KENTUCKY RETIREMENT SYSTEMS VS. BECKNER (ROSIETTA)
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RENDERED: JANUARY 22, 2010; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2009-CA-000315-MR
KENTUCKY RETIREMENT SYSTEMS
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FRANKLIN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE THOMAS D. WINGATE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 06-CI-01244
ROSIETTA BECKNER
APPELLEE
OPINION
REVERSING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: CAPERTON AND STUMBO, JUDGES; KNOPF,1 SENIOR JUDGE.
CAPERTON, JUDGE: The Appellant, Kentucky Retirement Systems, appeals the
February 2, 2009, opinion and order of the Franklin Circuit Court, overruling the
decision of the Disability Appeals Committee of the Board of Kentucky
Retirement Systems (hereinafter the Board), to deny the application of Appellee,
1
Senior Judge William Knopf sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and Kentucky Revised Statutes
(KRS) 21.580.
Rosietta Beckner, for disability retirement benefits pursuant to KRS 61.600, on the
ground that Beckner’s incapacitating mental illness was the direct or indirect result
of her mental condition prior to employment. Having reviewed the record, the
arguments of the parties, and the applicable law, we reverse.
Beckner began working with the Caldwell County School Board on
September 2, 1997. It is undisputed by the parties that Beckner has a mental
illness which has totally and permanently disabled her from employment since her
last day of paid employment on September 20, 2003. At issue between the parties
was whether Beckner’s mental illness is the result of a condition or illness which
pre-existed her employment with the School Board in September of 1997. KERS
asserts that Beckner’s mental illness began in 1995, while Beckner asserts that she
had no mental problems prior to beginning employment with the Board. Beckner
argues that the onset of her mental illness was on November 1, 1998, when she had
a mental breakdown at church.
As noted, Beckner applied for disability retirement benefits from
KERS pursuant to KRS 61.600. Beckner was denied by the KERS Medical
Review Board, and appealed her denial. An administrative hearing was conducted,
and on June 12, 2006, the hearing officer recommended that Beckner’s application
be denied. In so doing, the officer found, among other things, that Beckner had
depression which was totally and permanently disabling, but which pre-dated her
employment with the School Board. Further, the hearing officer found that
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Beckner had neither alleged nor shown that her disability was the result of a single
traumatic event which occurred while she was performing her job duties.
In so finding, the hearing officer also determined that Beckner’s
attempts to establish a 1998 onset date for her depression were insufficient and not
entirely credible. The hearing officer found that records of more than one source
indicated that Beckner herself reported that her depression probably began as early
as 1995, and predated her panic attacks. While acknowledging that the panic
attacks themselves post-dated her employment at the School Board, the hearing
officer found that they were linked to her depression throughout the medical
records and, as previously stated, her depression pre-dated her employment.
Accordingly, the hearing officer found that Beckner failed to meet her burden of
showing that she was totally and permanently disabled within twelve months of her
last day of paid employment in a regular full-time position.
Thereafter Beckner appealed the hearing officer’s denial to the Board.
The Board accepted the hearing officer’s report and recommended order in its
entirety. Beckner then appealed to the Franklin Circuit Court. In appealing to the
circuit court, Beckner disputed the medical records and statements upon which the
hearing officer relied in denying her application. Beckner asserts that statements
she made in May and June of 2002, which dated her depression to 1995, were
made during the course of psychiatric evaluation interviews in which she was
psychotic and hallucinating.
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More specifically, Beckner states that the first record containing the
1995 onset date of depression was that of Dr. David Meyer dated May 31, 2002.
Dr. Meyer had apparently been treating Beckner since February of 2002, after her
admission to a mental hospital for contemplations of suicide. At that time, Dr.
Meyer diagnosed Beckner with chronic major depression. Beckner notes that in
making his diagnosis, Dr. Meyer found that Beckner had once been active in her
church, but that she “had something like a panic attack, and has not been back for 4
to 5 years.”2 In a subsequent report dated May 31, 2002, Dr. Meyer noted that
Beckner’s symptoms “began in 1995 – ‘blacked out at church’ couldn’t move my
arms, and screamed, fighting people, ‘woke up in hospital’”.3 Beckner states that
this was the first mention of a 1995 onset date in any of Beckner’s records.
The second of the records mentioning a 1995 onset date of depression
was from Cumberland Hall Hospital, where Beckner was admitted on June 6,
2002, for psychiatric evaluation following recurrent suicidal attempts and thoughts.
At that time, Beckner was diagnosed with major severe depression, and it was
noted that Beckner had been depressed for “about 6-12 months”, and also, “a long
time, since 1995”, when her daughter was involved with drugs and alcohol.4
Beckner now argues that these two statements were the only evidence in the record
2
See A.R. pp. 30 and 68.
3
See A.R. p. 27.
See A.R. pp. 14-24.
4
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which contained any reference to a possible 1995 onset date for her mental
problems.
Beckner also argued that despite the hearing officer’s finding that she
made insufficient attempts to establish a 1998 onset date for her depression, she
presented substantial evidence that such was the case. Specifically, Beckner states
that she submitted records from the Eddyville Medical Clinic from 1974 to 1998
showing no pre-1998 mental condition, and records from Wyetha Woods, ARNP,
showing that the blackout in church occurred in November of 1998, thereby dating
her first complaint or treatment for mental condition. It also included the
testimony of Becker and her husband, and the testimony of Gail Davis, Beckner’s
former supervisor.5 Further, Beckner submitted a statement from Dr. Meyer,
correcting his previous statement that her mental condition had its onset in 1995,
and confirming that the actual onset date was 1998, as shown by her medical
records and statements from family members.
On the basis of the foregoing evidence, the circuit court reversed the
decision of the Board. In so doing, the court found that Beckner had no preexisting condition, and that the hearing officer’s findings were not supported by
substantial evidence. It is from that decision that KERS now appeals to this Court.
In McManus v. Kentucky Retirement Systems, 124 S.W.3d
454(Ky.App. 2003), this Court held that:
5
Davis testified that she had known Beckner for many years prior to her employment with the
School Board in 1997, and that Beckner was always stable, sweet, and easy to get along with,
and further, that Beckner had a mental breakdown at church which occurred after she began
working for the county.
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Determination of the burden of proof also impacts the
standard of review on appeal of an agency decision.
When the decision of the fact-finder is in favor of the
party with the burden of proof or persuasion, the issue on
appeal is whether the agency’s decision is supported by
substantial evidence, which is defined as evidence of
substance and consequence when taken alone or in light
of all the evidence that is sufficient to induce conviction
in the minds of reasonable people. Where the factfinder’s decision is to deny relief to the party with the
burden of proof or persuasion, the issue on appeal is
whether the evidence in that party’s favor is so
compelling that no reasonable person could have failed to
be persuaded by it.
McManus v. Kentucky Retirement Systems, 124 S.W.3d 454, 458 (Ky.App. 2003).
Further, in Bowling v. Natural Resources, 891 S.W.2d 406 (Ky.App. 1994), we
held that the trier of facts in an administrative agency is afforded great latitude in
its evaluation of the evidence heard and the credibility of witnesses appearing
before it. Indeed, it is the exclusive province of the administrative trier of fact to
pass upon the credibility of witnesses and the weight of the evidence. See 500
Associates, Inc. v. Natural Resources and Environmental Protection Cabinet, 204
S.W.3d 121, 132 (Ky.App. 2006).
The law of this Commonwealth is clear that the circuit court cannot
consider new or additional evidence, nor substitute its judgment as to the
credibility of the witnesses, or the weight of the evidence concerning questions of
fact. See Mill Street Church of Christ v. Hogan, 785 S.W.2d 263 (Ky.App. 1990).
Likewise, this Court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to
the weight of the evidence on questions of fact. See Louisville Edible Oil
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Products, Inc. v. Revenue Cabinet Commonwealth of Kentucky, 957 S.W.2d 272,
273 (Ky.App. 1997).
As established by KRS 13B.090(7), Beckner had the burden to prove
entitlement to the benefits she sought, and she was to do so by a preponderance of
the evidence standard. Thus, according to McManus, the issue on appeal is
whether the evidence in Beckner’s favor is so compelling that no reasonable
person could have failed to be persuaded by it. Stated otherwise, if the agency’s
determination that Beckner failed to meet her burden of proof was supported by
substantial evidence, the circuit court was bound to affirm. See Kentucky Comm’n
on Human Rights v. Fraser, 625 S.W.2d 852 (Ky. 1981).
On appeal, KERS argues that the circuit court misapplied the law
governing judicial review of administrative decisions, and improperly reweighed
the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses in reversing the Board. KERS
asserts that it was the role of the circuit court to review the administrative decision,
and not to reinterpret or reconsider the merits of the claim. More particularly,
KERS argues that the circuit court erred in its finding that “the conclusion that
Petitioner’s disabling depression predated her membership in the CERS is not
supported by substantial evidence.”6 In response, Beckner argues that the court
below correctly determined that the agency’s denial of Beckner’s application for
6
We believe that this issue was troubling to the circuit court in that the circuit court stated twice,
on pp. 3 and 6 of its opinion and order, that the record contained substantial evidence to conclude
that Beckner’s depression predated her employment with the school system, and by stating that
the Board’s decision to deny benefits to Beckner was based upon substantial evidence.
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disability retirement benefits was not supported by substantial evidence, and that it
properly reversed the agency’s decision.
Having reviewed the record in this matter, we are compelled to agree
with KERS. Our review of the circuit court’s order indicates that it failed to
acknowledge the burden Beckner carried on appeal, which was to present such
evidence that her depression and anxiety did not pre-date her employment and that
no reasonable person could believe otherwise. Further, having reviewed the order
in detail, we are of the opinion that the circuit court engaged in an impermissible
reweighing of the evidence in this matter.
Stated simply, the record contains medical evidence from not one, but
two physicians, who state that Beckner’s depression began in 1995. While
Beckner argues that these records should be discredited because they include
statements which she made in a state of hallucination and psychosis, the records
themselves reveal otherwise. Indeed, the records in which Beckner herself
reported the onset of her symptoms in 1995 indicate that at the time, her
intellectual functioning was “within normal limits,” and that she was alert, and
oriented to time, place, person, and situation.
While our review of the record confirms that Dr. Meyer did recant his
statement concerning the onset of Becker’s depression, he did so only after her
application for benefits had been denied.7 Further, our review of the
7
Repeatedly, we have held that the recanted testimony of a trial witness is viewed with
suspicion, and does not normally require the granting of a new trial. Fitzgerald, 8 Ky.Prac. § 933
(1978); and Hensley v. Commonwealth, 488 S.W.338 (Ky. 1972). We view the situation
concerning the medical records of Dr. Meyer in the matter sub judice no differently. Although
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“contemporaneous medical evidence” upon which Dr. Meyer apparently relied in
recanting his statement reveals said evidence is contradictory. Additionally, our
review of the record indicates that there was no evidence submitted to refute Dr.
Bhaghani’s medical record, which contained the same 1995 date of onset as did the
initial record of Dr. Meyer.
Stated simply, it was Beckner’s burden to present evidence that would
persuade a reasonable person that her condition did not pre-exist her employment.
While one could certainly look at the evidence and make the conclusion that her
condition arose after employment, one could also look at the record and conclude
that it arose before her employment. Certainly sufficient evidence exists in the
record for one to argue that Beckner began to experience symptoms of depression
and anxiety in 1995, which was at the time her daughter began having problems
with drugs.
While it is certain that Beckner’s condition progressed over time,
evidence as to the initial date of onset is conflicting. This being the case, it was the
province of the administrative fact-finder to review the evidence, and to make a
determination as to its weight and credibility. This the hearing officer did.
Having reviewed the record, we cannot conclude that the hearing officer erred in
he may have recanted his statement made in his earlier medical records, we consider this as new
or additional evidence, not as evidence which in some manner negates or outweighs the
statements made in the records as initially submitted.
A recanted statement presents the trier of fact with two factual scenarios. The fact that a
witness gave inconsistent statements does present credibility concerns but we must keep a
recanted statement in perspective, it is both a prior inconsistent statement and substantive
evidence. See Shepherd v. Commonwealth, 251 S.W.3d 309 (Ky. 2008).
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assessing the evidence. Accordingly, we are compelled to reverse the circuit court,
and reinstate the previous order of the hearing officer as affirmed by the board.
In so finding, we briefly address the issue raised by the circuit court
considering the severity of Beckner’s condition. We note that in its opinion and
order, the circuit court explained that people use the word depression in a number
of ways which do not rise to the level of clinical depression and are not
permanently disabling. The court relies upon this reasoning in further support of
its finding that Kentucky Retirement Systems should not have relied upon
Beckner’s assertions that she began suffering depression in 1995.
We are of the opinion that the circuit court misinterpreted the
mandates of KRS 61.600. That provision does not require that a condition be
“disabling” prior to the applicant’s employment date in order for the condition to
be considered pre-existing. Certainly, if the condition were already disabling prior
to employment, the employee would likely not have taken the employment in the
first place.
Finally, we address the circuit court’s findings concerning Beckner’s
panic attacks. The circuit court found that none of Beckner’s medical records
indicated that her panic disorder was merely an element of her depression.
However, to the contrary, we note that there is no evidence that the doctors treated
the panic disorder separate from the depression. In fact, contrary to the
“separateness” theory, the record refers to Beckner’s condition as “depression with
panic symptoms” in more than one instance. Thus, we cannot conclude that the
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two conditions were distinctly separate. Further, and critically, we note that there
is no evidence in the record to establish that the panic attacks, in and of themselves
are disabling. Accordingly, even if that condition were found not to be preexisting, benefits could not be awarded on that basis alone.
Wherefore, for the foregoing reasons, we hereby reverse the February
2, 2009, opinion and order of the Franklin Circuit Court, and order that the June
12, 2006, order of the hearing officer be reinstated in its entirety.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Katherine Rupinen
Frankfort, Kentucky
Roy Gray
Frankfort, Kentucky
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