BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE KENTUCKY RETIREMENT SYSTEMS VS. DAVIS (GERTRUDE)
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RENDERED: JANUARY 22, 2010; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2009-CA-000418-MR
BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE
KENTUCKY RETIREMENT SYSTEMS
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FRANKLIN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE PHILLIP J. SHEPHERD, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 07-CI-00816
GERTRUDE DAVIS
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: CLAYTON, TAYLOR, AND WINE, JUDGES.
CLAYTON, JUDGE: The Kentucky Retirement Systems (“KRS”) appeals the
judgment of the Franklin Circuit Court, whereby the court reversed the Kentucky
Retirement Systems' Disability Appeals Committee of the Board of Trustees' (“the
Board”) decision that denied disability benefits to Gertrude Davis. After
considering the arguments provided by the parties, a thorough review of the record,
and the accompanying law, we affirm the Franklin Circuit Court.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Davis was employed as a home health aide by the Kentucky River
District Health Department. Her job duties consisted of driving to patients’ homes,
helping them with personal care, housekeeping, meals, and various related tasks.
Davis was employed for 7.5 hours per day, and her job duties were classified under
Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 61.600 as “medium work”. On March 26, 2004,
while driving to a patient’s home, she was involved in an automobile accident
wherein she sustained serious physical injuries, which required several months of
intensive rehabilitation. Davis, who was 55 years old at the time of the accident,
suffered a fractured pelvis, three fractured ribs, a punctured lung, a lacerated
spleen, and a bulging disc with neuropathy. At the time of her administrative
hearing, on June 8, 2006, she was still receiving medical care for problems
resulting from the accident.
After the Kentucky River District Health Department was unable to
provide accommodations to Davis to allow her to continue in the job, she filed an
application for disability benefits on July 19, 2005. Because Davis did not have
the requisite 60 months of service credit to qualify for regular disability retirement
benefits under KRS 61.600, she applied for duty-related disability benefits under
KRS 61.621. This statutory provision, known as the Fred Capps Memorial Act,
provides that any state employee, who dies or is permanently disabled as the result
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of a duty-related injury, shall be eligible for minimum benefits. In her application,
Davis alleges that she is unable to engage in any paid occupation as a result of the
injuries sustained in her work-related accident.
Following Davis’s application for duty-related disability retirement
benefits under KRS 61.621, the KRS' medical review board denied her application.
Davis then requested a hearing on the matter. An administrative hearing was held
on June 8, 2006, and the resulting hearing officer’s report, dated February 19,
2007, recommended that duty-related disability benefits be paid. Thereafter, the
KRS filed exceptions to the hearing officer’s report. Following the filing of
exceptions, the Disability Appeals Committee of the Board, rejected the hearing
officer’s recommended order and issued its own order, which denied Davis’s
application for duty-related disability benefits. Then, Davis appealed this decision
to the Franklin Circuit Court. The Franklin Circuit Court issued its Opinion and
Order on December 1, 2008, reversing the Board’s denial of benefits. This appeal
followed.
ISSUE
No dispute exists that Davis suffered a traumatic, job-related injury.
The only issue is whether the Franklin Circuit Court erred when it reversed the
Board’s order. The Board found that in spite of the serious injuries sustained by
Davis, she was not “totally and permanently disabled” from employment as a result
of the duty-related injury, and thus, ineligible to receive benefits under KRS
61.621. Yet, the Franklin Circuit Court determined that, contrary to the Board’s
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order, Davis was “totally and permanently disabled,” from paid employment, and
entitled to duty-related disability benefits.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
When a court reviews an agency’s final order, the court may only
overturn the agency's decision if the agency acted arbitrarily or outside its scope, if
the agency applied an incorrect rule of law, or if the decision itself is not supported
by substantial evidence on the record. Kentucky State Racing Commission v.
Fuller, 481 S.W.2d 298, 300-301 (Ky. 1972).
It is well-established in Kentucky jurisprudence that “judicial review
of administrative action is concerned with the question of arbitrariness . . . . Unless
action taken by an administrative agency is supported by substantial evidence it is
arbitrary.” American Beauty Homes Corp. v. Louisville and Jefferson County
Planning and Zoning Commission, 379 S.W.2d 450, 456 (Ky. 1964). Moreover,
reversal of an administrative decision is justified when the evidence is “so
compelling that no reasonable person could have failed to be persuaded by it.”
McManus v. Kentucky Retirement Systems, 124 S.W.3d 454, 458 (Ky. App. 2003).
And while it is true that “a reviewing court is not free to substitute its judgment for
that of an agency on a factual issue,” it is authorized to do so if “the agency's
decision is arbitrary and capricious.” Id. at 458-59. See Johnson v. Galen Health
Care, Inc., 39 S.W.3d 828, 832 (Ky. App. 2001).
In the case at hand, we will focus on whether the administrative
decision was arbitrary. In American Beauty Homes Corp., a landmark case, we
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find an outline for the parameters of judicial review of an administrative agency. It
provides that the judicial review is not a de novo review of factual determinations
made by an administrative agency but rather a review by the court of whether there
was substantial evidence to support the agency's conclusion, whether the parties
were afforded due process, and whether the agency acted with its established
authority. American Beauty Homes Corp., 379 S.W.2d at 456. “[S]ubstantial
evidence’ means “evidence of substance and relevant consequence having the
fitness to induce conviction in the minds of reasonable men.” Owens-Corning
Fiberglas v. Golightly, 976 S.W.2d 409, 414 (Ky. 1998). With this standard in
mind, we will review the circuit court’s actions.
ANALYSIS
KRS argues that the court, in reversing the Board’s decision,
substituted its own judgment for the Board, and further, improperly found that the
Board’s decision was not supported by substantial evidence. Moreover, KRS
suggests that the court altered the standard of review for an appeal from a final
agency decision. And finally, KRS asserts that the court erred by determining that
Davis’s physical restrictions prevented her from performing sedentary work as
statutorily defined, and the court improperly considered factors outside the statute
in ascertaining whether Davis was eligible for duty-related disability benefits.
Conversely, Davis contends that the court’s order should be affirmed as the
Board’s decision was legally arbitrary because it was not based on substantial
evidence.
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We are not persuaded by KRS’ arguments that the court, in reversing
the Board’s decision, substituted its own judgment for the Board or that the court
altered the standard of review for an appeal from a final agency decision or that the
court erred by determining that Davis’s physical restrictions prevented her from
performing sedentary work and improperly considered factors outside the statute in
ascertaining whether Davis was eligible for duty-related disability benefits. The
key issue for us and the one that we will address is whether the court erred when it
determined that the Board’s decision was not supported by substantial evidence.
In sum, the issue here involves whether substantial evidence exists on
the record to establish that Davis has become “totally and permanently disabled to
engage in any occupation for remuneration or profit as a result of a duty-related
injury.” KRS 61.621(1). A chronological review of the history of the case shows
the following events.
First, after denial by the KRS’ medical review board for duty-related
disability benefits, Davis requested a hearing. Following the hearing, the hearing
officer recommended benefits based on his findings in the February 19, 2007,
report. In the report is found the following statement:
3. The preponderance of the medical evidence contained
of record indicate that the Claimant sustained numerous
and severe injuries as a result of a single traumatic event
that occurred while she was performing the duties of her
position, and though now healed and at maximum
medical improvement, numerous residual effects remain.
The Claimant’s primary physicians have indicated that
she retains the functional capacity to perform sedentary
activity limited by stringent permanent restrictions which
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include no bending, twisting, stooping, climbing,
kneeling, crawling, or lifting of more than ten (10)
pounds on an occasional basis. The restrictions also
require no prolonged sitting or standing, with the ability
to change postures frequently.
Based on these and other observations, plus the extent and severity of Davis’s
injuries, her ongoing pain, and the extreme limits on her physical actions, the
hearing officer recommended that she receive duty-related disability benefits.
Next, the KRS filed exceptions to the recommended order and the
Board’s disability appeals committee reviewed the findings. On May 18, 2007, the
committee issued its own order denying Davis’s application for benefits. The two
orders were virtually identical. The only real difference was one phrase in the two
orders. In the hearing officer’s finding of fact No. 4 it was stated:
The Claimant alleges disability on the basis of the
numerous injuries sustained in a motor vehicle accident
which occurred on March 26, 2004, while on duty.
These injuries included: three (3) broken ribs, punctured
and collapsed lungs, hip broken in three (3) places, a
lacerated spleen, and her pelvis was broken in two (2)
places. The Claimant continues to experience problems
with her neck and low back and also continues to
experience pain in her hips. She is unable to walk or
stand for prolonged periods of time. Her primary
physicians have restricted her from prolonged sitting or
standing or lifting more than ten (10) pounds and only on
an occasional basis. She is also restricted from frequent
bending, stooping, climbing, twisting, etc. The
Claimant’s primary physicians also indicate that she
retains the functional ability to perform sedentary
activities, so long as they are coupled with her
stringent permanent physical restrictions referred to
above.
(Emphasis added).
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The Board’s order was exactly the same as the hearing officer’s recommended
order except for the words that are in bold typeface in the above-cited paragraph.
Therefore, by eliminating the above fifteen-word phrase, the Board reached an
entirely different conclusion and determined that Davis could, following her injury,
return to paid “sedentary” employment. The Board, however, provided no
explanation for eliminating the phrase or, more significantly, a rationale for
holding that Davis could maintain employment categorized as sedentary.
Then, Davis filed a petition for review, with the Franklin Circuit
Court. The court reversed the decision of the Board, which had denied benefits to
Davis. Significantly, the court found that Davis had very stringent and permanent
restrictions to her activities that are inconsistent with “sedentary work” as defined
in KRS 61.600. Further, the court opined that the Board simply ignored these
restrictions when it rejected the recommended order of the hearing officer. We
concur with the findings and conclusions of the circuit court.
Keeping in mind that one standard of evaluation for a reviewing court
is whether an administrative agency has made an arbitrary decision and that an
arbitrary decision is one that is not based on substantial evidence, we note the
following facts. In the job-related accident Davis incurred three (3) broken ribs, a
punctured and collapsed lung, hip broken in three (3) places, a lacerated spleen, a
pelvis broken in two (2) places, and a bulging disc with neuropathy. She was still
receiving medical care. And while, according to her treating physicians, she
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retains functional ability to perform sedentary activities, the physicians also stated
these activities must be coupled with stringent, permanent physical restrictions.
We believe that these facts as well as the other facts in the record most
definitely provide substantial evidence that Davis is not able to procure and keep
paid employment. Indeed, Davis’s work-related accident and resulting disability
are expressly the reason for which the Fred Capps Memorial Act, (KRS 61.621)
was created.
Pertinent portions of the Act state:
(1) Notwithstanding any provision of any statutes to the
contrary, effective June 1, 2000, any employee
participating in one (1) of the state-administered
retirement systems who is not in a hazardous duty
position, as defined in KRS 61.592, shall be eligible for
minimum benefits equal to the benefits payable under
this section or KRS 61.702 if the employee dies or
becomes totally and permanently disabled to engage in
any occupation for remuneration or profit as a result of a
duty-related injury.
(2) (a) For purposes of this section, “duty-related injury”
means:
1. a. A single traumatic event that occurs while the
employee is performing the duties of his position; or
....
2. The event or act of violence produces a harmful
change in the human organism evidenced by objective
medical findings.
Undoubtedly, the purpose of the Fred Capps Memorial Act is to provide benefits to
state employees who are unable to engage in gainful employment after sustaining a
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traumatic injury during the performance of these job duties. Davis suffered serious
physical injuries with long-lasting implications after a work-related car accident.
But the key question becomes is she still able to participate in “sedentary work.”
Sedentary work is statutorily defined as “work that involves lifting no more than
ten (10) pounds at a time and occasionally lifting or carrying articles such as large
files, ledgers, and small tools. Although a sedentary job primarily involves sitting,
occasional walking and standing may also be required in the performance of
duties.” KRS 61.600(5)(c)(1).
The evidence in the administrative record, which is summarized in the
hearing officer’s report, persuasively establishes that Davis has very stringent
permanent restrictions that are inconsistent with the definition of “sedentary work.”
These un-refuted restrictions prevent Davis from not only obtaining such
employment but also performing the associated duties of such employment. The
Board simply did not address these restrictions in its order, which was copied
directly from the hearing officer’s report, other than redacting the following phrase
in the hearing officer’s finding of fact no. 4, which stated that Davis could perform
sedentary activity “so long as they are coupled with her stringent permanent
physical restrictions referred to above.” We find that Davis met her burden of
proof in establishing her eligibility for duty-related disability benefit. Furthermore,
we find nothing in the record suggesting that Davis could perform “sedentary
work.” Finally, not only do we find the Board’s order unsupported by substantial
evidence, but also that the evidence is “so compelling that no reasonable person
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could have failed to be persuaded by it.” See McManus, 124 S.W.3d at 458.
Therefore, we conclude that the board’s decision is a classic case of an arbitrary
decision. We agree with the Franklin Circuit Court decision.
CONCLUSION
In reviewing the decisions of the Kentucky Retirement Systems'
Board of Trustees, it is this Court's duty only to determine whether that decision
was based upon substantial evidence or whether the evidence is so compelling that
no reasonable person could have made that decision. Id. Given the evidence
presented, the law demands that the decision of the Franklin Circuit Court,
reversing the Board, remain undisturbed. Therefore, the order of the Franklin
Circuit Court to reverse the Board’s decision is now affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Brian C. Thomas
Frankfort, Kentucky
Thomas W. Moak
Prestonsburg, Kentucky
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