COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY VS. RHODES (TINA)
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RENDERED: APRIL 2, 2010; 10:00 A.M.
TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2009-CA-000336-DG
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
v.
APPELLANT
ON DISCRETIONARY REVIEW FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE ERNESTO M. SCORSONE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 08-XX-00044
TINA RHODES
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
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BEFORE: LAMBERT AND STUMBO, JUDGES; WHITE,1 SENIOR JUDGE.
LAMBERT, JUDGE: Tina Rhodes was arrested and charged with driving under
the influence. On October 27, 2008, the Fayette District Court ruled that Rhodes’
conduct on the night of her arrest amounted to a refusal to submit to an intoxilyzer
examination. Subsequently, the Fayette Circuit Court reversed the District Court’s
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Senior Judge Edwin White sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice pursuant
to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 21.580.
ruling and held that Rhodes’ conduct did not amount to a refusal to submit to the
exam. After careful review, we agree with the Fayette Circuit Court and affirm.
On September 13, 2008, Rhodes’ vehicle was stopped by Officer
Felinski. After determining that there was probable cause to believe that Rhodes
was driving under the influence (DUI) of alcohol, Officer Felinski placed her under
arrest. While Officer Felinski was trying to place Rhodes in the back of the police
cruiser, she became combative, saying she did not want to wear the seat belt, etc.
At one point, another officer, Officer Bradley, had to intervene in order to assist
Officer Felinski in placing Rhodes in the back of the police cruiser. She was then
transported to the Fayette County Detention Center.
Officer Felinski escorted Rhodes into the intoxilyzer room with
Officer Bradley following closely behind. Once inside the intoxilyzer room,
Rhodes “started getting belligerent again, stating ‘I’m not going to be in here with
him. You don’t have to make me be in here with him.’” Rhodes broke loose from
Officer Felinski’s hands and went out into the officer’s work area. Officers
Felinski and Bradley then made an attempt to escort Rhodes back into the
intoxilyzer room. According to the officers, Rhodes was refusing to walk and was
placing all her weight on the officer’s hands. Once inside the intoxilyzer room, the
officers tried to place Rhodes in a chair, but she was continuing to be combative.
At this point, a third officer had to come in to help restrain Rhodes.
Officer Felinski testified that it was impossible for him to complete a
reading of the implied consent warning to Rhodes despite trying on multiple
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occasions. He further testified that he “felt” like Rhodes would refuse to submit to
the intoxilyzer testing, although he never made such a request.
On October 27, 2008, the Fayette District Court conducted a refusal
hearing and ruled that Rhodes refused to submit to an intoxilyzer exam. Rhodes
appealed this ruling to the Fayette Circuit Court, arguing that she was not read the
implied consent form in its entirety and therefore was never specifically asked to
submit to the intoxilyzer exam. Rhodes argued that there cannot be a refusal to
submit to an intoxilyzer exam if there is not a request to submit to such exam.
On January 23, 2009, the Fayette Circuit Court issued its opinion
reversing the decision of the district court and ruling that Rhodes did not refuse to
submit to the exam because no request was made by the officers to conduct such an
exam. This appeal now follows.
On appeal, the Commonwealth argues that despite the language of
KRS 189A.105(2)(a), the officers acted appropriately given the circumstances and
correctly determined that Rhodes refused to take the intoxilyzer exam. Essentially,
the Commonwealth asks this Court to make an exception for officers being
required to read the implied consent warning to arrestees when they are unruly or
belligerent. Because the statutory language is abundantly clear that police officers
must read the implied consent to arrestees, we affirm the ruling of the Fayette
Circuit Court.
KRS 189A.105(2)(a) states:
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At the time a breath, blood, or urine test is requested, the
person shall be informed:
1. That, if the person refuses to submit to such tests, the
fact of this refusal may be used against him in court as
evidence of violating KRS 189A.010 and will result in
revocation of his driver's license, and if the person
refuses to submit to the tests and is subsequently
convicted of violating KRS 189A.010(1) then he will be
subject to a mandatory minimum jail sentence which is
twice as long as the mandatory minimum jail sentence
imposed if he submits to the tests, and that if the person
refuses to submit to the tests he will be unable to obtain a
hardship license; and
2. That, if a test is taken, the results of the test may be
used against him in court as evidence of violating KRS
189A.010(1), and that if the results of the test are 0.18 or
above and the person is subsequently convicted of
violating KRS 189A.010(1), then he will be subject to a
sentence that is twice as long as the mandatory minimum
jail sentence imposed if the results are less than 0.18; and
3. That if the person first submits to the requested alcohol
and substance tests, the person has the right to have a test
or tests of his blood performed by a person of his
choosing described in KRS 189A.103 within a
reasonable time of his arrest at the expense of the person
arrested.
(Emphasis added). Further, KRS 189A.105(3) states:
During the period immediately preceding the
administration of any test, the person shall be afforded an
opportunity of at least ten (10) minutes but not more than
fifteen (15) minutes to attempt to contact and
communicate with an attorney and shall be informed of
this right. Inability to communicate with an attorney
during this period shall not be deemed to relieve the
person of his obligation to submit to the tests and the
penalties specified by KRS 189A.010 and 189A.107 shall
remain applicable to the person upon refusal. Nothing in
this section shall be deemed to create a right to have an
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attorney present during the administration of the tests, but
the person's attorney may be present if the attorney can
physically appear at the location where the test is to be
administered within the time period established in this
section.
As set forth in the above provisions, the implied consent warning is an
integral part of the DUI statutes. It informs defendants of important rights and
duties that are involved in such cases, as well as the consequences of their
particular actions. The legislature has recognized the importance of the implied
consent warning by the use of the mandatory language “shall.” While reading the
implied consent warning to the defendant is mandatory, there is no statutory
requirement that the defendants understand or acknowledge the reading of the
implied consent warning. The statute merely requires that the officer read the
implied consent warning.
The Commonwealth asks this Court to substitute the legislature’s
mandatory language with its own permissive language. We decline to do so in
light of the clear language utilized in the statute that this warning shall be read to
all arrestees or defendants. “[T]he courts have a duty to accord statutory language
its literal meaning unless to do so would lead to an absurd or wholly unreasonable
result.” Holbrook v. Kentucky Unemployment Ins. Com'n, 290 S.W.3d 81, 86 (Ky.
App. 2009) (quoting Kentucky Unemployment Ins. Com'n v. Jones, 809 S.W.2d
715, 716 (Ky. App. 1991)).
A review of the evidence in this case indicates that although Rhodes
was belligerent, the officers could have still read the warning to her. Nothing
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requires that Rhodes listen to the warning, instead only that the officers read it to
her. Only once the warning is read can Rhodes then be deemed to have impliedly
or explicitly refused. See Cook v. Commonwealth, 129 S.W.3d 351, 360 (Ky.
2004) (“In order for there to be a refusal, there must first be a specific request that
the person take the test, not just an inquiry whether the person would like to take
it.”) (Internal citation omitted).
In defending the decision not to read the implied consent warning to
Rhodes, Officer Felinski stated that given Rhodes’ conduct, he feared for his safety
and that of the other officers. While we certainly sympathize with the officers and
understand that their safety is of utmost importance, Rhodes was in handcuffs with
three officers present, and we do not see how reading a warning to a handcuffed
defendant would put the officers at any further risk. The officer’s argument that
they could not have read the implied consent warning to Rhodes, who was
handcuffed, is without merit.
Based on the foregoing, we affirm the January 23, 2009, order of the
Fayette Circuit Court reversing the Fayette District Court’s ruling that Rhodes
refused to submit to the intoxilyzer exam. Given that Rhodes was never presented
with the implied consent warning, she simply could not have refused to submit to
the exam.
ALL CONCUR.
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BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Jack Conway
Attorney General
John Cornett
Georgetown, Kentucky
John Hayne
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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