KERR (TONI G. JONES) VS. OSBORNE (MICHAEL S.)
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RENDERED: FEBRUARY 26, 2010; 10:00 A.M.
TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2009-CA-000351-ME
TONI G. JONES KERR
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JOHNSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JANIE MCKENZIE-WELLS, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 08-CI-00225
MICHAEL S. OSBORNE
APPELLEE
OPINION
VACATING AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: NICKELL AND WINE, JUDGES; HARRIS,1 SENIOR JUDGE.
NICKELL, JUDGE: Toni Jones Kerr appeals from an order of the Johnson Circuit
Court, Family Division, denying her motion to vacate an agreed order signed in
May 2008 by Kerr and Michael S. Osborne. That order gave custody of their baby
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Senior Judge William R. Harris sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and Kentucky Revised Statutes
(KRS) 21.580.
girl to Osborne and granted Kerr supervised weekend visitation with the child.
Though unmarried, Osborne and Kerr are the undisputed parents of the child. The
circuit court approved and signed the agreed order, which Osborne maintains is a
final custody decree under KRS Chapter 403. Kerr claims should be set aside
because she was duped into signing it while under the influence of alcohol and was
mislead about its contents. She argues the agreed order is not a final custody order
because, among other alleged flaws, it contains no findings of fact and makes no
statement about the best interests of her daughter. The trial court denied a motion
to vacate because it was filed outside the ten-day window permitted by CR2 59.05,
and it was not filed within a reasonable time as required by CR 60.02. Having
reviewed the record, the briefs and the applicable law, we vacate and remand for
further proceedings consistent with this Opinion.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND AND FACTS
A daughter was born to Kerr and Osborne3 on February 6, 2008. On
May 20, 2008, when the child was three months of age, at Osborne’s instigation,
Kerr and Osborne signed an agreed order giving custody of the child to Osborne,
granting Kerr supervised visitation with the child for four hours every weekend
and permitting Kerr to resume standard visitation with the child upon completion
of a drug and alcohol education program. That same day, the agreed order was
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Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.
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Paternity test results filed with the court by Kerr on May 22, 2008, confirmed Osborne could
not be excluded as the child’s father. Osborne acknowledged paternity in the petition for custody
he filed on May 21, 2008.
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approved and signed by the circuit court judge, and the circuit court clerk mailed
copies of the signed document to all attorneys of record and to Kerr. The next day,
Osborne petitioned the court to award custody of his daughter to him. The custody
petition stated that Osborne and Kerr were lifelong residents of Kentucky and
Osborne was currently living in Paintsville but that Kerr’s address was unknown.
There was no mention of the child’s birthplace, residence or whereabouts. Both
the agreed order and the petition for custody were drafted by Osborne’s sister, an
attorney in the law firm of Osborne & Bowlin, whose office is located directly
below Osborne’s apartment, where Osborne and Kerr were living.
On September 16, 2008, nearly four months after its entry, Kerr
moved to vacate the agreed order. She admitted signing it in the downstairs law
office but claimed she did so without reading the document, while under such
undue influence and in such poor mental and physical condition that she could not
“understand the nature and consequences of the document she was pressed to
sign,” and believing she was only agreeing to allow Osborne to care for the child
and take her to the hospital should the need arise while Kerr was enrolled in a
residential rehabilitation program. She also contended that the petition for custody
was statutorily deficient and was never served on her as evidenced by the lack of a
receipt for a summons; the agreed order was legally deficient under KRS 403.4804
and lacked the required findings of fact, conclusions of law and determination of
the child’s best interests; the agreed order was mailed to the parties three days
4
Repealed in 2004 and superceded by KRS 403.838.
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before being entered into the court record; the agreed order lacked finality
language; Kerr did not answer the custody petition; Kerr did not waive her
appearance and no appearance was entered on her behalf; no evidence was taken;
and finally, no affidavit was submitted upon which permanent custody could be
granted.
Attached to the motion to vacate was a two-page affidavit signed by
Kerr stating she and Osborne often drank alcohol to excess and she needed to enter
residential rehabilitation to break her addiction to binge drinking. Kerr spent the
night of May 19, 2008, with Osborne in his apartment. She consumed so much
alcohol that night that she became unconscious and remained so until the next
morning. When Osborne awakened her the next morning, he took her downstairs
(while still clad in her pajamas and under the influence of alcohol) to his sister’s
law office in order to sign a paper which she believed allowed Osborne to care for
the baby (and take her to the hospital if necessary) while Kerr was in rehab. Kerr
did not question Osborne or his attorney-sister about the contents of the document,
she just signed her name at Osborne’s direction and went back to bed. Two to
three days later, Osborne told her that their relationship was over. Osborne also
told Kerr that her father had urged her to sign the agreed order. Kerr maintained
there was never any mention of custody or court involvement prior to her signing
the agreed order. Kerr alleged she had never seen Osborne care for their daughter
and doubted that he possessed the skill to do so. Kerr completed rehabilitation but
remains in outpatient treatment. Finally, Kerr stated she believed she was deceived
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into signing the agreed order. Kerr moved for immediate visitation with her
daughter and for temporary custody.
Osborne responded to Kerr’s motion to vacate by stating that he and
Kerr had followed the agreed order for four months; but now that Kerr had
completed rehab, she wanted to change the terms of their prior agreement.
Osborne argued that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to vacate the agreed order
because Kerr’s motion was filed outside the ten-day window allowed by CR 59.05
and that the agreed order became final when the time for filing an appeal expired.
Osborne maintained the only avenue by which Kerr could seek a change in custody
was to file a motion for modification supported by two affidavits demonstrating
their daughter was in “serious physical, mental, moral or emotional danger” as
required by KRS 403.340(2).
Osborne alleged by affidavit that social services was contacted twice
while Kerr was drunk and trying to care for their daughter; on May 19, 2008,
Osborne allowed Kerr to stay in his apartment but told her it was in their child’s
best interest for him to be named her sole custodian and for Kerr to have only
supervised weekend visitation until she completed drug and alcohol rehabilitation
when standard visitation would resume; Kerr agreed with Osborne’s plan; no
alcohol was consumed by Kerr or Osborne on May 19, 2008; Osborne awakened
Kerr on May 20, 2008, and brought her to his sister’s law office where he watched
Kerr read the agreed order and sign it; Kerr exercised visitation with her daughter
only once between May and October 2008; and while Kerr called Osborne one
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other time about visitation, she did not exercise it. Osborne denied deceiving Kerr
about the contents of the agreed order and stated he believed Kerr “understood
exactly what she was agreeing to in the Agreed Order.”
The motion to vacate was argued before the trial court on November
25, 2008. Both parties were represented by counsel. Kerr’s attorney argued the
agreed order was not a final custody order because of its many deficiencies, relief
was appropriate under CR 60.02 on several grounds including fraud and undue
influence, and at the very least, Kerr should be given the opportunity to present
proof. Osborne’s attorney argued Kerr’s filing of the CR 60.02 motion was an
attempt to avoid the requirements of KRS 403.3405 which she could not satisfy.
On January 26, 2009, the circuit court entered multiple orders. One
directed Kerr to pay monthly child support in the amount of $195.00 and to
provide medical insurance for her daughter. Another denied Kerr’s motion to
vacate the May 2008 agreed order as being untimely because CR 59.05 requires
such a motion to be filed within ten days of entry of the order to be vacated. The
agreed order was entered on May 23, 2008, but Kerr’s motion to vacate was not
filed until four months later. The court further found that under the circumstances,
four months was an unreasonable time in which to move to vacate the agreed order
because Kerr would not have been hung over and without legal representation for
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In the context of this case, a motion seeking a custody modification is not to be made “earlier
than two (2) years after its date, unless the court permits it be made on the basis of affidavits”
supporting a reasonable belief that “[t]he child’s present environment may endanger seriously his
physical, mental, moral, or emotional health.”
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one-third of a year, especially when one month of that time was spent in a
residential alcohol addiction treatment program. The court also found Kerr was
entitled to standard visitation6 with her daughter under the terms of the agreed
order since she had completed drug and alcohol education classes. Finally, the
court stated Kerr could move to modify custody under KRS 403.340 by filing an
appropriate motion with supporting affidavits because the court did not treat the
motion to vacate as a motion to modify or change custody. This appeal followed.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review a trial court’s denial of a CR 60.02 motion for an abuse of
discretion. Bethlehem Minerals Co. v. Church and Mullins Corp., 887 S.W.2d
327, 329 (Ky. 1994). To prevail, Kerr must have offered the trial court a “reason
of an extraordinary nature justifying relief.” CR 60.02(f). Similarly, we review a
trial court’s award of custody for an abuse of discretion. Coffman v. Rankin, 260
S.W.3d 767, 770 (Ky. 2008); Cherry v. Cherry, 634 S.W.2d 423, 425 (Ky. 1982).
To prevail, Kerr need not convince us the trial court should have reached a
different result but that the result reached was unsupported by substantial evidence.
Sherfey v. Sherfey, 74 S.W.3d 777, 782 (Ky. App. 2002).
After reviewing the sparse record, including the hearing on the motion
to vacate, we hold the trial court acted arbitrarily in finding four months to be an
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Kerr has since moved the trial court for extra weekend visitation with her daughter. In a
supporting affidavit, she claims she is living in a recently remodeled mobile home with access to
medical facilities for health emergencies and is taking her daughter to church every week.
Osborne opposes the request for additional visitation alleging Kerr has resumed drinking.
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unreasonable time for Kerr to move to set aside the agreed order. Additionally, the
court misread CR 60.02 as imposing a one-year “absolute cutoff” for the filing of a
motion to vacate. CR 60.02 reads in pertinent part:
On motion a court may, upon such terms as are just,
relieve a party or his legal representative from its final
judgment, order, or proceeding upon the following
grounds: . . . (d) fraud affecting the proceedings, other
than perjury or falsified evidence; (e) the judgment is
void, or has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a
prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed
or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the
judgment should have prospective application; or (f) any
other reason of an extraordinary nature justifying relief.
The motion shall be made within a reasonable time . . .
after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or
taken. A motion under this rule does not affect the
finality of a judgment or suspend its operation.
On appeal, Kerr argues the trial court should have granted relief under CR 60.02
(d), (e) and (f), none of which must be filed within a specified window of time but
rather must be brought only “within a reasonable time.” In Cain v. Cain, 777
S.W.2d 238 (Ky.App. 1989), we held that a delay of twelve years was a reasonable
time in which to allege fraud. Thus, contrary to the trial court’s opinion, there is
no “absolute cutoff” for filing a CR 60.02 motion alleging: (1) fraud; (2) that a
judgment is void, satisfied, released or discharged; or (3) any extraordinary reason
warranting relief. Furthermore, on the strength of Cain, there is precedent for
concluding a delay of only four months was not unreasonable. Clearly, each case
must be decided on its own facts.
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Kerr, the mother of a young child, recognized her addiction to alcohol
and her need for long-term residential rehabilitation. She thought she was
providing for her daughter to receive care, if needed, during her rehabilitation, by
signing an agreed order prepared by Osborne’s sister, whom she considered to be a
close friend. She subsequently learned that by signing the document she had
relinquished custody of her child. The parties disagree about whether Kerr signed
the agreed order while under the influence of alcohol. While it is debatable
whether she acted under the disability of alcohol, there is no dispute that she acted
without the advice of independent legal counsel and at the urging of individuals
who had a personal stake in the outcome. Furthermore, Kerr did not enter rehab
until a month after signing the agreed order and another of the four months was
spent in a Virginia treatment facility for alcohol dependence. Those dates have not
been disputed by anyone.
Custody of one’s child is a highly emotional decision. We laud Kerr
for trying to get her life together and shaking her dependence on alcohol. Under
the circumstances of this case, we hold that four months was not an unreasonable
time for Kerr to move to vacate the agreed order under CR 60.02, especially since
there is no proof in the record that she sat on her hands and simply delayed filing
the motion. However, we recognize that the taking of proof may shed a whole new
light on the facts of this case.
Furthermore, an award of custody must be made following a
determination of the best interests of the child. KRS 403.270(2). According to the
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record presented to us, the trial court has heard no evidence at all. At the time the
court approved the agreed order, there is no indication from the record that it knew
anything about the parents or the child. The extent of the court’s knowledge was
contained in the signed agreed order, which stated:
Upon agreement of the Parties hereto; IT IS HEREBY
ORDERED as follows:
1. That [Osborne] shall receive custody of the minor
child, [D.J.A.]7;
2. That [Kerr] shall receive supervised visitation every
weekend for four (4) hours. Said visitation must by
supervised by [Kerr’s] mother or father; AND
3. That [Kerr] shall receive standard visitation with the
minor child once she completes a long-term drug and
alcohol education class.
The agreed order gave the court some reason to believe Kerr was struggling with
drugs or alcohol, but it established nothing about Osborne and his ability to parent.
Because no custody petition had been filed at the time the court approved and
signed the agreed order giving custody to Osborne, the court could not, and did
not, determine it had jurisdiction to award custody.
Finally, a trial court’s award of custody must be supported by
substantial evidence. Cherry. Since the record contains no evidence, save
conflicting affidavits filed by the parents, there is nothing to which we can point as
being supportive of the trial court’s order. Therefore, we must hold the trial court
7
Pursuant to Court policy, minors are identified by initials to protect their privacy.
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abused its discretion in awarding custody to Osborne without receiving substantial
evidence in support of its decision.
For the foregoing reasons, the order of the Johnson Circuit Court,
Family Division, is vacated and remanded with direction that the court conduct
proceedings consistent with this Opinion.
WINE, JUDGE, CONCURS.
HARRIS, SENIOR JUDGE, CONCURS AND FILES SEPARATE
OPINION.
HARRIS, SENIOR JUDGE, CONCURRING: I agree with every jot
and tittle of Judge Nickell’s well written opinion, and accordingly I concur in it. I
write separately to give added emphasis to the requirement that trial judges
determine child custody issues by utilizing the best interest standard and by
rendering specific findings of fact predicated on matters of record. KRS 403.270;
McFarland v. McFarland, 804 S.W.2d 17, 18 (Ky. App. 1991).
Having labored for twenty years as a trial judge presiding over rural
courts with child custody subject matter jurisdiction, I am keenly aware that
exigent circumstances sometimes tempt trial judges to make a “do right” custody
decision, thus overlooking or disregarding the substantive and procedural
requirements which must be satisfied in order for a valid custody adjudication to be
rendered. That temptation can be particularly strong in small communities where
the judge may have extra-judicial knowledge of the parties, the child, and the
circumstances involved.
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The opinion in this case illustrates what can ensue when a trial judge
strays from the path which the statutes and procedural rules mandate that he or she
must follow. It should serve to remind domestic relations practitioners and trial
judges of the need to resist temptations to do otherwise.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Stephen Nick Frazier
Paintsville, Kentucky
J. Christopher Bowlin
Paintsville, Kentucky
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