WOODEN (GERALD R.) VS. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: MARCH 26, 2010; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2009-CA-000325-MR
GERALD R. WOODEN
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM HARDIN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE KELLY MARK EASTON, JUDGE
ACTION NOS. 05-CR-00566 & 06-CR-00266 & 06-CR-00522
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
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BEFORE: MOORE, NICKELL, AND WINE, JUDGES.
WINE, JUDGE: Gerald R. Wooden, pro se, appeals from an order of the Hardin
Circuit Court which denied his Kentucky Rule of Criminal Procedure (“RCr”)
11.42 motion to vacate his conviction. The trial court found that his allegations of
ineffective assistance of counsel were refuted by the record. Finding no error, we
affirm.
On April 4, 2007, Wooden entered a plea of guilty but mentally ill to
two counts of first-degree sodomy; two counts of first-degree rape; one count of
incest; and seven counts of first-degree sexual abuse. The charges arose from three
separate indictments and were based on allegations involving four children. In
exchange for his guilty plea, the Commonwealth recommended sentences totaling
thirty years’ imprisonment. The trial court imposed this sentence on June 5, 2007.
Thereafter, on December 17, 2008, Wooden filed a motion to set aside
his conviction pursuant to RCr 11.42. In support of his motion, he alleged that his
trial counsel provided ineffective assistance prior to his guilty plea. The trial court
denied the motion on February 2, 2009, finding that the allegations were refuted by
the record.
Wooden requested and was granted the appointment of counsel on this
appeal. However, the Department of Public Advocacy declined to represent him,
stating that the appeal was not a proceeding that a reasonable person with adequate
means would be willing to bring at his own expense. Anders v. State of California,
386 U.S. 738, 744, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967). Kentucky Revised
Statute (“KRS”) 31.110(2)(c). This pro se appeal followed.
Wooden argues that he received ineffective assistance from his trial
counsel. In order to maintain an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a movant
must satisfy a two-part test showing that his counsel's performance was deficient
and that the deficiency caused actual prejudice affecting the outcome of the
proceeding. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064, 80
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L.Ed.2d 674 (1984); Gall v. Commonwealth, 702 S.W.2d 37 (Ky. 1985). The
burden falls on the movant to overcome a strong presumption that counsel's
assistance was constitutionally sufficient. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. at
2065; Commonwealth v. Pelfrey, 998 S.W.2d 460, 463 (Ky. 1999). In cases
involving a guilty plea, the movant must prove that his counsel's deficient
performance so seriously affected the outcome of the plea process that, but for
counsel's errors, there is a reasonable probability that the movant would not have
pleaded guilty but would have insisted on going to trial. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S.
52, 58, 106 S.Ct. 366, 370, 88 L.Ed.2d 203 (1985); Phon v. Commonwealth, 51
S.W.3d 456, 459-60 (Ky. App. 2001).
In particular, Wooden contends that his trial counsel failed to
adequately investigate the evidence and failed to request a competency hearing.
He also contends that the trial court erred by failing to conduct an evidentiary
hearing on his motion. However, an evidentiary hearing is necessary only where
the record does not conclusively refute the allegations in the motion. Fraser v.
Commonwealth, 59 S.W.3d 448, 452 (Ky. 2001). We agree with the trial court that
the record clearly refutes Wooden’s claims.
In his motion before the trial court, Wooden simply made a general
allegation that his trial counsel failed to perform an investigation. As the trial court
correctly noted, a defendant is required to allege specific facts rather than
conclusory allegations in an RCr 11.42 motion. Sanders v. Commonwealth, 89
S.W.3d 380, 385 (Ky. 2002), overruled on other grounds by Leonard v.
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Commonwealth, 279 S.W.3d 151 (Ky. 2009). On appeal, Wooden contends that
his trial counsel failed to adequately investigate the ages of the victims at the time
the offenses were committed.
This issue is not preserved for review. Moreover, Wooden presents
no evidence that a reasonable investigation by trial counsel would have turned up
any mitigating evidence. See Hodge v. Commonwealth, 68 S.W.3d 338, 344 (Ky.
2002). Consequently, we decline to consider the issue further.
Wooden next argues that his trial counsel failed to request a
competency hearing prior to his sentencing. The trial court fully addressed this
issue in its order and we adopt its well-written and reasoned findings.
Wooden also complains that his competency was
not re-addressed at the time of his sentencing. To
address this concern, it is appropriate for the Court to
detail some history of this Court’s consideration of
Wooden’s mental condition. Bailey [Wooden’s trial
counsel] had given notice on behalf of Wooden that there
would be a claim with respect to Wooden’s mental
capacity pursuant to RCr 7.24. The Court ordered a
competency evaluation.
A hearing was conducted on February 20, 2007.
(Tape 07-66; February 20, 2007 at 8:05:30--8:34-20 and
9:21:15--9:39:22). Based upon the expert testimony of
Dr. Noonan, the Court found Wooden to be competent to
stand trial. (The Court’s detailed oral ruling appears at
9:35:05 – 9:39:22). Dr. Noonan explained his diagnosis
of borderline intellectual functioning. Depending upon
the particular measuring test, Wooden had an IQ of
approximately 70. Wooden could be considered as
having mild mental retardation. There is some
suggestion from the testimony of Wooden’s father that
Wooden’s abilities were adversely affected by a
traumatic brain injury in the 1980’s after a motor vehicle
accident. Dr. Noonan recognized Wooden’s particular
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challenges with respect to language skills. Wooden has
deficits in articulation, which are apparent from a review
of his interaction with counsel and the Court during these
proceedings. Even so, Dr. Noonan described Wooden as
“clearly competent.”
The issue of competency was again considered at
the time of the guilty plea on April 4, 2007. The Court
noted the prior testimony of Dr. Noonan as well as the
testimony of Dr. Smith, an expert retained by Bailey to
challenge the reliability of Wooden’s confession. Dr.
Smith’s involvement was limited to that issue, and he did
not offer opinions as to criminal responsibility or
competency to stand trial. His opinions were expressed
during a hearing on a motion to suppress on March 20,
2007. (Tape 07-98 at 15:50:30--16:17:52 and Tape 07104 at 16:18:39--16:26:35).
During the plea, the Court made sure to explain the
questions in detail using less “legal” wording than might
be used in a typical plea. The Court noted that Wooden
was responding appropriately to the questions and saw no
reason to revisit any issue of competency.
Citing KRS 504.140, Wooden argues that he
believes the Court erred in not reassessing competency at
the time of sentencing. Moody v. Commonwealth, 698
S.W.2d 530 (Ky. App. 1985). The application of this
statute must be understood in the context of the entire
chapter. Mental retardation, as defined by KRS
504.060(7), may provide a defense to responsibility.
KRS 504.020(1). It also may be the mental condition
which brings into question competency to stand trial.
Either by trial or a guilty plea, a finding may be made
that a defendant is guilty but mentally ill. KRS 504.130.
KRS 504.140 serves the purpose of insuring that
competency has been evaluated prior to sentencing a
mentally ill person.
The Moody case has been held not to require
successive competency evaluations. See Pate v.
Commonwealth, 769 S.W.2d 46 (Ky. 1989). In
Wooden’s case, the Court had made a determination of
competency approximately six weeks prior to the guilty
plea. The Court determined that there was no need to
revisit the issue of competency at the time of the plea.
No new circumstance was presented to the Court by way
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of Wooden’s conduct or any other information which
would have necessitated another competency evaluation
at the time of sentencing just two months after the plea.
In these circumstances, Wooden is not entitled to relief
because of any failure to revisit competency at the time
of his sentencing.
Accordingly, the order of the Hardin Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Gerald R. Wooden, pro se
LaGrange, Kentucky
Jack Conway
Attorney General of Kentucky
Christian K.R. Miller
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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