HIGGINBOTHAM (JEROME), ET AL. VS. KEENELAND ASSOCIATION , ET AL.
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RENDERED: JANUARY 29, 2010; 10:00 A.M.
TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2009-CA-000301-MR
JEROME HIGGINBOTHAM;
JEROME HIGGINBOTHAM,
ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE
OF JESSE HIGGINBOTHAM, DECEASED;
JEROME HIGGINBOTHAM, SURVIVING
PARENT OF JESSE HIGGINBOTHAM AND
MERCEDES HOPEWELL; REBECCA WOLOCH,
SURVIVING PARENT OF JESSE HIGGINBOTHAM
AND MERCEDES HOPEWELL
v.
APPELLANTS
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE PAMELA R. GOODWINE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 08-CI-02301
KEENELAND ASSOCIATION AND
COLLEEN MOUREAUX
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
APPELLEES
BEFORE: LAMBERT AND WINE, JUDGES; HARRIS,1 SENIOR JUDGE.
LAMBERT, JUDGE: Appellants are the estate of a passenger killed in an
automobile accident and a passenger injured in that accident. They appeal from
summary judgment entered in favor of Appellee, Keeneland Association, the
employer of the operator of the other vehicle involved in the accident. After
careful review, we affirm.
This case arises from a motor vehicle accident that occurred on April
18, 2007, on Versailles Road in Fayette County, Kentucky. Jesse Higginbotham,
then a high school student at Dunbar High School, was killed in the accident, and
Mercedes Hopewell, also a Dunbar student, was injured. The vehicle in which
they were riding was driven by Colleen Moureaux. A fourth passenger in the
vehicle, Cassandra Hardin, was not injured. The collision occurred when
Moureaux improperly reacted to a flat tire, lost control of her vehicle, and struck a
vehicle owned by Keeneland’s employee, Brad Pinkerton, which was parked on
the shoulder of the road. The Lexington Division of Police performed an extensive
accident reconstruction report and the material facts of the collision are undisputed.
During the spring race meet of 2007, it was Pinkerton’s job to activate
three temporary signs, including the subject sign on Versailles Road, in order to
direct traffic into Keeneland. Keeneland had applied for, and received, an
encroachment permit from the Kentucky Transportation Cabinet to use the
1
Senior Judge William R. Harris, sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the Chief Justice
pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and Kentucky Revised Statutes
(KRS) 21.580.
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temporary signs. These signs were intended to direct traffic into Keeneland and to
show people which gate to enter. Keeneland claims that it abided by all the terms
of the encroachment permit, but Appellants claim on appeal that Keeneland
violated the terms of the permit by having Pinkerton place the signs on the
highway during nonwork hours. Nonetheless, on the morning of the accident,
Pinkerton had parked his 1991 Jeep Grand Wagoneer partly on the shoulder of
westbound Versailles Road, with his two left wheels on the pavement of the
shoulder and his two right wheels in the grass.
That morning Moureaux was driving her vehicle in the middle lane of
westbound Versailles Road toward Dunbar High School when she felt her vehicle
pull to the left. Although Moureaux did not recall hearing a sound, Hopewell
testified that she heard a “pop” associated with this pull and then the vehicle began
swerving back and forth. Moureaux feared her vehicle might strike a vehicle
located in the lane to her left, so she tried to pull the steering wheel to the right.
Hopewell testified that the driver of the vehicle on their left side blew his horn and
that Moureaux managed not to hit that vehicle. Moureaux testified that there was
another vehicle to her right and that she was sandwiched in between the two
vehicles in the middle lane. Intending to move into the emergency lane, Moureaux
put on her brakes and turned her steering wheel to the right to move to the right
lane. Then, her vehicle turned 180 degrees clockwise. She traveled down
Versailles Road backwards at a rate of speed estimated between 55 and 65 miles
per hour and struck the rear of Pinkterton’s parked vehicle.
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Significantly, there were no allegations that Pinkerton’s vehicle was
parked on the shoulder near a blind curve or over the crest of a hill. His vehicle
was parked on a relatively flat portion of Versailles Road in plain view of
Moureaux, who testified that she saw the vehicle. Pinkerton’s vehicle was not
intruding into the traveled portion of Versailles Road, and in fact, two wheels were
in the grass to the right of the shoulder. Pinkerton testified that he had just parked
and exited his vehicle in order to activate the sign when he heard a noise. He then
saw the Moureaux vehicle traveling out of control in his direction and ran up the
embankment to safety. The impact pushed Pinkerton’s vehicle 151 feet, and the
Moureaux vehicle came to rest in the approximate location where Pinkerton’s
vehicle had been. It is not disputed that the shoulder of Versailles Road was
vacant except for the portion occupied by Pinkerton’s vehicle.
Subsequent investigation by the Lexington Division of Police
concluded that the Moureaux vehicle had a “flat tire on the left rear axle” and that
the “improper input of braking and steering” caused her to lose control. The report
stated:
Ms. Moureaux was a young driver with limited driving
experience. When she experienced the flat tire, she
lacked the experience[] or knowledge to properly handle
the hazard. Her response to the hazard was to brake and
steer in an attempt to stabilize her vehicle’s wobbling. . . .
As outlined in this report, the improper input of braking
and steering by Ms. Moureaux caused her to lose control
of her vehicle, in the unstabilized event of the flat tire.
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In her deposition, Moureaux, who had only had her license for about a month at the
time of the accident, admitted that she did not react properly to the blown tire:
Instead of stepping on the brake, which I did, you’re
supposed to tap on it because the sudden stopping is what
will make your car overcorrect even more . . . .I actually
got the little pamphlet—or the little book that they send
you home when you’re getting your driving test and
looked it up.
After a hearing on January 8, 2009, the Fayette Circuit Court entered
summary judgment in favor of Keeneland Association. The Court found that as a
matter of law, Keeneland, through its employee, Pinkerton, did not owe a duty to
Appellants and that even if a duty was owed, Pinkerton’s actions were not the
proximate cause of Appellants’ injuries. This appeal now follows.
The standard of review on appeal when a trial court grants a motion
for summary judgment is “whether the trial court correctly found that there were
no genuine issues as to any material fact and that the moving party was entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” Scifres v. Kraft, 916 S.W.2d 779, 781 (Ky. App.
1996); Palmer v. International Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, 882
S.W.2d 117, 120 (Ky. 1994); Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (CR) 56.03.
“The record must be viewed in a light most favorable to the party opposing the
motion for summary judgment” and all doubts will be resolved in his favor.
Steelvest, Inc. v. Scansteel Service Center, Inc., 807 S.W.2d 476, 480 (Ky. 1991).
Summary judgment is only proper where the “movant shows that the adverse party
could not prevail under any circumstances.” Id. at 480. Consequently, summary
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judgment must be granted only when “it appears impossible for the nonmoving
party to produce evidence at trial warranting a judgment in his favor[.]” Id. at 482.
(Citations omitted).
Appellants argue on appeal that the trial court erred in holding that
Keeneland did not owe a duty of care to Appellants and in finding, as a matter of
law, that Pinkerton’s actions were not the proximate cause of the accident.
Appellants contend in their first argument that Pinkerton’s parking in
the emergency lane of Versailles Road constituted negligence per se. Keeneland
argues, and we agree, that Appellants failed to raise this argument before the trial
court, and therefore it cannot be considered by this court on appeal. Appellants’
Complaint does not assert a claim against Keeneland based on negligence per se.
In response to Keeneland’s motion for summary judgment, Appellants did not
argue that Keeneland should be adjudged negligent per se based on the alleged
violation of certain administrative regulations. Nor did they raise the argument at
the hearing on January 8, 2009. Appellants’ negligence per se argument on appeal
is based on the premise that Keeneland violated certain administrative regulations
(which were not cited to the trial court or otherwise part of Appellants’ argument)
and a provision of the Kentucky Transportation Cabinet Permits Manual
(hereinafter “Permits Manual”), which is not part of the record on appeal but is
nonetheless attached to Appellants’ brief as an Appendix.
Kentucky caselaw is clear that Appellants may not raise new issues
for the first time on appeal. See Regional Jail Authority v. Tackett, 770 S.W.2d
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225, 228 (Ky. 1989) (An appellate court “is without authority to review issues not
raised in or decided by the trial court.”). In Florman v. MEBCO Ltd. P’ship, 207
S.W.3d 593 (Ky. App. 2006), this Court held that claims must be plainly stated in
the complaint and new theories may not be raised on appeal:
CR 8.01 requires that claims to be litigated be plainly
stated. “The scope of review is limited to the theories
upon which the case was tried.” “The Court of Appeals is
one of review and is not to be approached as a second
opportunity to be heard as a trial court. An issue not
timely raised before the circuit court cannot be
considered as a new argument before this Court.”
Id. at 607 (citations omitted). Furthermore, we are not permitted to consider
documents on appeal which were not before the trial court. See CR
76.12(4)(c)(vii). Because Appellants’ negligence per se argument and supporting
documentation was not presented to the trial court, we will not address it on
appeal.
Citing Grayson Fraternal Order of Eagles, Aerie No. 3738, Inc. v.
Claywell, 736 S.W.2d 328 (Ky. 1987), Appellants also argue that Pinkerton had a
duty to refrain from parking on the shoulder of Versailles Road based upon the socalled “universal duty of care.” The Kentucky Supreme Court has determined that
the universal duty of care is “not boundless” and that “[t]he requirement of ‘duty to
all’ is a beginning point for any duty analysis.” See Grand Aerie Fraternal Order
of Eagles v. Carneyhan, 169 S.W.3d 840, 848-849 (Ky. 2005) (internal citations
omitted). Moreover, this Court has directly addressed the issue and held that
“Grayson is cited often by parties advocating a theory of liability or a cause of
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action where none previously existed and legal authority is otherwise lacking.”
Jenkins v. Best, 250 S.W.3d 680, 689 (Ky. App. 2007) (internal citations omitted).
In Grand Aerie, the Kentucky Supreme Court noted that the
“examination must be focused so as to determine whether a duty is owed, and
consideration must be given to public policy, statutory, and common law theories
in order to determine whether a duty existed in a particular situation.” Grand
Aerie, 169 S.W.3d at 849 (citing Fryman v. Harrison, 896 S.W.2d 908, 909 (Ky.
1995). Kentucky law is clear that the “existence of a duty is a matter of law for the
court because ‘when a court resolves a question of duty it is essentially making a
policy determination.’” Ostendorf v. Clark Equip. Co., 122 S.W.3d 530, 533 (Ky.
2003) (internal citation omitted). This Court recently held that the trial court acts
as a gatekeeper for the otherwise extremely broad concept of negligence and must
“consider[] the policy consequences of imposing liability on a certain class of
situations.” Lee v. Farmer’s Rural Elec. Co-op. Corp., 245 S.W.3d 209, 218 (Ky.
App. 2007).
Accordingly, in order to impose a duty of care, the Court must
consider, among other things, whether the harm was foreseeable based on the facts
as viewed by a reasonable person in like or similar circumstances as well as several
other factors including public policy, statutory, and common law theories. See
Fryman, 896 S.W.2d at 909. Here, each of these factors supports the conclusion
that no duty existed and summary judgment in favor of Keeneland was appropriate.
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Appellants argue that the particular harm in this case was foreseeable.
The crux of Appellants’ argument is that “any reasonable person in Pinkerton’s
shoes would have foreseen that occupying the emergency lane on Versailles Road
during morning rush hour created a risk of harm to drivers and their passengers
who were in vehicles traveling on Versailles Road.” As grounds for this argument,
Appellants state that it is generally understood that the emergency lane should be
kept free of traffic so that it is available to other motorists in the event of an
emergency or breakdown.
Kentucky law has long distinguished between events which are
possible and events which are reasonably probable. Kentucky’s highest Court has
held that, “[m]en are not called upon to guard against every risk that they may
conceive as possible but only against what they can forecast as probable.”
Merchants Ice & Cold Storage Co. v. United Produce Co., 279 Ky. 519, 131
S.W.2d 469, 472 (1939). While it was certainly possible that a vehicle could
collide with Pinkerton’s vehicle that morning, it was not reasonably probable that
the temporary parking of Pinkerton’s vehicle on the shoulder of the road would
cause the injuries to Appellants. Pinkerton had a legal right to be parked on the
shoulder, two of his wheels were in the grass, his vehicle was visible to oncoming
motorists, he intended to be parked there for no more than three or four minutes,
and there were miles of shoulder available in the event another vehicle needed
access. Based on these undisputed facts, a reasonable person in Pinkerton’s
position could not have foreseen the injuries sustained by Appellants or that
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Moureaux would lose control to the extent that she could not bring her vehicle to a
complete stop utilizing the portions of the shoulder available to her on that
morning. A driver is “not required to anticipate such negligent inattention on the
part [of another driver].” Frozen Food Marketers v. Feisstreitzer, 335 S.W.2d 896,
897 (Ky. 1960). Accordingly, the Fayette Circuit Court appropriately found the
accident at issue in this case was not foreseeable to Pinkerton when he stopped to
briefly activate the sign.
Appellants also argue that Kentucky statutory law creates a duty on
behalf of Keeneland, through its employee, Pinkerton, to refrain from parking on
the shoulder of the road, which they call the emergency lane. Appellants cite to
KRS 189.450(3), which states, in relevant part:
No vehicle shall be parked, stopped, or allowed to stand
on the shoulders of any toll road, interstate highway, or
other fully controlled access highway, including ramps
thereto, nor shall any vehicle registered at a gross
weight of over forty-four thousand (44,000) pounds be
parked, stopped, or allowed to stand on the shoulders
of any state-maintained highway . . . .
(Emphasis added). Appellants concede that Versailles Road is not a toll road,
interstate highway, or other fully controlled access highway and yet still ask this
Court to rely upon KRS 189.450(3) to impose a duty of care on Keeneland. This
argument is not reasonable. KRS 189.450(3) prohibits parking on the shoulder of
certain highways, but given that Versailles Road is not a toll road, interstate, or
limited access highway, KRS 189.450(3) does not apply to the facts of this case.
Furthermore, Pinkerton’s vehicle weighed approximately 6,000 pounds, and thus
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the prohibition against vehicles weighing over 44,000 pounds also does not apply
or establish a duty on behalf of Keeneland. Stated simply, the Kentucky legislature
has specifically considered under what circumstances vehicles should be prohibited
from parking on the shoulder of the road, and the Legislature limited those
roadways to toll roads, interstate highways, and fully controlled access roads.
Given that the legislature could have included the terminology “all roadways” and
chose not to, we will not read that language into the statute. Accordingly,
Pinkerton did not violate a statutory duty of care by temporarily parking on the
shoulder of Versailles Road.
Appellants also suggest that KRS 189.290(1) may create a statutory
duty of care. That statute states, in pertinent part: “[t]he operator of any vehicle
upon a highway shall operate the vehicle in a careful manner, with regard for the
safety and convenience of pedestrians and other vehicles upon the highway.”
The statute is clear that it applies to an “operator” of a vehicle upon a highway.
Given that Pinkerton’s vehicle was parked on the shoulder of the road and that he
was outside his vehicle at the time of the accident, this statute does not impose a
duty of care on behalf of Keeneland, and Appellants’ argument to the contrary
fails.
Similarly, no common law duty existed for Pinkerton to refrain from
parking on the shoulder of Versailles Road. Appellants argue that the “emergency
lane” is for emergencies only and that Pinkerton had a duty not to park his vehicle
on the shoulder unless it was for emergency purposes. However, there is simply
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no authority for the proposition that the shoulder of Versailles road is reserved
exclusively for emergency purposes. Drivers may stop on the shoulder for many
purposes, including, but not limited to, attending to a sick child or reading a map.
In this case, Pinkerton parked his vehicle for three to four minutes to activate a
temporary sign, for which Keeneland had an encroachment permit. His use of the
shoulder was not prohibited by any statute or law. Nor was the harm that ensued a
foreseeable risk of harm to the Appellants. Therefore, the trial court properly held
that there was no common law duty for Pinkerton to refrain from using the
shoulder of the roadway to activate the signs.
Public policy considerations also support a determination that
Pinkerton did not have a duty to refrain from parking on the shoulder of the road.
The Kentucky Transportation Cabinet granted Keeneland an encroachment permit
for the placement of a temporary directional sign. Common sense supports the
notion that Pinkerton should be able to park his vehicle on the shoulder of
Versailles Road for three to four minutes in order to activate the sign authorized by
the Department of Transportation. Indeed, the encroachment permit states, “all
work necessary in shoulder or ditch line areas of a state highway is to be scheduled
to be promptly completed so that hazards adjacent to the traveled-way are kept to
an absolute minimum.” Since Pinkerton testified that he was able to activate the
sign in no more than three to four minutes, his work on the shoulder was “promptly
completed” as required by the permit.
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Further, Appellants argue that the permit required that “the right-ofway shall be left free and clear of equipment, material, and vehicles during nonworking hours.” Working hours were defined in the permit as being “between the
hours of 9:00 a.m. and 3:30 p.m.” Appellants argue that Pinkerton’s use of the
shoulder to place the sign at 7:30 a.m. (the time in which the accident occurred)
violated the terms of the encroachment permit. We disagree. A careful review of
the attached permit reflects that the above referenced “working hours” only apply
when it is necessary to block a traveled-lane of a state highway. As Pinkerton was
not blocking any traveled-lanes of highway and was instead placing a message
board on the shoulder of Versailles Road, he did not violate the terms of the
encroachment permit. There is simply no evidence that Pinkerton or Keeneland
violated the terms of the permit granted them by the Department of Transportation,
nor that they unreasonably completed the activation of the signs the permit
allowed. Thus, public policy considerations also favor a determination that
Pinkerton did not have a duty to refrain from parking on the shoulder of the road.
Finally, even assuming that the Appellants could somehow prove that
Pinkerton and Keeneland owed a legal duty to refrain from parking on the shoulder
of the roadway, Appellants cannot establish that Pinkerton’s actions and/or
inactions were a substantial factor in bringing about the collision. “[I]t is not
enough that the harm would not have occurred had the actor not been negligent,”
but the negligence must be a substantial factor in bringing about the harm.
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Pathways, Inc. v. Hammons, 113 S.W.3d 85, 92 (Ky. 2003) (citing the Restatement
(Second) of Torts § 431 comment (a) (1965)).
Thus, it is not sufficient for the Appellants to establish that Moureaux
would not have struck Pinkerton’s vehicle had it not been located on the shoulder
of the road. The Appellants must also establish that the location of Pinkerton’s
vehicle was a “substantial factor” in bringing about the collision and resulting
harm. This they simply cannot do. There is not any evidence to support the notion
that the location of Pinkerton’s vehicle was a substantial factor in bringing about
the collision. It is undisputed that Moureaux lost control of her vehicle because
she improperly reacted to a flat tire. The location of Pinkerton’s vehicle had
absolutely nothing to do with that fact. Appellants suggest that the location of
Pinkerton’s vehicle may have influenced Moureaux. However, Moureaux’s
testimony on this subject belies this argument, as she testified that she does not
place any blame on Pinkerton and in fact instead stated she improperly reacted to
the flat tire, in contravention of her drivers’ manual instructions. Thus, as a matter
of law, Pinkerton was not a substantial factor in causing the collision. See Pence v.
Sprinkles, 394 S.W.2d 945, 947 (Ky. 1965) (“Proximate cause becomes a question
of law when . . . there is no dispute about the essential facts of causation, and but
one conclusion may be reasonably drawn from the evidence.”) (Citations omitted).
Appellants argue that they can establish proximate cause because
“[b]ut for the location of Pinkerton’s vehicle in the emergency lane, the collision
would not have occurred and [Moureaux’s] vehicle would have come to a stop
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safely on the grass berm.” This argument is contrary to the facts and Kentucky
precedent, as set forth in Estate of Wheeler v. Veal Realtors & Auctioneers, Inc.,
997 S.W.2d 497 (Ky. App. 1999). In Wheeler, the driver of a truck collided with a
tree located near the roadway, resulting in his death. Id. at 498. It was undisputed
that the tree encroached on the roadway in violation of KRS 177.106 and that the
property owner had been ordered by the Department of Highways to remove the
tree. Id. It was further undisputed that the accident occurred when the driver lost
control of his truck and collided with the tree. Id. Like the Appellants in the
instant case, the Estate in Wheeler argued that the tree was physically part of the
collision and resulting injury and, further, that the accident would not have
occurred but for the location of the tree in violation of the statute. Id. at 499. The
trial court rejected this theory based on the fact that the accident would have
occurred regardless of the location of the tree; i.e., the fact that the driver lost
control of his vehicle had nothing to do with the location of the tree. Id.
This Court affirmed, holding:
When the original negligence is remote and only
furnishes the occasion of the injury, it is not the
proximate cause thereof.
....
[T]he accident[ was] directly attributable to other
negligent acts and [was] not proximately caused by the
statutory violations. In other words, the failure to remove
the tree did not cause Wheeler’s accident, as it would
have occurred absent [the] statutory violation.
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Id. at 499 (citations omitted). Similarly, Pinkerton’s vehicle parked on the
shoulder of the road did not cause the accident; the accident was caused by
Moureaux’s negligence and her improper reaction to the flat tire and would have
occurred absent Pinkerton using the shoulder to activate Keeneland’s sign.
Further, the photographs of the scene document that Moureaux’s
vehicle was headed toward a very steep earth berm at the time it impacted
Pinkerton’s vehicle. It is undisputed that Moureaux’s vehicle was traveling
backwards and out of control at a rate of speed estimated to be in the range of 55
m.p.h. to 65 m.p.h. Considering these facts, it simply cannot be argued that the
vehicle would have come to a stop safely on the grass berm. To the contrary, the
facts indicate that the vehicle was out of control, traveling at a high rate of speed,
and would have collided with whatever was in its path had Pinkerton not been
there—either the temporary sign, the steep earth berm, or both. Accordingly, the
Fayette Circuit Court properly found that Pinkerton’s vehicle being parked on the
shoulder of the roadway was not the proximate cause of Appellants’ injuries.
In conclusion, we do not find the existence of any duty on behalf of
Keeneland, or its employee, Pinkerton, to refrain from parking on the shoulder of
Versailles Road. Keeneland was not negligent, nor was there any statutory,
common law, or universal duty of care to prohibit Pinkerton from briefly parking
to activate a sign for which he had a permit to activate. The ensuing accident was
not reasonably foreseeable, nor does public policy indicate that Pinkerton had such
a duty not to park on the shoulder. Finally, Pinkerton’s actions were not the
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proximate cause of the Appellants’ injuries, as the proximate cause of this accident
was Moureaux’s failure to properly react to a flat tire. Accordingly, we affirm the
January 27, 2009, order of the Fayette Circuit Court granting summary judgment to
Keeneland in its entirety.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANTS:
Stephen M. O’Brien, III
Lexington, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE,
KEENELAND ASSOCIATION:
Perry M. Bentley
Lucy A. Pett
Lexington, Kentucky
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