign immunity to suit. Commonwealth, Dept. of Parks v.
Bergee Brothers, Inc., 480 S.W.2d 158, 159 (Ky. 1972). The Board is empowered
“to investigate, hear proof, and to compensate persons for damages sustained to
either person or property as a proximate result of negligence on the part of the
Commonwealth, any of its cabinets, departments, bureaus, or agencies[.]” KRS
44.070(1). It is proper for the Board to grant a motion for summary judgment
under the same circumstances it would be proper for a trial court to do so.
Commonwealth, Labor Cabinet v. Morris, 215 S.W.3d 49, 52 (Ky.App. 2006).
Summary judgment, both before the Board and before a trial court, is
warranted when there are no genuine issues of material fact in a case. Steelvest,
Inc. v. Scansteel Service Center, Inc. 807 S.W.2d 476, 480 (Ky. 1991).
Kentucky’s standard for granting summary judgment is more stringent than the
federal standard; it should be cautiously applied, and used only “when, as a matter
of law, it appears it would be impossible for the respondent to produce evidence at
the trial warranting in his favor and against the movant.” Id. at 482 (quoting
Paintsville Hospital Co. v. Rose, 683 S.W.2d 255 (Ky. 1985)). In Steelvest the
word “ ‘impossible’ is used in a practical sense, not in an absolute sense.” Perkins
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v. Hausladen, 828 S.W.2d 652, 654 (Ky.1992). In considering a motion for
summary judgment, “[t]he record must be viewed in a light most favorable to the
party opposing the motion for summary judgment and all doubts are to be resolved
in his favor.” Id. at 480 (citing Dossett v. New York Mining and Manufacturing
Co., 451 S.W.2d 843 (Ky. 1970) and Rowland v. Miller's Adm'r, 307 S.W.2d 3
(1956)).
Here, the Board improperly weighed the evidence instead of merely
determining whether there were genuine issues of material fact; likewise, it did not
construe the facts in the light most favorable to Johnson.
There were some facts presented to the Board which were not in
dispute. First, the parties agree Johnson had yielded to three KSP vehicles prior to
the collision, and that after resuming travel Johnson saw the lights of an emergency
vehicle behind her.1 They also agree the collision occurred in the southbound lane,
while Johnson was trying to turn off the main road.
Despite these points of agreement, however, the parties disagree as to
some facts important to the resolution of this case. First, they disagree as to
whether Johnson saw the KSP car just before it hit her. Johnson has asserted she
was not aware the vehicle driven by Trooper Smith was close behind her. On the
other hand, statements made by Trooper Smith and the officer who responded to
the scene indicate they believed it was unlikely Johnson had not seen the KSP car.
1
The parties do, however, dispute whether the lights Johnson saw were in the distance or quite
close to her, as well as whether she specifically saw Trooper Smith’s vehicle just prior to the
collision.
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Whether she was aware of the proximity of Trooper Smith’s car is a genuine issue
of material fact.
The Board relied upon the video to conclude Johnson did in fact see
the KSP vehicle approaching, but this reliance was in direct contradiction to her
sworn statement, and the video of the collision is far from conclusive on this point.
It does not show Johnson herself; in fact, it appears to have been mounted on the
dashboard of the KSP vehicle, and does not show the troopers who were in the
vehicle. Any conclusions about what Johnson actually did see or reasonably
should have seen based on this video required the Board to make a judgment call,
to weigh the strength of Johnson’s account of the events against the statements of
KSP’s witnesses and the very limited perspective of the video camera. The
Board’s conclusion that the video clearly indicates that either Johnson actually did
see the KSP vehicle or reasonably should have seen it is based on a weighing of
the relative strength of the evidence, something properly reserved for a hearing.
A second source of disagreement is whether Trooper Smith was
exercising due care given the circumstances. While Trooper Smith’s affidavit
implies he was not driving negligently, Johnson asserts she and other witnesses
would testify that the trooper was driving too fast given the traffic and road
conditions of that night. This gives rise to the possibility of comparative
negligence. See Hilen v. Hays, 673 S.W.2d 713, 718 (Ky. 1984)(comparative
negligence “calls for liability for any particular injury in direct proportion to
fault.”). Summary judgment is proper only when it is impossible for the
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nonmoving party to present evidence at trial which would allow that party to
prevail. Williams v. City of Hillview, 831 S.W.2d 181 (Ky. 1992). Here, it was
possible for Johnson to prevail if the KSP was even partially responsible for the
collision.
Furthermore, the Board was required to view the evidence in the light
most favorable to Johnson. Steelvest, 807 S.W.2d at 480. That means, for
purposes of summary judgment, the Board was required to presume Johnson’s
evidence was true. If the Board had done so, it would have assumed that Johnson
had not seen the approaching KSP vehicle, and that Trooper Smith had been
driving too fast. Under these circumstances, Johnson would have been able to
recover at least partially, and summary judgment was not warranted.
Instead, the Board impermissibly engaged in the type of fact finding
which should have been reserved for a hearing. The Board may have doubted
Johnson would prevail following a hearing, and may ultimately have found the
video more persuasive than Johnson’s testimony, but it should not have granted
summary judgment as a substitute for the hearing. Williams, 831 S.W.2d at 183.
There were genuine issues of material fact in dispute at the time of the
KSP’s summary judgment motion. Accordingly, it was improper for the Board to
grant summary judgment and improper for the circuit court to affirm the Board’s
order. We reverse and remand for proceedings consistent with this order.
ALL CONCUR.
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BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
Kenneth S. Stepp
Mancester, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE
KENTUCKY STATE POLICE:
Morgan M. Sprague
Frankfort, Kentucky
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