PHILLIPS (SANDRA GRISSOM), ET AL. VS. HIGHLAND PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH, INC.
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RENDERED: JUNE 18, 2010; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2009-CA-000389-MR
SANDRA GRISSOM PHILLIPS;
JAMES C. PHILLIPS; DAVE
DOWDELL; HEATHER DOWDELL;
JOHN STONE; BELINDA STONE;
GARY BATES; CYNTHIA BATES;
CHRIS LAVENSON; AND
TONI LAVENSON
v.
APPELLANTS
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE FREDERIC J. COWAN, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 07-CI-010247
HIGHLAND PRESBYTERIAN
CHURCH, INC.
APPELLEE
AND
NO. 2009-CA-000432-MR
HIGHLAND PRESBYTERIAN
CHURCH, INC.
CROSS-APPELLANT
v.
CROSS-APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE FREDERIC J. COWAN, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 07-CI-010247
SANDRA GRISSOM PHILLIPS;
AND JAMES C. PHILLIPS
CROSS-APPELLEES
OPINION AND ORDER
DISMISSING
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BEFORE: CLAYTON, TAYLOR, AND THOMPSON, JUDGES.
TAYLOR, JUDGE: Sandra Grissom Phillips, James C. Phillips, Dave Dowdell,
Heather Dowdell, John Stone, Belinda Stone, Gary Bates, Cynthia Bates, Chris
Lavenson, and Toni Lavenson (collectively referred to as appellants) bring Appeal
No. 2009-CA-000389-MR and Highland Presbyterian Church, Inc. (hereinafter
referred to as appellee) brings Cross-Appeal No. 2009-CA-000432-MR from a
January 21, 2009, opinion and order granting appellee a partial summary judgment
and a February 4, 2009, order of the Jefferson Circuit Court amending the January
21, 2009, order as “Final and Appealable.” For the reasons stated, we dismiss both
appeals.
The underlying dispute arose after appellee installed an airconditioning unit in an alley that abutted appellants’ properties. Appellants filed a
complaint against appellee and set forth various claims including trespass,
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violation of the noise control act (Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 224.30-100),
and nuisance.
In the January 21, 2009, order granting partial summary judgment, the
circuit court adjudicated the question of the parties’ respective property rights in
the alley. The court concluded that appellee owned the alley in fee simple and that
appellants’ easement claim to the alley had been “extinguished.” Thereafter, upon
motion by appellants, the circuit court amended the opinion and order by order
entered February 4, 2009. In this order, the court specifically held:
[I]t is hereby Ordered that the Opinion and Order entered
January 21, 2009[,] is amended making it Final and
Appealable, and bifurcating the action for nuisance so
that the nuisance portion of the action may remain on the
docket and proceed as scheduled.
Generally, a final and appealable judgment is one that adjudicates all
the rights of all the parties. Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (CR) 54.01; King
Coal Co. v. King, 940 S.W.2d 510 (Ky. App. 1997). In an action involving
multiple claims or multiple parties, CR 54.01 permits a court to make an otherwise
interlocutory order final and appealable in limited circumstances as provided for in
CR 54.02. The partial summary judgment is clearly interlocutory. However,
under CR 54.02, an interlocutory order may be made final and appealable if the
order includes the following recitations: (1) there is no just reason for delay, and
(2) the decision is final. Peters v. Bd. of Education of Hardin Co., 378 S.W.2d 638
(Ky. 1964). A court’s failure to include both recitations in the order renders it
interlocutory and nonappealable. Turner Const. Co. v. Smith Bros., Inc., 295
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S.W.2d 569 (Ky. 1956); Watson v. Best Fin. Servs., Inc., 245 S.W.3d 722 (Ky.
2008).
As noted by this Commonwealth’s highest Court in Peters, an
appellate court must raise the issue of lack of jurisdiction on its own motion where
an order lacks finality. By order entered May 25, 2010, this Court ordered the
parties to show cause why this appeal and cross-appeal should not be dismissed as
being taken from an interlocutory and nonfinal order. The parties submitted
simultaneous briefs in response to the show cause order. The parties
acknowledged that the order entered on February 4, 2009, did not contain the
proper CR 54.02 recitations to make the partial summary judgment final by
specifically failing to state that there was no reason or cause to delay an appeal of
that order. Both parties further acknowledged that upon receipt of the show cause
order from this Court, the parties tendered an agreed order to the Jefferson Circuit
Court which was entered on June 4, 2010, that contained the necessary CR 54.02
recitations to purportedly cure the defect of the interlocutory order on appeal.
Essentially, the order entered in Jefferson Circuit Court on June 4,
2010, was nunc pro tunc.1 The parties argue that this nunc pro tunc order has
cured any jurisdictional defect created by the appeal of a nonfinal order and
1
We do not have before this Court the record of the proceedings in the circuit court after
issuance of our show cause order that led to entry of the nunc pro tunc order on June 4, 2010,
and thus, reach no conclusion on its propriety. However, we note that even if a clerical error
occurred below, to correct such an error while an appeal is pending requires leave of the
appellate court. Hinshaw v. Hinshaw, 216 S.W.3d 653 (Ky. App. 2007). No such leave was
granted in this case. We also note that as a general rule, with a few limited exceptions, “the
filing of a notice of appeal divests the trial court of jurisdiction to rule on any issues while the
appeal is pending.” Young v. Richardson, 267 S.W.3d 690, 695 (Ky. App. 2008). An order
entered without jurisdiction by a trial court is a nullity. Id.
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effectively breathed finality into the February 4, 2009, order entered by the
Jefferson Circuit Court. Our Court has previously looked with displeasure upon
such a practice and specifically has reasoned that “a nunc pro tunc order cannot
retroactively vest finality upon a judgment which was interlocutory when the
notice of appeal herein was filed.” Copass v. Monroe Co. Med. Found., Inc., 900
S.W.2d 617, 619 (Ky. App. 1995). We view this reasoning as sound and likewise
hold that the subsequent entry of a nunc pro tunc order adding CR 54.02 finality
recitations will not retroactively vest finality upon a judgment which was
interlocutory when the notice of appeal was filed. We also note that the parties, by
agreement, cannot confer jurisdiction on this Court. Wilson v. Russell, 162 S.W.3d
911 (Ky. 2005).
In Watson v. Best Financial Services, Inc., 245 S.W.3d 722 (Ky.
2008), the Kentucky Supreme Court recently reviewed the purpose and function of
CR 54.02 in determining whether interlocutory rulings should be subject to
appellate review. The Supreme Court discussed the historic policy in Kentucky
against piecemeal appeals balanced with the practical needs of the case before the
trial court. Id. The Supreme Court held that CR 54.02 certifications look to the
sound discretion of the trial court and must be thoroughly reviewed by the trial
court before making a ruling. The Court noted:
A trial court should not grant CR 54.02 requests
routinely or as a courtesy to counsel. Each case must be
evaluated on a case-by-case basis.
Id. at 727.
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The underlying action clearly involves multiple parties and multiple
claims. The January 21, 2009, opinion and order granting partial summary
judgment did not adjudicate all the claims between all the parties; rather, it was a
partial summary judgment that adjudicated the parties’ respective property rights in
the alley. The circuit court attempted to convert the January 21, 2009, partial
summary judgment into an appealable judgment by its February 4, 2009, order.
Unfortunately, the February 4, 2009, order did not contain both of the required CR
54.02 recitations – that there was no just cause for delay and that the judgment was
final. The February 4, 2009, order only contained the recitation that it was “Final
and Appealable.” Under the mandate of Watson, in our first level of review we
cannot conclusively determine that finality was reached as required by CR 54.02.
Thus, we do not reach the issue of whether the trial court abused its discretion in
making a CR 54.02 certification. Id. Accordingly, the January 21, 2009, partial
summary judgment is interlocutory, nonappealable, and otherwise cannot be cured
by the nunc pro tunc order entered June 4, 2010.
Now, therefore, be it ORDERED that Appeal No. 2009-CA-000389MR and Cross-Appeal No. 2009-CA-000432-MR are hereby DISMISSED as
being taken from interlocutory and nonappealable orders.
ENTERED: June 18, 2010
/s/ Jeff S. Taylor
JUDGE, COURT OF APPEALS
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CLAYTON, JUDGE, CONCURS.
THOMPSON, JUDGE, DISSENTS AND FILES SEPARATE
OPINION.
THOMPSON, JUDGE, DISSENTING: I respectfully dissent from
the majority’s opinion that the appellant must file a new notice of appeal from a
judgment made final by the trial court’s nunc pro tunc order. I ask the same
question as did our Supreme Court when dealing with the same issue: why and for
what purpose? James v. James, ___S.W.3d ___ (Ky. 2010) (rendered May 20,
2010).
Although the law cited and the reasoning applied may be sound if a
judgment is not final and appealable, that is simply not the situation. The trial
court, the parties, and even the majority agree that the trial court’s nunc pro tunc
order included the finality language and, therefore, rendered the judgment final and
appealable. Thus, we are not dealing with an appeal from an interlocutory order
but, instead, with a prematurely filed notice of appeal.
The majority heavily relies on Copass v. Monroe Co. Med. Found.,
900 S.W.2d 617 (Ky. App. 1995), and, in doing so, quotes a statement in the
opinion that “a nunc pro tunc order cannot retroactively vest finality upon a
judgment which was interlocutory when the notice of appeal was filed.” Id. at 619.
I point out that this Court’s statement was made in the context of describing the
procedures leading to the appeal and was not its holding. Most significantly, the
order of this Court was apparently entered in early 1994 and presumably prior to
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the Supreme Court’s October 1994 decision in Johnson v. Smith, 885 S.W.2d 944
(Ky. 1994).
In Johnson, multiple notices of appeal were filed from a judgment not
technically final because a CR 59 motion remained pending. Following the federal
courts, our Supreme Court adopted the rule of relation forward. It held that the
notices of appeal related forward to the time when final judgment was entered Id.
at 950. Consistent with the substantial compliance doctrine, the Court emphasized
that a premature appeal does not harm the opposing party who has notice of the
intent to appeal before the expiration of the thirty-day time limit in CR 73.02(1)(a).
Moreover, the Supreme Court specifically held that the Court of Appeals erred
when it stated that the filing of a notice of appeal is a matter of jurisdiction. To
emphasize my point, I quote the Court’s holding:
To be precise, losing litigants are constitutionally vested
with a right of appeal and appellate courts are
constitutionally vested with jurisdiction. Strictly
speaking, the notice of appeal is not jurisdictional. It is a
procedural device prescribed by the rules of the court by
which a litigant may invoke the exercise of the inherent
jurisdiction of the court as constitutionally delegated.
This is why CR 73.02(2) describes automatic dismissal as
the penalty for failure of a party to file a timely notice of
appeal, but not as a lack of jurisdiction.
If it were otherwise, the rules could not be changed
except by constitutional amendment. This Court has the
power to deny or dismiss an appeal if the rules are not
followed, based on its own rules, but no power to create
or deny jurisdiction. The battle between strict
compliance with the rules of appellate practice to avoid
dismissal (Foremost Ins. Co. v. Shepard, Ky., 588
S.W.2d 468 (1979) and Manly v. Manly, supra), and
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substantial compliance (Ready v. Jamison, supra and
Foxworthy v. Norstam Veneers, Inc., supra) is now over.
Excepting for tardy appeals and the naming of
indispensable parties, we follow a rule of substantial
compliance.
Id.
The rule of relation forward was again invoked in Board of Regents of
Western Kentucky University v. Clark, 276 S.W.3d 819 (Ky. 2009), a
condemnation case where the notice of appeal was filed prior to the expiration of
the time for the filing of exceptions. Id. at 820-821. Although the appeal was from
an interlocutory judgment, the Court relied on Johnson and held that the notice of
appeal related forward to the time when the trial court’s interlocutory judgment
became final and could properly be heard and decided by the appellate court. Id. at
821.
Recently, in James, the Supreme Court reinforced its adherence to the
rule of relation forward. The appellant filed a late notice of appeal and a motion to
extend the time to file an appeal pursuant to CR 73.02(1)(d) based on excusable
neglect. Because the motion for an extension remained pending, this Court
dismissed the appeal holding that jurisdiction was transferred when the notice of
appeal was filed and, therefore, was filed in an untimely manner without leave to
do so. Id. at ___. The Supreme Court disagreed and reiterated that the rule of
relation forward is one based on common sense. “[I]f an otherwise appropriate
notice of appeal is filed as to an order or judgment of a trial court and it appears
otherwise reasonable under the circumstances, precedents, and the rules of
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procedure applicable to have done so, the notice of appeal may operate
prospectively.” Id. at ___.
The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the rule of relation
forward has been adopted in this jurisdiction. Additionally, the majority of the
federal court’s addressing the issue have held that the rule of relation forward
applies when the judgment or order is made final by a nunc pro tunc order. See
Good v. Ohio Edison Company, 104 F.3d 93 (6th Cir. 1997). Yet, this Court has
again ignored the Supreme Court’s directive and dismisses the appeal.
Particularly vexing is that the order entered by the Court omitted the finality
language by mere mistake which was corrected by the Court’s nunc pro tunc order.
Under the erroneous conception that the notice of appeal is a matter of jurisdiction
and that Kentucky adheres to the rigid substantial compliance doctrine, the
appellant will have to re-file a notice of appeal which will impose additional costs
on the parties and delay finality of the case. Again, I ask why and for what
purpose?
I would decide the case on its merits.
BRIEFS FOR
APPELLANTS/CROSSAPPELLEES:
Bill V. Seiller
Laura E. Landenwich
Louisville, Kentucky
BRIEFS FOR APPELLEE/CROSSAPPELLANT:
Robert E. Stopher
Robert D. Bobrow
Louisville, Kentucky
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